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Contesting Narratives of Progress in Modernist Literature: 
Robert Walser, Paul Scheerbart, and Joseph Roth 
Vincent Hessling 
 
Telling technology explores how modernist literature makes sense of technological change by 
means of narration. The dissertation consists of three case studies focusing on narrative texts 
by Robert Walser, Paul Scheerbart, and Joseph Roth. These authors write at a time when a 
crisis of ‘progress,’ understood as a basic concept of history, coincides with a crisis of narra-
tion in the form of anthropocentric, action-based storytelling. Through close readings of 
their technographic writing, the case studies investigate how the three authors develop alter-
native forms of narration so as to tackle the questions posed by the sweeping technological 
change in their day. Along with a deeper understanding of the individual literary texts, the 
dissertation establishes a theoretical framework to discuss questions of modern technology 
and agency through the lens of narrative theory. 
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Toward a Narratology of Technological Change 
“Technik ist Prozess”—“technology is process.” (Bense 1998, 172). I decided to take this lapidary 
statement by the philosopher Max Bense as a starting point for my reflections, because it helps bring 
across two central points of this dissertation: the view of technology as a process informs both the 
selection of the literary texts I investigate and my methodological approach to them.1 I chose to 
examine ‘technographic’2 prose by Robert Walser, Paul Scheerbart, and Joseph Roth, because these 
authors decidedly engage with the ‘process properties’ (Hans Jonas)3 of modern technology.4 They 
reveal technology as an all-encompassing dynamic of change, which at the same time poses particular 
challenges to narration as a technique of literary worldmaking, or poiesis. 
                                                   
1 With such a processual approach to technology I am in good company, especially among more recent scholarship 
concerning this subject. Cf., besides Max Bense and Hans Jonas: Gilbert Simondon’s Du mode d’existence des objets 
techniques (Simondon 2001), Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and Time (Stiegler 1994), Bruno Latour We have Never Been 
Modern (Latour 1993) and An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence (Latour 2013), Dirk Baecker’s essay “Technik und 
Entscheidung” (Baecker 2011), and N. Katherine Hayles “Komplexe Zeitstrukturen lebender und technischer Wesen” 
(Hayles 2011).  
2 In a primary meaning I use this expression to simply designate writings focusing on technology. In a secondary, 
tentative understanding, the expression could emphasize the fact that these texts, in their reflexivity, are written ‘through 
technology,’ i.e. from the standpoint of an inherently technological condition. With this dissertation, I decided to 
highlight the primary meaning. Viewing the literary texts as technographic in the latter sense would have lead to a more 
media-theoretical reading—an approach that has been explored extensively by literary scholarship of the recent decades. 
By approaching the relationship of literature and technology from a different angle I hope to establish a more direct 
entry point to questions of technology and agency. 
3 Partly in line with Bense’s view of technology, Hans Jonas argues that the ‘process properties’ are what sets apart 
modern technology from its pre-modern equivalents: “We are concerned with characteristics of modern technology and 
therefore ask first what distinguishes it formally from all previous technology. One major distinction is that modern 
technology is an enterprise and process, whereas earlier technology was a possession and a state.” (Jonas 1979, 34) 
4 In the context of this dissertation, the emphasis on modern technology as a process should not be understood as an 
ontological statement. If the dichotomy between structure and process rests on the assumption that the former implies 
reversibility while the latter implies irreversibility (Müller 2016, “Lust und Schrecken. Beobachtungen zu Friedrich 
Nietzsches ‘Die Geburt der Tragödie,’” 72), then it takes both concepts to construct a full picture of historical reality. If 
this dissertation focuses on the processual aspects of modern technology, this is simply a methodological choice to gain a 
better understanding of the agentic and irreversible dimension of this phenomenon. 
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In this vein, I approach these texts in three exploratory case studies from the angle of an 
exemplary narratology of technological change. This is to say that I take technology as more than 
just a motif or a set of objects represented by literature in the sense of ‘thematic history’ or 
‘Motivgeschichte’. To be sure, the literary texts in question deal with concrete technological objects, 
such as the airplane, the washing machine, the perpetual motion machine, or an automatic invalid 
chair. I argue, however, that the texts always link their depictions of such devices with more general 
concerns: They contain literary imaginations about how technological change occurs as a process and 
how different representations of this process impact history, as well as modes of temporality and 
agency.5 The main focus of the three case studies thus lies on a formal level—on the different 
narrative forms in which technological change appears in literature, rather than on the concrete 
technologies or their historical contextualization. That said, a historical contextualization will be 
necessary to accomplish an in-depth understanding of the texts on a formal level, and is a welcome 
benefit of this project. 
In approaching modern technology through the lens of literary fiction, this dissertation is 
mindful of the boom of scholarship concerning technology in the fields of literary and cultural 
studies that began in the 1980s and has continued through the recent decades. German literary 
studies deserves particular recognition for bridging the great divide between the ‘two cultures’ that 
C.P. Snow had found fault with in his seminal 1959 Rede Lecture (Snow 1998). To name just a few 
                                                   
5 This is in line with Harro Segeberg’s approach, who views technology decidedly not as a mere thing represented in 
literary works: “Ich interessiere mich für literarische Figuren oder Ding-Symbole (wie Brücken oder Tunnelbauten) also 
nur dort, wo deren Darstellung und Rezeption ein globales Einstellungsmuster zu Technik erkennen lassen.” (Segeberg 
1987, Literarische Technik-Bilder. Studien zum Verhältnis von Technik- und Literaturgeschichte im 19. und frühen 20. 
Jahrhundert, 7–8). Segeberg thus extended his epistemic interest beyond the narrow scope of a thematic history 
(German: Motivgeschichte). In doing so, he set the foundations for a sustainable research project which he would later 
continue under the same premises with his books about Literatur im technischen Zeitalter (Segeberg 1997) and Literatur 
im Medienzeitalter (Segeberg 2003). 
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examples: Friedrich Kittler has contextualized literature within a greater network of media-
technologies, or ‘Aufschreibesysteme’ (Kittler 1990; Kittler 1993; Kittler 1999); Harro Segeberg 
investigated comprehensively how modern literature has formed itself always already in a challenging 
interplay with technological modernity (Segeberg 2003; Segeberg 1997; Segeberg 1987, Literarische 
Technik-Bilder. Studien zum Verhältnis von Technik- und Literaturgeschichte im 19. und frühen 20. 
Jahrhundert; Segeberg 1987, Technik in der Literatur); and Helmut Müller-Sievers traced the 
narrative patterns of Realist literature, as well as the patterns of its production and consumption, 
back to one prominent geometric figure and its various technological applications in the age of 
kinematics (Müller-Sievers 2012, The Cylinder. Kinematics of the Nineteenth Century). The present 
dissertation is greatly indebted to all the path-breaking works illuminating the relationship between 
literature and technology, but it distinguishes itself with one central point: By viewing technology 
decidedly as a process of change, whose temporal form is not only represented but also continuously 
reshaped by narrative discourse, the present dissertation assigns to literature a primary role. It neither 
reduces the literary texts to secondary representations of present, past, or future technologies 
(Motivgeschichte or thematic history);6 nor does it view them as delightful and challenging arrays of 
data, to be processed by an ever-evolving network of media technologies (as nodes in a network of 
Aufschreibesysteme, or discourse networks).7 Instead, the three following case studies stress the literary 
                                                   
6 Some examples of such thematic histories of technology as a motif in (German) literature are Felix Phillip Ingold’s 
Literatur und Aviatik. Europäische Flugdichtung 1909-1927 (Ingold 1978), Tessy Korber’s Technik in der Literatur der 
frühen Moderne (Korber 1998), and Gerhard Rademacher’s Das Technik-Motiv in der Literatur und seine didaktische 
Relevanz (Rademacher 1981). 
7 Friedrich Kittler was the unchallenged progenitor of this tech-savvy derivative of discourse analysis. Originally from 
within the field of German studies, Kittler interconnected (what since around 1800 has been called) literature with an 
ever-evolving network of media technologies, which he referred to as ‘Aufschreibesysteme’ (English translation: discourse 
networks) (Kittler 1990). His desired goal was to critically describe literature (and culture) as a system, i.e. from without, 
rather than with an affirmative approach of immanent interpretation.  
Kittler’s historiography of media technologies can thus be understood as an update of Foucault’s discourse analysis to the 
‘high tech’ level of the second (media-technological) industrial revolution. This epistemological framework treats 
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texts in question as idiosyncratic attempts at narrating technological change. An in-depth 
observation of their narrative forms, so I hope, might promote a deeper understanding of how 
modern technology can be conceptualized as an emergent, and yet alterable, process of change. 
The conventional way of narrating technological change in modern times is by integrating it 
within a horizon of progress. Harking back to the Age of Enlightenment, the modern notion of 
progress originally integrated scientific and technological advances into the greater teleological 
framework of moral and social progress. In this form, ‘progress’ had two sides: the enabling, 
cumulative enterprise of science and technology on the one hand, and the postulated or desired 
improvement of the human condition on the other hand—the latter being partly viewed as an 
intended result of the former (Nisbet 1994, 5–6). In the course of the nineteenth century, however, 
these two sides of progress appear increasingly detached from one another, while technological and 
scientific progress seem to gain the upper hand. Toward the turn of the twentieth century, then, the 
advancement of inventions and discoveries is ever more often viewed as the actual realization of 
progress.8 
When applied to technological change, ‘progress’ is associated with the following three 
assumptions: first, the concept rests on the teleological premise that technology and its innovation 
                                                                                                                                                                    
literature as a technology among other technologies. It comes with a clear bias toward media technologies, which 
certainly has great persuasive power in the age of digital information and communication. However, by excavating the 
enabling conditions of culture and intellectual history on a level of media technology, Kittler’s media historiography 
seems oblivious of two things: firstly, that not all technology is media technology; and secondly, that questions of agency 
and possible intervention become ineffable if the following assertion remains uncontested: “daß Menschen die 
Informationsmaschinen nicht erfunden haben können, sondern sehr umgekehrt ihre Subjekte sind” (my translation: 
“that humans can’t have been the inventors of the IT machines, but, very conversely, they are their subjects”) (Kittler 
1993, 77). 
8 The physicist Edmund Reitlinger, for instance, writes in the 1870s in a popular scientific essay: “Immer mehr bricht die 
Ueberzeugung sich Bahn, daß Erfindungen und Entdeckungen die eigentlichen Errungenschaften der Menschheit sind. 
Socialer und politischer Fortschritt ist nur ihre Wirkung und Folge. Die neueste Geschichtschreibung steht schon auf 
diesem Standpunkte. Auch der Heroenkultus der Völker beginnt diese Ansicht zu manifestieren.” (Reitlinger 1877, 
229). 
 5 
serves in some way as an instrument or tool; second, technological progress commonly stands under 
the premises of anthropocentrism, driven by human agency, and ultimately to the benefit of the 
human species; and third, the idea of technological progress has the normative implication that every 
increment of innovation is ultimately a step toward improvement. 
As a general ‘form of emplotment’9 to make sense of technological change, progress remains 
common sense to this day, even though a number of great minds, reaching from Friedrich Nietzsche 
through Karl Kraus down to Jean-François Lyotard, among many others, have questioned its 
structural value and validity as a grand récit. Although this criticism expressed by philosophers, 
scholars, and intellectuals has redefined historical thought on a theoretical level within most 
academic fields10, it has remained an effective imperative determining most aspects of modern life 
(Bouveresse 2011). And the ongoing push for technological innovation—expressed by politicians 
and business representatives alike—is certainly the most palpable form of this imperative. In order to 
understand the criticism of progress, one must first grasp its place and function in modern societies 
and in what way it still serves as a unifying idea, even after various attempts at its deconstruction by 
theory. 
The German historian Reinhart Koselleck includes ‘Fortschritt’ or ‘progress’ among the 
‘geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’ or ‘basic concepts of history.’ As such a basic concept, Koselleck 
argues, the idea of ‘progress’ emerged with the beginning of the Modern Age—around 1800—in a 
formation process from a plurality of various ‘progresses’ to a collective singular describing the 
unified dynamic of (world) history as such (historia ipsa). In this shape, progress co-constitutes 
                                                   
9 This expression is roughly based on Hayden White’s coinage of ‘modes of emplotment.’ White names romance, 
comedy, tragedy, and satire as the four extant modes of nineteenth century historiography. But unlike White’s ‘modes of 
emplotment,’ progress, as a ‘form of emplotment’ does not predetermine the structure of an entire plot, with beginning, 
middle, and end, but rather an open-ended form, a direction. 
10 Think of post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-colonialist theories, and post-growth economics, among others. 
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history in its modern, temporal shape. In my own words, inspired by Hayden White, progress is the 
form of emplotment of modern history. This means that history progresses, or is thought to progress, 
even if there is decline or the impression of standstill at a given point in time. Despite the above-
mentioned array of progress criticism, I argue, this collective singular has not been fully replaced to 
this day in its role of serving as a unifying guideline for all human endeavors. 
Even though Koselleck rightly notices a clear move from a plurality of progresses to progress 
as such, modern thinking has always been defined by a clear distinction—if not hierarchy—of 
different types of progress. The advancement of knowledge (scientific progress) and of technological 
potential (or civilizational progress)–although the latter more than the former—generally figure as 
instrumental to a general moral progress that has its ultimate purpose in the betterment of the 
human condition (Nisbet 1994). This foundational hierarchy of the three types is crucial to the 
(original) modern notion of progress and in this way it co-determines the modern idea of history as 
such.  
In the course of the Modern Age, however, technological progress has been perceived as 
increasingly independent of general human progress. It has appeared to be gradually overtaking the 
latter in the form of industry, technization of the lifeworld, and by forming an ever-closer alliance 
with the progress of knowledge—in the shape of modern science. Koselleck recognizes this temporal 
and causal bifurcation11 as the inherent aporia of progress: 
Auch im 19. Jahrhundert war die Beteuerung üblich, daß Technik und Industrie in geometrischer Reihe 
forteilen, die Moral aber in arithmetischer Reihe nachhinke. Es ist diese Differenz, die offenbar seit Anbeginn 
zum Fortschritt gehört und seine Aporie ausmacht [!], daß er selber nicht einholen kann, was er ausgelöst hat, 
                                                   
11 Koselleck calls it a “Differenz” or “difference”. 
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oder anders gewendet, daß die Planung des Fortschritts nie jene Richtung einhalten kann, in der sich der 
‘Fortschritt selber’ über die Köpfe der Beteiligten hinweg vollzieht. (Koselleck 2006, 181)12 
The aporia described here strikingly resembles a recurring motif in technological criticism 
that social scientist Langdon Winner addresses as the trope of “autonomous technology” in a book-
length essay first published in 1977 under the same title. Winner critiques the widely held view that 
technology has become autonomous or has gotten out of control in that it has never been a neutral 
tool to begin with.13 His argument suggests that the impression of human powerlessness vis-à-vis 
modern technology arises from an over-simplified interpretation of the phenomenon. In the work of 
the historian of technology Lewis Mumford, for instance, Winner sees a move from an empirical, 
object-oriented historiography of technology toward a focus on questions of agency.14 Inspired by 
this move, Winner argues for a shift in attention from a positive history of technology to an 
investigation of the foundational notions of agency that determine our understanding and our 
engagement with technology. If, according to Koselleck, progress is a basic concept of history and at 
the same time determined by the above-described aporia, then the ‘foundational notions of agency’ 
also lie at the basis of the modern concept of history. 
Where a given technology—be it a technique, a process, or a device 15 —is generally 
understood as an instrument to human ends, the continuous advancement and perfection of such 
                                                   
12 “In the nineteenth century, too, it was common to assert that technology and industry hurry on in a geometrical 
sequence, whereas morality lags behind in an arithmetical sequence. This difference belongs to progress from the start, 
amounting to its aporia: it can never catch up with what it has actuated; or, in other words, the aporia implies that the 
planning of progress can never maintain the direction in which ‘progress itself’ sweeps over the heads of the ones 
involved.” (My translation). 
13  “Is technology a neutral tool to human ends? No longer can an affirmative answer be given without severe 
qualifications.” (Winner 1977, 29). 
14 “Lewis Mumford began his career by inquiring into purely factual aspects of technological change and ended with the 
question, What does technology have to do with not being free? It seems to me that this, rather than purely empirical or 
historical topics, is the urgent subject at present.” (Winner 1977, 46). 
15 Langdon Winner in fact suggests distinguishing four different forms in which technology manifests itself in the life 
world: as apparatus, as technique, as organization, or as network (Winner 1977, 11–2). 
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technology must be viewed as instrumental to the improvement of the human condition. In this 
vein, the modern notion of technological progress is a temporal extension of a common 
understanding of technology as a mere tool; this is what I referred to as the ‘teleological assumption’ 
of technological progress. Koselleck’s ‘aporia of progress’ thus ultimately comes down to an aporia of 
the instrumental or prosthetic notion of technology.16 
Both the above-described hierarchy of progress and the instrumental or prosthetic notion of 
technology imply that humans are the protagonists and primary agents of history; this is what I 
labeled the ‘anthropocentric assumption.’ In a slightly exaggerated version of this notion of history, 
the modern idea of progress is a temporal projection of the instrumental understanding of 
technology. Theorists and practitioners of history generally hold the view that our age promotes a 
post- or non-teleological view of history.17 In contrast to this, I argue that the instrumental notion of 
technology—and its temporal extension: technological progress—is in fact one last remnant of a 
historical teleology. The imperative of progress summons all humans to collectively work toward the 
betterment of the human condition, with the advancement of knowledge (i.e. science) and of 
technology as being instrumental for this betterment. This is what I labeled the ‘normative 
assumption’ of technological progress. According to Koselleck, modern historical thought is 
characterized by the idea of a generally open future (Koselleck 1995). I argue, however, that the 
                                                   
16 Concerning the notion of a prosthetic technology and the idea of cybernetics as its successor cf. Erich Hörl’s essays 
“Die technologische Bedingung. Zur Einführung.” (Hörl 2011), “Die offene Maschine. Heidegger, Günther und 
Simondon über die Technologische Bedingung.” (Hörl 2008), as well as the interview with Hörl by Marita Tatari: “Die 
technologische Sinnverschiebung. Orte des Unermesslichen.” (Hörl and Tatari 2014). 
17 The following passage from the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosphy is a striking example: “History, according to 
genealogists, is not teleological (as it is for Hegel). They cannot identify a goal of a historical process, and then go on to 
show how it gradually emerged from its embryonic beginnings. Rather, they chart the processes that, by contingent 
confluence, produce a contemporary result. Hence the metaphor: no individual is the goal of a family history. Rather, a 
family is a vast fabric of relationships, and any one individual represents only one among many confluences of past lines 
of descent.” (Hill 1998, 1). Regarding genealogy as a theory option for the humanities, also cf. Harro Müller’s essay 
Genealogie als Herausforderung (Müller 2016, “Genealogie als Herausforderung”). 
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status of progress as a basic concept of history is at the same time a residue of a teleological notion of 
historical change. If history (historia ipsa) is understood as a continued process of change and the 
demand to turn this change into a long-term improvement of the human condition remains an 
effective imperative, then the above-noted hierarchy of progress—even though it poses an aporia—
must be described as a last remnant of teleology in the modern understanding of history. 
Literature and theory around the turn of the twentieth century increasingly challenge the 
teleological remnant present in the notion of progress, as it clashes with an ever-accelerating 
technization of the lifeworld. Technological progress, it often seems, rather restricts the range of 
action instead of actually extending it. In such a setting, the notion of history whose protagonists or 
agents are humans and whose course is thought to be an increase of agency (German 
‘Handlungsspielraum’) must increasingly lose its credibility. 18  The above-described ‘aporia of 
progress’ causes another problem concerning the modern understanding of history, while the 
instrumental notion of technology is entering a crisis: technology appears to acquire autonomy. 
Modern history is an inherently narrative phenomenon (Paul Ricœur, Hayden White, Albrecht 
Koschorke) and narrative appears to be inherently anthropomorphic (Paul Ricœur, Albrecht 
Koschorke). Against this backdrop, Walter Benjamin’s diagnosis of a waning of storytelling (and the 
underlying crisis of human experience) could be seen in direct relation to the other two aporias—the 
one of progress and the one of technology. The technographic literature I investigate in this 
dissertation tackles the described triple ensemble of historiographical problems (of technology, of 
progress, and of narrative) as a challenge to the form and practice of narrative literature. All three 
                                                   
18 We can distinguish a fundamental (ontological or epistemological) critique of progress, as expressed by writers such as 
Nietzsche, Kraus, and Lyotard) from a critique of progressivism, i.e. of the belief that technological and scientific 
progress (will ultimately) improve the human condition. 
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authors I focus on link their literary approaches to the phenomena of technization with questions of 
how to integrate it into a narrative continuum. As modern technological reality appears to challenge 
conventional notions of human agency (within history), the inherent anthropomorphism of 
narrative (Ricœur, Koschorke) poses a challenge not only to the literary practice of those authors, 
but also to a theoretical occupation with their texts. 
A partial homonomy connects the concepts of ‘action’ and ‘plot’ in many languages—think 
of the German words ‘Handlung’ and ‘Handeln,’ the English ‘action,’ or ancient Greek ‘agein’ and 
‘diegesis’. Such homonomies predetermine the inherent anthropomorphism of narrative cognition 
and communication. According to Albrecht Koschorke, one important function of narration and 
storytelling (German ‘Erzählen’) lies in the assimilation of the world to human experience by 
integrating it into practical and symbolic contexts.19 This inherent anthropomorphism, I argue, is 
grounded not so much in the nature of narrative itself, but rather in the assumptions guiding the 
theoretical approach to literary narratives, or more concretely, in the narratological notions of 
agency, plot, and event. In other words, if we put aside the anthropomorphic assumption, we face a 
whole (potential) field of trans-human narratives.20 
                                                   
19 “Das Erzählen trägt demnach Sinn in die Welt, versieht ihren Lauf mit Absichten und Zielen, bevölkert sie mit 
anthropomorphen Akteuren, bringt sie überhaupt erst in eine intelligible Form und verwandelt sie so den Menschen an 
[!], die sich in ihr nicht nur praktisch, sondern auch symbolisch einrichten müssen.” (Koschorke 2012, 11). 
20 By ‘trans-human’ I mean any sort of agency that defies a clear attribution to human or anthropomorphic characters as 
well as notions of linear, intention-based actions. 
Regarding the diverse notions of post-human/post-humanist, and trans-human/trans-humanist cf. Hayles, N. Katherine. 
How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago, Ill.: University Of 
Chicago Press, 1999. Print and Winner, Langdon. “Are Humans Obsolete?” The Hedgehog Review 4.3 (2002): 25–44. 
Print. Hayles suggests that the separation of our bodily existence from a ‘purely cognitive’ handling of signifiers is the 
decisive step toward the ‘post-human’: “As you gaze at the flickering signifiers scrolling down the computer screens, no 
matter what identifications you assign to the embodied entities that you cannot see, you have already become 
posthuman.” (Hayles 1999, xiv). By no means should my usage of the word ‘trans-human’ be associated or confused 
with the ideological movement of ‘transhumanism’ or ‘Humanity 2.0,’ whose advocates propagate “the indefinite 
promotion of the qualities that have historically distinguished humans from other creatures, which amount to our 
seemingly endless capacity for self-transcendence, our ‘god-like’ character, if you will.” (Fuller and Lipinska 2014, 1). In 
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Modern literature and theory have been exploring this trans-human (non-anthropomorphic) 
space of narratives both within and beyond the realm of fiction for centuries. Gilbert Simondon’s 
1958 dissertation Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Simondon 2001), for instance, is one of 
the first and most profound attempts at constructing narratives of technological genealogy beyond 
traditional, human-centered mythologies of invention. Simondon’s work defies a conventional 
assumption that technological change equals progress whereas biological change equals evolution. 
Similar projects appear in the works of André Leroi-Gourhan and Bruno Latour (actor-network-
theory; recently: the Mode d’existence project), and in the works of Bernard Stiegler and Erich Hörl. 
Predating such scholarly engagements with the temporal structure of technological change, 
the literary texts I investigate explore the same space (of narratives about technology change) while 
re-thinking (and partly marginalizing) the significance of human agency within the course of events. 
All those texts deal with technology and how it comes about. For the most part, they focus on the 
motif of invention while re-conceptualizing the role of humans in this process. In classical narratives 
of technological invention,21 human—or quasi-human, such as anthropomorphic gods22—agents 
(inventors) are the protagonists and primal initiators of the process of technological genesis, even 
where they ultimately fail to control their inventions. The relation between humans and technology 
is a linear and asymmetrical one between inventor or user subjects on the one hand and artifact 
objects on the other. 
The modern literary narratives in question, in contrast, challenge this linear notion of 
invention and technological innovation. They do so by either over-emphasizing the inventive act and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
other words, this movement combines an overreaching anthropocentrism with an uncritical affirmation of technological 
innovation; neither of these is meant to be implied or confirmed by my usage of the expression ‘trans-human agency.’ 
21 These hark back to antiquity: think of Daedalus in Ovid’s Metamorphosis. 
22 Think of the figure of Prometheus. 
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thereby stalling the narrative progression (in the case of Paul Scheerbart’s Perpetuum Mobile), by 
ridiculing or marginalizing it (Walser’s Der Gehülfe), or by breaking up what used to be the 
continuum of progress into numerous micro-narratives of technological change (Roth’s 
technographic feuilleton). In brief, all of those narratives critically engage with the common 
correlation of human action and narrative plot (as etymologically manifested in the homonomy of 
Handlung-Handeln)—even where they precisely exaggerate it (Scheerbart’s inventor-narrator). 
Therefore, the texts require re-thinking (or at least bracketing) some widely held assumptions about 
the structure of literary narratives associated with the alleged inherent anthropomorphism stated by 
Paul Ricœur and Albrecht Koschorke. 
Most significant theories of narration23 rest on a notion of event as the principal element of a 
narrative sequence.24 The narratological notion of event, however, bears some ambivalence. Besides 
denoting the (somewhat neutral) elements, or temporal increments constituting a narrative 
(sequence), it can also—in an emphatic sense—refer to one turning point that a story (or a part of a 
story) revolves around (for instance a historical event) (Schmid 2003). Partly for this reason, more 
recent theories of narrative often replace the term event with the more abstract concept ‘change of 
state’ when referring to the single (neutral) elements, in order to avoid confusion with the more 
emphatic sense of the word event. But even in this neutral form, the notion of narratological 
elements bears traces of the above-described anthropomorphism. Narrative theory to this day 
describes every single event or change of state within a plot against the backdrop of human action, as 
                                                   
23 Think of Russian Formalism, classical German ‘Erzähltheorie,’ Gerard Genette structuralist narratology, Mieke Bal’s 
theory of “intercultural storytelling,” and even Koschorke’s recent ‘Allgemeine Erzähltheorie’. 
24 The function of ‘event’ as a basic element of narrative—with the direct association with human action and the implied 
teleology—reveals the origin of modern narratology in Aristotelian mereology and Goethean morphology (Dolezel 1989, 
14). Note that modern philosophical theories of ‘event’ or ‘Ereignis’ clearly distance themselves from the Aristotelian 
paradigm, often establishing the concept as the very opposite of a linear notion of human action. Cf. for instance the 
writings about ‘Ereignis’ in Martin Heidegger’s later work, such as his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). 
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an asymmetrical binary between acting and suffering/being affected (German ‘Handeln’ or 
‘Erleiden’, modeled after the Aristotelian categories ‘actio’ and ‘passio’):  
Wenn die Zustandsveränderung durch einen Agenten herbeigeführt wird, sprechen wir von einer Handlung. 
Wenn sie einem Patienten zugefügt wird, handelt es sich um ein Vorkommnis. (Schmid 2005, 13)25 
If every temporal element is either action (German ‘Handlung’) or occurrence (German 
‘Vorkommnis’) such a view of narrative implies that the entities, i.e. the characters in a story, 
understood as the subjects of a narrative are (at least potentially) acting subjects (handelnde 
Subjekte). But what, then, is the place of technology within this notion of narrative? Would 
technology fall under the same category with those human and anthropomorphic subjects who 
either—as agents—determine the course of events by their actions, or—as patients—are affected by 
it, and by the actions of those agents? Or would technological artifacts and processes rather take up 
an intermediate position, either reinforcing the difference between agents and patients in the form of 
an instrument of power, or arbitrating between the two extremes of agency as a medium of 
communication? 
These questions are especially difficult to answer with regard to literary and historical 
narratives that deal with technology not simply as a concomitant phenomenon of human affairs, but 
rather as their central concern. Prime examples for such narratives are histories of technology, such as 
the history of a given technological innovation or historical accounts of the technological 
achievements of a given period, inventor biographies, or various sorts of sci-fi literature, but also the 
success narratives promoted by tech companies for marketing purposes. Such narratives often 
oscillate between two extremes. One: they leave unquestioned that technology is instrumental for the 
                                                   
25 “If the change of state is brought about by an agent we call it an action. If it is done to a patient, we are dealing with an 
occurrence.” (My translation). 
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wellbeing of its human inventors and users. In this case, they feature technology either on the side of 
the ‘patient’ (with humans as the inventors or users), or as a mere tool providing the agents of a 
given narrative with more freedom of action. The other extreme of technographic narratives places 
artifacts themselves in the agent position. This goes mostly for sci-fi literature subscribing to a 
general demonization of technology under the trope of ‘autonomous technology’ as described by 
Langdon Winner.  
The literary texts I investigate, in contrast, defy at once the binary notion of narrative events 
(change of state between action and occurrence) and the understanding of technology as an 
instrument or tool. They do this by linking the modes of temporality constituting the structure of 
narrative literature with reflections on the relation between technology and humanity. The texts thus 
allow for a critical engagement with the ontology of technology and with questions of agency and 
intervention within the process of technological change. They are far from advocating a general 
technophobia or ‘procopophobia’ (i.e. the fear or dislike of progress) often ascribed to writers and 
poets.26 Instead of condemning modern technology, they acknowledge it as a profound challenge to 
conventional understandings of the world and of approaches to its narrative representation. 
The binary and asymmetrical understanding of narrative, I argue, is a temporal extension of 
the basic grammatical structure of Western languages between grammatical subject and object. On a 
metaphysical level, the same asymmetrical structure re-appears in the shape of the notorious subject-
object dualism that 20th century phenomenology was so keen to overcome (cf. Husserl, Heidegger, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). 
                                                   
26 Cf. Rolf Peter Sieferle’s book Fortschrittsfeinde? Opposition gegen Technik und Industrie von der Romantik bis zur 
Gegenwart for various examples of technophobia and procophobia among poets and intellectuals (Sieferle 1984). 
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With regard to technology, the shortcomings of the subject-object dualism become especially 
palpable—resulting in the ‘technological paradox’: tools becoming autonomous. This is in line with 
what Bruno Latour asserts in his book An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the 
Moderns:27 
 The reader must now see why the investigator could not possibly do justice to technologies with the two 
patterns of ‘Objects’ and ‘Subjects’ as her only resource. (Latour 2013, 211) 
As an alternative and remedy for the subject-object divide Latour proposes what he calls an 
‘ontological pluralism,’ which does not simply assume different modes of being or existence, but 
concedes that modes of existence partly depend on different ways of description. Latour’s ontological 
pluralism could thus also be called ontological constructivism—a methodological path that he has 
previously adumbrated in the so-called actor-network theory and his writings on hybrids. 
While Latour’s approach may have its own problems if applied to a whole theory of 
modernity, it makes good sense to replace the subject-object dualism by a more open ontological 
model (i.e. ontological pluralism) when investigating technographic narratives. Modern literature has 
plenty of examples of transition narratives, where technological artifacts shift from the object 
position to the subject position: Goethe’s homunculus in Faust, the brooms in his ballad Der 
Zauberlehrling; Automats in Romanticism (e.g. E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Sandmann), the monster in 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Panizza’s Menschenfabrik, and take almost any literary or filmic sci-fi 
fantasy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. But apart from such examples of an animism or 
demonization of artifacts, there are many literary examples that present technology as posing a 
fundamental problem of agency in the light of which classical notions of human actions shipwreck. 
                                                   
27 The book is part of an ongoing collective, trans-media, and trans-disciplinary inquiry into the conditions of the 
‘modern project’ (Latour 2013). 
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A much-cited example is the following passage from Goethe’s late novel Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahre, where the textile manufacturer Susanne laments: 
Was mich aber drückt, ist doch eine Handelssorge, leider nicht für den Augenblick, nein! für alle Zukunft. Das 
überhandnehmende Maschinenwesen quält und ängstigt mich, es wälzt sich heran wie ein Gewitter, langsam, 
langsam; aber es hat seine Richtung genommen, es wird kommen und treffen. (Goethe 1989, 429)28 
Two mistakes have often been made with regard to this passage. First, some scholars read it as the 
expression of deep-rooted technophobia inherent to (particularly) German-language literature. 
Second, some identified the character speech with an utterance of the author’s very opinion.29 Such 
readings do not hold up to a critical view of fiction, taking the distinction between author and 
characters more seriously, nor do they comply with the representation of technology in the rest of 
the novel.30 Far from reading the famous passage as the condemnation of modern technology by 
classical German literature, I suggest to take it as a concise formulation of a central problem 
determining the relation between technology and narrative literature that will be explored further by 
the authors I investigate. The problem becomes apparent when Susanne goes on to say:  
Hier bleibt nur ein doppelter Weg, einer so traurig wie der andere: entweder selbst das Neue zu ergreifen, oder 
aufzubrechen, die Besten und Würdigsten mit sich fort zu ziehen und ein günstigeres Schicksal jenseits der 
                                                   
28 “The increasing dominance of machine production torments and frightens me: it is rolling on like a storm, slowly, 
slowly; but it is headed this way, and it will arrive and strike.” (Goethe 1995, 396). 
29 Michael Niedermeier writes: “Nicht zufällig entwickelte Goethe in den Wanderjahren die Zerstörung des Handwerks 
und Manufakturwesens durch das ‘Maschinenwesen’, nachdem er von Johann Heinrich Meyer über die Krisen im 
Schweizer Textilgewerbe informiert worden war, als paradigmatische Entwicklungstendenz. 
Spätestens mit der Erkenntnis dieser ersten Krisen verspürte Goethe wie seine Helden in den Wanderjahren (1821-29) 
eine ‘große Abneigung gegen das Maschinenwesen’.” (Niedermeier 2000, 123) 
30 Helmut Müller-Sievers critiques such readings of Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre in his ongoing project on the 
discourses around astronomy and technology in Goethe’s novel (Müller-Sievers 2015). He stresses the widespread and 
very profound treatment of technology elsewhere in the novel and argues that on closer inspection Goethe’s take on 
modern technology is far from technophobic. 
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Meere zu suchen. Eins wie das andere hat sein Bedenken, aber wer hilft uns die Gründe abwägen, die uns 
bestimmen sollen? (Goethe 1989, 429)31 
Goethe’s late novel depicts the onslaught of new technologies32 not simply as determining 
human actions—although Goethe only deals with the mere harbingers in the form of industrialized 
textile production. Rather, new technologies appear to compromise the very fulcrum of human 
agency if understood as a choice between two (or more) options. It would be interesting to 
investigate how this double-bind situation already informs the very narrative constitution of Wilhelm 
Meister’s Wanderjahre, which is not without reason a work far from conventional modes of narration 
and forms of coherence. However, this is not the place to further pursue this question. I only 
mention the passage as an early and very telling example of literature revealing the topic of modern 
technology as a challenge to traditional modes of narration. The cited passages thus problematize an 
understanding of history as a process that is driven and determined by human actions. 
While Goethe’s novel depicts this problem of agency as the harbinger of an imminent 
epochal threshold toward a radically technicized future, the same problem arises as a pressing issue of 
a quickly changing lifeworld in the twentieth century. Under slightly altered conditions it reappears 
in the discourse about the shortcomings of a photographic and report-like representation of 
contemporary reality in Siegfried Kracauer’s 1930 essay Die Angestellten (The Salaried Masses) and 
Bertolt Brecht (Huyssen 2015, 123), as well as in Walter Benjamin’s reflections on a crisis of 
storytelling and of human experience developed in his 1936/7 essay Der Erzähler or The Storyteller. 
                                                   
31 “Here are but two choices, one as sorry as the other: either to seize on the new development and thus hasten our ruin, 
or to set out, taking the best and worthiest people with us, and seek a kinder fate across the seas. Each has its own 
drawbacks, but who will help us weigh the principles that should prevail?” (Goethe 1995, 396). 
32 In Goethe’s original formulation, expression “überhandnehmend”—translates to: ‘gradually winning the upper hand.’ 
This can be read as a subtle hint at the etymological fact that German ‘Handlung, Handeln’ (with its both meanings as 
action and trading) also bear the signature of an organ of the human body, the hand (die Hand). When the 
‘Maschinenwesen’ is winning the ‘upper hand,’ that implies that technology is reaching beyond the mere prosthetic 
status as ‘organ projection’ (Ernst Kapp). 
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All these authors detect a problem of literary and artistic representation that is caused by radical 
changes in the conditions of human existence. While Kracauer, Brecht, and Benjamin clearly link 
these changes to far-reaching technological developments of their time (both media technologies and 
the technological working conditions), they do not quite acknowledge that the reality of such 
technological change is itself directly related to a narrative understanding of history and the world—
even though Benjamin seems to adumbrate this somewhere in the theoretical space between his 
Artwork essay and his Theses on the Concept of History.33 
Kracauer, Brecht, and Benjamin, among others, tackle the question of how technological and 
the associated societal change pose problems to a poetic, literary, and artistic understanding of the 
world. Robert Walser, Paul Scheerbart, and Joseph Roth, in contrast, reveal the same relationship as 
an interdependency. Their texts raise questions of how a narrative understanding of the world itself 
is what constitutes technological change. They explore how the changing conditions of existence can 
be productively transformed into new ways of narration. While the majority of the texts in my 
corpus focus on technological inventions, I read them within a more general context of literary 
reflections on historical change. Even though the single pieces deal with actual technological 
inventions, my investigation does not focus on the factual historical development of technology, nor 
does it focus primarily on how the literature of the time represents and assesses it. My project is 
neither a history of technology, nor an investigation into the history of literature about technology. 
Instead, I treat the texts as literary reflections on the structure of technological change and of 
historical agency. Such a view, I argue, requires slightly altering the angle from which the literary 
texts are perceived. Unlike literary history, which roughly reads literary texts as historical 
                                                   
33 I am basing my reflections on a wide notion of narrative that implies literary genres even beyond the realm of what is 
usually called narrative literature or prose. 
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documents—albeit of a particular kind—I read the literary texts from a meta-historical standpoint.34 
The ongoing call for (technological) progress can be described as a ‘meta-historical imperative.’ If the 
literary texts I investigate challenge the validity and meaning of this imperative, then adequately 
reading them implies challenging Frederic Jameson’s “‘transhistorical’ imperative”: “Always 
historicize!” (Jameson 1983, ix).35  
Simply integrating the literary texts into a historical continuum (or be it its negation: 
historical discontinuity) by historicizing them would conflict with the insight that these texts 
critically engage with the very conditions of a historical continuum.36 As sketched out above, the 
common modern understanding of history is linked with the notion of progress, and by virtue of 
being inherently narrative it bears at least remnants of an anthropomorphism, whose constitutive 
flipside is an instrumental or prosthetic understanding of technology.  
The majority of the literary texts treated here deal with technological inventions as the 
increments of technological change. With the way in which they portray technology in its process of 
occurrence they challenge such an anthropocentric, action-based understanding of history. The 
depicted inventions are at the same time events and artifacts. The concept of invention unites the 
temporal dimension of technology with the aspect of its materialization. With this in mind, I focus 
on the phenomenon of inventions both as a literary motif and as a specific type of narrative event. 
Far from subscribing to a conventional understanding of history as a progressing process and 
of modern technology as an ongoing endeavor to improve the human condition, this type of 
                                                   
34 This is not to say that I view them as outside of—or detached from—any historical context, but rather as literary 
contemplations about history and historicity. 
35 Regarding the philosophical reasons of challenging Jameson’s slogan, cf. Amy Allen’s The End of Progress (Allen 2016). 
36 However, the non-historical approach is not meant—in Nietzsche’s terms—as an antidote against an over-historicized 
culture (cf. Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation: On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life). It is simply a 
methodological choice with a view to better understand the historical condition. 
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literature reveals the fundamental relation between these notions (of history, of technology, and of 
human practice) with modes of narrating the world. Progress, and most prominently technological 
progress, would be one such mode of narration. In this sense, progress is indeed, as has often been 
said, a modern myth, since it has at least for a while set the narratological foundations of human self-
description in this world.37  
With this in mind, my engagement with the literary texts is not guided by a historical, but 
rather by a theoretical, i.e. meta-historical interest. Accordingly, I do not intend to draw a line of 
development, or any sort of continuity, from an earlier to a later stage, or from a lower to a higher 
form of achievement in dealing with the above-described problem of literary representation. Neither 
will I provide a comprehensive picture of how literature represents technological change in the 
treated period. A historical approach (historicizing the texts in accordance with Jameson’s 
imperative) would not only be in conflict with my central research question, which is narratological 
and meta-historical rather than historical. It would also collide with the selection of texts 
constituting my corpus. 
All of these texts insinuate the constructedness of history and of historical truth. They defy a 
clear separation between truth and fiction on the formal as well as on the content level. This 
                                                   
37 The diction ‘myth of progress’ most prominently appears in the work of the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von 
Wright: cf. his essays “The Myth of Progress” and “Progress: Fact and Fiction” as well as Jacques Bouveresse’s paper 
“Wittgenstein, von Wright and the Myth of Progress” (Bouveresse 2011). Von Wright, however, suggests using the 
expression ‘myth of progress’ only when there is doubt in what he otherwise calls “The Great Idea of Progress” (progress 
in the understanding that caused Koselleck to count it among the basic concepts of history): “When doubt is cast on the 
veracity of the belief, the idea itself can aptly be renamed a Myth of Progress.” (von Wright 1997, 2), i.e. he uses the 
word myth in a modern sense. I argue that even without this component of doubt there are good reasons to treat 
progress as a modern equivalent of ancient mythology, which would have implications for the relation between progress 
and literature. Ancient mythology functioned as an important material source (German ‘Stoffquelle’) for the ancient 
predecessors of modern literature (epic, poetry, drama, etc.). Modern literature, in contrast, could be viewed as a critical 
engagement with (the myth of) progress in the way that it constantly challenges the unique truth claim of history. What 
cannot be integrated into the temporal continuum of history cannot be true. At least the literary examples I discuss in my 
project would support such a view of the relation between literature and progress. 
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characteristic feature of the literary texts and the non-historical focus of my argument allow me to 
work with a very narrow empirical basis of examples. The claims of my project do not lie in a wider 
historical argument, but in a largely exemplary, structural reflection on the narrative understanding 
of technological change. It is this theoretical concern that guided the selection of my corpus. In the 
following, I will briefly outline my analysis of the texts in the order of appearance: 
Robert Walser’s novel Der Gehülfe (1908) links the crisis of the idea of technological progress 
with the decline of a bourgeois family in particular, and of bourgeois society in general. To the same 
extent as the family father and engineer Carl Tobler has lost his role of the authoritative center of 
agency, there seems to be no demand or use for his inventions. Technological progress appears in 
decline as a general motivation for human endeavors and all attempts by humans to intervene in this 
process of decline look pointless. 
In my chapter about Walser’s novel I will investigate the various modes of narrative 
temporality in the text and how they are associated with the motif of technology, in particular with 
the technological inventions that account for the purpose of Tobler’s business. The novel juxtaposes 
the temporal structures associated with technology in a sophisticated way with motifs of natural 
cycles (such as the course of seasons) and with the personal development or decline of the 
protagonists/characters, the decline of Carl Tobler’s family enterprise. In my reading, Walser’s novel 
is the literary implementation of the ‘zero grade’ of progress linking this with the crisis of a classical 
type of novel, the Bildungsroman. In an article about Walser’s novel Jakob von Gunten, Rüdiger 
Campe argues that the author’s early novels are in fact ‘institution novels’ thus reverting back to the 
very beginning of the modern form of the novel, as theoretically established by Pierre Daniel Huet in 
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his 1670 Traitté de l’origine des romans. 38  With and against Campe I argue that the altered 
constellation of fiction (French ‘discours’) and story/history (French ‘histoire’) does not mean an 
affirmative recourse to a thinking of origins and the foundation of institutions, at least in the case of 
Der Gehülfe. Instead, Walser’s novel is the manifestation of a crisis of the genre (much like Walter 
Benjamin adumbrates it in his famous essay about Döblin’s Alexanderplatz39). But at the same time, 
it is a reflection on a crisis of progress as a paradigm of history on the whole. 
While Walser’s novel features several small and insignificant inventions that are even more 
marginalized in the course of the events, Paul Scheerbart’s book Das Perpetuum mobile. Die 
Geschichte einer Erfindung (1910) deals with one single invention that could not be more 
revolutionary. Scheerbart’s text depicts the invention of a perpetual motion machine in the making, 
and describes it as an endeavor that goes far beyond the control of its human inventor, the 
protagonist and narrator of the story. I read the text as a literary reflection on the creative process 
associated with technological innovation that challenges linear (intentionalist) conceptions of 
invention and of historical events. In a mocking, satirical way, Scheerbart zeros in on his time’s blind 
faith in science that ultimately clashes with another contemporary dogma, the above-described idea 
of history as progress. Content and structure of Scheerbart’s book defy both of these tenets of the 
time, by claiming the feasibility of a technological device that science has declared impossible, and by 
talking up the moment of its invention to a super-event that cannot be integrated into the continuity 
                                                   
38 “Sie [a certain group of novels from the first half of the twentieth century] wären dann nicht so sehr Kritik, Negation 
oder Ironisierung des Biographieromans – obwohl sie das sicherlich auch sind [!] –, sondern sie realisierten einen 
anderen, komplementären Formtypus. Sie sprächen von einer anderen Stelle her, und sie gingen auf eine andersartige 
Konstellation aus Fiktion (‘discours‘) und Geschichte (‘histoire‘) zurück.” (Campe 2005, 238). 
39 Unlike Döblin with his famous city novel, Walser does not apply the technique of montage on the surface level of 
style. But the intertwinement of different sub-genres (i.e. Bildungsroman, Institutionenromen, Angestelltenroman) and 
of different temporal structures (technological progress, individual career or fate, and ) amounts to a similar effect: it 
‘explodes the form of the novel’ as Benjamin states about montage in Berlin Alexanderplatz. 
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of a narrative. In this sense, Scheerbart’s book anticipates the very aporias that would later determine 
the history of science and technology of the twentieth and twenty first-century at least since Thomas 
S. Kuhn’s Structures. It depicts the moment of invention in a continued series of attempts while 
continuously spelling out imaginations about the revolutionary consequences of such an invention 
once it were achieved.  
Whereas Scheerbart explores the imaginary side of a technological invention, pushing the 
concept toward the realm of the fantastic, Joseph Roth bases his literary imaginations about 
technology on its factual manifestations within his surroundings. In a series of technographic 
commentaries published in the German-language feuilleton of the interwar period, Roth attacks 
technological progress as an ideology that increasingly infiltrates modern life, but also as a utopian 
projection of a radically different future. In these journalistic micro-narratives,40 technology change 
appears beyond human control as a constructive and destructive potential, as infrastructure that can 
enhance or thwart human communication or circulation, and as a dream of mankind that may 
ultimately result in a radical transformation of humanity. 
Roth himself saw his journalistic activity as a sideline source of income necessary to fund his 
existence as a novelist.41 But at the same time he emphasized the characteristic quality of his 
journalistic pieces—clearly distinguishing them from the fact-oriented, ephemeral genre of news 
reports. Against this backdrop, I read Roth’s much-cited statement “I draw the face of time” as a 
slogan promoting a unique mode of writing. With short texts focusing on the various manifestations 
of change in the modern lifeworld, he challenges the self-evidence common sense attributes to the 
                                                   
40 Even though Roth’s short journalistic texts for the most part do not feature proper storytelling, they are in a true sense 
narrative, and even narratological at times, as all of them draw and spell out temporal distinctions or vectors between 
before and after, earlier and later. It is for this reason that I decided to call them micro-narratives. 
41 That is at least what Roth writes in letters to his colleague and longtime friend Stefan Zweig (Roth and Zweig 2011, 
18, 21). 
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course of things as well as to the ways in which change comes about and how this determines our 
imaginations of the future. While in his technographic texts Roth focuses on actual inventions of his 
time, his writing makes obvious that such factual objects open up a whole realm of fictional 
imagination in that they require integration into a temporal horizon of possibilities. 
If the order of my analysis lines up the single texts in a chronological continuum, this is not 
to suggest a strong argument about some sort of historical development from earlier, less developed 
stages to later, more perfected ways of a literary understanding of technological change. To be sure, 
the technographic texts by all three authors reveal a general insufficiency of progress if taken as a 
form of emplotment and as a way of making sense of technological change in a historical context. 
The succession of the different techniques in which the single authors counter this lack may perhaps 
suggest a development spanning from Walser to Roth. My central concern, however, does not lie in 
such an argument of development, even if this may result as a byproduct from my analysis. The goal 
of this dissertation is to explore and compare the texts by the three authors as examples of literary 
narratives that challenge—each in its own way—the conventional idea of progress as the one 
adequate way of making sense of technological change. 
All three authors choose different subjects and text sorts, and yet, their technographic texts 
have one crucial feature in common: narration appears in their texts as the practice of integrating 
events (i.e. changes of state) into a larger temporal context of meaning. With their literary endeavors 
in narrating technological change, these authors respond and contribute to a larger cultural 
transformation that has been described as a ‘technological shift of meaning’ or ‘technologische 
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Sinnverschiebung’ (Hörl and Tatari 2014).42 While a close reading of the literary texts will generate 
profound insights about technological change, examining them through this lens will deepen the 
understanding of their literary qualities. 
 
                                                   
42 Erich Hörl describes the transition toward cybernetics taking place around the middle of the 20th century as an all-
encompassing cultural change which he calls ‘allgemeine Kybernetisierung’ (Hörl 2008, 632). He then contextualizes 
this development within a larger transformation regarding the ‘meaning of meaning’ that he calls ‘technologische 
Sinnverschiebung,’ following Edmund Husserl’s dictum of a ‘gefährliche Sinnverschiebung’ caused by the technization 
of science (Hörl and Tatari 2014, 44). According to Hörl, the ‘technologische Sinnverschiebung’ implies that under the 
impression of new technology, the question of meaning (Sinn) must be re-interpreted ‘beyond any teleology’ (“jenseits 
von aller Teleologie neu zu denken” (Hörl and Tatari 2014, 50). With this in mind, the crisis of traffic regulation that 
Roth describes should be viewed as a symptom of a more profound crisis of a teleological view of both technology as well 
as of history and culture in general. 
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As a familiar saying has it, ‘No man is a hero to his valet.’ To this 
I added—and Goethe repeated it ten years later—‘but not 
because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.’ 




Robert Walser’s Der Gehülfe: A Zero-Grade Narrative of Progress 
1. The Employee as a Modern Topos 
German social theorist Siegfried Kracauer begins his 193043 essay Die Angestellten (English: The 
Salaried Masses)44 with a striking observation. He states that contemporary and past novel writing has 
dramatically neglected the emerging social class of the clerks and employees, although their mode of 
employment and way of life have become a prevalent form of human existence. This neglect seems 
especially odd, as Kracauer indicates, within a modern urban setting like Berlin. Taking his cue 
directly from the city life around him, Kracauer starts his reflections by citing a statement made by a 
female employee whom he happens to meet on the tram: 
                                                   
43 Kracauer’s essay was finished in October 1929 and first published as installments in the Frankfurter Zeitung feuilleton 
in December of the same year. The book publication followed in January 1930 (Mülder-Bach 1998, 4). 
44 Note that the content of Kracauer’s book had previously been published as a series of feuilleton articles in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung. This bespeaks the special epistemic status of the feuilleton at that time, serving as an epistemic 
medium somewhere between academic research, news journalism, and literary writing (cf. my chapter on Joseph Roth’s 
technographic journalism regarding this special epistemic status of the feuilleton). Much in line with this, Kracauer then 
dedicated the book version of his essay to Benno Reifenberg, who at the time was the feuilleton editor of the Frankfurter 
Zeitung (Huyssen 2015, 122–3). 
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‘Das steht doch schon alles in den Romanen’, erwiderte eine Privatangestellte, als ich sie bat, mir aus ihrem 
Büroleben zu erzählen. (Kracauer 1971, 211)45 
The social theorist, however, finds himself in strong disagreement with the employee’s estimation 
when he concedes: 
Es steht nicht alles in den Romanen, wie die Privatangestellte meint. Gerade über sie und ihresgleichen sind 
Auskünfte kaum zu erlangen. (Kracauer 1971, 212)46 
In this spirit, Kracauer draws the legitimization of his own sociological study from the fact that an 
important part of current-day reality has been neglected by literary fiction. He bases his argument on 
the assumption that literature and social research have a common interest, at least potentially.47 
If Kracauer was right with his estimation, then some of Robert Walser’s writings are at least 
noteworthy exceptions from Kracauer’s observation, and the Swiss author’s 1907/8 novel Der 
Gehülfe is an outright counterexample. It is surprising that Kracauer does not mention Walser in a 
single syllable, although the Swiss author dedicated several of his texts to the figure of the employee 
and Kracauer’s colleague and friend Walter Benjamin praised Walser’s writings repeatedly. With this 
in mind, Kracauer’s claim may itself appear as a rhetorical move rather than an accurate 
representation of the cultural landscape. 
In the present chapter I will take a closer look at Walser’s novel while placing it within a 
greater tradition of employee’s literature. The examination of the employee as a literary character 
                                                   
45 “‘But you can already find all that in novels’, one private employee replied, when I asked her to tell me something 
about her life in the office.” (Kracauer 1998, 28). 
46 “You cannot, as the secretary thinks, find it all in novels. On the contrary, information about her and her kind is hard 
to obtain.” (Kracauer 1998, 28). 
47 As Inka Mülder-Bach points out, however, Kracauer clearly distinguishes his study from both literary reportages and 
from scientific treatises: “Kracauer subtitled the book with a phrase which, with laconic brevity, defines the viewpoint, 
method and claim of his investigation. What his study aims to be is neither a scientific ‘about’, nor a literary reportage 
‘on’, the salaried class. Rather Kracauer adopts the role of the ethnologist, who sets off on a sociological ‘expedition’ to a 
domestic ‘abroad’ and reports ‘from the newest Germany’ (a literal translation of the German original, Aus dem neuesten 
Deutschland) on the salaried employees as if from some exotic foreign land.” (Mülder-Bach 1998, 4). 
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may also shed light on the question why the social theorist Siegfried Kracauer ignores this tradition 
of writing in his essay about the salaried masses. 
Der Gehülfe tells the story of young Joseph Marti, who right at the beginning of the action 
takes up a job as a clerk for Carl Tobler, an inventor, engineer, and entrepreneur. For the duration 
of his employment, Marti lives with Tobler and his family in their mansion “Abendstern” (evening 
star) in the fictional place Bärenswil in Switzerland, which also hosts the workplace of the Tobler 
enterprise. In the course of the action, Joseph’s area of activities gradually extends beyond the typical 
office tasks of a modern clerk (Rinke 2009, 227). As though self-evidently, the protagonist takes care 
of the family’s garden, entertains an intimate relationship with Tobler’s wife, and altogether becomes 
a member of the Tobler family. His main task, however, is to help Tobler find investors, producers, 
and buyers for a number of technological inventions that the engineer has made. While this 
endeavor continues to fail until the very end of the story, Joseph grows increasingly discontent with 
his employer’s demeanor and management qualities. Tobler’s enterprise is facing bankruptcy, as a 
result of which his reputation within the local community dwindles and even his role as the 
patriarchic authority within his small family becomes questionable. Aware of the futility of Tobler’s 
enterprise and deeply unhappy with his employer’s quick-tempered behavior, Joseph ultimately 
leaves the family and moves on into an open future. 
In brief, Der Gehülfe recounts an episode in the life of a young clerk. What is more, it gives a 
narrative image of the employee’s form of existence. The novel does so by focalizing on the character 
of the employee himself, instead of telling the story through a superior observer, as does for instance 
Herman Melville’s 1853 short story Bartleby, the Scrivener. The particular setup of Walser’s narrative 
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perspective, at the same time, presents the inherent contradictions within this character type as well 
as the immanent conflicts predetermined by the power structure in which he resides. 
Der Gehülfe takes place in an ostensibly rural setting,48 within the framework of a patriarchic, 
family-based enterprise. And yet, the novel clearly highlights the modern nature of this character 
type as well as of the employment and life situation in which he resides. The historical vantage point 
from which Walser writes his novel—the first decade of the twentieth century in a rural part of 
Switzerland—widely predates major changes in the role and significance of the employee in modern 
European societies. As Kracauer would later point out in his book about the salaried masses, the 
situation of employees “hat sich seit den Jahren vor dem [Ersten Welt-]Krieg von Grund auf 
verändert” (Kracauer 1971, 212).49 And yet, Walser already uncovers in the employment situation he 
describes the harbingers of imminent social change—more than 20 years before Kracauer examines 
its symptoms in the city of Berlin. 
At first glance, however, Walser does not make a great effort to create with his novel a 
particularly modernist, up-to-date impression. He chooses the word “Gehülfe” as the title, in a 
spelling that was already antiquated at the time (Rinke 2009, 226–8). Instead, he could have opted 
for the more modern words “Angestellter” or “Assistent” (or even “Commis”), or at least for the 
                                                   
48 The novel explicitly emphasizes the tension between an urban and a rural field of experience, as well as the ‘alienation’ 
associated with modern city life, much like Georg Simmel described it around the same time: “Es war nichts anderes als 
die Fremdheit, die Ungewohntheit, die ihm [Joseph] entgegenblendete, und er fühlte es auch und sagte sich, daß, wenn 
einer bereits seit Wochen in der Toblerschen Villa lebe, er nicht nötig habe, sich über den Anblick eines Städtebildes und 
dessen Entfremdung zu verwundern.” (DG 126). The reader also finds a brief account of the history of industrialization 
in the region, with an early bloom and later stagnation: remarks about age-old industry and business in the region: 
“Auch sind viele angesehene Fabriken hier, so Seidenfabriken, Bandwebereien, die ebenfalls schon ein ziemliches Alter 
haben. Die Industrie und der Handel haben hier vor ungefähr hundertfünfzig Jahren zum ersten Mal ihre mehr oder 
minder primitive Räder und Gurten geschwungen, und sie haben sich bis zum heutigen Tag eines fortgesetzt guten 
Rufes nicht nur im Inland, sondern auch in der übrigen, weiten Welt zu erfreuen gehabt. […] im Gelderwerb hängen 
und stecken geblieben […].” (DG 67) 
49 The situation of the salaried employees “[…] has been utterly transformed since the pre-war years.” (Kracauer 1998, 
29). 
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more up-to-date spelling “Gehilfe.”50 In accordance with the antiquated word choice and spelling, 
the protagonist’s employment situation appears pre-industrial, almost pre-modern, as he becomes 
much like a member of his employer’s family. The young employee has to carry out tasks that are 
less related with Tobler’s enterprise than with the life of his family. And the way Joseph is treated by 
his employer often places him in the position of the oldest son, or else a bondsman or servant. Much 
in line with this, the plot takes place in a classical family enterprise, based in a relatively rural region 
of Switzerland. The unity of living and working under the one roof of Carl Tobler’s mansion 
“Abendstern” almost appears medieval. 
The choice of a traditional locale and setting appears all the more striking considering that 
the author was writing the novel in Berlin, at the time one of the world’s largest cities, aspiring to 
one of the most urban, industrialized places on the planet. Against this biographical backdrop, the 
novel may appear as a nostalgic reverie of its author. And yet, so I argue, Der Gehülfe is decidedly 
modern, despite its deliberate antiquating appearance. 51  It connects the evolving genre of the 
employee’s novel with the subject of technological innovation (technological). It presents the 
product of Tobler’s enterprise, the technological inventions, as commodities within a modern 
market place (economic). It presents characters as intersections of dependencies and power structures 
that are schizophrenic personas rather than holistic and autonomous individuals (psychological). 
This triad of technological, economic, and psychological aspects makes for the decidedly modern 
character of the novel. The above-described antiquating style choices do not express a reactionary or 
                                                   
50 Note that the novel ‘behind the title’ then juggles with very different words referring to the employment status of the 
protagonist: he is referred to with a whole variety of different titles as “Angestellter,” “Gehülfe,” “Knecht,” or even 
“Hülfsdirigent” (DG 194). 
51 Proof of this can be found in the various references to industrial mass production and marketing, both of which find 
explicit mention within the novel (“mass fabrication” or “Massenanfertigung” (DG 45) and ‘Advertising’ (German 
‘Reklame’ or ‘Reklamewesen’) in the invention “Reklame-Uhr”, and in connection with the “Schützenautomat“ 
(DG 72). 
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nostalgic mindset. Instead, it places emphasis on forms of transition by adding historical depth and 
‘patina’ to the described world. At the same time, it is part of the general negation of modern 
progress that appears to be a programmatic theme of the novel. Not in spite of, but rather 
complementing with the above described antiquating style and content,52  the novel depicts the 
employee character as a figure of transition. In this spirit, Walser’s novel provides a description of the 
employee as a character who is at the same time very new and very old. 
Der Gehülfe is by far not the only example of a literary work about this old and new type of 
character. Even if Kracauer really did not know of Walser’s novel or otherwise did not believe that it 
dealt with the same class of people that he had in mind as a social theorist, he does in fact neglect a 
whole tradition of texts dealing with the evolving ‘mass’ of salaried white-collar workers. Walser 
himself wrote a good number of shorter texts centering on various types of employees, office 
workers, scriveners, salespersons and the like as well as their forms of and places in modern life 
(Walser 2011). And besides, or before, Walser, a good deal of other international authors attended to 
the matter of the employees in their writings in the second half of the nineteenth century, such as 
Nikolai Gogol’s The Overcoat (1842), Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit (1855/57), Italo Svevo’s A Life 
(1892), Wilhelm Raabe’s The Vogelsang Files (1896), and Leo Tolstoy’s Resurrection (1899), and 
with Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener (1853) leading the way (Sorg and Gisi 2011, 130). 
Against this backdrop, Kracauer’s novelty claim must appear like deliberate denial, rather 
than true ignorance of an existing literary tradition, especially when one considers Kracauer’s 
indisputably high level of erudition. This estimation gains plausibility through an interesting 
observation; when Kracauer claims to be the first one who really deals with the class of employers, he 
                                                   
52 The word choice ‘Gehülfe,’ the rural setting, the stylized power structure of master and servant, and the forms of social 
interaction between the principal and the subordinate are just some of the most striking examples. 
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is not just denying a tradition of writing, but he also continues a tradition of novelty claims that 
seem to be the constant companions of the employee as a literary character. One of the early 
examples of that tradition reads as follows: 
The nature of my avocations for the last thirty years has brought me into more than ordinary contact with what 
would seem an interesting and somewhat singular set [!] of men of whom as yet nothing that I know of has ever 
been written:—I mean the law-copyists or scriveners. (Melville and McCall 2002, 3) 
The novelty claim in this opening sentence of Herman Melville’s short story Bartleby, The Scrivener 
comes along with strangely paradoxical formulations such as ‘more than ordinary’ and ‘somewhat 
singular set.’ The employees’ social status, which seems ordinary by definition, appears to stand in an 
irreconcilable conflict with their literary noteworthiness. Employees do not seem noteworthy at first 
glance, so goes the narrator’s implicit reasoning, because they are members of a more or less 
anonymous collective. And the narrator can claim an innovative achievement since he reveals the 
‘somewhat singular’ and hence noteworthy qualities of the employee by looking at it more 
thoroughly than just with a quick glance. 
Half a century later, Robert Walser then picks up on the claim of novelty in the first 
sentence of his 1902 short prose piece Der Commis:53  
Obgleich im Leben eine sehr bekannte Erscheinung, ist der Commis doch noch niemals zum Gegenstand einer 
schriftlichen Erörterung gemacht worden. Meines Wissens wenigstens nicht (Der Commis, 10). (Walser 2011)54 
In this passage, the narrator immediately qualifies the statement about the lack of a tradition or 
coverage of the employee figure in literature as a mere subjective observation, which may simply be a 
misjudgment caused by a lack of erudition on the part of the writer or narrator himself. The hedging 
                                                   
53 Der Commis. Eine Art Illustration, first published on June 22, 1902 in the Swiss journal Sonntagsblatt des ‘Bund’. 
Henceforth, the employee would be a stock character in Walser’s writing. 
54 “Even though he is a very well-known figure in everyday life, the clerk has never been made the subject of a written 
discussion. At least not to my knowledge.” (My translation). 
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phrase of “Meines Wissens wenigstens nicht.” draws additional attention to the fact that the absence 
of precedents and precursors—or the narrator’s ignorance thereof—ultimately comes down to a 
question of perspective. Conversely, the narrator speculates, the neglect of the employee may as well 
be caused by his own inaptitude to serve as a literary subject matter. 
Er ist vielleicht zu alltäglich, zu unschuldig, zu wenig blaß und verdorben, zu wenig interessant, der junge 
schüchterne Mann mit der Schreibfeder und Rechentafel in der Hand, um den Herrn Dichtern als Stoff zu 
dienen. Mir indessen dient er gerade. (Walser 2011, 10)55 
Bending the meaning of the verb ‘dienen,’ English ‘to serve,’ Walser superimposes the power-
relation of employment over the relation between literary material (‘Stoff’) and writer, in one of his 
typical self-reflexive rants. Poetic appropriation of a subject matter blends in with the power 
structure of the modern workplace. Already in this relatively early text, Walser masters the coup de 
main of granting the employee character a hearing, deploring an alleged lack of its literary coverage, 
and at the same time practicing criticism of the existing literary practice: 
 Ein Commis ist im Handumdrehen ein Lebensretter, geschweige denn ein Romanheld. Warum werden 
Commis so spärlich zu Helden in Novellen gemacht? Ein Fehler offenbar, der endlich einmal ernstlich der 
vaterländischen Literatur unter die Nase gehalten werden muß. (Walser 2011, 11)56 
And about a decade later, the same combination of presumptuousness and denial reappears in slight 
variation, in Walser’s 1913 short story Helblings Geschichte: 
Ich heiße Helbling und erzähle hier meine Geschichte selbst, da sie sonst wahrscheinlich von niemandem 
aufgeschrieben würde. (Walser 2011, 55)57 
                                                   
55 “He is perhaps too quotidian, too innocent, too little pallid and corrupt, too little interesting, the shy young man with 
quill and nomogram, to serve the gentlemen poets as a subject matter. At the moment, however, he does serve me.” (My 
translation). 
56 “A clerk is in no time a lifesaver, not to mention the hero of a novel. Why are clerks so scarcely made the heros of 
novellas? Evidently, this is a mistake, which finally must be, as a serious concern, rubbed in the face of the nation’s 
literature.” (My translation). 
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In this case, the employee has even acquired the position of the narrator and writer, placing the 
‘Schreibszene’ of the genre within the very workplace of its character subject. 
It is remarkable that along with the character of the employee, both Walser’s and Melville’s 
texts start off with the topos of originality or novelty, denying their own rootedness in a literary 
tradition. The fact that Walser’s employee writings share this commonality with Melville’s Bartleby 
has already been pointed out by Reto Sorg and Lucas Marco Gisi in their afterword to a recent 
anthology of Walser’s text about employees and offices (Sorg and Gisi 2011, 130). Sorg and Gisi do 
not note, however, that the novelty claim and the denial of a tradition reappear again in Siegfried 
Kracauer’s non-fiction essay Die Angestellten. 
The novelty claim linked with the employee’s genre is a counter foil of a historiographical 
phenomenon described as ‘invention of tradition’58. While such invention of tradition asserts a 
present entity as resting on a longstanding historical continuity, the novelty claim consists precisely 
in the denial thereof. Der Gehülfe juxtaposes these two narratological strategies, thereby highlighting 
a crucial tension inherent to the modern conception of history. Tobler’s inventions clearly represent 
novelty claims, whereas his celebrations on the occasion of the Swiss National Day—as discussed 
later on in this chapter—are all about the attempt of subscribing to a national tradition. In this way, 
Walser’s novel reflects a deep conflict within modern societies about how to reconcile collective 
memory on the one hand and disruptive innovation on the other hand.59 
                                                                                                                                                                    
57 “My name is Helbling, and this is the place to recount my story, as otherwise it would probably not be written down 
by anybody.” (My translation). 
58 The expression was made popular by the British historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger their eponymous 
book of 1983. Their prime example of such an invention of tradition is the legitimatory myth of a nation state. 
59 Andreas Huyssen writes about this shift in his 2003 book Present Pasts, calling it a ‘crisis of history’: 
“If the historical past once used to give coherence and legitimacy to family, community, nation, and state, in a discourse 
that Eric Hobsbawm called the ‘invention of tradition,’ then those formerly stable links have weakened today to the 
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With this observation in mind, I argue that the employee should be understood as a 
genuinely modern topos—in clear distinction to the concept of classical topoi rooted in ancient 
rhetorical tradition.60 In other words, I suggest reading this statement of ‘firstness’ or primordiality as 
a marker of the decidedly modernist nature of those texts. They inscribe themselves into an existing, 
undeniable tradition precisely by way of denying it. A classical topos is part of a canonical tradition 
that is ever furthered by new instantiations (variations) on passed-down ‘commonplaces’ (topoi) (cf. 
inventio in classical rhetoric). A modern topos, in contrast, would be a somewhat paradoxical 
concept: a continuous repetition of the same motif that has a claim of novelty or ‘firstness’ inscribed 
to it. It recurs to something that already exists and that is at the same time denying its own 
predecessors. In addition to finding an existing continuity, an author who employs a modernist 
topos must also invent, or better, make up, its originality, its novelty, and its unprecedentedness. 
Besides the described novelty claim, the employee figures have two key characteristics that 
appear almost invariably in their literary depictions, bespeaking their modern nature. One concerns 
their status as the representatives of a class, and the other consists in the employees’ particular lack or 
refusal of agency. As mentioned above, the employees’ peculiar status as mere representatives of a 
class of otherwise anonymous individuals often appears in literature in the form of paradoxical 
formulations, such as ‘a singular set’ (in Melville) or ‘einer der Vielen’ (in Walser). It is no 
coincidence that “Die Angestellten” (English: ‘the employees) in the title of Kracauer’s essay appear 
in the plural. The English translation, The Salaried Masses, then, makes it even more obvious that the 
title refers not to single, distinguishable individuals, but to an entire social group or class, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
extent that national traditions and historical pasts are increasingly deprived of their geographic and political groundings, 
which are re­organized in the processes of cultural globalization.” (Huyssen 2003, 4). 
60  For similar reasons, Sorg and Gisi label the character of the employee as a “Geburtshelfer der Moderne” or 
“obstetrician of modernity” (Sorg and Gisi 2011, 129). 
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characterized by a certain anonymity and lack of individualization. While the social theorist 
Kracauer deploys innovative sociological methods to tackles the task of describing the masses, fiction 
writers highlight the inherent epistemological problem with paradoxical formulations. Walser 
himself draws attention to this intrinsic contradiction that lies in giving a literary voice to the masses 
in his 1913 short prose piece Helblings Geschichte, where the first-person narrator states: “Ich bin 
einer der Vielen, und das gerade finde ich so seltsam.” (Walser 2011, 55). In this sense, the 
employees’ principium individuationis is precisely that they are no real individuals, but largely 
interchangeable members of the ‘masses.’ 
In accordance with their status as ‘mass individuals,’ employees are not their own masters, 
but in their everyday lives and even in (the forms of) their self-description, they highly depend upon 
their employers. This quality is the second characteristic determining their representation in 
literature. It concerns the employees’ lack or refusal of agency, which appears much like an immune 
reaction to their particular role in society, as well as to their place of work: the office. The office in 
particular, and the employment situation in general, can be described as “der Inbegriff eines 
fremdbestimmten Lebens” (Sorg and Gisi 2011, 134) or “the epitome of a heteronomous life”. 
When made the subject of literary depiction, however, it provokes evading this disciplinary setting 
by virtue of poetic imagination and narratological innovation. 61 
The above-discussed novelty claim is precisely one such narratological innovation. It helps to 
convert the employee’s inconspicuousness into a main selling point of its literary significance. This 
story is noteworthy, so the argument goes, since it revolves around a character that has previously 
                                                   
61 In this way, Sorg and Gisi describe the tension inherent to the employment situation as the germ cell of Walser’s 
existence: “Es ist dieser permanente Widerspruch zwischen Disziplin und Freiheit, zwischen Vorschrift und 
Entgrenzung, zwischen einem ‘Sitzen, Festkleben und Schreiben an kaufmännischen Schreibtischen, die man Pulte 
nennt’, und einem ‘Herumwandern in warmer, freier Natur’, der Walsers ‘Poetenleben’ fortan bestimmt.” (Sorg and Gisi 
2011, 134). 
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been neglected because he is both virtually ineffable and too dependent on others to make his own 
voice heard. The novelty claim thus helps the literary depictions to make up for the merely average, 
mass character of the employee figure by affecting to be new and unique itself, and therefore 
deserving attention. In other words, the employees seem insignificant by virtue of being the average 
men and therefore not exceptional. By claiming novelty, however, the text suggests that it is all the 
more exceptional itself as it is the first text that deals with the employees, despite the fact that they 
seem boring. This rhetorical function may be the reason why the novelty claim appears almost like 
an essential component of the employee’s genre. And with this in mind, it is somewhat surprising 
that Walser’s employee’s novel Der Gehülfe does entirely without it. However, the novel still features 
the paradoxical dimension of the genre, adding and perfecting some other strategies of dealing with 
the immanent paradoxical nature of the employee as a subject of literature. 
Instead of marking its own significance by a novelty claim at the outset, Walser’s novel 
acquires a veneer of innovation by centering on the idea of invention. And here again the genre 
displays its decidedly modernist orientation. Ancient rhetoric defines ‘inventio’ (Greek ‘heuresis’) as 
the retrieval of existing (handed down) matters and topics (Greek ‘topoi’) within the context of 
political and legal discourse. When this practice became serviceable to poetics and fine arts, it 
evolved into one of the key principles of Western culture. The modern idea of invention stands in 
crass contrast to this. It represents something radically new and unheard of. At once materialization 
and occurrence of modern technology ‘invention’ epitomizes, always anew, the claims of 
discontinuity with anything previous that is inherent to the modern project. Walser’s Der Gehülfe, in 
contrast, gives a picture of inventions that seems incompatible both with the modern and with the 
ancient notion. The inventions depicted in the novel are already there from the beginning. Only by 
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appearance they pass as truly modern inventions. On closer inspection, however, they turn out to be 
deprived of the very qualities that characterize inventions as the increments of technological progress: 
neither do they enable or empower its makers or potential users, nor do they really distinguish 
themselves as novelties from already existing and past technologies. 
To the extent that Walser’s novel presents the modern project of continued innovation as 
coming to a standstill, it also questions the idea of invention as the driving force of progress. Carl 
Tobler, the inventor, has degenerated into an entrepreneur who, at that, is largely failing at selling 
his ideas and inventions. He rather loses himself in petty obsessions, and instead of carrying forward 
the course of events through his own actions and achievements, he and his enterprise are overtaken 
by the mere progression of time. In this way, ancient cyclical patterns of temporality sneak back in, 
and with them an inventory of classical imagery: the cave that Tobler builds on his property, the 
garden that takes up increasing amounts of the employee’s working time, and the inexorable course 
of seasons that makes the standstill of the inventive endeavors even more noticeable. 
In brief, Der Gehülfe leaves out the novelty claim otherwise characteristic of the genre of 
employee’s literature. Instead, the novel centers on technological innovation as its central theme. 
Walser thus substitutes a critical engagement with the notion of technological invention for the 
claimed literary invention of a character type. This substitution within the genre repertoire of 
employee’s literature comes with a number of consequences, which I will further discuss in this 
chapter. Some of those consequences can be derived from a cursory comparison of Walser’s novel 
with Melville’s Bartleby. 
Aside from the fact that Der Gehülfe does not perpetuate the tradition of making a novelty 
claim at the outset, the novel differs in two important points from its American predecessor. The 
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first difference concerns the way in which the two employee characters behave toward the authority 
that their employers exercise over them. Melville’s Bartleby went down in history with the peculiar 
utterance: “I would prefer not to,” with which the title character incessantly expresses his total refusal 
to obey to the demands of his employer. Walser’s employee character Joseph Marti, in contrast, 
captivates the readership by his strange wavering between preemptive obedience and obstinate 
subversion. Headstrong and headless at once, Walser’s ‘Gehülfe’ constantly alternates between 
evading his employer’s commands and reprimanding himself for his own unruliness.62 This changed 
character dynamic is made possible by a different narrative perspective, marking the second point on 
which Walser’s novel set itself apart from most previous employee’s literature. Unlike Bartleby—and 
unlike Walser’s own earlier text Der Commis—, Der Gehülfe places the narrative focus on the 
employee character himself. Joseph Marti is the uncontested protagonist of Walser’s novel. While 
the narrative point of view shifts to the employer himself, however, the assistant does not acquire the 
position of a first-person narrator as will be true, for example, in Walser’s later story Helblings 
Geschichte. The narrator in Der Gehülfe instead applies some sophisticated strategies, which I will 
further discuss in this chapter, to avoid turning the employee into just another literary hero. Walser 
thus manages to focus on the employee, yet without writing a purely subversive master narrative in 
which the ruled class would take over the position of the rulers. By providing the employee with his 
own voice—albeit through the lens of a third-person narrator—the novel draws attention to the 
immanent conflict between the characters’ individual interests and the higher purpose of the 
                                                   
62 This inner tension between disobedience and self-disciplining determines the employer character from the start: 
“Später wurde er in die Geheimnisse der Toblerschen geschäftlichen Unternehmungen kurz eingeweiht und mit den 
Pflichten, die er zu erfüllen hatte, im allgemeinen vertraut gemacht. Es ging ihm dabei eigentümlich, er verstand nur die 
Hälfte. Was denn nur mit ihm sei, dachte er und machte sich Vorwürfe: ‘Bin ich ein Betrüger, ein Schwätzer? Will ich 
Herrn Tobler hintergehen? Er verlangt einen ‘Kopf’ und ich, ich bin heute absolut kopflos. Vielleicht daß es morgen 
früh oder bereits heute abend besser geht.’” (DG 10) 
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technological enterprise. This sophisticated narrative construction highlights a de-personalized power 
structure, as the narration (i.e. the telling voice and the told agency) does not focalized on one 
coherent character position.63  
Der Gehülfe gains a good deal of its literary power by combining the thematic focus on 
technological inventions with the narrative focus on the power structure. It is this original 
combination that highlights the relation between modern technology and agency as a problem of 
literary and historical narration. In the following sections of this chapter, I will first examine the 
particular power structure between employer and employee against the backdrop of the master-
servant paradigm that the novel draws upon. Then, I will take a closer look at the perspective as well 
as the particular use of irony and narrative focalization deployed in the novel. And finally, I will 
discuss the role modern technology plays in Der Gehülfe, in the form of Tobler’s inventions, of his 
manic character, and as a modern project, which, in juxtaposition with nature, informs the 
temporality of the novel. 
The literary problems posed by the social phenomenon of the employees arise from the 
particular power structure within which they reside (i.e. subordinate position conflicting with the 
heroization tendency of literary protagonists); the mass anonymity conflicting with the ‘uniqueness’ 
of literature; the dependency of the employee appears in conflict with the enunciating setting of a 
literary narrative. 
                                                   
63 When narrative theorists speak of focalization, they usually refer to a given horizon of information or knowledge in 
relation to the narrator and the characters (this is at least the way in which Genette applies this category). In the case of 
Der Gehülfe, what I mean by ‘focalization’ rather refers to the field of different interests and opinions informing the 
narrative (discourse) and that can be (more or less) attributed to the different characters. 
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2. The Master and the Servant: A Farce on Progress 
As mentioned above, the setting of Walser’s novel indicates a transition between a family-based 
craftsman’s workshop and a modern, rather de-personalized workplace.64 This transition manifests 
itself as a contrast between the generally modern subject matter of this novel—the enterprise of a 
technological inventor—and a number of apparent anachronisms within its content.  
The first of these anachronisms lies in the novel’s title. By choosing the word “Gehülfe” over 
more modern expressions such as ‘Angestellter,’ ‘Assistent,’ or ‘Sekretär,’ Walser contrasts his novel 
well against a modernist atmosphere of an industrialized, urban environment. The antiquated or 
dialectal spelling “Gehülfe” (as opposed to the high-German spelling “Gehilfe”) adds to this effect, 
endowing the novel with a historical patina. In this vein, combinations of modern with atavistic 
elements permeate the novel and thus hint at an ongoing process of transition from a context of 
family-based craftsman’s workshop to the modern workplace of the white-collar worker in a 
company.65 
Second, Tobler’s ‘Villa Abendstern’ appears to be another archaism fully in line with the 
antiquated feel of the novel’s title. As described above, the site of the mansion merges work and life 
of the protagonists. And yet, this site characteristic should not simply be read as an archaism. On the 
contrary, the fusion of work and life or leisure could be one example of a truly visionary design of 
Walser’s novel. Melville’s Bartleby, the predecessor text, is still “von Mauern und Wänden 
durchzogen” (Han 2016, 49) (‘lined with walls and facades,’ my translation), which also stand for a 
clear divide between work and life.66 Walser’s employee’s novel, in contrast, is a narrative of the 
                                                   
64 In a similar way, Stefanie Rinke describes the employee’s identity as being ‘between the epochs’: “Josephs narrative 
Identität steht hierbei noch zwischen den Epochen.” (Rinke 2009, 238). 
65 Cf. Rinke’s paper regarding the meaning and usage of the word ‘Gehülfe’ at the time (Rinke 2009, 228).  
66 One of Bartleby’s flagrant transgressions is precisely that he converts his office into a living space. 
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blurry lines. As philosopher Byung-Chul Han correctly notes with regard to Bartleby, “[d]ie 
Gesellschaft, die Melville beschreibt, ist noch eine Disziplinargesellschaft” (Han 2016, 49). Walser’s 
Der Gehülfe, in contrast to this, gives a visionary account of an emerging post-disciplinary—if you 
will, post-industrial—society. 
Third, the novel is set at the outskirts of a small town in a rural part of Switzerland. Within 
such a setting, Tobler’s “Villa” (mansion) is reminiscent of a romantic estate rather than an 
industrialized workplace. The fact that the mansion bears the name “Abendstern” (English ‘evening 
star’) adds to this impression, as it evokes not only narratives of decay and doom, but also 
associations with the romantic tradition, notably with Jean Paul’s 1795 novel Hesperus oder 45 
Hundposttage. 
Apart from emphasizing the historical depth, the state of abeyance between two modes of 
employment and the blurry line between work and life thus also hint at a trans-historical dimension 
of the employee’s condition. The novel attends not only to the specific class of employee’s 
characteristic for the given historical period, but also to the general power relations among humans. 
Within his oeuvre, Walser dealt repeatedly with this general power structure. For the most part, he 
did so from the viewpoint of subordinate individuals, such as the servant, the boarding pupil, the 
roaming employee, or other members of modern society who usually receive little attention from 
writers. Der Gehülfe is thus fully in line with Walser’s trademark of favoring the small67  and 
insignificant, which later in his life materialized even in the microscopic cursive of his manuscripts 
(cf. micrographs, Aus dem Bleistiftgebiet). 
                                                   
67 The writer and critic W.G. Sebald once fittingly described Walser as a “Hellseher im Kleinen” or “clairvoyant of the 
small” (Sebald 1998, 142), freely quoting Walser’s own words from his first book Fritz Kochers Aufsätze. 
 43 
In the case of Der Gehülfe, this favoring of the small and insignificant comes with one 
important benefit: it amplifies the reflexive and perceptive modes68 of the novel’s discourse while 
bracketing—or questioning—the unity of agency, which otherwise appears clearly centered on one 
or a number of characters. While the employee Joseph Marti is clearly in the focus of the novel’s 
narration, his subordinate position does not leave much leeway for a significant intervention or the 
character’s development up until the very end of the action.69  
The beginning paragraphs of the novel explicitly reveal the purpose of Joseph Marti’s 
employment, which is the primary subject of the novel. When the new employee enters Carl 
Tobler’s mansion, he presents himself to the housemaid (‘Magd’) with the words: “Ich bin der neue 
Angestellte.” (DG 5) The novel begins and ends with this employment situation. This holds true not 
only in a temporal but also in a spatial sense. The very house that Joseph steps into at the beginning 
will be both his workplace and his habitation until the end of the novel. An ‘enamel plaque’ 
(“Emailleschild, DG 5) at the entrance of the house informs about the nature of the enterprise “C. 
Tobler, technisches Büro” (DG 5). Stating the owner’s name and the company’s area of activity, 
“technisches Büro” or “technical office,” the sign makes apparent that Joseph Marti is entering a 
small family enterprise. The purpose of the Tobler’s “engineering office”—as the novel clearly 
states—are a number of inventions that the entrepreneur has made: “Reklame-Uhr”, “automatische 
Krankenstuhl” “Gewehr” “Tiefbohrmaschine”. And it is the new employee’s primary task to assist 
his boss in finding industrial producers and buyers for these inventions. Yet, fully in line with the 
                                                   
68 The subordinate role of a servant or assistant that Walser chooses for his protagonist involves exactly this priority of 
observation over action, as Catherine Sauvat rightly remarks: “Der Diener genießt das seltsame Privileg, immer auf der 
Bühne und doch nie beteiligt zu sein, beobachten, schnuppern, sich nähern zu können, doch nie zuzupacken oder 
herauszufordern.’ (Sauvat 1993, 155). 
69 As I will later show, this character restriction of the protagonist not only concerns his agency and development, but 
even his qualities as a perceptive and communicative instance within the novel’s design. 
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setting of a pre-modern family enterprise, Joseph’s field of duties goes clearly beyond the mere 
technological-economic realm and well into the socio-psychological fabric of the Tobler family. His 
employment seems to have no limitations, neither regarding the tasks incumbent upon the young 
employer, nor the timeframe of his availability.  
Die Obliegenheiten eines Angestellten liegen in solch einem Haus weder ausdrücklich da noch ausdrücklich 
dort, sondern überall. Auch die Stunden der Pflichterfüllung sind keine exakt begrenzten, sondern erstrecken 
sich manchmal bis tief in die Nacht hinein, um bisweilen plötzlich mitten am Tag für eine Zeitlang 
aufzuhören. (DG 25)70 
The employee-protagonist functions as a factotum, “als ein richtiger Mann für alles” (DG 47), which 
is a character type epitomizing the transition from the Middle Ages to the early modern period. 
The blurry line between professional and familial relations is complemented by a set of 
imagery that helps in leveling out the demarcations between the human and the technological realm. 
The following three examples will help demonstrate this. Firstly, the novel describes Tobler’s 
relationship with his inventions as one of fatherly affection, likening his technological creations to 
biological children. 
‘Sie ist wie ein kleines oder großes Kind, solch eine Uhr’, dachte der Angestellte, ‘wie ein eigensinniges Kind, 
das der beständigen Pflege bedarf, und das nicht einmal dankt dafür. Gedeiht denn eigentlich dieses 
Unternehmen, wächst dieses Kind? Man merkt wenig davon. Ein Erfinder liebt seine Erfindungen. Diese 
kostspielige Uhr ist Tobler beinahe ans Herz gewachsen. […]’. (DG 29)71 
Accordingly, the inventor and family father entrusts his young assistant alternatingly with fostering 
his brainchildren, the inventions, and with looking after his biological children. In this vein, a fine 
                                                   
70 “The responsibilities of an employee in such a household do not lie explicitly in one realm or explicitly in the other—
they are dispersed. Even the hours for the discharge of duties are not precisely calibrated, but rather may at times extend 
deep into the night, or occasionally cease abruptly in the middle of the day for a while.” (Walser 2007, 27). 
71 “‘It is like a small or large child, this clock,’ the clerk thought, ‘like a headstrong child that requires constant self-
sacrificing care and doesn’t even thank one for watching over it. And is this enterprise flourishing, is the child growing? 
Little progress can be seen. An inventor does love his inventions. Tobler has become quite enamored of this costly clock. 
[…]’” (Walser 2007, 31). 
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web of imagery links the semantic field of biological reproduction and male potency with the act of 
invention and with Tobler’s obsessive engagement with technology.72  
Secondly, the very first encounter of the employer Tobler with his new employee sets the 
tone for a complicated power relation that defies the premises of a linear hierarchy. In a conversation 
that bears all the hallmarks of a modern job interview, the inventor-entrepreneur proclaims that he 
needs a self-reliant ‘head’ for an employee, as a ‘machine’ could not serve him well (DG 7). The 
passage in question invests the relationship between the employer and his employee with a deeper 
meaning that extends beyond the field of human interactions and into the man-machine 
relationship. I will discuss this passage further below in detail, in the section about kaleidoscopic 
narration, as it is of crucial significance for the picture this novel gives of the relation of modern 
technology and human agency. 
Thirdly, the novel repeatedly characterizes the relationship between Tobler and his employer 
as one between master and servant. Midway into the text, the narrator describes a slightly awkward 
encounter between the two main characters in the little town’s pub: “Da hatte man sie also beide, 
den Herrn und den Knecht, und wo? In der Kneipe.” (DG 150).73 This formulation is clearly ironic, 
and it remains the only passage that raises the reference to such literal explicitness. However, it is a 
sufficient indicator that Der Gehülfe inscribes itself into a literary-philosophical tradition around the 
dialectic of mastery and bondage (German ‘Herrschaft und Knechtschaft’). In Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) where the old topos of master and servant is described as a struggle 
for recognition, it marks an important episode in the gradual formation (German ‘Bildung’) of spirit 
                                                   
72 I will not discuss this dimension of the novel in detail, as it has elsewhere been explored at length (Gößling). 
73 “So there they were, the two of them, master and servant—and where? In a public house.” (Walser 2007, 152). 
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at the step from consciousness to self-consciousness.74 But aside from its significance in Hegel’s 
understanding of consciousness, it is also possible to invest this famous passage in the fourth chapter 
of Phenomenology with a historical dimension. In such a reading, the struggle for recognition would 
not simply mark the decisive step in the formation of self-consciousness. Indeed, it would also mark 
an important episode in the historical development of human culture, namely one where a power 
relationship establishes the conditions for collective productive action. It would then not only 
represent a stride along the way of the ‘progression’ (German ‘Fortgang’) in the formation of 
consciousness (as Hegel envisions it in the introduction to his book). But the struggle for recognition 
would also represent a leap in the trajectory of ‘progress’ (German ‘Fortschritt’), as Hegel would later 
spell it out in his writings on the philosophy of history. 
While recent Hegel scholarship has cast serious doubts on the validity of an overly historical 
(or meta-historical) reading of the master-servant dialectic (Bluhm 2004; Osborne 1995, 72), it may 
in fact be one of the most productive misreadings in the history of modern philosophy (Ottmann 
1981).75 None other than Karl Marx appears to have provoked exactly such a reading of the master-
servant dialectic within the framework of historical progress. It is primarily Marx’s early writings that 
suggest an analogy of the master-servant dialectic with the struggle between proletarian and 
                                                   
74 The German word ‘Bildung’ that Hegel uses to describe the progressing development he describes in Phenomenology 
can mean both ‘formation’ and ‘education.’ An emphatic reading of the word in the sense of ‘education’ may in fact be 
indicated as Hegel’s book falls right between the flowering periods of debates about ‘Bildung’ (Wilhelm v. Humboldt, 
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi) on the one hand and of the genre of Bildungsroman on the other hand. In this vein, Chris 
Arthur suggests reading Hegel’s book as a philosophical form of a Bildungsroman: “The Phenomenology is a spiritual 
odyssey, or, perhaps, a Bildungsroman of spirit, in which spirit discovers that the objective shapes given to it in 
consciousness and self-consciousness are nothing but its own self-determination.” (Arthur 1983, 71). 
75 If not this, then the passage is at least to be viewed as “einer der am meisten mißgedeuteten und mißverstandenen 
Texte Hegels.” (Ottmann 1981). Henning Ottmann argues that against the backdrop of Hegel’s later philosophy of 
history, historical progress actually lies between the struggle for recognition on the one hand and the modern law and the 
state on the other hand (Ottmann 1981, 371). The dialectic of master and slave would thus fall into the original 
condition of history (German ‘Anfangszustand’), marking the emergence from the state of nature (Ottmann 1981, 384), 
rather than a primal scene of historical progress itself. 
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bourgeois (Bluhm 2004). Under the premise of this analogy, Marx’s categorical imperative to 
overturn “alle Verhältnisse […], in denen der Mensch ein erniedrigtes, ein geknechtetes, ein 
verlassenes, ein verächtliches Wesen ist” must appear as a call to invest Hegel’s master-servant 
dialectic by giving it an emancipatory momentum (Bluhm 2004, 67). Marx’s later works view such 
emancipation as the telos of history as class struggle, in that the working class takes control of the 
means of production and ultimately bring about a state of classless society. Only in hindsight, the 
philosophical and political consequences of this theoretical transformation have been projected back 
onto the dialectic of master and servant as it was developed in Hegel’s famous fourth chapter of 
Phenomenology. Marx’ own responsibility for this backward projection is highly questionable and 
may itself be a consequential “myth of Marxology” (Arthur 1983). But however inaccurate a socio-
historical understanding of Hegel’s master-servant dialectic may be, such a reading has left a lasting 
impression in the history of ideas around progress and recognition. On the one hand, the struggle 
for recognition is as a primal scene of social progress, and the master-servant relationship, on the 
other hand, is viewed as an allegory of historical progress as class struggle in the Marxian sense.76 
Both Hegel and Marx view the dialectic exemplified by master and servant as an 
asymmetrical power relation that is mediated through mutual recognition. Walser’s novel, on the 
contrary, depicts how the enlightenment-informed paradigm of master and servant itself shipwrecks 
on its own foundations: namely on an ultimately technocratic ideology in which all members of 
society are instrumental for a common purpose (teleology). For Hegel, mutual recognition between 
                                                   
76 A highly consequential example of such a conflation of Hegel and Marx can be found in Alexandre Kojève’s Lectures 
on the Phenomenology of Spirit, delivered in the 1930s at the École des Hautes Études. The notes from the lectures, 
assembled by Raimond Queneau, contain sentences like the following: “The complete, absolutely free man, definitively 
and completely satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed in and by this satisfaction, will be the 
Slave who has ‘overcome’ his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all 
human, social, historical progress. History is the history of the working Slave.” (Kojève 1969, 20). 
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master and servant is necessary because “was geschehen soll, nur durch beide zustande kommen 
kann.” From the standpoint of historical progress,77 this struggle is a necessary condition that is 
sublated (German ‘aufgehoben’) as an archaic state in historical reality.78 The telos of historical 
progress in Hegel is the integration of society in an order of hierarchic representation.. For Marx, 
true recognition seems to imply “die Individuen nicht auf ihre Eigenschaft, bestimmte Rollen zu 
realisieren, zu reduzieren” (Bluhm 2004, 67). True progress as the telos of history as class struggle 
would mean to first reverse the existing power relation by virtue of a revolution in whose course the 
proletariat takes possession of the means of production and of power in order to ultimately establish 
classless society. 
In Walser’s novel, in contrast, progress seems to be neither thwarted by a lack of mutual 
recognition between employer and employee, nor does it appear to be hindered by reduction of 
individuals to their social roles or by an unjust monopoly held by one side over the means of 
production and social power in general. The power relationship between Carl Tobler and Joseph 
Marti appears dysfunctional in and of itself. To the same degree, the paradigm of master and servant 
seems archaic and strangely unfit as a structure to inform the relationship between Tobler and his 
employee—and it is certainly not conducive to their common endeavor in the service of the 
technological, let alone for social progress. 
Doch nein. Hier war es ja ganz anders. 
                                                   
77  In Hegel’s terms, progress is to be understood as ‘juridification’ (German ‘Verrechtlichung’) in ‘civil society’ 
(‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’). 
78 Hegel’s concept of reality (German ‘Wirklichkeit’) differs from today’s common sense as it does not describe 
contingent states and processes under the laws of nature, but the necessary under the law of reason, as later formulated in 
his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.” 
(Hegel 1889, 24). 
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Hier handelte es sich nicht um eine immerwährende Verbannung auf eine öde Felseninsel sondern um eine 
Tagesreise per Eisenbahn und um einen praktischen und ein wenig unangenehmen Besuch. […] Und von 
einem besonders betrübten Knecht [!] und Vasallen war hier ebensowenig die Frage und Rede als von einer 
noch fassungsloseren Kammerfrau.” (DG 249)79 
In this passage, Walser once again evokes a literary topos in the same breath as he ironizes it. The 
narrator only caricaturizes the employment situation as one between master and servant, thereby 
questioning the paradigm’s own validity as a lens to sharpen the view on social reality. Walser’s novel 
paints a world in which a binary, asymmetric power relationship and its mediation through work 
and labor only underlines the pointlessness of progress altogether. But to the extent that this power 
relation is dysfunctional and a mere farce in itself, the prospect or desire of overturning it would not 
mean progress either.80 In this vein, the means of production and the products of labor do not 
function as devices or rewards of societal power in the world of Tobler’s technological office. 
To conclude, the topos of master and servant represents a literary model to explain how 
power enables productive collective practice (Hegel), or else how it impairs such practice in the form 
of alienation and injustice (Marx). Walser’s Der Gehülfe, in contrast spells out this model only as a 
farce to show the failure of progress as the intended goal of collective practice. The following two 
sections of this chapter will show how the two agents and their relationship are not maintained by a 
functioning power relation, but rather undermined by the technological conditions. 
                                                   
79 “But no. Here things were quite different.  
What was being embarked on here was not everlasting exile on some rocky desert isle, but rather a mere daytrip by rail 
and a practical and somewhat disagreeable visit. Nor was there a queen present, […]. Nor was the figure of the 
melancholy hero represented; rather, it was only the engineer Tobler, modern in both his garb and sensibilities, escorting 
the lady on the first bit of her journey, not to comfort her exactly, but to share with her a few sensible words.” (Walser 
2007, 251). 
80 Much in line with this, the option of ‘socialism’ only appears as an ideological dream of Joseph Marti’s past. Likened 
to a “Schlingpflanze” or “climbing plant,” (DG 132) it represents the antithesis rather than an ideological proxy of linear 
progress. Cf. the section “The Inventions and their Distribution” in this chapter for a close reading of the respective 
passage. 
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3. Irony of ‘Kaleidoscopic Focalization’ 
Der Mensch besteht nicht aus zweierlei Dingen, sonst wäre 
wahrhaftig das ganze Erdenleben eine zu bequemliche Sache. 
(DG 41)81 
 
From the standpoint of narrative theory, the genre of the employee’s novel comes with two main 
problems that require major alterations to the conventional form of narrative literature. The first of 
these problems concerns the character design, since employee tales by definition center their 
narration on protagonists who are in some sense anti-heroes. Moreover, employees are ‘members of 
the masses’ rather than outstanding individuals. A literary piece that stands under this premise has to 
provide a quite original answer to the question of how its protagonist’s life may nevertheless be of an 
exemplary significance. 
The second problem of the employee’s tale concerns the speech situation. The protagonists, 
by virtue of their subordinate position within the power structure depicted in the text are always 
already subject to compromise, manipulation, or corruption by their employers. Employees are not 
wholly free individuals in and of themselves, and this is all the more consequential where the literary 
characters coalesce with the narrator’s voice, as is the case in Der Gehülfe. Hence, their employers are 
in some way the provider of the writing tools, the subject of writing, and the space and time in 
which the piece of literature is produced. The employee-protagonists are highly dependent on their 
employers, both in a material and in a spiritual way.82 
                                                   
81 “Human beings do not consist of two separate entities. Otherwise life on earth would in truth be far too simple.” 
(Walser 2007, 43). The formulation can be read as a subtle reference to an utterance from Goethe’s Faust: “Zwei Seelen 
wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,” expressing the inner struggle of modern man. 
82 Of course this is not always true in a literal sense. In fact, Walser wrote the novel, at least according to his own meta-
fictional statements, some years after he had actually been in the role of a ‘Gehülfe’ himself: “Als ich in Wirklichkeit 
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Facing these two principal problems inherent to the genre, Robert Walser comes up with a 
set of highly innovative narrative and rhetorical devices in Der Gehülfe. On the one hand, the author 
adumbrates seriality in the novel’s design by introducing Joseph’s predecessor, Wirsich, who appears 
somewhat like a ghost of the past, but who at the same time figures very much as Joseph Marti’s alter 
ego. By means of such diachronic reduplication of the main character, Walser reconciles the 
phenomena of anonymity and social mass with the exemplarity of a literary figure. On the other 
hand, Walser gets away from a conventional person-based form of narration by blurring the 
boundaries of and between the single characters: 
Die Identitätsgrenzen zwischen den Figuren, nicht nur die zwischen Wirsich und Marti, verlaufen durchweg 
schwankend und diffus. Aber was ihr Bewußtsein zerspalten, ihre Erinnerung einer ‘einstigen Einheit’ weithin 
getrübt hat, war jene ästhetische Schizophrenie, der gleiche ‘Kunstgriff’, der die Figuren des Bewußtseins 
beraubt hat, daß sie zugleich ‘Autoren’ einer Phantasiewelt seien, die sie als formal undistanzierte Wirklichkeit 
umschließt. (Gößling 1992, 53)83 
The blurry identity lines between the characters do not arise only from the ‘aesthetic schizophrenia’ 
that Andreas Gößling describes as the literary device responsible for the oblivion of the act of literary 
world making; they also display the very power structure that not simply connects, but in fact 
constitutes, the characters in Walser’s novel. With this in mind, the novel’s discourse oscillates 
between indoctrination and subversion as all information about the narrated world is channeled 
through the protagonist’s mind. Joseph Marti often says what his employer, Carl Tobler and his 
family, want to hear, in a manner of preemptive obedience—be it conveyed in the form of direct or 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Gehülfe’ war, hatte ich da eine Ahnung, daß aus diesem Stück Erleben ein ‘Wirklichkeitsroman’, also aus dem 
wirklichen Wirken ein schriftstellerisches entstehen würde? Nein, keine Spur! […] weil er sich dem Erleben 
uninteressiert hingab, d.h. unbekümmert um Schriftstellerei, will also sagen, noch nichts schrieb, so schrieb er seinen 
‘Gehülfen’ Jahre später […].” (Walser 1966, 218). 
83 “The identity lines between the characters, not only those between Wirsich and Marti, are unstable and diffuse 
throughout. It was their aesthetic schizophrenia, however, that has fractured their consciousness and has widely clouded 
their memory of a ‘past unity.’ And it is the same ‘artifice’ that has deprived the characters of their awareness that they 
were at the same time ‘authors’ of a fantasy world, which envelops them as a formally impartial reality.” (My translation). 
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indirect speech or of free indirect discourse. Just as often, however, a subversive strain slips into 
Joseph’s stream of thoughts. The polarity between these two attitudes manifests itself in an 
oscillation between self-will and ulterior will, i.e. obedience to the authority. It is exactly this 
oscillation that constitutes the very personality structure of Walser’s protagonist. 
The split, decentered personality structure is one aspect of the literary technique that I 
decided to call ‘kaleidoscopic narration.’84 Another aspect is that Joseph, in his status as employee, 
carries out multiple roles or functions within Tobler’s house. Apart from the above-mentioned 
family tasks he has to fulfill, the young employee also helps Tobler to create and maintain the 
impression that his two-men-enterprise is actually a well-established company: „Und er beschäftigte 
sich mit der Tiefbohrmaschine. Die Handelsabteilung schrieb [!] einen Brief an den 
Tiefbauingenieur Joël, der sich wie es schien, ‚gewaltig’ für dieses Werk interessierte.“ (250) 
The described volitional dynamic is particularly striking when it comes to Carl Tobler’s 
technological inventions, which Joseph is hired to develop into marketable commodities. Young 
Joseph appears to be partly indoctrinated by the ideology of modern technology in general and by 
the employer’s delusional faith in his inventions in particular.85 But this complicity toward his 
master is itself repeatedly jeopardized by hints of doubt and subversion on the part of the 
‘bondsman’. And what is more, this ambiguous relationship between inventor and assistant is 
strangely interfused with the peculiar relation between technology and humans in the novel. 
                                                   
84 Lukas Rüsch uses the metaphor of a picture puzzle (German ‘Vexierbild’) to describe this shifting of the narrative 
focus: “Bei der ironischen Verflechtung von Bericht und monologischer Darstellung werden die divergierenden 
Ansichten oft mit der Konsequenz eines Vexierbildes ineinander verwoben, so daß sich auf den ersten Blick die 
Einstellungen kaum gegeneinander abgrenzen lassen und sich eine sinnfällige Optik des Geschehens erst aus der 
wechselseitigen Projektion der Einstellungen aufeinander ergibt.” (Rüsch 1983, 20–1) 
85 In other words, the complex volitional dynamic and kaleidoscopic narration are narratological manifestations of a 
social phenomenon that Herbert Marcuse would later call ‘technological rationality’—as opposed to ‘individualistic 
rationality’ (Marcuse 1982, 141). 
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The above-described opening scene of the novel makes explicit how the line between humans 
and technology is at the same time permeable and critical, at least on a metaphorical level. When 
Tobler greets his new employee in a very unwelcoming manner, his remarks suggest that he views 
the imminent employment relationship at risk of turning all too technomorphic. 
Er müsse, sagte Tobler in rauhem Ton, einen Kopf als Angestellten haben. Eine Maschine könne ihm nicht 
dienen. (DG 7) 
This statement of the inventor evokes not only discourses about the division of labor and the 
principles of ‘scientific management’ that the American engineer and management consultant 
Frederic Winslow Taylor propagated around the same time as Walser wrote his novel. The passage 
also subverts the classical dichotomy between head and body or head and hand by replacing a 
machine for human corporeality in the first sentence. The second sentence then further distorts the 
classical metonymy of head and body. 
In Tobler’s world, the human body appears to be either mechanized, or fully obliterated, as a 
mediator between human volition and the machine world. Within the classical paradigm of head 
and body or head and hand, the head would rather be associated with giving orders than with 
serving. The second sentence in the cited passage, however, suggests (if only ex negativo) that it is a 
head that could best serve Tobler, the master. Against the backdrop of Walser’s literary obsession 
with ‘servantship,’86 this second sentence of Tobler’s statement can not only translate to ‘a machine 
can be of no use to me’ but also ‘a machine cannot be my servant.’ Understood in such a way, the 
passage implies that the ability to serve is what distinguishes humans from machines. In Tobler’s 
mind, there seems to be something intrinsically human to this ability. And yet, the tone of his 
                                                   
86 Walser celebrates this obsession most prominently in his third novel Jakob von Gunten, which appeared in 1909, about 
a year after Der Gehülfe. 
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statement shows that this distinguishing quality and with it the qualitative difference between 
humans and machines cannot be taken for granted.87 Why else would Tobler assault his yet-to-be 
hired employee in such a deterrent manner? By appealing to Joseph that he ought to be a ‘head’ and 
not a machine he implies that there are in fact humans who act much like machines, or else 
machines that surreptitiously take up the place of human workers.88 
In this subtle way, the first conversation between Carl Tobler and Joseph Marti interweaves 
the automata theme of romanticism with the problems of the employee genre. Marti seems to take a 
strange intermediate position between the master on the one hand and the machine world on the 
other. This is not to say that he appears as an ambiguous, technomorphic creature, but simply that 
he has to arbitrate between his employer’s will to create technology and his obsession with everything 
technological. By virtue of Marti’s intermediate position, the protagonist character functions as a 
contrast agent that reveals the points where technology overrides the realm of rationality. 
What is at stake here is rationality understood as the unifying force of technological 
progress.89 While rationality would be the principle unifying all human will and desire in the 
purpose of technological progress, Walser’s novel presents the symptoms of its erosion. Der Gehülfe 
explores a world in which self-will and ulterior will cannot be told apart, where personal volition is 
                                                   
87 Walser’s subversive take on the man-machine opposition is particularly interesting if seen against the backdrop Kant’s 
seminal essay on What is Enlightenment. Throughout the essay, Kant uses metaphors of machine and mechanism to 
illustrate the difference between private and public use of reason. ‚Unmündigkeit.’ “Enlightenent is,” as Kant puts it in 
the much-quoted opening sentence of that essay, “the departure from a state of self-inflicted tutelage (Unmündigkeit)” 
(“[…] der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit,” my translation). And where 
enlightenment is achieved, writes Kant in the final sentence of the essay, man will be ‘more than machine’ (“mehr als 
Maschine”). The “progress of Enlightenment” (“Fortschritt der Aufklärung”) is thus conceived of in contrast to 
technological progress: as a process that transcends humanity. 
88 Andreas Gößling points out that Carl Tobler’s cigar smoking habit, which the entrepreneur passes on to his employee 
with a condescending gesture, assimilates him to a factory of steam engine of the industrial age: “Tobler ist die 
‘Maschine’ in Vollendung; irrtümlich sucht er draußen die ‘Fabrik’, die er selber längst verkörpert und in all seinen 
“Erfindungen” reproduziert, einer “Massenanfertigung” (45) gleichförmiger Produkte.” (Gößling 1992, 103). 
89 Note that Siegfried Kracauer names rationalization (German ‘Rationalisierung’) as the main cause of the increasing 
numbers of employees (Kracauer 1971, 213). 
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eroded by an ideology that is no more than another individual’s obsession. In such a world, the 
rationalist understanding of technological progress can no longer serve to unify an aggregate of 
different human wills into one universal purpose of humanity. 
Walser’s art of blurring the boundaries between the single characters as well as between 
human individuals and the technological world is the main narrative device of the novel. However, it 
is far more than a poetic strategy: it reveals that the crisis of progress does not simply consist in a 
contingent standstill or an absence of successful innovation. In fact, the problematic power relation 
between Tobler and his employee is a key symptom of that crisis. Progress ceases to convince both as 
an ultimate purpose informing the means-ends hierarchy of modern society and as a narrative 
pattern to construe the process of social change. The cause of this crisis can be found in technology 
itself, or rather in the fact that the relation of humans with technology has become problematic. In 
order to get a deeper understanding of this problematic relation, I will go on to discuss the role of 
Tobler’s inventions in Walser’s novel. Subsequently, I will conclude the chapter with a closer look at 
the structures of temporality linked with the themes of technology and agency. 
4. The Inventions and their Distribution 
The passage about Joseph Marti’s first encounter with Carl Tobler makes apparent how Der Gehülfe 
establishes a direct connection between the employment situation and the significance of technology 
in contemporary society. Besides the body-machine analogy introduced at the beginning of the 
novel, the protagonist’s workplace is labeled as a ‘technisches Büro’ and its area of operation is the 
creation of technological inventions. Later on in Der Gehülfe, Tobler reveals a true obsession with 
 56 
new technology even in his leisure time when he invests a great amount of energy and capital 
electrifying his property. 
Although technology clearly plays a crucial role throughout the novel, the extant scholarship 
on Der Gehülfe has strangely neglected this central theme. The single study known to me that places 
its main focus on technology in Der Gehülfe is a (forthcoming) doctoral thesis by Nathan Taylor 
(Cornell University). Taylor, however, predominantly stresses the economic rather than the 
technological aspects of the novel. Consequently, he looks at Tobler’s inventions chiefly as 
commodities, not as innovations in the realm of technology and engineering.90 The present chapter, 
by contrast, will focus on how Walser’s novel deals with technology as a narrative phenomenon. It 
explores how Tobler’s inventions as well as his obsession with state-of-the art technology feature as a 
literary crystallization of problems inherent to contemporary society and of a progressivist notion of 
history prevalent at Walser’s times. 
Tobler’s inventions—the narrator mentions five of them—form a strangely marginalized red 
thread in the novel’s plot. Although they are the main purpose of Tobler’s enterprise and hence of 
Joseph’s employment, the novel’s narration repeatedly veers off to other subjects, such as the affairs 
in the Tobler family, Joseph’s eroticized relationship with Tobler’s wife, his—strangely 
unmotivated91—visit to his friend or ex-girlfriend Klara in the country’s capital, and the tragic fate of 
                                                   
90  Der Gehülfe provides plenty of good reasons for such an economic reading. Carl Tobler and Joseph Marti’s 
preoccupations largely concern the acquisition of investors to sponsor the production and distribution of the inventions; 
the job that Joseph holds in the enterprise is roughly the one of a product manager; the decline and fall of Tobler 
enterprise presents itself as the failure of such acquisition endeavors and thus as a classic case of bankruptcy; and at least 
two of the inventions—the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ (DG 15) and the ‘Schützenautomat’ (70) are described as being “mit dem 
Reklamewesen verbunden” (DG 15, 71) or ‘connected with the advertising industry.’ If the present chapter stresses the 
technological aspects, this is not to question, but rather to complement the validity of an economic reading of the novel. 
91 Along these lines, Andreas Gößling observes: “Besonders die Passage des Gehülfen, in der Klaras Herkunft und 
Entwicklung aus Erzählerperspektive referiert werden, wirkt anfangs recht irritierend, da sie mit dem sonst Erzählten 
kaum verbunden und an einer Stelle geradezu gewaltsam mit der Tobler-Handlung verknüpft scheint.” (Gößling 1992, 
57). This gaping lack of narrative motivation, however, proves to be in fact one of Walser’s key strategies within a radical 
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his predecessor Wirsich. Moreover, the narrator does not provide very clear descriptions of the 
inventions’ functionality and this neglect appears to partly result from the actual uselessness of 
Tobler’s creations altogether. Whenever the novel gives hints concerning the appearance or purpose 
of the inventions, every single one of them seems quite unspectacular and without any real use or 
benefit. 
Der Gehülfe merges the purpose or function of the technological inventions on the one hand 
with the telos informing and driving a literary narrative on the other, thereby turning technological 
objects into truly aesthetic artifacts. In this way, useless inventions appear to result in an aimless 
storyline, for how could one describe a machine that serves no clear purpose, and how could one tell 
a story about technological progress that has come to a standstill? 
The sheer futility and insignificance of all the inventions described in the novel would be a 
good reason to discuss them only in passing, if at all—just like most scholars have done. It would be 
indeed, if the digressions were any less vain and futile than the novel’s red thread about technology 
they distract from. However, the inventions stand in a pars-pro-toto relation to the plot in general. 
Their insignificance and futility is the crystallization of the uneventfulness of Walser’s novel on the 
whole. In this way, Tobler’s inventions figure as the defective gears in a malfunctioning narrative 
engine. The following paragraphs will therefore collect the information the novel provides about 
Tobler’s inventions in order to reflect upon their significance for the novel’s narrative construction. 
Altogether, the narrator mentions five inventions of Tobler’s making: a ‘Reklame-Uhr’ 
(advertising clock), a ‘Schützenautomat’ (marksman’s vending machine), a ‘patentierter 
                                                                                                                                                                    
critique of conventional structures of narrative cohesion. Walser’s conspicuous use of the word ‘zufälligerweise’ 
(‘coincidentally,’ 131) in this context features as an additional marker of such critical techniques, as Gößling rightly 
points out (Gößling 1992, 57). 
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Krankenstuhl’ (patented invalid chair), a ‘Dampfapparat’ (steam device), and a ‘Tiefbohrmaschine’ 
(deep hole drilling machine). While some of them (Reklame-Uhr, Schützen-Automat, and 
Krankenstuhl) find repeated mention in the novel and are at least allusively described in their 
functionality or purpose, the other two (the ‘Tiefbohrmaschine’ and the ‘Dampfapparat’) are just 
briefly brought up (‘der Dampfapparat, auch einer Toblerschen Erfindung’, DG 148). But even 
where the descriptions are more elaborate, they render fuzzy the actual functionality of the objects or 
the technical core of the inventive idea. The technological side of the inventions appears to be 
swathed in a cloud of verbiage about business and advertisement. This sections initial objective to 
collect the technological details about Tobler’s inventions from the novel is jeopardized by the very 
manner in which the narrator presents them. The observation takes a sudden turn, however, when 
we take into account that the very function and purpose of two of the five inventions appear 
identical with the advertising activities that surround them. Both the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ and the 
‘Schützenautomat’ are described to be “directly connected with the advertising business” in a 
formulation that appears verbatim in the description of the two inventions. In this sense, Walser’s 
technology appears to be always already part of a larger discursive practice of propaganda and 
persuasion. If the following paragraphs will provide a close look at Tobler’s inventions, they will do 
so by paying as much attention to the way in which they appear within the novel’s plot. 
After the narrator has introduced Joseph’s new workplace as a ‘technisches Büro’ in the first 
paragraph of the novel, it is surprising how late and how casually the inventions, i.e. the actual 
products of Tobler’s enterprise, find mention. Only after his new employer has treated Joseph with a 
good breakfast (DG 7) and lunch (DG 10) and after Tobler has introduced him to his wife (DG 9), 
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he briefly refers to one of his inventions, the ‘Reklame-Uhr’, without any further explanation 
thereof:  
Und nun sehen Sie einmal hierher, das da, aber sehen Sie sie ordentlich an, sind die zur ‘Reklame-Uhr’ 
erforderlichen Papiere. Können Sie gut rechnen? – Dann um so besser. (DG 11)92 
Strictly speaking, Tobler does not even refer to the invented device itself, but rather to some 
paperwork that he calls a ‘requirement’ for the invention. And even a day later, when Joseph gets a 
chance to familiarize himself with Tobler’s “Reklame-Uhr,” it seems as if he is dealing with a 
business plan rather than with a technological innovation. 
Im Laufe des nächsten Tages glaubte er sie [!] mit dem Wesen der ‚Reklame-Uhr’ dadurch bekannt gemacht zu 
haben, daß er begreifen lernte, daß dieses gewinnbringende Unternehmen eine dekorative Uhr sei, die Herr 
Tobler im Begriff war an Bahnverwaltungen, Restaurateure, Hoteliers etc. zu verpachten. (DG 14)93 
This passage is a perfect example of the above-described technique of kaleidoscopic narration. 
Although the focalization lies on Joseph and his inner life (“glaubte er,” or “it seemed to Joseph”), 
the narrative voice at the same time incorporates his employer’s beliefs and diction (“dieses 
gewinnbringende Unternehmen” or “this profitable enterprise”). We face a clearly mediated speech 
situation. The mental verb ‘glauben’ (to believe, to think) brackets the proposition once, which is 
then bracketed a second time by the infinitive construction “begreifen lernte” (he learned to 
understand), to finally remain in the subjunctive mood “sei” of the verb ‘sein.’ This cascade of 
mediation implicitly verbalizes the process of indoctrination that Joseph experiences. The narration 
thus identifies the inventor’s activity—“dieses gewinnbringende Unternehmen”—with a material 
                                                   
92 “And now look over here: this right here—and make sure you look it over carefully—is the required paperwork for the 
‘Advertising Clock. Are you good at figures? All the better.” (Walser 2007, 13–4). 
93 “In the course of the next day, it seemed to Joseph that he had succeeded in acquainting himself with the nature of the 
‘Advertising Clock,’ for he had managed to comprehend that this profitable enterprise was a decorative clock which Herr 
Tobler was intending to franchise to railway station managers, restaurateurs, hotel owners, and the like.” (Walser 2007, 
16). 
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object—“eine dekorative Uhr” (a decorative clock); however, this equation remains hypothetical as it 
is phrased in the subjunctive.  
The indeterminacy between object and activity corresponds with an ontological ambiguity of 
technological inventions as such. Walser’s text addresses this ambiguity with the word ‘Wesen,’ 
which provides reason enough to pay close attention to its usage in this context as well as in the 
whole novel. The word’s general meaning translates either to ‘being,’ ‘creature,’ or ‘essence,’ ‘nature’ 
in English. But yet another semantic layer comes to mind, considering that the word also appears 
more than once in the novel as part of the expression ‘Reklamewesen.’ In compounds of this sort, 
German uses ‘-wesen’ very universally in the meaning of ‘affairs,’ ‘business,’ ‘industry,’ and ‘sector,’ 
or just as a suffix to form a collective noun describing the general practice surrounding something. A 
special case of such compounds is the expression ‘Unwesen,’ English ‘nuisance,’ most commonly 
used as part of the phrase ‘sein Unwesen treiben,’ English ‘being up to mischief,’ ‘making trouble,’ or 
‘walking abroad.’ This negative flipside certainly reverberates as an undertone wherever the word 
‘Wesen’ pops up in Der Gehülfe.  
Walser is in good company when he uses the word ‘Wesen’ to describe the dubious quality of 
technological phenomena. As I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, no less a figure than 
Goethe gave an early cue with the infamous formulation ‘das überhandnehmende Maschinenwesen’ 
in his late novel Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre. I showed that the passage in Goethe’s novel links 
concerns about technology’s increasing prevalence with a contemplation about its impact on human 
agency. In Der Gehülfe, just like in Goethe’s novel, ‘Wesen’ conjures up a strange ambiguity of 
agency. The above quoted passage from Der Gehülfe, features the word as part of a genitive 
construction: ‘Wesen der Reklame-Uhr,’ which adds to the semantic ambiguity. We can read the 
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form ‘der Reklame-Uhr’ in three grammatically distinct ways, either as an explicative or definitive 
genitive, as a subjective genitive, or as a possessive genitive. If the form is read as a possessive genitive, 
‘Wesen’ will signify the essence, or the true nature of the advertising clock. In such a reading, 
‘Wesen’ hints at a reality that might remain hidden to a superficial, everyday observation, and that 
can only be revealed at closer inspection. In a less emphatic reading, but still as a possessive genitive, 
‘Wesen’ may be viewed as a mere attribute of the invention, an aspect or property of the advertising 
clock, something through which this invention has an impact upon Joseph’s—and Tobler’s—reality.  
 If understood as a subjective genitive, on the contrary, the advertising clock appears as the 
agent of the activity ‘Wesen’. This would surely imply a slight violation of conventional usage of the 
German language. However, it could make full sense if we assume a heightened etymological 
awareness and flexibility, or in other words: poetic license.94 ‘Wesen’ understood as the activity of a 
‘subject’ Reklame-Uhr would certainly make the undertone of the word ‘Unwesen’ most audible, in 
a much similar way as the verb ‘verwesen’—decompose, decay—clearly resonates when Martin 
Heidegger uses the word ‘wesen’ as a verb in his ontology of existence. If we read the form as an 
explicative genitive (as in ‘the city of New York’), the advertising clock would itself feature as a 
‘Wesen’, a being or creature. More so than the other two readings, this interpretation would very 
well align with other passages of the novel where the inventions (in particular the ‘Reklame-Uhr’) 
appear as Tobler’s ‘true’ children, or in an animistic, anthropomorphic way as having human 
qualities: 
‘Sie ist wie ein kleines oder großes Kind, solch eine Uhr’, dachte der Angestellte, ‘wie ein eigensinniges Kind, 
das der beständigen Pflege bedarf, und das nicht einmal dankt dafür. Gedeiht denn eigentlich dieses 
Unternehmen, wächst dieses Kind? Man merkt wenig davon. Ein Erfinder liebt seine Erfindungen. Diese 
                                                   
94  Such a reading is much in line with what Martin Heidegger would show about two decades later with the 
unconventional usage of the same lexeme ‘wesen’ as a verb in his philosophical magnum opus Being and Time (1927). 
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kostspielige Uhr ist Tobler beinahe ans Herz gewachsen. Was aber denken andere Leute von dieser Idee? [...]’ 
(DG 29)95 
This passage fully embodies the subversive tendency of the young assistant vis-à-vis his employer. It 
is another example of kaleidoscopic narration. On the one hand, Joseph identifies with Tobler and 
his worldview by describing the invention with a compassionate gesture as a child that demands 
costly care, but cannot show adequate gratefulness for it. On the other hand, he conveys through 
subtle allusions his own doubts and the general dubiousness of Tobler’s whole enterprise. 96 On an 
even subtler note, the passage evokes criticism, and downright mockery, at the inventor’s obsessive 
dedication to his inventions while arguably neglecting his own, biological children. The final 
question of the quoted passage then appears as an implicit prolepsis to the novel’s later parts where 
Tobler exhibits a sheer technomania while using technology to impress others. Through the lens of 
the young assistant, however, it becomes clear already at this early point that Tobler’s obsessive 
devotion to technology is detrimental rather than conducive to his integration and reputation in 
society. Instead of justifying paternal pride in its maker, the invention turns out to be rather infirm, 
and unrewarding at that. 
Die Reklame-Uhr liegt am Boden und jammert nach flüssigen Kapitalien. Nun also, gehe auf sie zu, stütze sie, 
damit sie sich wieder langsam, Glied für Glied, erheben [...] kann. (DG 139)97 
Although these passages may support an interpretation of ‘Wesen’ as creature or being in the 
above-discussed genitive construction, the most obvious and straightforward reading is clearly the 
                                                   
95 "It is like a small or large child, this clock," the clerk thought, "like a headstrong child that requires constant self-
sacrificing care and doesn't even thank one for watching over it. And is this enterprise flourishing, is the child growing? 
Little progress can be seen. An inventor does love his inventions. Tobler has become quite enamored of this costly clock. 
But what will other people think of it?” (Walser 2007, 31). 
96 To be more precise, the passage features the protagonist’s thoughts in the form of direct discourse in quotation marks. 
Hence, the subtle allusions should be attributed to the narrator rather than the protagonists. 
97 “The Advertising Clock is sprawled on the ground in defeat, wailing for a bit of solvent capital. Go to it and give it 
your support so that it may gradually, one limb at a time, rise up […].” (Walser 2007, 141). 
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one where ‘Wesen’ stands for the essence or true nature of the ‘Reklame-Uhr.’ Either way, favoring 
one interpretation of ‘Wesen’—and of the associated genitive—over the other would mean to miss 
the genuinely literary quality of that formulation. Ultimately, it remains indeterminate whether 
Joseph familiarizes himself with a being or creature called ‘Reklame-Uhr,’ with the affairs or 
machinations emanating from a technological quasi-subject, or rather just with the true essence of an 
inanimate object. This indeterminacy is key for adequately understanding the passage and with it the 
overall usage of the word ‘Wesen’ in the novel. 
Generally speaking, the essence of a technological invention would be identical with its 
purpose or functionality. The opposite, however, appears to be the case with Tobler’s creations. 
Rather than revealing any clear utility of their own, they turn out, at closer inspection, to be 
connected with another ‘Wesen,’ namely the ‘Reklamewesen,’ that is the advertising industry. The 
ambiguity of the word ‘Wesen’ is key in that it links the characteristic polysemy of a literary text 
with the ontological indeterminacy of technological entities. While technology appears to penetrate 
the realm of the human in Walser’s novel, engaging in a mutual play of assimilation—the human 
characters are compared and assimilated to the technological objects, and vice versa—its 
manifestations are still clearly different from human beings. However blatant the anthropomorphism 
concerning the inventions (the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ is a case in point) may be, it does not imply at all that 
technological entities acquire human-like agency. And Tobler’s inventions clearly do not appear as 
acting individuals. Hence, in Walser’s novel there is no question of ‘autonomous technology’—in 
Langdon Winner’s understanding. Instead, the technological ‘Wesen’ (Maschinenwesen) seems—or 
seem—to undermine human autonomy. This arises precisely from the strange semantic 
entanglement between technology and human limbs or bodily parts. To the extent that the 
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inventions appear to have human features, the human characters in Walser’s novel seem in return to 
be possessed by the ‘interests’ of technology. 
[…] Etwas viel Wichtigeres geht mich viel näher an, und das ist die Firma, deren Schild [saying ‘technisches 
Büro’] ich auf meiner Stirne trage, deren Interesse ich im Kopf und im Herzen tragen sollte. Im Herzen? 
Warum nicht? Das Herz muß bei einer Sache sein, wenn die Finger und die Gedanken richtig sollen arbeiten 
können. Am Herzen liegen! Nicht umsonst sagen die Leute so.’ 
Er zergrübelte sich lange darüber den Kopf was man wohl jetzt noch tun könnte, um der Reklame-Uhr stramm 
auf die Beine zu helfen, über welchem ‘geschäftlichen Nachdenken’ er endlich einschlief. (124)98 
Joseph’s interests, motivations, and thoughts are strangely brought into line with the bodily parts 
and with the functionality and market value of the invention ‘Reklame-Uhr.’ The virtual space in 
which the company sign is mounted on the employee’s forehead and the company’s interests are 
lying ‘by’ his heart is identical with the topography in which the inventions are directly connected 
with the advertising industry (‘direkt mit dem Reklamewesen verbunden’). And in this same space, 
Joseph wants to help the invention to its feet (‘auf die Beine helfen’), hoping to enable it to move 
forward by itself, much like an—at least partly—autonomous being. 
The passages suggesting that the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ actually has limbs for locomotion can also be 
read as subtle hints at the metaphorical dimension of the word ‘progress’ or ‘Fortschritt’. An ‘Uhr’ 
(English clock, watch, timer, timepiece) is an instrument to measure, indicate, or coordinate time. If 
Tobler’s ‘Uhr’ offers any noteworthy, innovative feature at all, it is precisely not related to that 
original function of a clock or timepiece, but it lies in its connection with the ‘advertising business,’ 
or ‘Reklamewesen.’ Instead of being a materialization of the linear progression of time, as one would 
                                                   
98 “There is something far more important that concerns me far more greatly, namely the firm whose insignia is 
emblazoned on my brow and whose interest I should bear in my head and my heart. In my heart? Why not? One’s 
fingers and thoughts can hardly work as they should if one’s heart isn’t in it. There’s a reason people speak of certain 
matters as being ‘close to one’s heart.’” (Walser 2007, 125–6). 
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usually expect from a clock, Tobler’s invention is situated within a dispersive, virtual space. The 
example of the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ embodies a general emphasis on the dispersive dimension of 
technological change in Walser’s novel, while the linear dimension, usually epitomized by the 
concept of progress, is outdone.  
The corporeal metaphors, although they are connected with bodily locomotion, contrast in 
the description of the invention with that dispersive notion. This divergence is epitomized in the 
opposition between the anthropomorphic body of the device on the one hand, and the abstract, 
virtual entity of ‘Reklamewesen’ on the other. For one thing, there is a centralized body that is 
supposed to move in space. For another, there is an already ubiquitous entity that reappears in more 
than one of Tobler’s inventive ideas. To be sure, the side about anthropomorphic, bodily 
locomotion is the one that clearly fails, while the one about distributive allocation is more like a 
virtual, but impactful structure or web that constantly imposes demands upon the human characters. 
Viewed in this way, Walser’s ‘Reklamewesen’ corresponds with another image in the novel, 
which is featured in the passage about Joseph leaving the orbit of the Tobler mansion for once to 
visit his former girlfriend Klara in the country’s capital. This passage is a digression in the true sense, 
as it departs both spatially and temporally from the main plot. Joseph’s excursion to the capital is 
also a time travel of sorts, namely one to the protagonist’s own biographical past. His visit at Klara’s 
house includes a brief account of their past lives as well as a description of the general zeitgeist of that 
period. Both Joseph and Klara, as the narrator recounts, followed a spreading trend of the time, by 
becoming enthusiastic adherents of socialism.  
Es war damals eine sonderbare Welt und Zeit gewesen. Unter dem Namen ‘Sozialismus’ hatte sich, einer 
üppigen Schlingpflanze ähnlich, eine zugleich befremdende und anheimelnde Idee in die Köpfe und um die 
Körper der Menschen, alte und erfahrene nicht ausgenommen, geworfen, dermaßen, daß, was nur Dichter und 
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Schriftsteller hieß, und was nur jung und rasch bei der Hand und beim Entschluß war, sich mit dieser Idee 
beschäftigte. (DG 132)99 
Describing socialism, the political trend of the period, as a ubiquitous, all-capturing climbing 
plant,100 establishes a subtle parallel to the all-embracing phenomenon of ‘Reklamewesen’ in the 
novel. Just like the political ideology is described as something that has ‘thrown itself around the 
heads and bodies of humans,’ the ‘Reklamewesen’ is said to be penetrating the individual 
technological objects. In both cases, a super-corporeal entity appears to deprive individual subjects or 
objects, be they human or technological, of their autonomy.  
Just like the ‘vine’ of socialist ideology, the ‘Reklamewesen’ cannot be located in a well-
defined place. It is strangely omnipresent, and there is no clear goal or purpose to it either. The 
inventions refer back to themselves, as is epitomized not simply by the semantic content of the word 
‘Reklame,’ but also by its etymological structure (the Latin prefix ‘re-’ translates to again, back, 
backward). Against this backdrop, Joseph’s strange musings about the ‘topography’ of the matter 
must be read at the same time as a subtle critique of a tacit chronotope of progress. 
Der Gehülfe’s narrative voice—focalizing on Joseph, the protagonist—explicitly associates 
mobility with freedom while ascribing it to the inventor-entrepreneur Tobler: 
Er [Tobler] kann als freier unabhängiger Erfinder und Geschäftsmann wohnen, wo es ihm beliebt, er ist an 
keinerlei Scholle gebunden. (70)101 
                                                   
99 “What a strange world and age that had been. Under the label ‘socialism,’ a notion at once disconcerting and enticing 
had cast its tendrils, like those of a luxuriant vine, into the minds and about the bodies of even the old and experienced, 
so that anyone who fancied himself a writer or poet, anyone who was young, quick to take action and seize resolve, was 
preoccupied with the idea.” (Walser 2007, 134) 
100 The German word ‘Schlingpflanze’ actually designates a particular type of vine or climbing plant, the English 
botanical term would be ‘bine,’ that grows on a structure by, winding helixes, or slinging itself around it. 
101 “As a freelance independent inventor and businessman, he could live anywhere he pleased, he wasn’t bound to any 
one spot.” (Walser 2007, 71). 
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Accordingly, it is the key objective of Joseph’s task to mobilize his employer’s inventions, or, in the 
words of the novel, to ‘help them to their feet.’ And yet, the protagonist seems to be caught up in a 
quandary of pseudo-autonomies. On the one hand, he is indoctrinated by his employer who himself 
appears to be obsessed with—or possessed by—technology, rather than mastering it as a means of 
emancipation or empowerment. On the other hand, he sees himself confronted with technological 
objects that fail to work as commodities or as functioning devices. 
Consequently, the endeavors of mobilizing Tobler’s invention turn out to be futile. Not only 
does the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ never really leave the narrow confines of Tobler’s ‘technisches Büro’ as a 
marketable product. It also never even seems to work in the intended way as a technological device. 
This general failure to function and the unfitness to move does not only characterize the ‘Reklame-
Uhr,’ but it is also a defining quality of Tobler’s inventions altogether. The imagery of locomotion, 
however, appears to be a specialty of the passages about the ‘Reklame-Uhr,’ which is a striking 
observation when considering that a clock is actually a device to measure time, not space. In its 
literary elaboration, this invention thus stands in a certain discrepancy to the original purpose of the 
technical device. 
The situation is similar for another of the inventor’s creations. The ‘Schützenautomat,’ 
which the narrator calls the “Nummer zwei” or ‘runner-up’ of Tobler’s products (DG 70), is a 
vending machine for rifle bullets. This device is not just the second invention in order of 
importance: its description reveals that the invention itself has a quality of ‘secondariness’102 since the 
inventor has derived its functionality from an existing machine by simply transferring it to a slightly 
                                                   
102 Gößling, too, notes this derivative, secondary character of Tobler’s inventions, referring to them as ‘sekundäre 
Erfindungen’ (Gößling 1992, 59, 104), albeit without spelling out the deeper significance in opposition to the 
requirement of novelty generally associated with the modern notion of invention. 
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different application. This secondariness is true, albeit to different degrees, for all five of Tobler’s 
inventions, as none of them is actually revolutionary. 
Truly revolutionary inventions are sometimes difficult to grasp in their functionality and 
potential impact. It is their unprecedented nature that causes amazement and incomprehension. And 
it often takes a good deal of persuasive power, explaining, and time to successfully bring them to the 
intended use. The situation is entirely different regarding Tobler’s ‘Schützenautomat.’ What causes 
amazement here is precisely how quickly it can be grasped. 
Und er [Joseph] wunderte sich, wie rasch es ihm gelang, sich mit dem innern und äußern Wesen dieser 
Nummer zwei vertraut zu machen. (DG 70)103 
The statement of Joseph’s amazement appears ironic, considering the above-noted twofold 
secondariness of the invention. Marti’s own surprise about how quickly he grasps the internal and 
external ‘Wesen’ of this invention clashes with the fact that he is already familiar with it on two 
levels. First, the ‘äußeres Wesen’ is identified once again with the ‘Reklamewesen.’ The 
‘Schützenautomat’ is thus closely akin to the ‘Reklame-Uhr.’ Second, the ‘inneres Wesen,’ if 
understood as the functionality of the invention, simply derives from an existing, very common 
device: the chocolate vending machines at train stations, to which the narrator refers as a matter of 
course, implying that any given reader would know what he is talking about (DG 70). Hence, 
Joseph’s amazement is just the obverse of how little surprising, i.e. how little revolutionary, Tobler’s 
inventions are altogether. 
One detail making the “Schützenautomat” stand out from the other inventions is that it is 
introduced through a relatively detailed description of its functionality. As mentioned above, it is 
                                                   
103 “And he was surprised how quickly he was able to familiarize himself with the inner and outer workings of this second 
invention.” (Walser 2007, 73). 
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compared with vending machines at train stations. Instead of providing hungry travelers with sweets, 
however, its raison d’être consists in spitting out a “Paket scharfer Patronen” (DG 70) or “a pack of 
live ammunition”. While the inventive achievement is quite insignificant, simply replacing one 
commodity for another, its symbolic effect is rather powerful when viewed as a motif within the 
aesthetic fabric of the novel. The substitution of ‘live bullets’ for sweets not only adds to the absurd 
character of Tobler’s inventive undertakings, it also infuses the enterprise of technological progress 
with a rather bitter taste. Instead of giving delight to humanity in the form of chocolate, the re-
purposed vending machine provides consumers with means to end life. 
Once again, the description of the machine is clad in anthropomorphisms: “Leibesumfang 
des Apparats” (DG 71), “in ungefährer Manneshöhe ein Schlitz angebracht,” “bis ein zweiter oder 
dritter Schütze des Weges daherkam und ihn von neuem zu der eben beschriebenen Betätigung 
reizte [emphasis added].” (DG 71) The verb ‘reizen’ also hints at another important aspect: the 
description of the ‘Schützenautomat’ abounds with sexual imagery.104 Its anatomy is characterized by 
a “bequem zu erfassenden Hebel” and “ungefähr in Mannshöhe ein Schlitz” on the outside, and 
“drei sich gegenseitig bedienende Hebeln” as well as an “abwärts gleitenden Kanal” on the inside 
(DG 71).105 While on the poetic level, the sexual imagery localizes the invention within the realm of 
human biological reproduction, the actual purpose of the machine points in the opposite direction. 
Making ‘live ammunition’ (‘scharfe Patronen’) available to shooters everywhere, around the clock, 
                                                   
104 Andreas Gößling has sufficiently described the rich sexual imagery of Der Gehülfe in general, and of the passages 
about the ‚Schützenautomat’ in particular (Gößling 1992, 105–6). Gößling refers to the ‘Schützenautomat’ as a 
“phallische Maschine” and an object of a primarily male, “homosexuelle Begegnung” (Gößling 1992, 105). However, 
with its anatomy characterized by both levers and openings, and its functional repertoire of giving and receiving, sliding 
and ejaculating, the machine cannot be clearly attributed to just one of the two sexes. 
105 The English translation has “a lever located at a convenient height,” “a slight approximately at eye-level,” “three 
interconnecting levers,” and a “sloping chute,” (Walser 2007, 73) while largely missing the sexual undertones of the 
German original. 
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evokes scenarios of the production of death rather than of the reproduction of life. Aside from this, 
the invention is not a machine for production or reproduction, but one that simply helps 
distributing products that have already been produced. As mentioned above, the ‘Schützenautomat’ 
is, just like the Reklame-Uhr, “mit dem Reklamewesen verbunden.” (DG 71)  
The passages in Der Gehülfe that deal with Tobler’s inventions epitomize the novel’s quality 
as a zero-grade narrative of technological progress. If inventions are the atoms of progress in a dual 
sense, both as events and as products, these atoms appear only in the mode of negativity within 
Walser’s novel. Tobler’s inventions are deprived of their eventfulness,106 and just as little do they 
reach the status of full-fledged products. In line with this, they defy—rather than epitomize—the 
following three characteristics commonly associated with technological progress as a narrative 
pattern: 
First, the idea of technological progress is generally marked by a preference of novelty over the 
traditional or established; second, it follows patterns of linearity rather than circularity; and third, 
technological progress presupposes an instrumental rather than an intrinsic purpose. Der Gehülfe, in 
contrast to this, characterizes the depicted inventions as anything but novel. Viewed as technological 
objects that appear within the novel’s plot, the inventions are by all means secondary, derived from 
existing devices and simply serving and reproducing the logic of a marketplace (keyword: 
‘Reklamewesen’) within which they themselves are supposed to appear as products. As narrative 
events constituting the novel’s plot, they are characterized by a minimum of eventfulness. The novel 
narrates almost no real eureka moments. Instead, the bulk of Tobler’s inventions have already been 
                                                   
106 Cf. Wolf Schmid’s 2003 paper “Narrativity and Eventfulness” regarding the narratological significance of eventfulness 
(Schmid 2003). 
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made before they find mention. In other words, the actual inventive achievements are pre-diegetic, 
i.e. they predate the temporal horizon of the novel’s main plot. 
While common narratives of progress favor patterns of linearity over ones of circularity, 
Walser’s novel depicts technological inventions that appear to be caught up in circles and loops of 
self-referencing.107 The protagonist’s repeated attempts at helping the ‘Reklame-Uhr’ ‘to its feet’ are 
doomed to failure. Imagery of human, bodily locomotion stays with the ‘dead metaphor’ (Paul 
Ricœur) of progress while spelling out its etymological origin and thereby reviving it. Taking the 
metaphor in a literal sense—albeit without using the word ‘progress’ verbatim—the novel also 
problematizes the ontological premises upon which it relies. The word ‘progress’ is missing from the 
novel’s discourse, and imagery of progressive (linear) locomotion is used in the context of the 
inventions’ failure. Instead of assigning the notion of progress with a positive value, the novel 
prominently and repeatedly features the expression ‘Reklame.’ Two of Tobler’s five inventions are 
said to be ‘direkt mit dem Reklamewesen verbunden,’ and one of them even bears the word 
‘Reklame’ in its very name. Strikingly, the word ‘Reklame’ starts with the prefix re-, which is in a 
certain way the grammatical opposite of the ‘pro-‘ in progress. With this in mind, the recurring 
motif of ‘Reklame’ must appear as the prevailing counterpart of progress. 
It is worth noting that by substituting ‘Reklame’ for ‘Fortschritt’, the novel eludes a 
traditional dichotomy of progress vs. regression or decline. Instead of setting against the forward 
movement of progress a movement backwards, Der Gehülfe addresses with the word ‘Reklame’ a 
ubiquitous, non-linear reference structure. Tobler’s inventions are ‘directly connected’ with it, but 
                                                   
107 The novel even makes this cyclic dimension explicit the context of advertisement when Joseph is described how he is 
handling ‘Zirkulare’ or ‘circulars.’ These pamphlets first arrive from the printer and then have to be folded neatly and be 
sent to potential byers ‘all over the world (‘in alle Welt hinaus verschickt’), advertising the ‘Dampfapparat’ (DG 148) 
with an image and a print text. 
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they also demand a great deal of ‘Reklame,’ or advertising, themselves, which in the course of the 
action is carried out by the inventor and his young assistant. It is exactly this advertising activity that 
amounts to the novel’s core plot. 
Moreover, the peculiar use of the word ‘Wesen’ in this context draws attention to an open 
question regarding the notion of progress. The expression ‘Reklamewesen,’ with its implicit citation 
of Goethe’s ‘Maschinenwesen’, as well as formulations like ‘mit dem inneren und äußeren Wesen,’ 
evoke questions concerning the acting subject of progress and of technological agency. While leaving 
such questions unanswered, it is clear that Walser’s novel subscribes neither to a reading of 
technology and progress as instrumental to the human will, nor does it propagate theories of 
autonomous, let alone demonized, technology. 
The etymology of ‘Reklame’ bears another evocative hint in that regard. The German word 
derives from the French verb ‘réclamer,’ meaning ‘to desire, to demand, to claim, to complain.’ This 
etymological baggage appears to be spelled out in the anthropomorphic passages about the ‘Reklame-
Uhr,’ describing it as a ‘willful child that requires persistent, self-sacrificing care’ (DG 29) and how it 
‘lies at the ground, crying for liquid assets’ (DG 139). Technology, in the shape of Tobler’s 
inventions, does not serve as a means to human ends. It rather makes demands and sets its own 
purposes, which humans in turn feel compelled to fulfill. In this way, the inventions take an 
intermediate position between subjects and objects. The peculiar teleology they represent is neither 
adequately described with the means-end logic of a classic instrumental notion of technology, nor 
can it be captured by an end-in-itself logic. This in-between teleology also finds expression in the 
narratological setup of the novel, both focusing on the inventions and at the same time marginalizing 
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them. Notwithstanding this intermediate position, the technology Walser depicts in his novel 
challenges living beings, and humans in particular, for their ontological privilege of setting purposes. 
It is a characteristic feature of Walser’s writing that it remains strangely noncommittal. Plots 
remain in a strange state of abeyance and central themes and motifs are conjured; yet they are never 
explicitly addressed. 108 In this vein, the passages about Tobler’s inventions establish a virtual field of 
tension between standstill, linear locomotion, and circular distribution. If Walser’s novel can be 
viewed as an inventor’s story, it would count as a story dealing with fundamental failure, as the 
inventions never reach their temporal telos, as events that would mark a significant change in the 
history of technology. As mentioned above, the idea of technological invention generally unites the 
structural and the processual aspects of technology. In other words, a technological invention is both 
an artifact and an event. In Walser’s novel, however, the processual aspect is reduced to a monotony 
of mere repetition. At the beginning of the story, all of the inventions have already been made. In 
other words, it deals not with the process of how they are generated, but it rather depicts them as 
existing objects or ideas that the protagonists find or come upon. And yet, the novel does 
occasionally indicate moments of closure, for instance when the narrator unexpectedly announces: 
Das erste Schützenautomaten-Exemplar war inzwischen fertig geworden, es funktionierte in der Tat glänzend 
und erweckte fröhliche Hoffnungen. (DG 180)109 
However, such hints at successful completion remain strangely remote and largely without 
consequences to the further course of things. It is only a costly prototype of the ‘marksman’s vending 
machine’ that has been manufactured by a helping mechanic in a neighboring village. Due to 
                                                   
108 This observation is in agreement with Samuel Frederick’s 2012 book, which identifies digression as a central feature 
of Walser’s texts possessing an equal status as the plots in the constitution of their narrativity (Frederick 2012). 
109 “The first model Marksman’s Vending Machine had meanwhile been completed, and indeed it functioned gloriously 
and occasioned the gayest hopes.” (Walser 2007, 183) 
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Tobler’s lack of funds, this contract work cannot be paid for, and the device never goes into serial 
production. 
Such occasional experiments with prototyping remain the exception in the novel. Otherwise, 
the course of events mainly consists in repeated attempts at promoting the inventions, which 
bespeaks the double end use of modern inventions as reproducible industry products and marketable 
commodities. The inventive moment, i.e. the very instant when the invention is made, may appear 
as unique, much like the works of original genius.110 However, technological inventions do not 
adopt the status of actuality (i.e. socio-historical reality) until they reach the stage of serial 
production. In other words, the inventive moment, as a singularity, is only a halfway realization that 
is not completed until it is converted into the mode of seriality in the form of industrial 
reproduction and market distribution. 
In wrapping up the observations made about the inventions in Der Gehülfe, I would like to 
briefly discuss why it may have been that scholarship widely neglected the techno-theoretical 
dimension of Walser’s novel. One possible answer to this question is that wherever theorists discuss 
the significance of the technological inventions, they primarily ascribe them a poetological meaning 
while ignoring their rather literal technological dimensions. In opposition to this, I propose to read 
Tobler’s inventions as both poetological metaphors (self-reflexive) and as concrete objects that 
epitomize the problems (if not the complete failure) of a progressivist-rationalistic notion of 
technology. 
                                                   
110 It is no coincidence that the novel refers to the technological inventions as if they were works (German ‘Werk’) of art: 
“Joseph erklärte ihm die Reklame-Uhr. Er holte ein Exemplar derselben in Natura herbei, legte sie vor die Augen des 
Gastes auf den Tisch zu Besichtigung und schickte sich zu gleicher Zeit an, dem aufmerksam alles, was ihn umgab, 
beobachtenden Mann die Gewinnchancen des Werkes auseinanderzusetzen.” (DG 76); “Die Handelsabteilung schrieb 
einen Brief an den Tiefbauingenieur Joël, der sich, wie es schien, ‘gewaltig’ für dieses Werk [i.e. the ‘Tiefbohrmaschine’] 
interessierte.” (DG 250); The creation of another inventor who tries to enlist Tobler’s support, a ‘Kraftmaschine’ 
(English ‘power machine’ or ‘prime mover’) even receives the title of a “Geniewerk” or ‘work of genius’ (DG 275).  
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A poetological reading clearly suggests itself, especially as Walser’s writing consists to a good 
degree always of self-reflexive and self-referential musings about the act of writing and authorship.111 
Moreover, the distinguishing line between technological inventions and literary text appears to be 
permeable in Der Gehülfe. On the one hand, the inventions are referred to as ‘Werk’ or works (cf. 
note 110), and on the other hand, the protagonist refers to his own writing as an ‘Erfindung’ or 
‘invention’ when he writes in his journal-like ‘memoires’: 
Jener Brief ist mit einem ersonnenen und erdichteten Gefühl geschrieben worden, er ist wahr, aber er ist 
zugleich eine Erfindung gewesen, herauserfunden aus einem Geist, der erschreckt ist, darüber, daß ihm 
einfachere und näherliegende Beziehungen vollständig mangeln. (DG 91)112 
This reflection about the fictitious or truthful content of a letter thus takes place in the 
protagonist’s own writing. In this double mediation, the word ‘Erfindung’ or ‘invention’ appears 
even more conspicuously as a mise-en-abyme re-instantiating the novel’s own ‘invention.’ At the same 
time, it establishes a conceptual analogy with those other inventions that the novel deals with: the 
technological devices ‘dreamed up’ by Joseph’s employer Carl Tobler. Moreover, circumstantial 
evidence suggests that Walser’s novel itself was no ‘original invention,’ but that the author just 
turned his own lived experience into a literary narrative, without even changing much about the 
details of the story.113 The unoriginal quality of Tobler’s technological inventions seems to be just a 
fitting epitome of own creation from found footage. If read in such a way, Tobler’s inventive 
                                                   
111 One well-known example is the story Der Spaziergang or The Walk, which is a narrative navigation through a space 
that seems to be at the same time walkable and writable or readable. The later “microscripts”, of course, are another 
proof of Walser’s life-long poetological awareness that finds very concrete manifestation in his writing. But even in 
Walser’s lesser-known texts, the modern distinction. 
112 “The sentiment behind that letter was a fictitious one, a feeling I dreamed up. The letter is true, but at the same time 
it was an invention, produced by a mind that was horrified to find itself entirely deprived of relationships of a simpler 
and more self-evident sort.” (Walser 2007, 93). 
113 Walser writes in an autobiographical sketch penned during his time in Biel, Switzerland between 1919 and 1920: “Als 
ich in Wirklichkeit ‘Gehülfe’ war, hatte ich da eine Ahnung, daß aus diesem Stück Erleben ein ‘Wirklichkeitsroman’, 
also aus dem wirklichen Wirken ein schriftstellerisches entstehen würde? Nein, keine Spur!” (Walser 1966, 218). 
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enterprise appears as a self-reflexive allegory about the creation of modern fiction and, if you will, a 
literary critique of the idea of original genius.114 However, opting for a purely poetological reading of 
technology and the inventions in Walser’s novel falls short of the mark. Even if there is a clearly 
poetological side to it, the novel’s strength lies precisely in the ambiguity spanning between a 
poetological and a more literal meaning. 
5. Technomania. Technology Beyond Rationalization 
With the described teleological ambiguity, Tobler’s inventions defy a classic notion of technology 
that is based on a means-end-logic. Walser’s depiction of modern technology thus appears as an 
antithesis to leading social theories of his time that placed technological progress within the context 
of a general process of rationalization (Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto). Even more blatantly, Walser’s 
picture of technology contrasts with Frederick Winslow Taylor’s ‘scientific management,’ whose 
writings and doctrines became popular in Europe around the same time when Der Gehülfe was 
written and published. 
Aside from Tobler’s inventions it is not least the depiction of their inventor himself that 
defies any notion of modern technology as a rationalist enterprise. Carl Tobler’s personality is in 
                                                   
114 Andreas Gößling clearly opts for such a poetological reading of Tobler’s inventions: “Daß aber Toblers ‘technische 
[...] Probleme’ (DG 140) stets auch die ästhetisch-technische und poetologische Problematik des Romans reflektieren, 
erhellt schließlich aus dem doppelsinnigen Begriff Montagen, der zugleich Schwierigkeit und Scheitern der Intentionen 
des Autors bezeichnet: Will er die assoziativ gefundenen Verbindungen (‘montagen’: DG 140) im ästhetischen Gebilde, 
in seinem ‘Abendstern’ ‘verwirklichen’, so bleibt auch ihm keine Wahl, als sich jener inadäquaten ‘technischen’ Mittel 
(‘Montierung’: DG 151) zu bedienen. Von Tobler, seinem figürlichen Repräsentanten, unterscheidet er sich in diesem 
Aspekt einzig durch sein kritisches Bewußtsein, daß der ‘korrespondierende Kopf’ (DG 60), der seine ‘Träumerei’ 
scheinbar ‘verwirklicht’, ‘in Wirklichkeit’ (DG 181) doch immer nur ‘schwindelt’ (DG 180).” (Gößling 1992, 86). 
He suggests that both the passages about Tobler’s inventions and the reflections on photography come down to a quasi-
luddite critique of the poet’s or artist’s marginalized role in modern industrial societies: “Der Künstler, so lassen sich 
Walsers ‘Automaten’- und ‘Photographen’-Parabeln (vgl. DG 131 f.) verstehen, der im Zeitalter industriekapitalistischer 
‘Massenanfertigung’ (DG 45) naiv illusionieren wollte, würde unweigerlich zum Produzenten industrieller ‘Ware’ und 
‘Reklame’. Daher kann sich ‘der in der Schlinge Gefangene’ (DG 175), der wie alle andern der Geld-Maschinen-Waren-
Zirkulation zwangsintegrierte Künstler, einzig noch in der kritischen Reflexion eines verselbständigten Mechanismus 
behaupten, den auch er im Bereich der Imagination automatenhaft wiederholt.” (Gößling 1992, 114–5). 
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many ways the exact opposite of means-end-rationality, although, as an entrepreneur-engineer, he 
would be the ideal representative of the societal home regions of instrumental reason in Max Weber’s 
sense. According to Weber, “[j]ede denkende Besinnung auf die letzten Elemente sinnvollen 
menschlichen Handelns ist zunächst gebunden an die Kategorien Zweck und Mittel.” (Weber 1968, 
149). In Tobler’s universe, however, the two categories appear utterly confused. Correspondingly, 
the inventor’s actions elude common sense and it is hard to fathom out the motivations that drive 
him and the objectives he pursues. Rather than personifying the system/sphere of rational actions 
commonly associated with the fields of business and technology, his personality is determined by 
irrational behavior, with obsessions and unpredictable outbursts that often verge on madness. 
Tobler’s erratic personality is a central cause of conflict in the novel. From the view of the young 
employee, the entrepreneur alternates between irritable moods, moments of unexpected joviality, 
and sudden outbursts of impatience and fury. 
The inventor already bears this quick-tempered quality in his very name. Tobler echoes the 
German verb ‘toben,’ meaning to rage, to rave. The word is also featured in the compounds 
‘Tobsucht’ and ‘Tobsuchtsanfall,’ meaning ‘raving madness,’ which quite accurately describes the 
inventor’s sudden outbursts of temper that repeatedly occur throughout the novel’s action. 
‘Tobsucht’ or ‘raging madness’ originally designated a pattern of mental illness, furor maniacus, 
which is, as Meyers großes Konversations-Lexikon of 1909 has it, an “einzelnes Symptom 
bestimmter Geisteskrankheiten, z. B. des Säuferwahnsinns (s. Delirium) oder der Melancholie, der 
Verrücktheit.”115 This association of Tobler’s name with madness or mania strangely corresponds 
                                                   
115 Another, perhaps more obvious etymological traces of the name leads to the geological term ‘Tobel,’ English ‘ravine,’ 
“eine schluchtartige Talenge, namentlich am Ausgang des Tales (schwed. Klämma, franz. Gorge)” (ibd.) It is worth 
noting that the Lemma “Tobel” refers to the synonym “Klamm,” which is a word that in turn evokes a subtle hint to the 
homonymous adjective “klamm,” which is a colloquial expression equivalent to English ‘cash-strapped’ or ‘broke’. The 
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with the name of the engineer’s mansion ‘Abendstern’. In Greek mythology, Mania is the daughter 
of Nyx, the goddess of the night. 
Another etymological trace leads from Tobler’s name straight to the geological term ‘Tobel’ 
(English ‘ravine’), which describes a narrow valley or canyon with a slope. Again, it is not difficult to 
see a link between this geomorphological figure and Tobler’s own downfall that the novel describes. 
This imagery sets a clear counterpoint to the metaphor of progress that usually associated with the 
enterprise of a technological inventor. 
It is not important here whether these etymological trails and the associated behavior 
patterns be linked with Tobler’s alcohol abuse—which he seems to share with his previous employee 
Wirsich—or whether they just be inherent features of his personality. What is crucial in this context 
is rather that those details open up the novel’s thematic scope toward the non-rational regions of 
human behavior while placing them right within the realm of technology and business management. 
In Max Weber’s terminology, the majority of Tobler’s activities would fall under the category of 
‘Affekthandlung’, ‘affective actions,’ of which Talcott Parsons wrote that they represent an under-
developed part of Weber’s social theory (Parsons 1981, 87). These shortcomings, Parsons argues, can 
ultimately be traced back to Weber’s failure or refusal to study Freud’s psychoanalytical approach 
(Parsons 1981, 87). This said, Tobler’s irrational characteristics lend themselves perfectly to 
psychoanalytic interpretations (Gößling 1992). Without delving too deep into the unconscious 
economy of desires and drives that the novel unfolds, I would like to emphasize one central point 
here. The signs of Tobler’s ‘madness’ indicate that the seemingly rational enterprise of technological 
                                                                                                                                                                    
same edition of Meyers Konversations-Lexikon also lists three personalities named Tobler: Titus, Adolf, and Ludwig, all 
of whom are linguists or philologists. 
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progress, represented by his own business, are undermined and questioned vis-à-vis those non-
rational forces that actually drive and structure the novel’s action. 
The irrational tendencies of Tobler’s character manifest themselves not only in erratic mood 
swings (“der jähe Wechsel seiner [Tobler’s] Laune,” DG 222), but also in a peculiar relationship 
with technology, which is manic at times, and at times obsessive. On the one hand, his intimate 
relationship with his inventions borders on fetishism. Instead of serving as profitable products 
contributing to the success of Tobler’s family business, they increasingly fall into suspicion of being 
the causes of its oncoming bankruptcy. And yet, the inventor remains bound to his ‘brain children,’ 
while investing in them growing amounts of time, capital, and energy. Tobler’s refusal to consider 
and act upon any cost-benefit ratios is a fatal symptom of his mania. Defying common rules of 
proportionality, Tobler has clearly transcended the range of a rational engagement with technology 
toward a behavior that can be described as techno-mania. The insignificance and smallness of 
Tobler’s inventions only underlines that aspect of disproportionality. 
On the other hand, Tobler’s techno-mania appears in the form of megalomania. He 
overreaches himself not only in financing his petty inventions, but parallel to this he also leads an 
extravagant lifestyle, employing a full-range of modern technology. He lavishly uses the telephone 
(DG 84), takes boastful rides on the train (DG 95), he sets great store by the electric lighting of his 
property (DG 58, 64, 221-2), he carries out a grand landscaping project (DG 104, 149-50, 170-1), 
and he celebrates the Swiss National Day with a pompous fireworks spectacle (DG 57-67). That 
Tobler lacks a sense of proportion is one thing. Another is that he displays a behavior reminiscent of 
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what American sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen had described as conspicuous consumption 
a few years before Walser wrote his novel, and Tobler does so very conspicuously.116 
Through his practices of conspicuous consumption, Tobler tries to impress his neighbors 
and to attract potential investors or producers who could possibly attend to his inventions. It is only 
ostensibly, though, that he behaves so boastfully under the premise of a rational goal. But here, too, 
Tobler lacks the necessary sense of proportion. His behavior is all too pretentious, and instead of 
promoting his social advancement, it exposes him as an outright imposter. Tobler is a man who lives 
far beyond his means, and given he does so primarily in order to climb the social ladder, his practice 
of conspicuous consumption is reminiscent of a Ponzi scheme. Tobler’s display behavior culminates 
in the scene about the Swiss National Day, (German ‘Bundesfeiertag’), or, as the novel has it, the 
“alljährlich wiederkehrende Jubelfest” (DG 57) celebrated on August 1. The passage about this 
festivity marks a climax in a novel that is otherwise rather poor in drama and tension. Apart from 
this climactic quality, the festive scene deserves a closer examination for the following three reasons. 
First, the depiction of this celebration and its preparations shows the nature of Tobler’s 
character in a particularly clear manner, since the inventor, entrepreneur, and family father appears 
to come to his full bloom in the light of such festive activities: “Für Feste und deren schöne 
Inszenierung schien er [Tobler] wie kaum ein zweiter geschaffen zu sein.” (DG 58) 117 
Correspondingly, Tobler’s delusional and manic personality reaches a level of intense display around 
and during the celebration. In other words, the scene can be viewed as an extreme eruption of his 
manic character.  
                                                   
116 Regarding the concept of conspicuous consumption, cf. Andrew B. Trigg. “Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous 
Consumption” (Trigg 2001). 
117 “No one, it appeared, was better suited than he to putting on parties in high style.” (Walser 2007, 60) 
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Second, the passage constitutes a remarkable connection between narrative motivation, 
temporality (i.e. time as a motif [content] and motivation [form]), and character design. Time and 
punctuality play a central role as a motif in the passage directly preceding the ones about the festival 
scene. And the same passage also explicitly names the oncoming festivities as a reason for one of 
Tobler’s mood swings from erratic anger to sudden kindness. 
Third, the parts about the celebrations seem remarkable vis-à-vis the role that technology 
plays in this crystalizing moment of the novel. Tobler’s own inventions shift to the background, and 
instead, electric light (“Beleuchtungsapparate,” DG 58) and fireworks come to the fore. Strikingly, it 
is one of Tobler’s typical mood swings, which precedes the festive scene within the narrative 
succession and which prepares it on the level of motivation. One day, Joseph’s late appearance at 
work causes a sudden outbreak of anger in his boss. What follows is one of Tobler’s characteristic 
tirades and an argument between him and his employee about the importance of punctuality. When 
Joseph tries to defend himself by downplaying the significance of his demeanor: “[...] es werde ja 
doch wohl auf ein paar Minuten nicht ankommen,” (DG 56) 118 , Tobler fires back with the 
authoritative statement: “‘Sie haben pünktlich bei der Arbeit zu erscheinen.’” (DG 57)119. This 
reprimand is then followed by an entire harangue underlining the requirement of professional 
discipline and threats of Joseph’s dismissal from the ‘technical office’. Shortly afterwards, “Eine halbe 
Stunde später war Herr Tobler der gütigste Herr und freundlichste Mann seinem Gehülfen 
gegenüber.” (DG 57)120. The passage exemplifies that Tobler’s mood swings literally occur ‘by the 
clock’, which transforms the modern notion of time as a medium of uniformity and rational 
                                                   
118 “Joseph had the impertinence to reply that a few minutes one way or the other made little difference.” (Walser 2007, 
58). 
119 “It is your duty to appear at work punctually.” (Walser 2007, 58). 
120 “Half an hour later, Herr Tobler was comporting himself as the most benevolent master and most amicable of men.” 
(Walser 2007, 59). 
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discipline into its opposite. While at first glance Tobler’s change of mood seems unmotivated, 
immediately thereafter the narrating voice provides an explicit reason: the upcoming celebrations of 
the Swiss National Day: “Der Grund dieser Freundlichkeit war eigentlich ein außenstehender, er war 
in der Idee der Vaterlandsliebe zu suchen.” (DG 57)  
Watched from an independent standpoint, Tobler has neither means nor reasons to celebrate 
in the given situation. His technological inventions do not catch on, his business is failing, and his 
social status is jeopardized. In this sense, the reason for his ‘friendliness’ is ‘extrinsic’ to the extent 
that it is not rational. And even if Tobler’s national pride can appear as a positive sentiment at first, 
the further course of events clearly reveals it as subverted. The friendliness that his employee believes 
to witness ultimately turns into hostility, and the sense of belonging—allegedly connecting him with 
the village community and with his compatriots—reveals itself as vindictive and hostile. These 
negative undercurrents of the seemingly positive sentiments erupt during the celebration’s high 
point, when Tobler shoots his fireworks in the direction of the village. 
‘Schießt, ihr Fötzel!’ 
Solches rief Tobler aus, und zwar in die Dorfrichtung, und er meinte damit jene paar Leute, die sich immer 
einen gewissen spöttischen Ton herausnahmen, wenn er angefangen hatte, am Biertisch von seinen technischen 
Erfindungen zu reden. (DG 65)121 
Tobler’s previous conciliatory mood could thus be read as just the prelude to a greater plan of 
retaliating for the continuous humiliations that he has suffered. 
To conclude, Carl Tobler is clearly a problematic figure. He personifies the epochal failure to 
reconcile the idea of means-ends rationality with the modern technological ‘apparatus’ in Herbert 
                                                   
121 “‘Shoot, you lousy bastards!’ 
These words, shouted by Tobler in the direction of the village, were addressed to those few individuals who always 
permitted themselves a certain derisive tone when he began to speak of his inventions over a beer.” (Walser 2007, 67). 
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Marcuse’s sense (Marcuse 1982). Walser forms by no means an exception when showing the cracks 
in the liaison between rationality and technology. Around a century earlier, the romanticists had 
explored the non-rational sides of modern technology and science in the form of uncanny automats 
(E.T.A. Hofmann’s Der Sandmann) or demonized artifacts (Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein). The 
character type of the mad scientist has its homeland in that tradition (Toumey 1992). It is no 
coincidence that the same theme would have a comeback in twentieth century Expressionism, where 
mad scientists and android characters haunt the scene of the collective imagination. Fritz Lang’s 
Rotwang or Dr. Mabuse, Robert Wiene’s Dr. Caligari, Paul Wegner’s Golem embody the anti-
rationalist, anti-enlightenment, dark, uncanny side of modernity. More so than their romanticist 
predecessors, however, the Expressionist characters personify systems of power and discipline. They 
are no longer just individuals venturing out to the dark side. But they represent, in a metonymic 
relation, an entire techno-scientific apparatus that defies the postulates of an enlightenment project 
while shifting the focus from the human individual to the masses (Metropolis, Golem), reducing 
human rationality and knowledge to an abyss of madness and conspiracy (Caligari, Mabuse). 
An extreme type of this paradigm can be found in the work of Franz Kafka, notably in the 
short story In the Penal Colony (1919), where “ein eigentümlicher Apparat” takes center stage as a 
parable on the abysmal nature of modernity. On the one hand, Kafka’s text is similar to Walser’s 
novel in that it depicts technology as an entity that requires continuous maintenance, without 
serving clearly set human goals. Both in the penal colony and at Tobler’s villa, the center of agency 
seems to have strangely shifted from human individuals to ambiguous technological enterprises. On 
the other hand, Kafka’s text makes most visible how Walser’s technology differs from both the 
romantic and the expressionist paradigms. The ‘peculiar apparatus’ of In the Penal Colony appears as 
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the mechanical embodiment of all human—and superhuman—atrocities. Kafka’s technology not 
only raises doubts as to whether the modern project actually flies the flag of meaning and reason, but 
it also takes the shape of a dark, uncanny threat to humanity at large. The ‘apparatus’ bears the 
qualities of a cruel instrument of torture that ultimately kills the commanding officer, who simply 
wanted to demonstrate its functionality. With these uncanny, atrocious, and ultimately fatal 
qualities, Kafka’s technology can be viewed as a consistent continuation of both the romanticist and 
the expressionist paradigms. The technology in Der Gehülfe, in contrast, lacks all such signs of 
demonization, and it is just as far removed from the tropes of discipline, mass manipulation, and 
totalitarian power. Instead, Tobler’s inventions appear banal in their trifle and pettiness. To be sure, 
they defy notions of technology as a rational endeavor instrumental to human will and progress, just 
like the romanticist and expressionist scenarios do. But at the same time, they appear to be utterly 
harmless.  
The archetype of the mad scientist embodies the notion of technology (or science) as an 
instrument of power falling into the wrong hands. In doing so, it has consistently nourished doubts 
as to whether the project of modernity is really so benevolent altogether (Toumey 1992). At least 
since romanticism, the salvation promise of progress thus has its flip side in the ‘dark satanic mills.’ 
Franz Kafka, then, pushes this paradigm to the extreme. In his fiction, mad scientists are missing 
from the picture, while the madness appears to have metastasized into the apparatus itself. Walser’s 
technology, in contrast, takes another direction. Tobler’s inventions are no instruments of power, 
but mere symptoms of their inventor’s impotence. The inventor’s madness lacks the edge of evil, and 
his manic relation with technology is in downright denial of any means-ends demands. 
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Daunting techno-imaginaries from romanticism to expressionism follow the paradigm of 
morality—they are not yet ‘beyond good and evil’ in the Nietzschean sense. In other words, the type 
of technology they depict can be used for benefit or for harm. Even in the fully subverted form in 
Kafka’s Penal Colony, the hideous fatalism of the apparatus springs from an inherent means-ends 
logic, i.e. some means is used for some ends.122 Walser’s novel, in contrast, depicts the crisis of the 
means-ends paradigm, and with it the inherent instrumentality or teleology of progress altogether. 
This crisis shows itself most clearly in the personality of Tobler, the inventor. His madness is 
harmless to the extent that his technology remains ineffective. 
The first encounter between the employer and the employee already sets the stage for this 
fundamental crisis of rationality. By using the self-contradictory opposition between head and 
machine when he describes the envisaged role of his employee, Tobler undermines not only any 
productive hierarchy between the human agents, but also the instrumental notion of technology that 
forms the basis of the industrial workplace. This impression is deepened in the course of the action. 
Technology, in the form of Tobler’s inventions, defies notions of instrumental machines, and the 
employee’s behavior alternates between headstrong and ‘headless’, instead of bespeaking an 
‘intelligent mind, a autonomous work force’. And Joseph’s headless moments in turn have their 
counterpart in Tobler’s own manic personality. 
Tobler’s erratic behavior forms the crossing-point between two main themes of the novel. 
On the one hand, the entrepreneur embodies the corrosion of hierarchic power, understood as a 
relationship between master and servant. He not only fails to exercise authority over his employee, 
                                                   
122 Note that in Kant’s understanding, in contrast, morality and moral philosophy are precisely what transcends rational 
behavior toward the whole, or the universal good (Kant 1969, 172–3). The openness of modern literary forms, however, 
stand in sharp contrast to such a notion of the whole. 
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but he also defies from the start the very principles upon which a hierarchic employment situation 
would possibly rest. With his initial speech about his favoring a head over a machine, Tobler 
undermines the constitutive divide of an industrial production environment, where one side controls 
the work process and the other side carries it out (Taylorism). On the other hand, Tobler’s behavior 
contradicts the divide between work and leisure as a constitutive principle of modernity. As 
described above, Joseph’s scope of duties sprawls far beyond the field of his actual employment and 
deep into the intimate family life of the Tobler’s. At the same time, Tobler repeatedly admonishes 
Joseph to appear at work on time and to attend to his duties in an efficient manner. 
These admonitions are where the two central themes meet, the crisis of hierarchic power on 
the one hand, and the collapsing structure of modern life as the temporal dichotomy between work 
and leisure on the other. Both crises crystallize in Tobler’s mania, just like his admonitions to 
punctuality and discipline seem to arise from that same manic side, rather than from rational 
business thinking. With the Tobler character, Walser demonstrates the zero grade of a modern 
power structure that would be defined by an efficient structuring of both time and human 
productivity. The failure of this power structure is also what determines Walser’s novel as a whole. 
To the extent that Tobler does not manage to establish and maintain this structure in an inter-
subjective or temporal dimension, the narrative unfolding in Der Gehülfe is the antithesis, the zero 
grade, of a progress or success story. The novel spells out how the social dimension of modern 
progress becomes problematic while rationality ceases to inform the way in which humans rely on 
each other and on technology. In the world of Der Gehülfe, the means-ends paradigm no longer 
helps formulating meaningful purposes, and it can no longer be projected onto the canvas of a social 
hierarchy, nor onto the way in which humans engage with technology. 
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6. Acceleration, Deceleration, Untimeliness 
At first glance, Der Gehülfe appears to be a quite untimely piece of literature. As discussed above, the 
novel is set in a relatively rural environment and revolves around a quite traditional social structure. 
Unlike the futurist and expressionist ventures of the period, it defies the drive for radical or utopian 
new beginnings. But this ostensible untimeliness is also made explicit within the novel’s plot. As an 
intra-diegetic problem it is already introduced at the very beginning of the story. When Joseph Marti 
arrives at his new workplace, Carl Tobler welcomes him with the exclamation that he arrived one 
day too early at his workplace. Joseph’s objection then amounts to the expression of the first conflict 
between employer and employee:  
‘Warum’, sagte er, Joseph strafend anblickend, ‘kommen Sie denn eigentlich heute schon? Ich habe Sie doch 
erst für Mittwoch bestellt. Ich bin noch gar nicht soweit eingerichtet. Haben Sie’s so eilig gehabt? Wa?’ (6)123 
As the story unfolds, such temporal irregularities reoccur repeatedly, proving to be a central factor of 
the conflict that motivates the novel’s plot and that defines the relationship between its main 
characters. As shown above, the problem of time is critical with regard to Tobler’s failure as an 
employer and authority figure. His repeated appeals to his employee’s punctuality go unheard, at 
least in the sense that Joseph never really changes his habit of appearing late for work. At the same 
time, the hours that Joseph is supposed to spend at the office increasingly deteriorate into empty, 
unproductive time: 
Grundsätzlich hatte Joseph seine Bureaustunden innezuhalten, aber in Wahrheit gab es im Bureau kaum noch 
etwas Reelles und Vorwärtsführendes [!] zu tun, sondern es galt im Grunde nur noch überhaupt da zu sein. 
(174)124 
                                                   
123 “‘Why is it,’ he asked Joseph with a punitive glare, ‘that you’re already here today? You weren’t supposed to arrive 
until Wednesday. I haven’t finished making arrangements. What were you in such a hurry for, eh?’” (Walser 2007, 8). 
 88 
The erosion of productive time is the main symptom of Tobler’s failure in his role as an 
authority figure. It stands in harsh contrast to the doctrines and measures of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s scientific management, which around the time started gaining a foothold in American and 
European enterprises. Punctuality is the main ‘trademark’ of rationalistic authority, and exactly this 
virtue is undermined by Joseph’s defiance: ‘auf die Minute wird es nicht ankommen’. While Taylor 
is known as the man with the stopwatch, Tobler’s key attribute is the Reklame-Uhr, which is a clock 
whose primary function is no longer to measure time (the ultimate symbol of modern progress), but 
to advertise, to reclaim etc. And to make matters worse, this trademark device never even reaches the 
desired state of marketability. 
In this sense, the problem of time defines the relationship between Tobler and Joseph as well 
as the failure of the technological enterprise at large. To the same extent, however, it is also crucial to 
the particular narrative situation of Walser’s novel. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, the role 
of Joseph, the protagonist, is compromised by the very nature of the literary genre that he embodies. 
His intra-diegetic role as employer is characterized by a ‘conflict of interests’ with his extra-diegetic 
role as protagonist. Within the universe of the plot, Tobler would evidently be the actual 
protagonist, as he is the owner and manager of the ‘technisches Bureau’ as well as the ‘head’ of his 
family. On the extra-diagetic level, however, it is Joseph, his employee, who assumes the role of 
protagonist. The novel’s narration, for the most part, focalizes on his character, even though the 
‘conflict of interests’ clearly manifests in the form of ‘kaleidoscopic narration,’ as previously shown. 
The problem of time and temporality intensifies the representational conflict as pre-
determined by the employee’s genre. Tobler, in his role as employer and family father, would 
                                                                                                                                                                    
124 “In principle, Joseph was to maintain his regular hours in the office, but in truth there was scarcely anything serious to 
be done there, anything that might further Tobler’s affairs; it was simply a matter of being present.” (Walser 2007) 
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naturally be the one who dictates the rhythm of events. But instead, the novel’s plot is determined 
precisely by his failure to do so. Through the lens of his employee, the reader witnesses how Tobler’s 
creations never come to fruition as inventions in their temporal form, namely as events that would 
mark progressive steps in the history of technology. And as an entrepreneur and business manager, 
Tobler proves to be incapable of structuring the lived time of his subordinate by enforcing the 
modern dichotomy of work and leisure. Resulting from his failure at structuring time, Tobler 
increasingly turns out to be the ‘unconscious foe of all that progresses,’ (“der unbewußte Feind alles 
dessen, was [...] vorwärtsschritt,” 158) instead of acting as a conscious agent who would drive the 
succession of events forward in a meaningful or intentional way. To the extent that Tobler fails as an 
agent in the story, the novel’s plot structure disintegrates, as it is not held together by the actions (or 
experiences) of a conscious, intention-driven subject. Hence, the problem of time in the content of 
the novel corresponds with a narratological problem regarding its temporal form. 
The preceding observations cast a different light on questions regarding the novel’s 
timeliness. Combining time as a motif with an exploration of the novel’s temporal structure, Der 
Gehülfe may be slightly ahead of its time, but at closer inspection it is not untimely at all. Marcel 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, whose first volume was published only a few years after 
Walser’s novel (in 1913), has the same crisis of temporality in its title, and it transpires it through all 
its pores. Around the same time, Thomas Mann started writing his novel Der Zauberberg, which 
describes with all narrative sophistication a place strangely removed from its historical time, just to 
culminate again and again in meditations on temporality and narration. 
It is no coincidence that Proust’s Recherche serves as the prime example to one of the most 
impactful works of modern narrative theory, namely to Gérard Genette’s 1972 Discours du récit. 
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Essai de methode. Drawing upon observations regarding Proust’s masterpiece Genette develops his 
structuralist categories for an analysis of narrative texts, which is often read as a decisive step toward 
a scientification of literary studies. However, while Genette clearly adheres to structuralism’s 
doctrines and ambitions, he subscribes by no means to crude epistemological positivism. An anti-
positivistic strain in his thinking does not only come to the fore in the afterword to his book, where 
in clear words he undoes any false hopes that his methodological contemplations could serve any 
progressive, cumulative construction of a science of literature.125 It also manifests itself in the way 
Genette employs some passages from Proust’s novel not as positive, but rather as negative examples 
that nevertheless corroborate the productive potential of his structuralist method. 
The part where Genette discusses the notion of ‘descriptive pause,’ for instance, is one of the 
points in his book where he exemplifies his theoretical reflections with what he calls a “negative 
finding” in Proust’s Recherche. Within the present study, the concept of pause is of particular interest 
as it designates parts in a narrative where the progression of discourse time corresponds with (almost) 
no progression in story time. In a descriptive pause, narrative discourse proceeds without 
representing any eventful change within the story. In other words, pause is the zero grade of 
narration within narrative discourse. Genette finds a way of expressing this narrative situation with 
one of his “pseudo-mathematical” (Genette 1980, 114) formulas: “NT=n, ST=0. Thus: NT > ST” 
(Genette 1980, 95), “with ST designating story time and NT the pseudo-time, or conventional time, 
of the narrative” (Genette 1980, 94). The “negative finding,” now, regarding descriptive pauses in 
Proust’s novel, is that  
                                                   
125 As clear as these words may be, they have not prevented the scientific musings of generations of literary scholars from 
causing a reflex as  “As he says in his Afterword, the very nature of poetics as a progressive, cumulative enterprise ensures 
that his formulations will one day be relegated to the rubbish heap. If this happens, it will doubtless be because they have 
inspired improvements.”  
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[…] Proustian ‘description’ is less a description of the object contemplated than it is a narrative and analysis of 
the perceptual activity of the character contemplating: of his impressions, progressive discoveries, shifts in 
distance and perspective, errors and corrections, enthusiasms or disappointments, etc. A contemplation highly 
active in truth, and containing ‘a whole story.’ This story is what Proustian description recounts. (Genette 
1980, 102) 
Proust’s descriptive pauses, in fact, are no true pauses of narration. They represent changes of state, 
albeit no external ones regarding the character’s actions, but internal ones, concerning the character’s 
mental life. In other words, Proust’s pauses do not represent minimums or zero grades of narrative 
progression, but rather function as mental internalizations of plot. In this form, plot does not 
progress as a sequence of external actions or occurrences, but as an internal stream of the 
protagonist’s mental activity. For Genette, this particular engagement with narrative temporality is 
what sets Proust apart from the realism and naturalism of a Stendhal or a Balzac. And it is ultimately 
what—in Genette’s eyes—amounts to “Proust’s genius,” putting him in the position of “fathering 
that modern literature which owes him so much” (Genette 1980, 265). 
It is a special attention to narrative temporality that Robert Walser shares with Marcel 
Proust. Much like À la recherche du temps perdu, Der Gehülfe can be read as a literary meditation on 
modern temporality. Both novels shift the focus from an account of events in time toward a narrative 
reflection of the form of time as such. Proust accomplishes this reflective mode of narration through 
the described technique of pause, and thus ultimately by contrasting external progressions with 
internal changes of state within the protagonist’s mind. Walser, in contrast, creates a literary universe 
in which there is almost no progression at all, neither external, in the form of actions, nor internal 
progression, in the form mental developments on the part of the protagonist. While Proust’s 
descriptive pauses are eventful in their own internalizing way, the plot of Walser’s novel is 
characterized by a minimum of eventfulness altogether. Unlike Proust’s Recherche, Der Gehülfe 
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recounts no actual progressive developments, neither external nor internal ones, which stands in 
contrast to the thematic setting of Walser’s novel. The modern topos of the ‘technisches Bureau’ 
naturally evokes ideas of progress and acceleration, whereas the novel’s plot could be called a non-
plot, representing standstill, rather than change.126 In this way, Der Gehülfe resembles a modernist 
painting whose canvas is left (partly) blank to reveal the spatiality and materiality of the medium. 
Expecting actual blank spots in the fabric of Walser’s text, however, would mean to take this analogy 
all too literally. Far from actually abandoning the medium of narrative literature, Walser finds ways 
of narrating a story that is constituted by no conventional plot in the sense of a progressive sequence 
of events. This seemingly impossible project of telling a story without a plot runs as a red thread 
through Walser’s life work. 127  Der Gehülfe, however, drives this project far beyond a pure 
narratological experiment. As shown in the present chapter, the novel links the lack of eventfulness 
directly with a critical meditation on a crisis of technological progress as a grand récit of modernity. 
The novel’s plot hinges on two time regimes whose mutual disagreement amounts to a good 
part of the tensions, asynchronisms, and conflicts that inform its structure. On the one hand, there is 
                                                   
126 This is in line with observations made by Samuel Frederick who views Walser’s prose as a prime example of a form of 
narration that no longer centers on a plot, where plot “is that impulse in a narrative that strives for totality, 
subordinating the incidental and subsuming the contingent.” (Frederick 2012, 3). In other words, Der Gehülfe is a case 
in point of a narrative “that is not regulated by plot” (Frederick 2012, 8). 
 
127 A short text entitled “Spaziergang im Park” (“Walk in the Park”), which was published over two decades after Der 
Gehülfe, makes it explicit with its opening sentence in the form of self-reflection: “Kaum weiß ich, wie ich eine 
Geschichte anfangen soll, die vielleicht handlungslos abläuft” (Walser 1986, 127). In this vein, many of Walser’s prose 
pieces from his first book Fritz Kochers Aufsätze (1904) and up until his so-called “microscripts” (German 
“Mikrogramme”) revolve around this notion of an uneventful story linked with a self-reflexive meditation on the 
narrative situation. The author himself appears to go so far as to describe his entire oeuvre of prose pieces as a continuous 
series pursuing that same project of a plotless story, which in its entirety amounts to a grand novel. In a meta-narrative 
commentary published in the volume Für die Katz he writes: “Meine Prosastücke bilden meiner Meinung nach nichts 
anderes als Teile einer langen, handlungslosen, realistischen Geschichte. Für mich sind die Skizzen, die ich dann und 
wann hervorbringe, kleinere oder umfangreichere Romankapitel. Der Roman, woran ich weiter und weiter schreibe, 
bleibt immer derselbe und dürfte als ein mannigfaltig zerschnittenes oder zertrenntes Ich-Buch bezeichnet werden 
können.” (Walser 1986, 322). Cf. Samuel Frederick’s very insightful book Narratives Unsettled (Frederick 2012) 
concerning the theoretical implications of such non-plot-centered narration. 
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the linear, progressive regime of technological and economic time represented by Tobler’s inventions 
and by his entire technological enterprise. This regime, however, remains in the deficient mode of 
unfulfilled expectations. On the other hand, there is the cyclical regime of nature and ritual, 
represented by the course of seasons, the Tobler family’s and Joseph’s weekly routines, and the 
celebrations held on the Swiss National Day. Thus far, Walser’s novel accords with a temporality 
structure typical for a modern piece of literature. What makes Walser’s novel particular, however, is 
that the two time regimes are in a strange way inverted. The same criteria that are usually associated 
with technological time, in Der Gehülfe appear on the side of nature, and vice versa. The natural 
course of seasons is what progresses, whereas the human affairs around Tobler’s enterprise plod along 
in unprogressive monotony.  
Die Zeit machte einen unsichtbaren Schritt vorwärts. Auch in der Gegend von Bärenswil blieben die 
Jahreszeiten nicht stehen, sondern [...] sie veränderten sich, trotz des Herrn Tobler, der vielleicht wünschen 
mochte, die Zeit stillstehen zu sehen. Ein Mann wie er, dessen Geschäfte nicht gingen, war der unbewußte 
Feind alles dessen, was ruhig und gleichmäßig vorwärtsschritt. (DG 158) 
The paradoxical nature of this passage reflects the existential crisis the novel’s characters find 
themselves in. Karl Tobler, the inventor, whose job and calling it is to advance technical progress, is 
unhappy with the natural progression of time—manifested in the course of seasons—as he is 
extremely unsuccessful with his technological undertakings. It is no surprise that Tobler is “the 
unconscious foe of all that progresses,” as he is unable to find investors in order to bring his technical 
inventions to market maturity, and hence he is heading straight for bankruptcy. In this vein, it is the 
central problem of the novel that certain desired events—the success of the inventions—do not 
occur. This situation can be described as anti-dramatic, as it is not a relentless course of events that 
closes in on the characters, but rather a glaring uneventfulness. As a result, time itself has 
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disintegrated into an amorphous set of units, such as days, weeks, or seasons. It no longer appears as 
a uniform dimension, but as an erratic force that seems too fast at one point, and too slow at 
another. Along these lines, time appears as a deceptive masquerade of change. The course of seasons 
mimics change only ostensibly, while its actual nature is a never-changing monotony. 
Und die Welt, verändert sich nicht? Nein. Das Winterbild kann sich über die Sommerwelt werfen, aus dem 
Winter kann Frühling werden, aber das Gesicht der Erde ist dasselbe geblieben. (DG 196)  
Walser’s novel inverts a central criterion of technicized modernity: acceleration.128 Instead of 
presenting acceleration in its positive form, Der Gehülfe depicts dwindling assets and failure of 
innovation. It is not that technological change emancipates itself from the temporal structure of 
natural cycles, which, according to Reinhart Koselleck, is the key feature of the modern experience of 
time.129 Instead, the natural course of things (such as the seasons) and the mere units of time (weeks, 
months, years) seem to be accelerating in relation to Tobler’s technological endeavors, which have 
reached a standstill. Rather than working toward acceleration, Tobler appears to secretly hope for a 
slowing down of natural or cosmological time. 
As the present chapter has shown, Der Gehülfe demonstrates how progress fails on various 
levels within the plot. Progress shipwrecks as the form of collective purpose in a social hierarchy 
between human individuals (master and servant), it disappoints as a principle to structure the 
temporal succession of events (inventions), and it does not convince as a promise of emancipation as 
                                                   
128 Cf. the pertinent publications by Harmut Rosa for in-depth analysis of acceleration as a central phenomenon of 
modern societies (Rosa 2005; Rosa 2010). 
129 Koselleck speaks of “Denaturalisierung der Zeiterfahrung durch die technischen Beschleunigungsfaktoren” (Koselleck 
2000, 153–68) and a “Denaturalisierung der Altersmetaphorik” (Koselleck 2006, 168). For Koselleck, this 
denaturalization is at the same time a fading away of spatial implications that progress still has as a metaphor, but that it 
forfeits as a modern concept: “Meine spezielle begriffsgeschichtliche These wird nun lauten, daß Fortschritt ein 
neuzeitlicher Begriff geworden ist, indem er seine naturale Hintergrundsbedeutung des räumlichen Ausschreitens 
abgestreift oder in Vergessenheit gebracht hat. Der bildliche Verweis ist verblaßt.” (Koselleck 2006, 162). In other 
words, this coinciding process of de-spatialization, de-naturalization, and de-metaphorization is precisely what marks the 
becoming of ‘progress’ as a modern concept. 
 95 
embodied modern technology (inventions and techno-mania). In Walser’s novel, it is thus the 
absence of concrete progress within the plot that reveals the crisis of progress as an idea. The 
following chapter, in contrast, will deal with a literary example ranging at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. My reading of Paul Scheerbart’s Perpetuum Mobile will show how the literary treatment of 
a technological super-invention can amount to a critique of progress quite similar to, and perhaps 




Paul Scheerbart’s Perpetuum mobile as Anti-Science Fiction 
1. Daedalus and Icarus: A Primal Scene of Invention 
Modern invention narratives have some of their classical forebears in Greek mythology. Besides the 
myth of Prometheus, the titan and trickster who is said to have provided humans with fire as well as 
with the art of invention, it is the figure of Daedalus who has informed Western imaginations of 
inventiveness and engineering skills over centuries. The story of Daedalus and Icarus in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses (Ovid, met. 8,183-235) is one of the most influential depictions of a technical 
invention and its dramatic consequences. 
The short narrative describes how the Athens-born Daedalus, weary of his long exile in Crete, 
devises a way for himself and his son Icarus to escape from king Minos’s sphere of power. Of feathers 
and wax he crafts two pairs of wings that he models after nature. Before the two mortals dare their 
god-like flight over the sea in order to escape from the island, Daedalus instructs his son about the 
proper use of the wings and about the various risks involved. However, the story comes to a tragic 
end when the young Icarus disregards his father’s advice. He flies too high up towards the sun where 
the heat melts the wax in his wings so that he falls and drowns in the sea. 
 The narrative represents a primal scene of human inventiveness and ingenuity, depicting the act 
of creating something completely new and formerly unknown after an existing model. It can be read 
as a general topical matrix for how the phenomenon of technical invention has been henceforth 
treated in literature. Ovid’s text intertwines various classical themes that I will briefly outline by 
distinguishing the following three aspects: an aesthetic, an ethic, and a cognitive one. 
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Firstly, the idea of invention is treated as an aesthetic phenomenon in the metamorphosis, as 
Daedalus is described as a homo faber who crafts the wings as the example of a new and beautiful 
order, imitating a natural model and using found components and material, such as feathers and 
wax. 
Secondly, the technological invention is ascribed an ethical-political dimension. This shows not 
only in its purpose—as Daedalus creates the wings in order to escape from king Minos’s power—but 
it also manifests in the execution of the invention, which is presented as an act of hubris through 
which Daedalus outwits and circumvents existing natural constraints. The ethic dimension becomes 
explicit when the invention is used for its maiden flight. The instructions Daedalus gives to his son 
make obvious that there is a right and a wrong use of the newly created device, where the right use is 
characterized as a golden mean, just as in Aristotle’s mesótês doctrine.130 The actual flight then is a 
three-dimensional visualization of this doctrine: it opens up a space in which the young Icarus tends 
to the extremes and thus causes his own downfall. 
The cognitive dimension of the invention, thirdly, finds expression in the tension between 
Daedalus’s superior knowledge and skills as inventor and craftsman on the one hand, and the 
unknown factors of his endeavor on the other hand. Between those extremes, the act of inventing is 
described as a process of knowledge acquisition and transfer. When Daedalus sets to work inventing 
the new device, he is described as applying his thought to “unknown arts” (“ignotas artes,” 188). 
Later, Icarus is said to hinder his father at work, “without knowing” that he is handling things that 
will later endanger him (“ignarus sua se tractare pericla,” 196). Following the instructions that 
                                                   
130 Marjorie Hoefmans correctly points out that this appeal to moderation stands also apply in contrasts with Daedalus’s 
initial act of hubris and adds to the overall ambivalence of his character and the irony of Ovid’s adaptation of the myth 
(Hoefmans 1994, 144–5). The same ambivalence and irony also apply to the assessment of Daedalus’s invention in 
Ovid’s text and they are a common tone of technology assessment in literature from early Promethean narratives up to 
modern day science fiction. 
 98 
Daedalus gives to his son, the invented device is once more referred to as “the unknown wings” 
(“ignotas alas,” 209), suggesting that even though the father has a lead in knowledge over his 
contemporaries, he cannot completely rule out the unknown. 
It is crucial that the represented knowledge difference has both a synchronic and a diachronic 
dimension. Daedalus has a lead in knowledge over his son by virtue of his age and life experience, 
and over his contemporaries by virtue of his technical understanding and skill. This difference in 
knowledge is mirrored by the narrative construction. The narrator evidently has knowledge about 
the further course of events as well as about the tragic end of the story; he also ensures through 
repeated prolepses that the reader, too, gains a lead of knowledge over the characters regarding the 
invention’s fatal consequences. We can thus distinguish a narratological hierarchy of knowledge with 
four levels, at the top of which is the narrator, followed by the reader or recipient, then by Daedalus, 
and at the bottom ranges Icarus. The hierarchy is temporally organized on an axis between not 
knowing yet and knowing already. Icarus does not know yet what his father knows, Daedalus does not 
know yet what the reader knows, and the reader does not know yet what the narrator knows. This 
diachronic hierarchy of knowledge can be read as an archetype for a progress narrative whose 
epistemic focal point lies in the figure of the narrator. It finds its late reverberation in modern Whig 
history where the historian-narrator claims a superior position, towards which the narrated events are 
oriented in a teleological fashion. 
The cognitive aspect of Ovid’s text also makes apparent that technological and narrative 
knowledge overlap at a point where the material composition of the invented device harbors risks 
and dangers that at least potentially determine the fatal further course of events. The knowledge that 
Daedalus tries to pass on to his son is rooted at least partly in his technical know-how and is proven 
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valid by the further course and fatal outcome of the story. Technological and poetic invention thus 
share a common logic that accounts for a widespread poetological reading of the passage (Feldherr 
2010, 111). Following such an interpretation, the aesthetical, ethical and cognitive aspects laid out 
above can be equally applied to the creation and reception of Ovid’s literary work itself. The 
technical invention of the wings is seen as a mise en abyme of Ovid’s poetic work. Accordingly, the 
craftsman Daedalus can be identified with the poet himself.131 In the above-mentioned mode of 
ambivalence and irony, Daedalus’s invention can then be seen as a positive or a negative example for 
an aesthetically and ethically good work of art. In this spirit, the short narrative of Daedalus and 
Icarus contains a literary aesthetic of poetic production in a nutshell as a theory of narrative 
invention.132 
With its emphasis on imitation after nature (“ut ueras imitetur aues,” 195), the the 
metamorphosis must also be read as a statement in the classical discourse on mimesis. Within this 
discourse, Ovid takes a clear stance for the Aristotelian and against the Platonic understanding of 
mimesis. While Plato had banished poets and artists from his ideal state because they produced 
ephemeral copies of nature, his disciple Aristotle enhanced the value of the mimetic arts: he ascribed 
to them the ability to ‘mimic’ nature in its potential, non-ephemeral form. This positive Aristotelian 
notion of mimesis is suggested by Ovid’s detailed description of how Daedalus reinvents nature by 
skillfully imitating the form of bird wings. 
                                                   
131 This reading is supported by the fact that Daedalus is called “opifex,” and his invention is called “opus,” words that 
are otherwise used in metamorphoses where the poet refers to himself. In addition, the very last passage of the work 
allows drawing another parallel between Daedalus and Ovid as well as between their respective works (opera). When the 
craftsman creates his device to soar into the skies, the poet creates his poem to claim for himself an eternal place above 
the stars (“super […] astra, ”XV, 875 f.; Feldherr 2010, 111).  
132 Although the word ‘inventio’ is not used in this passage of the Metamorphoses, the text should be read with reference 
to the classical canon of invention or heuresis, understood as the discovery of arguments and topoi in ancient rhetoric. 
However, the classical orator (gr. rhetor) essentially rediscovers previously known sources that he then re-composes in the 
process of dispositio (gr. taxis). Daedalus, on the contrary, discovers natural models (in bird wings) and then, by means of 
imitation, creates something previously unknown, i.e. wings that can be used by humans in order to soar into the sky. 
 100 
Through the creative act, Daedalus changes the natural order of things by repositioning himself 
as a human within the scala naturae (great chain of being) and at the same time transcending it.133 
His transcendence of the natural order comes with a divine dimension that finds expression in the 
further course of the narrative. While Daedalus is ‘recreating’ nature, he is viewed through the eyes 
of his son as ‘pater mirabilis,’ the miraculous father (“suo mirabile patris,” 199). Subsequently, when 
father and son are rising into the air, “a ploughman, a shepherd, or a fisherman” who sees them 
flying “believes that they are gods” (“credidit esse deos,” 220). At this point, too, the narrative 
depiction is characterized by ambiguity. Daedalus’ invention adorns the two characters with divine 
glory, but also appears as a device of imposture with the aid of which the two mortals pretend to be 
gods, i.e. more than they actually are. 
In this vein, Ovid’s fable neither zeros in on a critical or even negative view of technological 
invention and progress, nor does it help toward their glorification.134 Unlike the other 
metamorphoses in Ovid’s collection, the narrative of Daedalus and Icarus does not describe how a 
higher order is re-established through the character’s change of shape. It presents the topic of 
human’s reliance on tools and technology as a problem rather than a solution. The text thus presents 
the tension between the two extremes of technology’s emancipatory potential on the one hand and 
its fatal risks on the other hand. Where Daedalus stands for the successful use of technology and its 
emancipatory potential, his son Icarus personifies its failure and fatal risks when abused. To be sure, 
it is this ambiguity that accounts for the power of Ovid’s take on technical invention. 
                                                   
133 A comparison of this passage with the earlier version in Ovid’s Ars Amatoria makes this point even more blatant in its 
significance for the idea of metamorphosis. In the earlier version, Daedalus innovates or reinvents just his own nature 
(sua natura), whereas in the later version of the metamorphoses he is said to reinvent nature and the natural order of 
things on a whole. 
134 It thus occupies an intermediate position in an ancient controversy between the view of tools as a means for humans 
to liberate themselves from a hostile nature on the one hand, and the natura sola dictum of the Cynics on the other 
(Hoefmans 1994, 142). 
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2. Changing Grounds for Technological Skepticism around 1900 
There are only a few examples in the reception history of the Daedalus myth in general and of 
Ovid’s adaptation in the Metamorphoses in particular that view the content and message of the 
narrative in a narrow sense as a take on technology.135 As outlined above, tradition has rather treated 
the motif of Daedalus’s creation under the umbrella of a general discourse on invention, which can 
equally refer to artistic, poetic, or technological creations. It is not so much a renunciation of 
machines and technology that led to the widespread negative reading of this metamorphosis; instead, 
the idea of original invention by humans has been blocked over centuries by two discourses. On the 
one hand, a biblical-theological discourse rooted in Genesis and Ecclesiastes reserves the power of 
creatio ex nihilo to the creator god. On the other hand, a philosophical-poetological discourse 
harking back to Platonic ontology allows for inventions only in the sense of the re-discovery of 
predetermined truths (Haug 2008). For modernist literature, to be sure, those conditions have 
changed radically. Aristotelian poetics has lost its normative and canonical clout. And the conception 
of artistic and poetic mimesis has changed in so far as art—under the buzz-words of realism and 
naturalism—often takes a secondary position after modern science (and technology) in the endeavor 
to understand and make visible truth and the workings of nature.136 
                                                   
135 Only scarce examples are known of cases where people tried to transfer the idea of human air-flight, which actually 
forms a basic motif of the narrative, primarily in a poetological, and not in a literal, i.e. technological way. Most well-
known exceptions are for instance Leonardo da Vinci (Poleskie 1985, 69) and Emanuel Swedenborg (Söderberg 1988). 
136 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, French naturalism pushed the limits of this modern epistemic hierarchy by 
propagating ‘l’idée d’une littérature déterminée par la science” (Zola, Le roman expérimental, 1879). It would go far 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to delving deeper into the complex discourse about Realism and Naturalism. But 
what is important to note in the given context is that the model of science that Zola’s has in mind is profoundly 
determined by a technological worldview. Claude Bernard’s epistemological dichotomy of observation versus 
experimentation, which has exemplary status for Zola’s own scientific enterprise, has technology inscribed to it on both 
sides. Bernard, as Zola cites him, compares on the one hand the observer with a photographer. And he explains the 
procedure of scientific experiment, on the other hand, as a ‘mechanism.’ In Zola’s poetics, literary production is 
secondary in so far as it borrows its methods (experiment, observation) as well as its narrative pattern (evolution, 
heredity) from science from science.  
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The modern progress narratives discussed in this dissertation arise from a historical context in 
which the above-mentioned theological and philosophical discourses have lost a good part of their 
impact. Biblical maxims such as “there is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes) and “God is the 
sole creator” (St. Augustine) appear just as incompatible with an ever-changing industrialized and 
engineered reality around 1900 as does Plato’s theory of forms. The introduction of a number of 
great inventions at that time shook up the traditional social structures and routines. After the great 
century of industrialization had radically mechanized production processes and the work place, 
inventions such as the automobile and the airplane, the telephone, and film began to diffuse 
technology widely in the personal everyday life in terms of transportation, communication, 
information and entertainment. Around the same time, a great movement of rationalization 
reshaped once again the production processes and the understanding of human work and labor in 
Europe and North America. Increasingly mechanized manufacturing meant that humans no longer 
appeared simply as the operators of the machines, but more and more as small cogs in the big wheel 
of production.137 While this new form of existence brought about its own sorts of disability and 
fatigue (Rabinbach 1990), it also provoked ideas about how it could be optimized and rendered 
more efficient. 
With this in view, the American engineer and management consultant Frederick Winslow 
Taylor begins around 1900 to develop a new handling of human labor, which will later be called 
                                                   
137 These developments could be viewed as continuations of what Karl Marx had called the “estrangement of labor.” 
Marx, however, describes those changes as deviations from the ideal of individual human development—an idea he 
borrowed from “German humanist culture” (Berman 1982, 96)—caused by capitalist economy. In the present context, 
however, they are more adequately described as a function of an application of engineering processes to human activities. 
While “humanistic ideal of self-development” could be traced back—if not to organic models of growth and adaption—
to an “emerging reality of bourgeois economic development” (Berman 1982, 96); notions such as increase of efficiency 
and acceleration of work processes can be seen as principle functions of an engineering way of thought. Which of the two 
notions—bourgeois development or technological increase of efficiency—implies a greater extent of estrangement from a 
‘natural human way of existence’ must be left open. 
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‘scientific management.’ Aiming to maximize worker’s efficiency, Taylor approaches humans “in the 
same manner as he treated machines as an engineer,” with the purpose of “wrenching ever higher 
performances from them” (Borscheid 1996, 129).138 The historian Sigfried Giedion gets to the heart 
of it when he writes in his seminal 1948 book Mechanization Takes Command: “The human body is 
studied to discover how far it can be transformed into a mechanism.” (Giedion 1972, 98). One of 
Taylor’s declared goals was to reduce the workers’ scope of action in order to render their labor at 
the production line more efficient. The intended consequence of this restriction of freedom at the 
workplace was to manifest the societal division between head and hand, between white-collar and 
blue-collar workers, i.e. between intellectual work on the one hand and physical labor on the other. 
While Taylor consigned managers and engineers to decide over the nature and purpose of a 
production process, he limited the blue-collar worker’s raison d’être to its mere execution. Taylor’s 
maxims thus turned workers gradually into gears in the mesh of modern mechanical production. 
Described in the words of Sigfried Giedion: “Human movements became levers in the machine” 
(Giedion 1972, 99). In this sense, the majority of people involved in the production process 
experience its procedures as de facto inalterable. Any behavior deviating from the pre-determined 
workflow would have harmful consequences both for the workers (by losing either their jobs or their 
limbs) and for the smooth functioning of the process. An ever-growing demonization of technology 
and an increasing technomorphism in human self-perception are logical consequences of such 
                                                   
138 My translation of: “Taylor hatte sich den Menschen auf die gleiche Weise genähert wie er als Ingenieur an Maschinen 
herangegangen war, um immer größere Leistung aus ihnen herauszuholen.” Taylor began to promote his theories around 
the turn of the century and published them in a concentrated form in his seminal book The Principles of Scientific 
Management (1911) that came out in a German translation in 1913 under the title Theorie der wissenschaftlichen 
Betriebsführung. 
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mechanization of human labor.139 
Besides those concrete technical developments, the technological sector of German society 
undergoes radical changes on the organizational and administrative level. The formation of the 
Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) in 1956 and of the various regional so-called Dampfkessel 
Überwachungs Vereine (DÜV, later Technische Überwachungs Vereine) around that time provides 
engineers and manufacturers with more social influence. As a result, 
[…] the state’s power to regulate technology was ceded step-by-step to the engineering associations, which 
increasingly regarded themselves as being engaged in ‘technical and scientific community work’—a slogan 
which reveals both the broad concept of responsibility of scientists and engineers, and the understanding of 
communitarian activities as a substitute for governmental intervention. (Dierkes, Knie, and Wagner 1990, 160) 
In brief, the technological sector of modern societies gains autonomy while active (political) 
intervention in the process of technical change from outside the sector becomes increasingly 
unlikely.140 At the same time, the technical regime (or code; defined by the “Leitdifferenz” 
efficient/non-efficient141) encroaches on processes in society that have previously been reserved to 
human agency. The enormous avail in human power and agency that the flood of inventions and 
wave of industrialization promises is thus accompanied by massive restrictions of human freedom. 
Technological progress appears as a double-edged sword. 
It goes without saying that the great wave of technological change and innovation accordingly is 
                                                   
139 There has been debate among historians about how much of the Taylorist doctrine actually made its way into 
European businesses before World War I. However, as Anson Rabinbach argues, Taylor’s significance should be seen in 
bundling and conceptualizing views and practices that had been independently developed on both sides of the Atlantic. 
This is to say that “the debate about the Taylor system was in many ways far more important than the extent of its 
application.” (Rabinbach 1990, 240). 
140 Borrowing an expression from Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, this could be described as ‘Ausdifferenzierung des 
Techniksystems’ or ‘differentiation of the technological system.’ 
141  Note that Luhmann does not count technology (or German “Technik”) as one of the sub-systems that are 
differentiated in the transition to modernity. Instead, technology or technics appear as an aid for any system to increase 
its efficiency (Bammé, Berger, and Kotzmann 2012, 28–9). 
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met only in part by enthusiasm, but to a large extent also by skepticism, fear and fierce opposition.142 
However, it would be too simple to describe early twentieth century industrialized societies in 
general and pre-war Germany in particular as battlegrounds of a progressive technophile left and a 
conservative technophobe right. The boundaries between technological enthusiasm and 
technological skepticism are rather blurred and they often cross the dividing lines between the 
different political camps rather than paralleling them. The explosive atmosphere in the wake of 
radical technological change causes ambiguities rather than outright oppositions between different 
social groups. Especially among writers and intellectuals of various political complexions those 
oppositions are expressed and documented in diverse forms.143 
In particular the literary and journalistic writing of the time draws a complex picture of technical 
progress with regard to its potentials as well as its dangers. As Ovid’s metamorphosis illustrates, not 
only with regard to the ancient context, the motif and narrative structure of technological inventions 
can function as magnifying glasses for different views of change, progress, and the process of 
aesthetical or technological fabrication and imitation. Just like the Deadalus myth, some modernist 
writings provide insight in the workings and imaginations of progress. They impart this knowledge 
when we examine more closely depictions of how technical inventions are made, of how they are 
marketed and diffused in society, and of how they are used for the first time under real world 
conditions. While the narratives generally imply a value judgment regarding the technical inventions 
they deal with, those literary assessments often consist not only in a contemplation of the benefits 
                                                   
142  Regarding the German context, cf. the chapter “Konservative Technikkritik” in Rolf Peter Sieferle’s book 
Fortschrittsfeinde? (Sieferle 1984, 155–6). Sieferle sees a clear binary between conservative technophobia and progressive 
(socialist and social-democratic) technophilia at the turn of the century and before the Great War. 
143 A telling example is futurism that is probably the most extreme expression of technological enthusiasm in literature 
and the arts. Its founding figure Filippo Tommaso Marinetti did not subscribe to any existing political formation. 
Instead, he first founded his own political party before he later went cheek to jowl with Mussolini’s fascist movement. 
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and harms of one single invention, but also in a contestation of technology’s “cultural value” 
(“Kulturwert der Technik,” (Sieferle 1984, 157)) and of progress as such. 
Ovid’s depiction of Daedalus and Icarus is a classical and paradigmatic example of how narrative 
literature deals with technology not simply as a static object, but as a dynamic process. The ancient 
author presents Daedalus’s invention in its fabrication and application with its own dynamic tension 
between risks and potentials. The text does not merely deal with technology and its meaning for 
humans as a static relation or, in other words, as a fixed structure. It rather focuses on the temporal 
aspects and describes how the invention of something radically new takes place, with all its ethical, 
aesthetical and epistemological implications and consequences as a process. In short, Ovid depicts 
the motif of Daedalus’s invention as a genuinely narrative phenomenon. 
The following investigation of modern invention narratives puts the emphasis exactly on those 
narrative aspects or “process properties” (Hans Jonas) of technical progress. Investigating the 
depictions of inventions in modern literature, it does not take technology as a sum total or a network 
of given artifacts. Instead, it focuses on how those technological phenomena are described in flux, as 
narratives about how they take place or come about. In this sense, inventions can be seen as positive 
instances of technical progress, since they constitute the events or points in time where the 
technological universe makes—or is believed to make—a step or leap ahead. At the same time, 
inventions appear as touchstones for technological assessment. While often either providing a 
positive or a negative view of the described invention, literary narratives always also imply statements 
about the value of technological change on the whole. 
Narratives that put particular emphasis on the process properties of technology form a special sub-
set within the corpus of literature about technology. Those narratives underscore the aspects of 
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change brought about either by or through (new) technologies. This sub-set of narratives can be 
further distinguished and structured according to two main criteria. First, they differ in regard to the 
type of events they deal with, be it the inventions and applications of (new) technologies, or the 
accidents, catastrophes, and dilemmas that such innovations bring about. Second, those progress 
narratives can be discerned by their different attribution of agency with regard to technology and its 
fabrication or use, be it that they suggest a functionalistic view of the change process, a demonization 
of technological devices, or models of serendipity. The present chapter focuses on narratives that 
primarily deal with the event type invention and serves the purpose of shedding light on the various 
models of agency attribution. 
A guiding question for this investigation is how literature portrays inventions as possible points 
of interventions in the course of change. In order to elucidate this question, I will briefly sum up the 
narratological preliminaries presented in the previous chapter. When I refer to invention as a certain 
type of event I do so with reference to the common narratological usage of the term, yet at the same 
time with a critical assessment of the notion. In recent works on narratology, the term ‘event’ is 
commonly explained as ‘a change of state’ and often used interchangeably with this latter 
expression.144 While ‘change of state’ may seem very technical and abstract, the more traditional 
word “event” might be somewhat misleading. A narrative event is usually viewed in the context of an 
“action” (like the German “Handlung,” in the double meaning as either diegesis or active deed) 
against the backdrop of the classical binary of doing (Greek “agein”) versus being affected (Greek 
                                                   
144 Wolf Schmid shows that a distinction between the two concepts would in fact make sense and can be very productive 
for a theory of ‘eventfulness’: “every event is a change of state, but not every change of state constitutes an event. The 
event, therefore, has to be defined as a change of state that fulfills certain conditions.” (Schmid 2003, 24) This 
conceptual sophistication, however, does not help overcoming the prejudice that events and states of event should be 
understood in the context of action and agency: “If a change of state is brought about by an agent, we speak of an action. 
If it affects a patient, we have a happening.” (Schmid 2003, 19). 
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“paschein”). It thus already implies an attribution regarding the center of agency, or in other words, 
the initiating cause of a sequence of “events.” 
In contrast to this, literary depictions of technical change often leave the questions as to who is 
the actor and who is affected by the action deliberately undecided. In some cases, they engage 
critically with common assumptions about agency. In others, they problematize the mere possibility 
of intervention in a given course of change. Turned positively, a literary depiction of a fundamental 
change of state can open up the view on what intervention could possibly look like (just like Walter 
Benjamin suggests when he refers to Bertolt Brecht’s program of an epic theater in his essay Der 
Autor als Produzent or The Author as Producer). Such narrative depictions are thus not accurately 
described as a simple structure of action, i.e. as a causal nexus between the two poles of agency: agein 
and paschein, but rather as different states of knowledge in a communication process. Along the same 
lines, the narratives do not simply project a causal chain in a subject-object relation, such as between 
humans and tools, gods and mortals, or the like, on a linear sequence of events. Instead, they can be 
viewed as more complex temporal structures of knowledge versus ignorance, seeing versus not seeing, 
possibility versus impossibility, and probability versus improbability. 
As seen in the discussed example of Ovid’s metamorphosis, the literary engagement with the 
motif of invention has the tendency to turn into a meditation on fictionality and literaricity at the 
point where technical and poetic invention coincide. In Ovid’s case it is clear that the poet finds the 
motif or fabula (German “Stoff”) in the myth of Daedalus and Icarus. The literary production 
process thus follows the classical paradigm of invention understood as the ancient “inventio” (Greek 
“heuresis”). This setting becomes more complex where the poetic idea at the basis is either freely 
invented in the modern sense, where it originates in the author’s own life experience, or where it is 
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taken from history and is marked with a true facts claim. Along the same lines, some narratological 
characteristics apply when the classical paradigm of invention in literature is translated to modern 
takes on the idea. While Ovid’s Daedalus and Icarus follows more or less suit in the genre of myth 
with its own specific truth claims, the majority of the modern narratives on technical inventions 
reside on the blurred borders between fiction and non-fiction. This intermediate extent of the 
literary field calls for some precautions vis-à-vis a general indeterminacy as to the truth claim of the 
single texts that shall be briefly listed in the following. First and foremost, the narrator’s position and 
voice should not be attributed to any fictional or biographical subject. The narrator in Joseph Roth’s 
journalistic writings, for instance, or the inventor-narrator of Paul Scheerbart’s Das Perpetuum mobile 
should not be prematurely identified with the respective authors’ signing for those works. In the 
same spirit, the voice expressing the assessment of technology within the narratives cannot be simply 
reduced to one single subject position—be it the narrator or the author. This is important even if 
such a subject is viewed as changing over time, e.g. as undergoing a development from technophile 
to technophobe or the like. Finally, and on a deeper level, this implies that the literary analysis has to 
suspend a decision as to where the texts draw the lines between the observer subjects and observed 
subjects (or objects), between technology and non-technology, and between invention and non-
invention. 
3. Paul Scheerbart’s ‘Invention’ between Fiction and Feasibility 
One modernist work amalgamating the ideas of technical and of literary invention is Paul 
Scheerbart’s Das Perpetuum mobile. Die Geschichte einer Erfindung (1910). Just as Ovid’s rendition of 
the Daedalus and Icarus myth, Scheerbart’s text forms an intersection between technological creation 
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and literary imagination. But this merging quality is not the only aspect that puts Scheerbart’s 
Perpetuum close to Ovid’s metamorphosis. With the idea of a perpetual motion machine Scheerbart 
focuses on an age-old dream of mankind, just as Ovid does with the idea of human air flight. Unlike 
in Ovid, however, in Scheerbart the literary—intra-diegetic—figure of the inventor appears in 
personal union with the narrator and the author. The poet Ovid and the inventor Daedalus appear 
as different personages and only a subsequent interpretation of the metamorphosis allows for a 
reverse attribution of Daedalus the inventor’s characteristics to Ovid the author’s. In contrast to this, 
Paul Scheerbart himself appears as the inventor of the perpetual motion machine, and thus the 
literary text, published in 1910 by Rowohlt supplemented with 26 technical drawings likewise 
penned by the author, is to be viewed as a typeset fossil of Scheerbart’s long-lasting pursuit of 
inventing and constructing such a machine. Where Ovid uses a traditional myth as the material 
source for his literary meditation on the idea of invention, Scheerbart deploys the handed-down idea 
of the perpetual motion machine as a stepping-stone for his own technical and literary imagination. 
This extraordinary setting poses an unusual challenge to common notions of literaricity and 
authorship. Before taking up this challenge by subjecting Scheerbart’s Perpetuum to an in-depth 
analysis, I will describe in more detail the circumstances of this work. 
Scheerbart is one of those authors, artists and creative minds who enjoyed relatively great 
influence and renown during their lifetime, but who were buried in boggy oblivion by their 
posterity. While Scheerbart achieved anything but financial success with his work, he was both 
extremely prolific145 and considerably well respected by the members of the Berlin avant-garde of the 
early twentieth century who often stylized him as a culture guru of sorts. After his death, however, 
                                                   
145 John A. Stuart counts “twenty-seven books and over three hundred articles” (Stuart 1999, 61) and “hundreds of 
sketches [i.e. drawings]” (Stuart 1999, 64). 
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Scheerbart became somewhat ill-reputed as a quixotic writer of astral fantasy literature. As a result, 
there is no critical or annotated edition of his works until this day, about a century after his death. 
Accordingly, his writing has only rarely been subjected to critical investigation by literary 
scholarship. 
Literary scholars have long treated Scheerbart as an also-ran among the members of the 
expressionist Sturm circle around Herwarth Walden, and only few seem to know that he also showed 
a keen interest in the technological developments of his time.146 Among these few are attentive 
readers of Walter Benjamin, who mentions Scheerbart repeatedly and enthusiastically in his work.147 
It was not until recently that Scheerbart enthusiasm and scholarship have seen a slow but steady 
increase. Architectural studies have been leading the way, gradually discovering Scheerbart as a great 
visionary in the development of modern glass architecture (Banham 1996; Elcott 2014). It is found 
that Scheerbart had a constructive input to modern re-assessments of how architecture impacts 
human existence, which proves that he was not just dreaming away into far-removed astral fantasies. 
                                                   
146 At the same time that Scheerbart published his astral fantasies in the avant-garde literary magazine Der Sturm, he also 
wrote a polemic essay about aerial warfare, and later a programmatic treatise on glass architecture, as well as an 
informative article about the same topic, which he published in the engineering magazine Technische Monatshefte 
(Scheerbart 1914). 
147 Aside from scattered references in Benjamin’s works and letters, there are also two short essays dedicated solely to 
Scheerbart. One is a praise to the author, written in French; it appeared under the editor’s title ‘Sur Scheerbart’ in the 
Frankfurt edition of Benjamin’s collected works; this text describes a new relationship of humans with technology as the 
central idea of Scheerbart’s work: “Cette idée—cette image, plutôt—était celle d’une humanité qui se serait mise au 
diapason de sa technique, qui s’en serait servie humainement.” (Benjamin 1977, “<Sur Scheerbart>,” 630). The other 
text is a short review of Scheerbart’s 1913 fantasy novel Lesabéndio, written between 1917 and 1919 (Amelunxen 2014, 
276); in this commentary, Benjamin praises Scheerbart’s narrative focus on technology as the epitomy of literary style: 
“Die strenge Fügung des erzählenden Aufbaues, die nichts als die Erbauung des Turmes ins Auge faßt, hat die 
Vollendung des Entwurfes ermöglicht. Dabei hat die geistige Überwindung des Technischen ihren Gipfel erreicht, da die 
Nüchternheit und Sprödigkeit des technischen Vorgangs zum Symbol einer wirklichen Idee geworden ist. Die Arbeit der 
Technik ist der deutlichste Ausdruck jener keuschen und strengen Deutung der Geschehnisse, die an ihre äußerste, 
reinste Oberfläche angeschlossen ist.” (Benjamin 1977, “Paul Scheerbart: Lesabéndio,” 619). It is no surprise that 
technology plays a central role in Benjamin’s take on Scheerbart, considering that Benjamin’s own theory of 
technology—as spelled out for instance in his later Artwork essay—seems deeply indebted to Scheerbart’s technological 
visions. There are clear hints that Benjamin was originally planning to write a more extensive critique of Scheerbart’s 
Lesabéndio rounding off a major work on politics in the 1920s (Steiner 2010, 75, 77). This fact casts an interesting light 
on the political dimensions of the two authors’ technological thought, which has yet to be fully captured by scholarship. 
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His 1914 book on Glass Architecture provides sufficient evidence that he was driven by a practical 
interest in the potentials of change in the real world. This practical concern, however, makes him 
anything but a prosaic pragmatic. With the idea of feasibility in sight, his approach to fiction and to 
reality always pushes the limits of the imaginable and the potential (Morse 2015). 
Scheerbart’s interest in the practical realization of his visionary fantasies was not just a result 
of his later collaboration with the architect Bruno Taut—as the American designer and architectural 
theorist John Stuart falsely suggests (Stuart 1999). Instead, his involvement in technical and practical 
concerns became apparent at the very latest during the 1900s when he was working actively on the 
invention of a perpetual motion machine and published what one could call a speculative polemical 
essay entitled Die Entwicklung des Luftmilitarismus (1909, ‘The Development of Aerial Warfare’).148 
Scheerbart’s future-oriented speculations were not fed simply by the inventions of others, but he 
himself dabbled in hands-on inventive activities, at least if reports by contemporaries are to be 
believed.149  His attempts at engineering resulted in the 1910 book Das Perpetuum mobile. Die 
Geschichte einer Erfindung, which was created and published at the instigation of publisher Ernst 
Rowohlt after he had seen Scheerbart’s ‘invention’. To be sure, it is at this point that the inventor’s 
biography and the literary work blend into one another. 
Bracketing for a moment the biographical background, I will now take a closer look at the 
literary and narrative construction of this particular text. As the title suggests, the story centers itself 
                                                   
148 The full title of this self-described ‘Flugschrift’ or ‘pamphlet’ goes: Die Entwicklung des Luftmilitarismus und die 
Auflösung der europäischen Landheere, Festungen und Seeflotten (‘The Development of Aerial Militarism and the 
Demobiliyation of European Ground Forces, Fortresses, and Naval Fleets’) (Scheerbart 1994). 
Note that Scheerbart published this text two months after witnessing the Brothers Wright’s arrival at Tempelhof airport 
in Berlin in September 1909 (Morse 2015), the same month when Franz Kafka published Aeroplane in Brescia, his poetic 
reflections on an air show he witnessed in Italy in the newspaper Bohemia. 
149 Cf. for instance remarks by Erich Mühsam stating that he received postcards from Scheerbart mentioning the 
perpetual motion machine, and that he occasionally even witnessed the “Geschehen im Hause Scheerbart” (Mühsam 
1996, 140). 
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on the protagonist’s attempts at inventing a perpetual motion machine. It is recounted by an intra-
diegetic first-person narrator who is identical to the protagonist. Judging by statements of Scheerbart 
and his contemporaries the protagonist-narrator can also be identified with the author himself, 
which complicates the matter as to the story’s fictional or non-fictional nature. However, 
Scheerbart’s name finds no mention within the text, except for the usual author-ascription on the 
title page. With the text, Scheerbart clearly explores the borders between fiction and reality, as in it 
he alternately declares the invention of the perpetual motion machine as either already achieved, 
possible, or as a mere impossibility. 
The ambiguous nature of the text is intensified by the fact that the plot presents itself in two 
temporally distinct layers or stages. The narration starts with a short introductory frame referring 
from a present-day perspective to past events: namely to the beginning of the narrator’s 
preoccupation with the idea of a perpetual motion in December 1907. It is worth noting that this 
preoccupation has its point of departure in ‘little stories’ (“kleine Geschichten,” 373) about future 
technological innovations that can be categorized as science fiction. 
Am 27. Dezember 1907 dachte ich über kleine Geschichten nach, in denen etwas Neues—Verblüffendes—
Groteskes—vorkommen sollte. Ich dachte an die Zukunft der Kanonen, die mir als Transportapparate sehr 
nützlich erschienen; ich glaubte, daß abgeschossene Waaren mit automatisch sich öffnender 
Fallschirmvorrichtung ganz bequem wieder zur Erde herunterkommen könnten. (PM 373)150 
                                                   
150 “On 27 December 1907 I was thinking about little stories in which something new—astonishing—grotesque—would 
play a part. I was thinking about the future of cannons, which struck me as having great potential as instruments of 
transport; goods shot into the air with automatically opening parachute attachments would, it seemed to me, return 
quite comfortably to earth.” (Scheerbart 2014). 
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In this way, the narrator’s poetic imagination generates both fantastic stories and technological 
inventions. An imagined future technology coincides at least partly with the curiosity of poetic 
fantasies, as its objects are characterized as “something new—astonishing—grotesque.” 
Following this introduction, the narrator then illustrates his inventive endeavors by citing 
some diary notes and, later on, literary “sketches” that he penned at that time, and which he hopes 
will “meinen damaligen Zustand sehr deutlich machen” (PM 377) 151 . The framing narrative 
established by the introduction resurfaces time and again within and after the sequence of diary 
notes, commenting on their meaning and reinforcing the temporary distance between the act of 
narration and the narrated events. The diary notes come with the usual header dates and cover a 
timespan of altogether some six weeks from January to February 1908. They are followed by eleven 
literary “sketches” that are less clearly dated than the diary notes, thereby adding to their more 
fictional appearance. Yet, also within this sequence, the framing narrative sustains its commenting 
function, breaking a narrative linearity and underscoring the temporal distance, which is at this 
point also a difference concerning the genre and the degree of fiction. The two distances, however, 
decrease towards the end of the text, where the literary sketches make way for narrative chunks of 
text that directly describe the progression of the inventive endeavor. Unlike the diary notes, these 
chunks are not introduced by calendric header dates, but concluded by indications of date and time, 
just like in texts that are composed for publication (such as editor’s notes or author’s prefaces). This 
switch concerning the text sort is accompanied by a reversal of the temporal relation, as the narrative 
now appears to be written in simultaneous succession with the narrated events. In other words, the 
time of narration and the narrated time have the tendency to coincide in this part of the text. After 
                                                   
151 “A few notes dating from this period should serve to illustrate my frame of mind […].” (Scheerbart 2014, 210). 
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the last one of those chunks, subscribed with “Friedenau bei Berlin, 16. Juni 1910” (PM 443), the 
book concludes with a note on the successful completion of the invention. While this final passage 
provides an exact date for the successful completion of the inventive endeavor, this note itself 
remains undated. It could possibly be attributed to the date of the book’s publication itself: the year 
of 1910. As is usual for the indication of the publication date in a book, there is no exact statement 
of day and month. Due to this lack of exactness conditioned by the genre, it remains unclear 
whether the narrative has just reached the present, or even the future of its own fabrication. 
4. Die Geschichte einer Erfindung as Anti-Science Fiction 
Scheerbart’s book, whose genre is yet to be determined, deals with the eponymous perpetual 
motion machine as a real object, even though this object is still in the process of completion until the 
very end of the story. In this vein, the text can be described as a piece of anti-science fiction or 
“contra-science fiction” (Banham 1996, 34), as it claims the possibility and the factual realization of 
a device that modern science has explicitly declared mere fiction more than half a century prior to 
the book’s publication. While thus negating the truth-value of scientific knowledge, the book can be 
viewed as a positive inscription into the cultural history of perpetual motion as well as a meditation 
on the truth-value of fiction. 
The idea of a perpetual motion machine was introduced into Western culture around 1200 
from presumably Indian origins (Klemm 1983, 13).152 One of the earliest European references can 
be found in the Portfolio of the thirteenth century artist and engineer Villard’s de Honnecourt 
(Barnes 2009, 49–50; Color Plate 12. Folio 5r). From that point on, cultural history alternated 
                                                   
152 The fact that antiquity and most of the European Middle Ages did not beget this idea may root in the foundations of 
the old cosmology and ontology (Klemm 1983, 8), and it says a great deal about the revolutionary transformations 
taking place in the late Middle Ages, leading up to the modern era. 
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between claims and refutations of the possibility of such a machine. In France, this historical tug of 
war was settled by official order when the Académie royale des sciences in 1775 declared not to 
consider for patenting any machine that is said to produce perpetual motion.153 A second, and more 
decisive, step on the path toward the exclusion of perpetual motion from the realm of possibility was 
made when around the middle of the 19th century the law of conservation of energy and 
subsequently the laws of thermodynamics were formulated. 
In some sense, the perpetual motion machine thus bears similarity with the philosopher’s 
stone. Both ideas had for a long time inspired human fantasies about converting nature’s resources in 
such a way that they work to the advantage of the inventor. In one case, this was imagined as an 
unlimited supply of mechanical work, in the other case as an unlimited resource of material value, 
namely gold. In both instances, it was modern science that put a disillusioning end to mankind’s 
dreams about a universal invention or discovery that would make any given dream come true. To be 
sure, this process of demarcation makes obvious that science and fiction are partly claiming 
sovereignty over the same realms. 
In the case of perpetual motion, science reigned in productions of all-too-frenetic fiction on 
two fronts, as there are at least two kinds of devices that are claimed to render this possible. The 
perpetual motion machine of the first kind is imagined as a system capable of producing 
(thermodynamic) work without the input of energy from its surroundings. Such a machine would 
violate the energy conservation law, that is to say the first law of thermodynamics, which states that 
“the internal energy of an isolated system is constant” (Atkins 2007, 29). Asserters of the perpetual 
motion machine of the second kind (Maxwell’s demon is one example) describe such a device as a 
                                                   
153 In their official publication of that year, the academy announces „la résolution de ne plus examiner [...] aucune 
machine annoncée comme un mouvement perpétuel.“ (Académie Royale des Sciences (France) 1778, 61). 
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system capable of converting spontaneously thermal energy into work without losing any thermal 
energy to its surroundings. This would mean a violation of the second law of thermodynamics, 
which implies that “the entropy of the universe increases in the course of any spontaneous change,” 
(Atkins 2007, 62), 154  if the universe is understood as the unity of a given system and its 
surroundings. 
Putting aside the fact that some sources list a perpetual motion machine of a third kind with 
varying properties, the device Scheerbart describes in his book can clearly be attributed to the first 
kind, claiming that it produces work without the input of energy from the surroundings.155 “Work” 
(German “Arbeit”) is first introduced to Scheerbart’s text near its beginning—as part of the narrative 
frame—as a physical quantity that is caused by the Earth’s gravitation: 
Ich sagte mir: die Anziehungsarbeit der Erde ist eine perpetuierliche, und diese perpetuierliche 
Anziehungsarbeit läßt sich durch auf einander gestellte Räder in perpetuierliche Bewegung umsetzen. 
(PM 375)156 
Interestingly, work here does not appear as the performance rendered by the perpetual motion 
machine, but rather as the force that drives it. At this early point in the narrative, the primary idea of 
Scheerbart’s machine turns out to be a sleight of hand: the idea hinges upon the fact that Earth’s 
gravity is perpetual. Although this observation may contain some deeper truth, there are two major 
inaccuracies that creep into Scheerbart’s picture of mechanics. First, Earth’s gravitation is not 
perpetual work but, if at all, a perpetual force. In order for it to perform perpetual work, the force 
                                                   
154 Transforming thermal energy (heat) into work accounts for a reduction of entropy. 
155 Tessy Kober wrongly states that it is the second law of thermodynamics that was declared false by Scheerbart in his 
Perpetual Motion book, without giving further explanations for her statement, and without noting a distinction between 
narrator and author (Korber 1998, 114).   
156 “I said to myself: the Earth’s steady exertion of gravitational force is a form of perpetual work, and this perpetual work 
of attraction can be translated, using a series of wheels placed one on top of the other, into perpetual motion.” 
(Scheerbart 2014, 209). 
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would also have to move a body over an unlimited trajectory or path—as physical, i.e. mechanical, 
work equals force multiplied by displacement (W = F · d). In the case of gravitational force, however, 
the moved body will by definition always at some point arrive at a resting position unless an opposed 
force will work against gravity. 
The definition of physical (i.e. mechanical) force, at least how it was introduced by Gaspard-
Gustave Coriolis in 1826, was not the work with or performed by gravitational force, but rather the 
work against that force.157 This inaccuracy in the choice and usage of the word “work” is in fact not 
caused by a lack or inadvertence on Scheerbart’s part. It rather accounts for a constitutive vagueness 
resulting from deliberate choice that favors creative freedom over scientific rigor. The narrator of 
Scheerbart’s Perpetuum leaves no doubt about that: 
Daß jeder Physiker widersprechen würde, wußte ich sehr genau. Aber darin bestand ja ein 
Hauptreiz für mich. Die Physiker waren mir immer verhaßt. Was ging mich Robert Meyer [!] – und das Gesetz 
von der Erhaltung der Energie an? (PM 375)158 
Thus refusing conceptual clarity in the literary account, Scheerbart countermands the terminological 
trim of language by scientific nomenclature. Seemingly misusing the term “work,” the author 
reintroduces it to a creative and productive language game. The choice of words makes it obvious 
that this verbal misappropriation is a subversive act cum ire et studio: the narrator names the fact that 
he always “detested” physicists (“verhaßt”) as the “main stimulus” (“Hauptreiz”) for him to disregard 
their “law” (“Gesetz”). 
                                                   
157 Coriolis himself modeled and exemplified his theory of force after the “work” of steam engines in ore mines. 
158 “I was quite aware that any physicist would object. But this was one of the main advantages of my project. I’ve always 
abhorred physicists. What was Robert Mayer and his law of conservation of energy to me?” (Scheerbart 2014, 209). 
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Along with the inaccurate use of “work” in the narrower context of mechanics, the physical 
concept of work is likened to the labor done by a (human) worker. In another step, then, human 
work is reduced to a mere function of planetary work: 
Dadurch ist ja die Menschheit von aller Arbeit erlöst. Der Stern Erde arbeitet für uns. Die von mir so viel 
gepriesene Misere hat ein Ende. (PM 377)159 
Komisch finde ich nur, daß die Menschheit immerzu ihre Arbeit für sehr wichtig hielt – und garnicht 
bemerkte, daß eigentlich auch in den Dampfmaschinen doch nur der Stern Erde arbeitet. (PM 420)160 
The side effect of this linguistic transfer—a re-appropriation of a word by natural language—is that 
the reduction of the common notion of work to physical labor161 must eventually appear as an 
arbitrary choice: 
Und der Arbeiter war immer sehr stolz auf sein Tun und Treiben, der nichtstuende Künstler und der 
unpraktische Dichter wurden immer vom ächten Arbeiter so recht von oben herab behandelt. 
Das wird nun ganz anders werden. (PM 415)162 
This last passage is not only a socio-political contemplation on the valuation of labor, but at the 
same time a poetological self-description of the literary “work,” and the work that it takes for its 
production. The linguistic ambiguities of “Arbeit,” or “work” and “labor,” become a device of 
inventiveness. They allow for the creative endeavor of inventing the perpetual motion machine and 
its story, or history, in the first place. Along the same lines, the word turns out to be an autological 
self-reference. It is directly linked with the question of whether or not the invention and the faculty 
                                                   
159 “This invention will relieve mankind of all its labors. The star Earth will work on our behalf. The misery I’m always 
harping on will come to an end.” (Scheerbart 2014, 210). 
160 “I do find it strange, though, that humankind persists in considering its work extremely important—without even 
realizing that actually, even in the case of steam engines, it is the star Earth doing all the work.” (Scheerbart 2014, 238). 
161 Note that both concepts, labor and work, are captured by the German word ‘Arbeit.’ 
162 “And the worker has always been quite proud of all his labor and activity. The do-nothing artist and the impractical 
poet have always been looked down on by bona fide workers. 
Now this is all going to change.” (Scheerbart 2014, 236). 
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of inventiveness as such—be it the poetic or the technological one—should be accounted and valued 
as work.  
To be sure, the mere idea of perpetual motion can serve as an engine driving poetic imagination. 
If this imagination is considered work, then the machine does indeed—even in its ideal form—fulfill 
its duty. The numerous future revolutions that the new machine is believed to spark apparently 
trigger the poetic imagination of the present: 
Über alle diese bevorstehenden Revolution ließen sich zehn tausend utopische Romane schreiben; der Stoff lässt 
sich in ein tausend Romanen nicht überwältigen. (PM 397)163 
This passage transposes the autological aspect to a temporal dimension. It thereby adds a 
preposterous twist, as Scheerbart’s book Perpetuum can already be viewed as one of those ten 
thousand novels that the machine is yet to make possible. The work at the machine as recounted in 
the book and the work of the device, in other words the work that it requires and the work that it 
produces, thus come full circle at least in the ideal state, in which one ignores for a moment that the 
machine is declared impossible.164 
However, the preposterous twist that makes the present flow of imagination a product of the 
future effectiveness of the perpetual motion machine is just mirroring a preposterous moment in the 
history of its impossibility. When the inventor in Das Perpetuum mobile triumphantly denies the 
impossibility of such a machine toward the end of his narration, he does so by casting serious doubts 
on the credibility of those scientists who declared that same machine impossible: 
                                                   
163 “A good ten thousand utopian novels could be penned about these immanent revolutions; the material could certainly 
not be covered in a mere one thousand novels.” (Scheerbart 2014, 222). 
164 Interestingly, it is exactly the imagined feasibility, and not the actual one, that is said to drive poetic imagination. 
Once the „wheel“ would in fact work, the narrator asserts, it would rather impede than stimulate literary production: 
„Die Litteratur [!] wird durch das Nichtgehen des Rades mehr gefördert als durch das Gehen des Rades – das weiß ich 
ganz genau.” (PM 386-7). 
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Robert Mayer hat sich drei Jahre hindurch ebenfalls vergeblich mit dem großen Perpetuum beschäftigt. Und als 
er es nicht herausbekam, sagte er: jetzt kanns überhaupt Keiner fertig bringen, denn wenn ichs nicht kann, so 
gehts eben nicht – geistreicher als ich kann doch Keiner sein. (PM 442)165 
With this sort of mockery the narrator points the finger at the tentative logic of empirical science 
that can claim truth only until a potential falsification (at least according to falsificationism à la Karl 
Popper). This implies that an idea can be declared impossible only under the premises of a given 
theory. But once this theory is questioned or even refuted, the impossibility claim must be 
questioned as well. Accordingly, the expression ‘impossible’ can be rephrased as ‘something that 
cannot be explained by a given theory.’ In the history of perpetual motion, as Scheerbart’s narrator 
recounts it, the relation between the impossibility claim and the relevant theory underwent an 
interesting reversal. 
A present-day physicist, when asked whether a perpetual motion machine of the first kind is 
possible, will deny and probably explain the impossibility with the first or second law of 
thermodynamics. In contrast to this, the scientists who discovered that law in the first place argued 
differently around the middle of the nineteenth century. As Thomas S. Kuhn observes in his 1957 
paper on the history of the energy conservation law, the intuition that perpetual motion was 
impossible worked as “an essential intellectual tool” (Kuhn 1959, 340) on scientist’s way to 
                                                   
165 “Robert Mayer also spent three full years vainly pursuing a great perpetual motion machine. And when he couldn’t 
figure it out, he said: now No One will be able to accomplish this, for if I cannot do so, then it cannot be done—No 
One can be cleverer than I am.” (Scheerbart 2014, 252). This version of Mayer’s failed attempts in perpetual motion 
strongly resembles the respective autobiographical account that was quoted in a 1905 popular science book about Julius 
Robert Mayer by Scheerbart’s friend Salomo Friedlaender: “Ein verunglückter Versuch, ein perpetuum mobile zu 
verfertigen, machte auf den kaum zehnjährigen Knaben, der sich lieber mit mechanischen und chemischen Versuchen als 
mit den griechischen Zeitwörtern beschäftigte, einen bleibenden Eindruck, und als er im erwachsenen Alter die 
prinzipielle Unmöglichkeit von dem eingesehen hatte, was er einmal als Kind unternehmen wollte, so hatte er damit 
eigetnlich schon den Grund zu einer richtigen Theorie der Naturkräfte, zu welchen ja bekanntlich auch die Wärme 
gehört, gelegt.” (Friedlaender 2010, 74). Considering this resemblance and Scheerbart’s long-term close friendship with 
Friedlaender, it seems very likely that Scheerbart took a good deal of his knowledge about Mayer, perpetual motion, and 
thermodynamics from that book. 
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formulate the law. Both Hermann von Helmholtz and Julius Robert Mayer used the assumption 
that a perpetual motion machine is impossible as a negative argument to support their theory. 
Mayer, for instance, writes the following in a letter of December 1842 to his friend and colleague 
Wilhelm Griesinger: 
Ein Beweis, der, für mich subjectiv, die absolute Wahrheit meiner Sätze darthut, ist ein negativer; es ist nemlich 
ein in der Wissenschaft allgemein angenommener Satz, daß die Construction eines Mobile perpetuum eine 
theoretische Unmöglichkeit sey (d. h. wenn man von allen mechanischen Schwierigkeiten, wie Reibung etc. 
abstrahiert, so bringt man es doch auch in Gedanken nicht hin); meine Behauptungen können aber alle als 
reine Consequenzen aus diesem Unmöglichkeits-Principe betrachtet werden; läugnet man mir einen Satz, so 
führe ich gleich ein Mobile perpetuum auf. (Mayer and Griesinger 1889, 34–5)166 
In brief, Mayer’s argument goes as follows: A perpetual motion machine is impossible and thus the 
law of conservation of energy is valid. 
Once the law of energy conservation had become common sense in the scientific 
community, this argument was reversed. It now stated: The law of energy conservation is valid and 
therefore a perpetual motion machine (of the first kind) is impossible. This reversal is a scientific 
revolution of a particular sort. It marks a point where the vulgar logic of history as a temporal 
sequence of individual events collides with the claim for universal validity by a physical law. 
Universality in this context means that the law is claimed to be valid always and everywhere 
in the universe. This implies that it was valid before its discovery and formulation as well as it will be 
afterwards. The claim of universality, however, appears restricted when it is seen against the 
                                                   
166 “It is a negative proof that reveals, to me subjectively, the absolute truth of my theorems; for it is a commonly 
accepted proposition in science that the construction of a perpetual motion machine is a theoretical impossibility (i.e. 
even if one disregards all mechanical difficulties, such as friction, etc., one will not manage to construct it in thoughts); 
my claims, however, can all be considered consequences arising from that impossibility principle; if one denies a single 
one of my theorems, I will forthwith present a perpetual motion machine.” (My translation). 
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backdrop of the history of science, which allows for the general observation that physical laws have 
been changing over time and thus may equally change in the future. In the case of conservation laws, 
the universality claim may in fact be particularly strong and stable, as the law is at a high point in the 
theoretical hierarchy of natural sciences. In 1915, only a few years after Scheerbart’s book was 
published, Emmy Noether formulated her great theorem, according to which every continuous 
symmetry of a physical system corresponds to a conservation law.167 Within this framework, the 
energy conservation law corresponds to the symmetry of time (Atkins 2007, 45), which implies that 
physical time is homogenous in that each point in time is identical as a starting point to a process. 
This profundity of the energy conservation law is the reason why today, after the events, the 
formulation or discovery of that law still appears as the coffin nail to the idea of perpetual motion. 
Scheerbart thus pushes the claims of poetic license further than simple play on words over 
their scientific and their societal meaning. His narrator’s disregard for the scientific knowledge of his 
time bespeaks a more general attack on the hegemony of modern science over all human affairs. The 
device he invents may primarily bear the hallmarks of a perpetual motion machine of the first kind 
and Scheerbart’s straw man representing modern science may be Julius Robert Mayer and the energy 
conservation law. However, there seems be yet another law of nature lurking in the background of 
Scheerbart’s anti-science fiction narrative: the law of entropy, which is generally counted as the 
second law of thermodynamics. 
Although entropy is not named one single time explicitly in Scheerbart’s book, it may 
actually be the real beast lurking in the background, whose dark forces are so frightening that it 
cannot even be mentioned by its name. After Mayer, Clausius, Maxwell, Boltzmann, and others had 
                                                   
167  The theorem, commonly known as Noether’s (first) theorem, was published in a paper entitled “Invariante 
Variationsprobleme” in 1918. 
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gradually pushed thermodynamics into the center of scientific debates, its laws and their 
philosophical consequences only slowly seeped into the terrains of common knowledge.168 This 
reluctance by a broader public to engage with and accept the new concept may have had two 
reasons. One is that entropy is certainly the concept in thermodynamics that is the hardest to grasp 
regarding its sheer scientific meaning. Another reason might be that entropy is also the most 
disturbing theorem of thermodynamics with regard to its philosophical and cosmological 
implications.  
The most striking of these philosophical implications is that the law of entropy appears to be 
the antithesis of the idea of progress; and its discovery did indeed feed into progress criticism 
formulated by some contemporaries less versed in natural science (Mäder 2010, 52–3). Of course 
such facile translations of scientific theories into the realm of history and society hardly do justice to 
the complexity or specificity of such theories. And yet, the impression that the continued increase of 
entropy in the universe may in fact run counter to any prospects of sustainable progress leaves a 
general uncertainty of the kind that rarely remains without a trace in collective imagination. 
Pessimistic readings of the law of entropy and scenarios about its ultimate consequences in the form 
of so-called ‘heat death of the universe’ haunted the collective imaginaries, feeding on more general 
doubts in the sustainability of progress around 1900;169 and Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion, so I 
argue, bespeaks some of these general uncertainties regarding entropy and its consequences to the 
idea of progress, albeit without joining in the chorus of doom uncritically. 
                                                   
168 It was not until around 1900 that the law of entropy found regular mention even in scientific handbooks for 
academic students (Oels 20015, 15). 
169 Elizabeth R. Neswald describes this atmosphere of doom with the following words: “Die sich gegen Ende des des 19. 
Jahrhunderts verbreitende pessimistische [!] Interpretationen von Entropie und Wärmetod brachten diese Ängste um die 
gesellschaftliche Zukunft deutlich zum Ausdruck. Die Welt, die in den eindrucksvollen Bildern des Wärmetods zu Ende 
ging, war nicht das physikalische Universum, sondern die eigene, fortschreitende industrielle Gesellschaft und die 
Utopien, die der Fortschritt ins Leben gerufen hatte.” (Neswald 2006, 405–6). 
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It is worth noting that ‘Fortschritt’ or ‘progress’ appears as a word only once in Scheerbart’s 
Perpetual Motion Machine, and in this single occurrence its meaning is anything but positive. 
Moreover, the narrator uses the word neither with regard to the general advancement of history, nor 
concerning the claimed achievements by past scientists or inventors that he otherwise scorns so 
fiercely. Instead, he casts doubt on progress when talking about the envisioned consequences of his 
own invention: “Und so wird das Perpeh auch nicht so ohne Weiteres nur einen Fortschritt 
bedeuten.” (PM 418)170. In German, this formulation reads either as ‘only one progress’ or as ‘just 
progress,’ depending on whether the reader stresses the word ‘einen’ or the word ‘progress’ in the 
sentence. Although this might add to the overall ambiguous feel of this statement, the content makes 
the intended meaning at least a little clearer. The paragraph preceding this statement contains a 
sweeping blow of technology skepticism concerning some great inventions of modernity, notably the 
railroad, the steam engine, and electricity. These inventions, laments the narrator, have caused a 
“gefährliche Zentralisation der Menschen in den Großstädten,” “fast eine Verwirrung unsres 
gesamten Geisteslebens,” and a “veritable Gedankenflucht im Menschengehirn […], die einen 
Niedergang der Kultur erzeugte.” (PM 418)171. While this passage echoes conservative technology 
criticism on the rise around 1900 (Sieferle 1984, 155–60), its message oddly conflicts with the fact 
that it is expressed by an inventor who otherwise indulges in uncurbed technological enthusiasm. 
The ambiguousness of the picture of progress is complete. However, the civilization critique of this 
passage does not come without a warning. Only a few paragraphs prior to the discussed passage, the 
narrator describes his invention as a ‘great disruption’ that might come too early for humanity 
                                                   
170 “And so the Perpet will not be just another bit of progress with no further repercussions.” (Scheerbart 2014, 237). 
171 “[T]he dangerous centralization of humans in the cities […] the bewilderment of almost our entire intellectual lives 
[…] a paucity of thought in the human mind and, in consequence, a decline of culture.” (Scheerbart 2014, 237). 
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[…] die Folgen dieser Entdeckung nur im Allgemeinen zu überblicken […]. Aber—wir haben das Ganze 
hinzunehmen—wie ein Naturereignis […]. Die Geschichte wird wie ein kolossales Erdbeben wirken—und 
viel—sehr viel—wird dabei Zusammenstürzen. (PM 417)172 
Not only do these statements appear like an uncanny prophecy of nearing World War One, 
but they also indicate that technological progress, as embodied in the protagonist’s super-invention, 
is increasingly perceived as a force of nature coming over humans rather than a chosen path or step 
toward humanity’s greater emancipation or empowerment. While the invention, in its conception, 
conflicts with the first law of thermodynamics, in its realization, it assimilates to the very content of 
the second law of thermodynamics, namely to the law of entropy. Like the irreversible increase of 
entropy in the universe, Scheerbart’s invention is envisioned to cause a great disruption that will 
subject the world to an inexorable transformation. Represented by the super-invention, progress 
appears in the shape of an overpowering natural force within Scheerbart’s book. In this vein, the 
book not only deals with questions about the physical possibility and impossibility of a technological 
device. Perpetual Motion also bespeaks how modern science, in the shape of thermodynamics, has 
interfered with the modern understanding of history and progress at large. The book thus engages 
critically with the philosophical implications on two fronts, each corresponding with one of the two 
first laws of thermodynamics. On both fronts, the quarrel is over questions of how historical change 
is to be construed. 
The first law [of thermodynamics] and the internal energy identify the feasible change among all conceivable 
changes: a process is feasible only if the total energy of the universe remains the same. (Atkins 2007, 65) 
                                                   
172 “Our imagination has not yet progressed to the point of being able to grasp the consequences of this discovery even in 
general terms. 
But—we must accept this in its entirety—as we would a natural phenomenon […]. The thing [German: ‘Geschichte’] 
will make the same sort of impression as a colossal earthquake—and a great deal—a very great deal—will collapse 
beneath its force.” (Scheerbart 2014, 237). 
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As discussed above, the universal claim of such a statement implies that whatever is feasible is 
considered to be so only in accordance with the laws of nature. Scheerbart’s book challenges such 
claims of natural science by pointing at the imaginative, or if you will fictional, dimension of history 
as epitomized in the impossible invention of the perpetual motion machine. Under the premises of 
fiction, universal laws become subject to singularities, contingency, and arbitrariness, which already 
mark the transition to the second front of Scheerbart’s confrontation with science. On this front, the 
Perpetual Motion book broaches questions about how individual instances of change come about 
within a spectrum of determinism and voluntary choice. In this vein, the invention of the perpetual 
motion machine is to be considered a thought experiment about the space left for human agency 
after the law of entropy has been formulated. 
The second law [of thermodynamics] and entropy identify the spontaneous changes among these feasible 
changes: a feasible process is spontaneous only if the total entropy of the universe increases. (Atkins 2007, 65) 
Considering that entropy is to be understood as a measure of disorder (Atkins 2007, 61), the second 
law at least superficially conflicts with an important idea of modernity which implies that social 
progress in general, and technological progress in particular, will grant to humanity an ever-greater 
measure of order and control. The outcome of the confrontation on this front, however, brings 
nothing other than a tie, or more accurately, a Pyrrhic victory. The stakes that Scheerbart’s inventor 
plays for are infinitely high: his super-invention promises the ultimate level of empowerment. And 
yet, the devised machine appears to bring about rather loss of control, like an unexpected, 
overwhelming natural disaster, than the gain of agency or power. 
Regarding Scheerbart’s Perpetuum mobile it should be put on record that what sealed the 
impossibility deal of perpetual motion started with an individual—and indeed partly subjective—
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intuition. The core of Scheerbart’s book, and of the inventive endeavor it deals with, is the reverse 
argument, namely that one individual event could at least theoretically topple the entire hierarchy of 
physical laws. The perpetual motion machine then is the archetype of such an event. If it functioned, 
the law of conservation and with it the whole theory of thermodynamics would collapse, and all its 
absoluteness and impossibility claims with it: “Aber wenns erst geht, ist tatsächlich Alles möglich.” 
(PM 381)173 Scheerbart thus marginalizes the universal ban of the idea of perpetual motion machine 
by Mayer and others to an individual, subjective event. His “Geschichte einer Erfindung” or “history 
of an invention” can be described not just as anti-science-fiction, but also as an anti-history, or ‘Anti-
Geschichte,’ in a way that shall be further explained in what follows. 
5. Das Perpetuum Mobile as Anti-Geschichte 
In fact, the usage and meaning of the word ‘Geschichte’ in the book’s sub-title deserves 
closer attention. In the German original, the title could possibly suggest at least three meanings of 
the word, which poses problems not only to translators of the text; the German word ‘Geschichte’ is 
very rich and thus raises a variety of reader’s expectations that could be either met or disappointed by 
the book’s contents. To be sure, one possible meaning of the word in the given context is more or 
less equivalent with the meaning of the English word ‘story,’ that both Andrew Joron (Scheerbart 
2011) and Susan Bernofsky (Scheerbart 2014) chose for the title of their respective English 
translations.174 However, considering the title of the German original, this is hardly the most obvious 
reading. Interpreting the title more intuitively as “the history of an invention” would suggest to rank 
                                                   
173 “But once it’s been set in motion, anything will be possible.” (Scheerbart 2014, 213). 
174 Unlike Joron, Bernofsky omits the article before the word ‘invention.’ Her rendition: ‘The Story of Invention’ 
suggests philosophical universality. It thus adds some of the original ambiguity to the English title that Joron’s version 
‘The Story of an Invention’ fails to capture. 
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the book in the popular German non-fiction genre of ‘Sachbuch’ as in ‘the history of a nation,’ ‘the 
history of a conquest,’ ‘the history of a discovery,’ or the like.175 In the German context, the meaning 
of the word ‘history’ of course strikes the key of a rich and powerful tradition. It starts with Hegel’s 
Geschichtsphilosophie (dialectic philosophy of history), continues with the Historicism movement 
around Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen, and culminates in Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
theory of Geisteswissenschaften (roughly: ‘science of culture’), which claims history as its principal 
subject matter, as opposed to natural sciences that deal with the laws of nature and causality. This 
tradition gives a hint that Scheerbart’s book could possibly read as a position in a larger context of 
epistemology and theory of science. 
Besides the two above-noted meanings of ‘Geschichte,’ Scheerbart’s text itself suggests yet 
another meaning of the word that is a little less obvious and even trickier to capture in English. 
Scheerbart’s narrator uses the word throughout the text when referring to the perpetual motion 
machine as an object, just like in the following formulation: “‘Durch Gewichte bewegtes Zahnrad’ 
nannte ich die Geschichte.” (PM 375)176 This rather colloquial usage of the word is perhaps best 
captured in English with a formulation such as “the whole thing” or the like. This formulation at 
least reflects the nonchalant irony of Scheerbart’s attitude toward the whole enterprise. And yet, 
there is good reason to believe that there is a more serious import to the meaning of ‘Geschichte’ in 
Scheerbart’s book, considering that the word is used incessantly throughout the text, and almost 
consistently with this colloquial meaning. In fact, the expectations insinuated by the book’s title are 
disappointed twice. At first sight, the title makes the reader expect a cultural history of the perpetual 
                                                   
175 In a preface published 1977 in a re-print of the 1910 original Scheerbart himself calls his book a “phantastisch-
technische[s] Sachbuch” (quoted from (Ege 2009, 114)). 
176 “‘Cogs Driven by Weights’ is the title I gave this story [German: ‘Geschichte’].” (Scheerbart 2014, 209). In other 
passages, Susan Bernofsky alternatingly uses the words ‘thing,’ ‘matters,’ or ‘business’ in her translation to capture this 
peculiar usage of the word ‘Geschichte.’ 
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motion machine. This expectation is disappointed, as the text on the first few pages merely holds out 
the prospect of presenting not the history, but just the story of an invention, namely a series of 
attempts to invent the perpetual motion machine, and of failed attempts at that. Yet, even this more 
partial notion of “Geschichte” must seem inadequate soon, as the word does not refer to the account 
of a sequence of events, but—in the above-mentioned colloquial fashion—to the “whole thing,” the 
material object of the invented ‘wheel’ itself. And this ‘wheel,’ to make matters worse, repeatedly and 
tenaciously refuses to function in the way it is supposed to; and from time to time even the narrator-
inventor loses all hope that it ever will: 
Daß es so nicht gehen konnte, war mir bald sehr klar, und ich wurde es müde, mich weiter mit der Geschichte 
[!] zu beschäftigen. (PM 399)177 
Instead of denoting a narrative account, “Geschichte” thus appears to stand for a technical object 
(“‘Durch Gewichte Bewegtes Zahnrad’,” PM 375) that can be seen as both the cause and the 
product of the inventor’s continuous alternation between hope and despair. 
The construction of the “Geschichte” perpetual motion machine thus goes hand in hand with a 
destruction of “Geschichte” as universal history. Geschichte as history is first reduced to a mere 
“wheel driven by weights” to then further disintegrate into numerous ‘little histories, stories, or 
things’ (“kleine Geschichten,” PM 373) that represent mere inventive novelties. 
Scheerbart’s destruction of history follows a simple trajectory. In a first step, he questions the 
discovery of energy conservation by Robert Mayer as a historical event of global importance. He 
presents Mayer’s ‘discovery’ as a statement of subjective opinion, thereby negating that it is 
irreversible or unequaled and unparalleled. In a second step, relativizing this alleged ‘revolution’ in 
                                                   
177 “That this configuration would not work became clear to me soon enough, and I was growing tired of occupying 
myself with this business [German: ‘Geschichte’].” (Scheerbart 2014, 223). 
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the history of science, Scheerbart valorizes his own story of an invention. In a third step, then, the 
invention Scheerbart’s narrator announces is awarded so much revolutionary potential that it is 
eventually believed capable to topple the logic of history as such. On the one hand, the one 
‘Geschichte’ sparks a whole chain reaction of “kleine Geschichten” that with their imaginative 
innovations outperform the unifying force of ‘one universal history.’ On the other hand, the “wheel” 
soon casts doubts that the course of history is still lying in the hands of human individuals. The 
“Radgeschichte,” as a technological construction that increasingly gains momentum and autonomy, 
is viewed in a zero-sum game against human-driven history, and at times appears to win the upper 
hand: “Das ganze Potentatenspiel ist garnichts gegen diese Radgeschichte.” (PM 377).178 
This sentence forms the opening to the journal-like account following the narrative frame, 
and it should therefore be attributed key function in the understanding and interpretation of the 
whole text. It appears as an abrupt statement starting the account in medias res, without a clear and 
explicit point of reference. Hence, meaning and context of the statement remain subject to the 
reader’s imagination. It could be understood, for instance, as an ad hoc comment uttered by someone 
who is reading the daily newspapers or a history book. The peculiar word ‘Potentatenspiel’ could 
then be paraphrased as ‘day to day politics’ or the history of nations as the power play among their 
aristocratic leaders. Yet, appearing without a specified context in Scheerbart’s text, ‘Potentatenspiel’ 
could easily refer to the entirety of human affairs as presented by historiography. 
The opposition between ‘Potentatenspiel’ and ‘Radgeschichte’ underscores the reassessment 
and redistribution of actuality and potentiality. While “Geschichte” describes the entirety of actual 
reality, ‘Spiel’ or ‘play’ implies a bracketing of actuality, opening up the action toward the realm of 
                                                   
178 “All those squabbling potentates are nothing compared to this wheel business.” (Scheerbart 2014, 210). 
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potentiality. In this sense, ‘Spiel’ shares a common ground with literary and non-literary 
imagination.179 The history of nations and of the political sphere is commonly viewed as the sector 
with the highest actuality and relevance for human affairs. Along the lines of the above-mentioned 
reassessment of work, the inventor-narrator of the Perpetuum mobile also rethinks the common ideas 
of how history progresses. The “Potentatenspiel” is driven by human agents who make decisions and 
act accordingly in order to increase their influence and power. The ‘Radgeschichte,’ by constrast, 
suggests a different structure of intervention that does away with conventional notions of human 
agency. 
This new conception of how intervention in the course of things is possible—and how it is 
construed in a narrative form—culminates in the word “Erfindung” or “invention,” which is, along 
with “Geschichte,” the other component of the book’s subtitle. The word “Erfindung” appears there 
in genitive case, which raises the above-noted polysemy of “Geschichte” to even higher power, as this 
grammatical case allows for at least three different types of relation in the given context. It could be 
read, firstly, as genitivus obiectivus, which would be the most obvious interpretation, meaning that 
the “Geschichte” as story or history has “invention” to its (grammatical) object, i.e. it deals with the 
invention. Less self-evident, secondly, but equally possible, would be a reading as genitivus 
subiectivus, implying that the invention takes subject function as the actual cause or driving force of 
“Geschichte.” In yet another reading, “einer Erfindung” could, thirdly, be read as genitivus 
explicativus, meaning that the invention itself is the “Geschichte.” At first glance, this latter reading 
                                                   
179 It is no coincidence that we have expressions such as “free play of imagination.” 
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might be the least plausible. However, it makes full sense when one keeps in mind the insistent usage 
of “Geschichte” in the colloquial sense as “the whole thing,” which prevails throughout the book.180 
All three readings are possible and it is not advisable to favor any single one of them over the 
others. Instead, the polysemy can be viewed as an early preparation of a deliberate ambiguity that is 
further developed by the book’s content. This ambiguity makes the invention shift constantly, in a 
sort of gestalt switch, between two alternative states in two different aspects. On the one hand, the 
invention is shifting on an axis between the status of a static entity (i.e. as an artifact)181 and a 
progressive process (i.e. an activity), depending on whether it is seen as the subject matter of the 
account told by the narrator or as the machine the inventor is striving to complete. On the other 
hand, it alternates on an axis between the position of an object, fabricated, changed, and constantly 
described by the inventor, and a subject, that imposes on the inventor as well as on the narrative, and 
that appears, like a demon, to take possession of the inventor’s will power.  
Ich glaube nicht mehr, daß ich das alles mache – das macht ein Andrer in mir. Ich beschäftige mich einfach 
wider meinen Willen mit dem alten Problem. Vielleicht ist dieser passive Zustand für alle Künstler und 
Erfinder [!] der beste – dann kann der Andre in uns am leichtesten wirksam werden. (PM 379)182 
                                                   
180 Note that a transition from subjective to objective genitive marks a crucial step in Reinhart Koselleck’s genealogy of 
‘history’ and ‘progress’ as collective singulars: “So wird aus den Geschichten der einzelnen Fortschritte der Fortschritt der 
Geschichte. Dies ist die zweite Phase. Denn im Zuge der Universalisierung unseres Begriffes tauschen Subjekt und 
Objekt ihre Rolle. Der Genitivus subiectivus wird zum Genitivus obiectivus: Im Ausdruck ‘Fortschritt der Zeit’ oder 
‘Fortschritt der Geschichte’ übernimmt der Fortschritt den führenden Part, er wird selbst zum geschichtlichen Agens.” 
(Koselleck 2006, 174). 
181 It should be noted that even where the text refers to the invention as an object, this object is in continuous flux. It is 
repeatedly described as a “Rad” (PM 379, 381, 383, 386, etc.) or “wheel” that itself consists of a changing number and 
constellation of individual wheels (PM 426, 405, etc.). Therefore, it is in fact difficult to conceive of the invention as one 
object. 
182 “I no longer believe I’m the one doing all of this—someone else inside me is making it happen. I’m simply 
preoccupied, against my will, with the same old problem. Perhaps this passivity is the best state for all artists and 
inventors—it makes it easier for the Other in us to act.” (Scheerbart 2014, 212). 
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This “passiver Zustand” or “passive state” in which the narrator-inventor finds himself can also be 
described as a state of obsession183 or quasi-religious ecstasy (Ege 2009, 117). Putting aside the 
psychological and the theological dimensions, the obsessive—or passive—state is just the reverse side 
of the inventive idea that has gained autonomy in the artist’s or inventor’s mind and that can 
ultimately work against their will, as a subsequent passage of the book suggests: 
Das aber ahnte ich nur, sah es keineswegs ein, und so arbeitete meine Phantasie ‘gegen meinen Willen’ 
unablässig weiter. Wohl wollte ich immer das ganze Rad c beseitigen, aber dazu fehlte mir vorläufig jeder 
Einfall. (PM 389)184 
The mechanical momentum of the machine converts into something that could be called 
‘imaginatory momentum.’185  As a result, the inventive activity no longer appears as subject to 
voluntary decisions or deliberate choices, just as the ‘wheel’—if only it were turning—would do its 
‘work’ regardless of any human will. In the above-quoted passage, human will and intention 
subordinate to fantasy. In the first sentence, the latter appears as a force against the former, whereas 
                                                   
183 Sigmund Freud had explained obsessional neurosis in an early article on “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894) as 
a ‘defense’ or ‘Abwehr’ of the human soul against “a case of intolerance,“ or “Fall von Unverträglichkeit” (Freud, Neuro-
Psychosen der Abwehr; my translation), which “proves so distressing to the ego that the ego can only protect itself by 
denying what has occurred” (Rottenberg 2000, 941). While Freud largely replaces ‘defense’ by the more pregnant 
expression of ‘repression’ or ‘Verdrängung’ in his later work, he would name neuroses as the prime instance of the ‘third 
blow’ or ‘dritte Kränkung’ posed to humanity by the findings of psychoanalysis: “In gewissen Krankheiten, allerdings 
gerade bei den von uns studierten Neurosen, ist es anders. Das Ich fühlt sich unbehaglich, es stößt auf Grenzen seiner 
Macht in seinem eigenen Haus, der Seele. Es tauchen plötzlich Gedanken auf, von denen man nicht weiß, woher sie 
kommen; man kann auch nichts dazu tun, sie zu vertreiben. Diese fremden Gäste scheinen selbst mächtiger zu sein als 
die dem Ich unterworfenen; sie widerstehen allen sonst so erprobten Machtmitteln des Willens, bleiben unbeirrt durch 
die logische Widerlegung, unangetastet durch die Gegenaussage der Realität.” (Freud, Eine Schwierigkeit der 
Psychoanalyse). It is striking how much these descriptions overlap with the consequences Scheerbart’s narrator sees 
arising from his invention to the ideas of human agency and free will. And it does not surprise that the two authors write 
around the same time. While Freud called the blow done to humanity by his findings the ‘psychologische Kränkung,’ 
Scheerbart’s “große Störung” or “Great Disruption” could accordingly be called a ‘technologische Kränkung’ instead. 
184 “Of all this, however, I still had only the vaguest inkling; I hadn’t yet grasped it, and so my imagination went on 
working ‘against my will.’ I kept trying to do away with wheel c altogether but had no idea how this could be managed.” 
(Elcott 2014, 217). 
185 Modeled after the concept of “technological momentum” as coined by Thomas Hughes in 1969 (Hughes 1994) and 
used by Hans Jonas (Jonas 1979, 37). 
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in the second sentence it appears as a sort of scarce resource, failing to bolster up the will. While in 
psychology as well as in theology, willful acting is conceived of as the normal or ideal state, 
Scheerbart presents the “obsessed” state as a necessary dimension of the process of invention. 
The inventive “activity” is increasingly demonstrated as an involuntary event that is not in 
human control, but in control of humans, and this does not appear as a lack, but rather as an 
immanent quality of invention. 
Doch—jetzt will ich vorläufig nur von dem sprechen, was zur weiteren Entwicklung der sogenannten 
‘Erfindung’ gehört—die natürlich wie alle Erfindungen besser mit dem Namen ‘Entdeckung’ belegt werden 
müsste; das Finden und Erfinden hängt von uns Menschen ganz bestimmt nicht in erster Linie ab. (399)186 
The two cases of gestalt switch—static versus narrative object and subject versus object—do not 
amount to careless indeterminacy; neither should an interpretation decide for one of the two poles 
on the mentioned axes. Instead, the continuous shifts make the distinctions visible as arbitrary 
determinations, as lines that could just as well be drawn differently. Such lines run between inventor 
and invention, between invention and discovery, between doing and being affected (actio vs. passio), 
between idea and realization, between history and fiction, etc. All those lines converge in the blurry 
demarcation running between Scheerbart’s invention understood as the author’s fictional 
imagination on the one hand, and the accounted ‘story’ as an—at least potentially—historical event 
on the other hand. Attempts at fixing this line eventually come down to the question of how 
Scheerbart’s “Perpetual Motion Machine” should be categorized: as a document in the history of 
                                                   
186 “And yet—for the moment I wish to speak only of what is relevant to the further development of the so-called 
invention—which of course, like all inventions, ought to be referred to as a ‘discovery’: all this uncovering and inventing 
is surely not primarily the doing of us humans.” (Scheerbart 2014, 222–3). The dichotomy of ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’ 
generally aligns with the distinction between technology and science. Against this backdrop, it is striking that this passage 
apparently reduces all invention to discovery, regardless of the above-noted rejection of scientific knowledge.  
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technology, or as a piece of fictional writing. Or else, can this distinction be maintained anyway on 
the grounds of Scheerbart’s “Geschichte”? 
These questions, although they must perhaps remain unanswered, cast light on some 
important aspects of Scheerbart’s project. Its discussion extends the realm of analysis from the 
narrower frame of the literary product—i.e. the book entitled Das Perpetuum mobile—toward the 
wider context of its production. As mentioned above, Scheerbart’s book has a creation history that is 
quite unusual, at least if compared to products of literary fiction. If contemporary statements are to 
be believed, the project did not originate in the idea of writing a work of literature in the first place. 
Instead, notes from that time by Erich Mühsam, Ernst Rowohlt, and Scheerbart himself document 
that the author was attempting to actually invent a perpetual motion machine in his laundry room 
that he had turned into a home laboratory (Rowohlt 1992, 50–3). Only on the instigation of his 
publisher, admirer, and friend Ernst Rowohlt, did Scheerbart eventually put the notes about his 
work on the invention into the form of a book. Nevertheless, the resulting book should not simply 
be read as a published collection of diary notes. In fact, Scheerbart’s text—accompanied by the 
technical drawings and particularly in its originally luxurious book design—is a full-fledged literary 
composition, created in awareness of its representational construction. This becomes most obvious 
when the figure of the narrator-inventor—even when alluding to the actual object of the perpetual 
motion machine—refers in a peculiar way to its representation: either as the “Geschichte”—with the 
above-mentioned implications—or as the “Zeichnung,” or “drawing”: 
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Die Zeichnung des Modells stand ein ganzes Jahr hindurch auf meinem Schreibtisch—und ich beschäftigte 
mich mit andern Dingen—besonders mit Luftgeschichten und mit dem grandiosen Luftmilitarismus […]. 
(PM 432)187 
It is striking that the drawing is not laying but standing on the inventor’s desk. It could be standing 
on some sort of drawing board or easel. But such a construction would usually stand on the ground, 
not on the desk. A more likely meaning is that it is in fact the object featured in the drawing that is 
standing on the desk. What is more, the said drawing is modified as ‘of the model,’ with another 
ambiguous genitive construction, which casts an interesting light on the inventor’s engineering 
method. Rather than constructing models after drafts, he apparently creates drafts after the models. 
The mention of “Luftgeschichten” and “Luftmilitarismus” is an unmistakable intertextual reference 
to Scheerbart’s work on that matter. Thus, the text once again blurs the line between fiction and 
reality by equating the inventor-narrator with the author. In this vein, the cited passage hints on 
various levels at the representational nature of the book and its contents that always impact in 
various ways the structure of the represented ‘objects.’ 
It would certainly take a more profound philological investigation to fully assess the 
significance borne by the documents preceding and surrounding Scheerbart’s book, such as letters, 
postcards, other diary notes, as well as the handed-down story about the book’s origin. While such a 
philological investigation would go beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is sufficient to note that 
Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion undermines the traditional hierarchy between product and materials. 
The book appears as the document of a larger—perhaps ongoing—process, rather than as a final 
                                                   
187 “The drawing of this model remained lying [!] on my desk for a full year—while I occupied myself with other 
things—particularly with aerial matters [German: ‘Luftgeschichten’] and with grandiose air militarism […].” (Scheerbart 
2014, 246). The translation misses the semantic nuance that the German formulation evokes by describing the drawing 
as ‘standing on my desk.’ 
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product in and of itself. It does not represent a complete, finished work, constituting the intended 
result of a creative process. Instead, Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion raises questions about the very 
conditions and procedures amounting to such a creative process; and it does not provide clear 
answers to those questions either, but rather unfolds them as unsolved problems surrounding the 
modern ideas of invention, history, and progress before the eyes of a critical reader. 
Perhaps the most crucial one of those questions is where we should draw the line between 
the invention understood as a product of author’s fictional imagination on the one hand, and as a 
real historical event on the other—as it is supported by evidence, documents, witnesses. This 
question is directly linked to problems of attribution and responsibility, which the book raises both 
on an intradiegetic and an extradiegetic level, in the sense that both ‘Geschichte’ and ‘Erfindung’ 
refer to an object and its fabrication that the literary narration deals with, as well as the fabrication 
and fabricatedness of the literary narration itself. Scheerbart’s “history of an invention” could thus be 
read as an extended ‘writing scene’ or ‘Schreibszene’ (Rüdiger Campe), where the technological 
invention serves as a poetological symbol for the inventive writing of literary fiction, and the writing 
of history at large. The depicted process of invention could then be understood as an instance of 
writing in the middle voice (Roland Barthes, Hayden White), “as it places the writer-agent within 
the writing process and reveals the constitution of the subject-of-writing as the latent principle, aim, 
and purpose of all writing” (White 1992, 187). The above-discussed depiction of the inventive 
moment as a quasi-obsessive ‘passive state’ would tie in neatly with such a reading, as modernist 
literary writing is described in a similar way as an “obsessionally neurotic” act (White 1992, 187). 
However insightful such self-referential readings of literature may be, they always run the risk 
of reaching deadlock in pure media reflection. In the case of Scheerbart’s Perpetuum, such a deadlock 
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would mean to miss that the text actually provokes reflections regarding technological change, 
human agency, and how their relation can be captured by narration. Prematurely equating the 
technological and the literary invention by reading both as one great ‘medium’ would mean to 
disregard the very tensions that Scheerbart’s text generates between the various different layers of 
meaning. And hence it would mean to disregard the critical light that the book casts on unanswered 
questions concerning modern technology and agency. In this chapter, I have therefore tried to 
highlight the tensions Scheerbart’s text generates between technological and the literary invention, 
between the inventor and the narrator, between the narrator and the author, and between 
‘Geschichte’ and ‘Erfindung’ respectively, instead of blurring the lines between those distinctions. 
Such a reading allows for seeing a discourse on responsibility and agency attribution at play in 
Scheerbart’s book. This discourse, to be sure, is not about a concrete case—regarding a given action, 
observation, or account. Instead it is about questions concerning the responsibility for change and 
the problem regarding the attribution of agency in general, and attributing it by means of narrating 
change in particular. 
It is worth noting that when Scheerbart’s narrator questions his responsibility for the genesis 
and consequences of his own invention, he does not claim that instead of him there are other agents 
who are responsible and therefore earn the credit for the invention and the work of the machine. 
Rather than re-attributing agency to any other individual subject, he universalizes the action being 
driven by a global non-subject, symbolized by ‘star Earth’: “Jedenfalls wissen wir jetzt, daß Alles vom 
Willen des Sterns Erde abhängt.” (PM 430)188. In this way, the narration actually deposits agency in 
a state of abeyance by abstaining from drawing common distinctions between actor and sufferer, 
                                                   
188 “In any case, we now know that everything depends upon the will of the star Earth.” (Scheerbart 2014, 243). 
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subject and object, cause and effect, or between different options for action. However, while the play 
of indeterminacies189 makes such polarities seem arbitrary, the invention itself does appear neither as 
arbitrary, nor as a subject to a choice between a binary of alternatives. The inventor does not choose 
to invent the perpetual motion machine: neither does he decide to invent this particular device over 
something else, nor does he choose the act of invention over not inventing anything at all. Instead, 
from the very start he seems driven and obsessed by the idea, and the act of inventing consists in 
necessity rather than in free choice. And even the result, i.e. the completion of the inventive project, 
defies the laws of binary logic. Until the very end, even the inventor-narrator himself has a hard time 
assessing whether or not the machine actually works: “Die Räder drehten sich so schwerfällig, daß 
ich nicht sehen konnte, ob die Geschichte ging oder nicht ging.” (PM 431).190 And the agentic 
indeterminacy reaches a level of absurdity when it comes to the anticipated consequences of the 
successful invention: 
Wenn die Geschichte jetzt geht, ist es zweifellos das größte Weltwunder auf der Terra—ein unheimliches 
Weltwunder. 
Wenn die Geschichte nicht geht, haben wir aber zweifellos ein noch größeres Weltwunder vor uns. (PM 439)191 
This passage defies the binary logic of agency that allows for choices such as acting versus not acting, 
achieving versus not achieving, choosing A over B (or C, D, E, etc.). No matter if the inventor-
narrator achieves the goal of successfully inventing the perpetual motion machine, the outcome will 
be (or is at least believed to be) wonderful. But if he does not succeed, the consequences will be ‘even 
                                                   
189 The above-noted gestalt switches are the most striking instances of these indeterminacies. 
190 “The wheels turned so haltingly that I was unable to see whether the thing worked or not.” (Scheerbart 2014, 243). 
191 “If the thing now works, it is beyond all doubt the greatest wonder of the world to be found on Terra—an unsettling 
Wonder of the World. 
If the thing doesn’t work, though, then we shall have before us, beyond all doubt, an even greater wonder of the world.” 
(Scheerbart 2014, 251). 
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more wonderful.’ Instead of a binary logic, this paradoxical setting is reminiscent of spiritual ideas 
usually found in Eastern religions and teachings such as Zen. Besides relativizing binary 
oppositions—the wheel either does or does not work—the result is described as a miracle or wonder: 
something that is beyond explanation. As “a wonder of the world,” the invention marks on the one 
hand a crossing between reality and fiction; on the other hand it also enters into a greater context of 
mankind’s history at the threshold of ancient mythology, as the wonders of the world were 
considered milestones of human culture whose origins and existence have always been entwined with 
various myths and legends. 
In the same way as Scheerbart’s “Geschichte” defies the binary logic of action, it also breaks 
down notions of technology as a tool used by humans to fulfill their purposes, serving them in the 
sense of emancipation, empowerment, and progress. As noted above, the perpetual motion machine 
develops—even in its imaginary state—a dynamic that goes against individual human will. And 
finally, it even appears capable of greater persistence than humanity as a whole: 
Gesetzt, es stürbe eines Tages die ganze Menschheit aus, so würden unzählige Perpetua ruhig sich weiter 
drehen. (PM 439)192 
What Scheerbart’s narrator surmises here about the future under the invention of perpetual motion 
machines—now they appear in plural—may appear today as likely forecast of our own technological 
future, as automation and the diffusion of information technology are rapidly progressing today. 
Some have viewed such scenarios of a technological world ‘without us’ as wakeup calls to finally face 
unresolved philosophical problems (Günter Anders, Konrad Paul Liessman). Others take them as the 
drum roll cheering us into a technological future of ‘the Singularity’ (Vernor Vinge, Ray Kurzweil). 
                                                   
192 “Assuming that all of mankind were to die out some day, countless Perpetua would imperturbably go on turning.” 
(Scheerbart 2014, 251). 
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But the insights sparked by Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion run deeper than just the concrete and 
practical reality—in the sense that modern technology does work and keeps working in a self-
operated way, regardless of human presence. Scheerbart’s book implies on a more profound level 
that technological innovation possesses in and of itself a self-perpetuating dynamic. In other words, 
an invention that has once been made—be it for a declared and intended purpose—can in some 
sense grow independent and self-employed during its lifetime, allowing for and begetting panoply of 
new technologies that are based on it. This quality inherent to modern technology is insufficiently 
explored in old debates about ‘technological determinism’ (Thorstein Veblen), or even about 
‘technological momentum’ (Hughes 1994). Asking questions such as “Does Technology drive 
history?” (Smith and Marx 1994) falls short of the mark, as with the structure of a subject-driven 
history such discussions simply transpose the model of human agency to machines. Scheerbart’s 
“Geschichte,” on the contrary, makes apparent that the interplay between imagination, invention, 
and historical reality is more complex than that. The perpetual motion machine functions as a sort 
of super-invention that incorporates the ‘process properties’ of modern technology on the whole. This 
super-invention accrues from little fantastic stories (PM 373), then it turns into one all-
encompassing ‘Geschichte,’ to ultimately outperform, and yes, even to ‘destroy’ the very ‘phantasies’ 
that it originated from:  
“Das sind natürlich nur Phantasieen. Die wahre Wirklichkeit ist immer ganz anders und zerstört gar viele 
Phantasiereiche. Und so muß ich zum Schluß ehrlich gestehen, daß ich eigentlich die praktische Verwertbarkeit 
dieses Perpetuums nicht sehr heftig herbeiwünsche. Die Praxis wird viele meiner Phantasieen zerstören. Das 
weiß ich ganz genau.” (PM 440)193 
                                                   
193 “Of course these are all fantasies. Actual reality is always quite different and destroys a great many fantasy realms. And 
so in the end I must honestly confess that I am not particularly eager to see practical applications developed for this 
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In this vein, Scheerbart’s book depicts how technological innovation first originates in fiction, but 
also how it will ultimately outgrow and destroy its own fantastic origins. 
To conclude, I would like to take recourse to the example from Ovid’s metamorphosis 
discussed at the outset of this chapter so as to emphasize how Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion deviates 
drastically from the ancient model. Like the invention depicted in Ovid’s metamorphosis about 
Daedalus and Icarus, the “Geschichte” dealt with in Scheerbart’s book has an aesthetic dimension. 
The narrator makes this aesthetic dimension quite explicit, notably when referring to the drawings 
that the invention materializes in and when musing about the fantastic and utopian stories that will 
spring of it. On a more subtle level, the aesthetic dimension also manifests in the way in which 
invention’s identity is fused with the genesis and form of the literary work it is contained in. 
However, while Daedalus’s invention consists in the mimetic creation of a new and beautiful order, 
Scheerbart’s perpetual motion machine appears to bode the exact opposite: it is expected to cause a 
“große Störung” or “great disruption,” which, like a natural catastrophe comes unexpectedly and 
with disturbing consequences to humanity. Moreover, it comes into existence not through the act of 
a mimetic finding (heuresis, inventio), but by way of a disruptive, revolutionary toppling of the 
existing order constituted by history in general, and by the history of science in particular. 
This revolutionary aspect gives away that Scheerbart’s invention, like Daedalus’s, also has a 
decidedly ethical-political dimension; but unlike the flying machine in Ovid’s metamorphosis, the 
perpetual motion machine does not come with a clear-cut disclaimer about the rules and methods of 
its use and abuse. Instead, it defies any binary logic of decision, and hence also defies a choice of a 
golden mean between two extremes. The logic of the perpetual motion machine is a rationale of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
perpetual motion machine. Practical experience will destroy many of my fantasies—of this I am quite sure.” (Scheerbart 
2014, 251). 
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inexorable outdoing: if the invention works, it is said to be “the greatest wonder of the world,” and, 
absurdly enough, if it does not work, it would be “an even greater wonder of the world.” No 
meaningful ethics or political agenda could be construed on the basis of this logic of action. 
Scheerbart’s Perpetuum presents a picture of technology that is not just ambiguous, but in fact defies 
the possibility of any value-based judgment altogether. What decides over the outcome of 
Scheerbart’s ‘Geschichte’ is not a certain way of using the invention—a right or a wrong 
application—but in fact is the further development of technology itself. Scheerbart’s perpetual 
motion machine thus represents a form of technology that points beyond existing notions of ethics 
and not simply towards an uncharted moral territory. The world after the invention of the perpetual 
motion machine comes with an entirely unknown ethical dimensionality, unlike the sky of Icarus’s 
flight in Ovid’s metamorphosis, which has a clearly delineated system of coordinates. 
This unknown dimensionality already bespeaks the fact that the reality of Scheerbart’s 
invention is unknowable altogether, which amounts to the perpetual motion machine’s cognitive 
dimension. Like in Ovid’s metamorphosis, it is the narrative situation and its temporal horizon that 
sets the stage for this dimension. However, while Ovid’s narrative provides the reader with clear 
hints that help distinguish three different cognitive layers, Scheerbart’s text lays out a rather opaque 
structure of time and knowledge. Ovid presents his plot through the voice of an omniscient narrator 
who, like the chorus in ancient drama, gives proleptic hints to the risks and dangers of the invention 
as well as to the tragic outcome of the story. Scheerbart’s protagonist, in contrast, presents himself as 
a strange hybrid between an omniscient and a limited narrator, who even shows tendencies of 
unreliable narration. He tells his ‘story’—for lack of a more suitable word—roughly from the 
moment of the invention’s successful completion; and yet, he withholds the information about this 
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outcome until, or in fact beyond, the very end of the story. On the one hand, this principal open-
endedness of Scheerbart’s text is a literary implementation of a key feature of progress: it informs the 
modern conception of history, according to which the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of 
expectations’ no longer share the same borders.194 On the other hand, Scheerbart does not simply 
perpetuate this modern notion of progress, but his text highlights the ruptures and open questions 
inherent to this notion by virtue of exposing its narrative constructedness. 
What makes this possible is the form of diary notes as well as their compilation or 
publication at a moment that lies after the actual events, and after the time of narration. The 
structure of Scheerbart’s text thus splits up the narrator’s personality—or rather his temporal 
situation—into consecutive temporal stages on the one hand, and an omniscient narrator-compiler 
who collects, reflects on, and publishes the single text elements on the other. Notwithstanding this 
temporal complexity, Scheerbart’s entire plot hinges on one crucial event, namely the successful 
completion of the invention. This event, however, does not occur until the end of the plot, and its 
actual occurrence is not reported until the very end of the narrative discourse presented in the book. 
And even then, the narrator-compiler does not bother to share any details about the event when he 
states: 
[L]eider muß ich darüber schweigen, da sonst die Anmeldung bei den Patentämtern der verschiedenen Staaten 
hinfällig werden würde. (PM 443)195 
                                                   
194 “Progress […] combined [since the eighteenth century] experiences and expectations, both endowed with a temporal 
coefficient of change. […] Even the new experience gained from the annexation of lands overseas and from the 
development of science and technology was still insufficient for the derivation of future expectations. From that time on, 
the space of experience was no longer limited by the horizon of expectations; rather, the limits of the space of experience 
and of the horizon of expectations diverged.” (Koselleck 2004, 279–80). 
195 “[U]nfortunately I must keep silent about my discovery, since this would invalidate the applications I have submitted 
to the patent offices of various countries.” (Scheerbart 2014, 253). 
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In this vein, the logic of outdoing sneaks into the cognitive structure of the narrative fabric itself. 
Unlike Ovid’s narrator, Scheerbart’s inventor has a vested interest in withholding information about 
the outcome of the story, since the knowledge of this information is critical to the market success of 
his invention. If understood in this way, progress no longer means the promise of emancipation or 
empowerment for humanity on the whole, but rather a set path on which one party has to maintain 
an innovative lead over another.196 
In Scheerbart’s case, this competitive dimension of progress is exaggerated to a confrontation 
between the single individual of the inventor on one side, and the rest of humanity on the other. 
The inventor has to keep the secret of his invention to himself to maintain the innovative lead over 
the rest of the human species. This tension between individual and species or society is paralleled by 
implicit divergence between the narrative form of the individual story of an invention on the one 
hand, and the one ‘history of progress’ on the other. While every individual story has an end, the end 
of history is still pending. It is the very last sentence of Scheerbart’s text that points in that direction 
by virtue of the trademark indeterminacy. The narrator self-reflectively states with it the happy 
ending of his own story, while with the same words claiming the satisfactory conclusion of his 
invention: “Aber zu einem befriedigenden Schluß bin ich gekommen.” (PM 443) 197 . This 
indeterminacy of the word ‘Schluß’ can also be applied to the relation between story and history. 
Unlike the end of a story, however, the end of progress in history is ineffable, which provokes the 
suspicion that any progressivist narration of history may in fact be in the service of some inventor’s 
vested interest. As progress has lost its persuasive power as a grand récit capturing the advance of 
                                                   
196 “Der Fortschritt bündelte also Erfahrungen und Erwartungen, die beide einen temporalen Veränderungskoeffizienten 
enthielten. Man wußte sich als Gruppe, als Land oder schließlich als Klasse den anderen voraus, oder man suchte die 
anderen einzuholen oder zu überholen.” (Koselleck 1995, 364) 
197 “But I did reach a satisfactory conclusion.” (Scheerbart 2014, 253). 
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humanity on the whole, it comes under suspicion of simply working to the advantage of one party 
over the rest of the species. 
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Ich wage mich bis zu der Formulierung vor, von der ich fürchte, 
sie wird wie eine Lästerung klingen: Man kann das Radio 
erfunden haben, das Kino—und dennoch ein Schuft sein. 





Joseph Roth’s Technographic Feuilleton 
1. Literature as ‘News that Stays News’: Technology in the Feuilleton 
Roth’s Interwar Journalism between Mythomania and Meta-History 
“[T]echnology has now become the subject of history” (Anders 1995, 9)199, writes Günther Anders 
in the preface to the second volume of his magnum opus Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. 
‘Technocracy’ is what Anders calls this new era—the rule of technology200—, which, as he claims, 
culminated in one major historical event: the invention and first launch of the nuclear bomb. The 
bomb empowers humanity by making her capable of her own total extinction, and at the same time 
                                                   
198 “I dare to advance to a formulation that I’m afraid will sound like a sacrilege: One may have invented the radio or the 
cinema—and nevertheless be a villain.” (My translation). 
199 My translation of the German original: “[D]ie Technik ist nun zum Subjekt der Geschichte geworden”. 
200 Anders promotes this notion of technocracy in opposition to the widespread understanding of the word implying not 
the rule of technology, but “eine technizistische und planungsoptimistische Haltung gegenüber gesellschaftlichen 
Problemlagen.”—“an attitude toward societal problem areas that is characterized by technicism and optimism for 
planning.” (my translation) (van Laak 2012, 106), or: “In general, technocracy has been taken to mean the government 
(or control) of society by scientists, technicians, or engineers-or at least the exercise of political authority by virtue of 
technical competence and expertise in the application of knowledge.” (Gunnell 1982, 392) The significance of 
technocracy in this common sense for the devastating events of World War I has been repeatedly asserted in its trailblazer 
role for the arms race of the twentieth century (van Laak 2012, 111–2). 
Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx’s title question Does Technology Drive History? could be read as a critical echo to 
Anders’s statement, although with no explicit reference to the latter (Smith and Marx 1994). 
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it subjects humanity to technology’s absolute force. With this in mind, the ‘event’ of the nuclear 
bomb may be ‘unprecedented’ in its intensity and punctuality, but it certainly has its peers and 
predecessors in the history of the twentieth century in the way it short-circuited technological means 
with human fate. What Anders states about the invention of the nuclear bomb could equally well be 
said of World War I. This is to say that in a straightedge history of technology, the Great War would 
certainly mark the first watershed event of the century. Trench battles, attrition warfare, military 
aircraft, and the devastating use of chemical weapons were only the most shocking, and the most 
consequential, signs indicating that the technical means of war had changed radically. The high 
significance of ‘battles of material’ during World War I made the outcry more plausible than ever 
before that humans were mere ‘canon fodder’ for the gears of warfare. 
The Great War was not only an unprecedented instance of making use of new technology for 
destructive purposes. It also marked a shift in how the populations of the participating countries 
perceived technology as such, regarding its development and its impact on humanity’s fate. Hence, 
we can also describe the war as a meta-historic event, since it marks a turning point not only in the 
course of history, but also with regard to the way in which techno-historical narratives are 
constructed ever since. If this dissertation largely brackets war as a historical event, it is not to 
question its significance with regard to the history of technology. Instead, the argument takes 
account of the observation that the meta-historical and narratological significance of the Great War 
is most visible where the war as a historical event is largely absent. To be sure, the war with all its 
destruction and terror caused a good deal of disillusionment and skepticism concerning the 
perception of technology and progress. However, it also sparked new forms of technological 
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enthusiasm that is often falsely reduced to a mere ardor for war and destruction.201 Instead of being a 
solution to humanity’s problems, since 1918 technology has been increasingly revealed as a problem 
in itself, which the war has exposed with new urgency. 
The general disillusionment brought about by the war is often linked with ‘Neue 
Sachlichkeit,’ a new stylistic tendency setting in about midway into the 1920s, which favored 
documentary descriptions over poetic imagination and straightedge surfaces over an iridescent 
inwardness.202 The author and journalist Joseph Roth, whose earlier works are often attributed to 
that tendency, puts the program of ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’ in a nutshell when he writes in the 1927 
preface to his novel Die Flucht ohne Ende or Flight Without End: “Es handelt sich nicht mehr darum 
zu ‘dichten’. Das Wichtigste ist das Beobachtete.” (IV 391).203 If this dictum may be valid as a battle 
cry of ‘Neue Sachlichkeit,’ Roth himself was rarely true to his own maxim.204 
David Bronsen, author of the first comprehensive Joseph Roth biography, describes his 
subject as a “Mythomanen” or “mythomane” (Bronsen 1974, 13) who continuously subjected his 
                                                   
201  Especially in Germany, the post-war period saw a new wave of enthusiasm for technological acceleration, 
rationalization, and efficiency (Borscheid 1996). Modern technology, largely perceived as an import product from 
America, appeared to some as the beacon of a new and peaceful social order: “In Weimar Germany after World War I, 
many persons believed that Taylor and Ford had the answer not only to production problems but to labor and social 
unrest as well. […] Many Europeans, especially Weimar Germans, decided that democracy, American technology, and 
new European and modern culture could restore war-devastated Europe and create a good society.” (Hughes 2004, 9). 
On the rather bellicose end of technological enthusiasm during the Weimar years ranges Ernst Jünger, who describes 
modern technological warfare as the production site of the “neue Mensch” or “new human” (72) and a “neue Rasse” or 
“new race” (Jünger 1980, 72–3). 
202 Besides Helmut Lethen’s theoretical attempt at coming to terms with Neue Sachlichkeit, also cf. the photographer 
August Sander’s work, according to which Neue Sachlichkeit is “to provide a dispassionate visual ‘anatomization’ of 
social structure”—in the words of Martha Rosler (Rosler 2013, 36). Also cf. Helmuth Plessner’s ‘Verhaltenslehre’ or 
‘theory of behavior’ and his essay 1924 “Die Utopie in der Maschine” (Plessner 1985, “Utopie der Maschine”), as well as 
Plessner’s later essays on progress and technology: “Die Entzauberung des Fortschritts” (1936) (Plessner 1985, 
“Entzauberung”) and “Technik und Gesellschaft in Gegenwart und Zukunft” (1969) (Plessner 1985, “Technik und 
Gesellschaft in Gegenwart und Zukunft (1969)”). 
203 “‘Creating fiction’ [German ‘dichten’] is no longer the central concern. The observed reality is what matters most.” 
(My translation). 
204 With regard to Roth’s critical position within the discourse of ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’ also cf. his text “Schluß mit der 
‘Neuen Sachlichkeit’” Die literarische Welt. 17. und 24. Januar 1930. W III, 153-64. 
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life and personality to his own fictional imagination. Roth divulged various contradictory narratives 
about his origin, upbringing, ethos, career, love life, etc. that often underwent radical changes during 
the course of his life.205 As Bronsen notes, this ‘mythomania’ poses particular problems to his 
biographers who find themselves confronted with a continuously shapeshifting subject. In one 
context, Roth appears as a reactionary monarchist and a convert to Catholicism, driven by nostalgic 
love for the Habsburg Empire. In another, he seems driven by a revolutionary free spirit, who signs 
his articles with “der rote Joseph,”206 who described himself as a convinced socialist and whose sharp 
eye and wit made him a fierce opponent to nationalist reaction and the rising Nazi movement. 
Biographical accounts that try to streamline Roth’s shapeshifting self into a linear development from 
progressive socialist to reactionary cultural pessimist fail to recognize that their subject is an author of 
fiction with a heightened awareness of ‘roles’ as a central aspect of modern subjectivity.207 Roth’s 
‘mythomania’ thus draws attention to the general fact that the line between the life of an author and 
his literary work is not static, but itself subject to a continuous interchange between fiction and facts.  
Roth was known to many of his contemporaries as a prolific exponent of cultural journalism 
who worked for leading Austrian and German newspapers and whose rates per line set records.208 He 
wrote for the feuilletons and culture sections of various different papers such as Der Neue Tag 
(Vienna), Frankfurter Zeitung, Berliner Börsen-Courier, Neue Berliner Zeitung-12-Uhr-Blatt, 
Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, and for party newspapers (Parteizeitungen) of the social democrats of 
                                                   
205 Along these lines, Roth was also using different pseudonyms, or monikers, such as “der rothe Joseph” and “Josephus,” 
with which he signed his feuilleton pieces in the newspapers of different political and religious orientation. One could 
argue, against this backdrop, that in Roth’s case, even in his journalistic pieces, the author position itself becomes subject 
of literary fictionalization. 
206 “Der rote Joseph” or “the red Joseph” was in fact a moniker Roth himself used to sign his contributions in social 
democratic newspapers. 
207 A blatant example of such biographical streamlining can be found in Wilhelm von Sternburg’s Joseph Roth. Eine 
Biographie. 
208 “[A]t a Mark a line, [Roth was] the highest paid journalist working for the Frankfurter Zeitung.” (Chambers 2006, 
101). 
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Austria (Arbeiter-Zeitung) and of Germany (Vorwärts). Although Roth’s journalistic writings have an 
aesthetic and intellectual value beyond the day-to-day concerns they accrued from, the writer has 
made his way into the literary canon primarily as the author of some great novels of the century, 
such as Hiob, Radezkymarsch, and Die Kapuzinergruft, as well as of the novella Die Legende vom 
heiligen Trinker. In recent decades, however, Roth’s journalistic writings have been rediscovered as 
literary productions in their own right. The edition of collected works by Kiepenheuer & Witsch in 
1989-92 reflects this development by dedicating far more pages to Roth’s journalistic writings than 
to his novels, novellas, and short stories together. This is to say that the texts originally published in 
the feuilletons of newspapers were recognized as possessing a value far beyond day-to-day news 
reportage of the time, and as documents of historical research. 
The Technographic Feuilleton 
The rediscovered value of Roth’s journalistic writing is in line with the overall tradition of the 
European feuilleton, which is per definition a medium209 transcending the actuality principles of the 
newspaper. In the Weimar years, this counterpoint function may have gained particular importance 
as newspapers were the most up-to-date news medium of the time with many papers appearing two, 
often three times per day. Multiple daily editions reflected the race against time, which was viewed 
                                                   
209 The word ‘feuilleton’ is used with varied meanings referring either to the medium (Huyssen 2007, 30) as in the place 
of publication within a newspaper, to a literary or journalistic genre of writing preferably published in that medium, or 
to a style of writing and thinking that was native to the newspaper section but that often transcended it. The long-lasting 
confusion caused by this ambiguity of the term has been noted by an emerging field of ‘feuilleton research’ (Kernmayer 
2012, 496), but a clarification of the term is still missing. 
“Das Feuilleton der zwanziger Jahre ist das Medium der Widersprüche, ein Text, an dem die gesamte literarische 
Intelligenz der Epoche mitschreibt […].” (Bienert 1992, 18). The question whether the feuilleton can be called a ‘genre’ 
remains subject to debate within the growing field of research and theory on this heterogeneous corpus of text. Hildegard 
Kernmayer, Barbara von Reibnitz, and Erhard Schütz in the preface to the 2012 issue of the Zeitschrift für Germanistik 
entitled “Perspektiven der Feuilletonforschung” trace back this debate and the confusion it is rooted in to the self-
reflexive tendencies within the feuilleton itself, that were always at the same time attempts of self-assertion: “Was vor 
allem blieb, war die Konfusion von Feuilleton als kulturbefasstem Teil der Zeitung, feuilletonistischem Schreibstil und 
Feuilleton als Genrebezeichnung. (Kernmayer 2012, 496). 
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by contemporaries to be continuously accelerating due to an onslaught of scientific discoveries, 
technological inventions, and political events. Within this accelerated buzz of news reporting, the 
feuilleton appears as an oasis of calm observation, providing a stage for larger temporal contexts and 
more sustainable contemplation of a world that seemed to change at an ever-quicker pace. 
The label itself gives a hint of this particular media status: the French word ‘feuilleton’ 
originally means leaflet or little sheet (Stöber 2005, 202). During the first half of the twentieth 
century, this expression could still be taken quite literally. The word referred to the bottom third or 
fourth of the newspaper page that featured the feuilleton. Traditionally, this part was even “[d]ivided 
by a line from the remaining sections” (my translation) making it easy for the reader to cut off and 
collect what he or she deemed to possess more enduring value than the ordinary daily press.210 The 
practice was so engrained in the cultural habits of the time that people simply referred to that sort of 
journalism—at least in the German-speaking realm—as writings ‘unter dem Strich’ or ‘below the 
line.’ 
When it comes to the feuilleton of the Weimar period, we can hence take Ezra Pound’s 
famous bon mot of “literature is news that stays news” quite literally. What was published ‘below the 
line’ covered the intersection between the up-to-date quality of news journalism and the 
sustainability of ‘high literature,’ featuring an interesting blend of different subjects and genres of 
writing. It provided a stage for reviews of art, literature, theater performances, movies, sometimes 
music, etc. alongside a more general cultural criticism leaning toward philosophical contemplations, 
most prominently practiced by authors such as Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin. But it also 
                                                   
210 “Mit einem Strich vom Rest des redaktionellen Teils getrennt, sollte dem Leser das Sammeln erleichtert werden: Das 
Feuilleton konnte einfach abgetrennt werden.” (Stöber 2005, 202). While the Frankfurter Zeitung, as one of the most 
important voices in Weimar Republic, strictly complied to that format convention, other papers did not, but inserted the 
culture sections more loosely into their layouts (Neue Berliner Zeitung) or featured them in the form of a “Beilage” or 
supplement (Berliner Börsen-Courier).  
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offered the place for literary productions in a more classical understanding with a clearly fictional 
content, ranging from sequel novels to the famous plenitude of ‘short prose’ running under a variety 
of labels such as literary sketches, short stories, prose poems, urban miniatures etc. and written by 
authors such as Egon Erwin Kisch, Alfred Polgar, Robert Musil, Hans Siemsen, or Robert Walser.211 
Positioned at the crossroads of different media, reading practices, genres, and literary movements, 
the feuilleton of the early twentieth century often combined meditations on the medium’s own 
temporality with observations of change and acceleration in modern society at large.212  
Within this framework, Joseph Roth’s journalistic pieces range somewhere between culture 
review, cultural criticism and semi-fictional ‘short prose.’ The change of times is not only a recurring 
motif in the author’s sharp observations of the modern everyday life, but it can also be viewed as a 
programmatic theme guiding Roth’s entire journalistic activity. Roth himself gets to the heart of this 
theme in a letter to Benno Reifenberg, director of the feuilleton of the Frankfurter Zeitung, when he 
writes: 
Ich zeichne das Gesicht der Zeit. Das ist die Aufgabe einer großen Zeitung. Ich bin ein Journalist, kein 
Berichterstatter, ich bin ein Schriftsteller, kein Leitartikelschreiber.213  
“Antlitz der Zeit”, “face of time”—with “Antlitz” being a synonym of “Gesicht”—was also the title 
of a new year’s feuilleton article by Roth of 1920 in “Der Neue Tag” (I 113-5). This article makes 
apparent even more than others that Roth’s cultural criticism starts with a critique of style and 
                                                   
211 Joseph Roth can as well be added to this list, as he published his novel Das Spinnennetz as a serial in the Viennese 
social democratic newspaper Arbeiter-Zeitung in 1923. It was not until 1967 that the novel came out in book format.  
212 For a more detailed picture of the genesis and function of the feuilleton in interwar Germany and Austria, cf. (Jäger 
and Schütz 1999, Städtebilder zwischen Literatur und Journalismus; Jäger and Schütz 1999, “Feuilleton im Feuilleton. 
Zur Geschichte des autoreflexiven Diskurses”; Stöber 2005). 
213  “I draw the face of time. This is the task of a great newspaper. I am a journalist, no reporter, I am a writer, not just an 
author of news articles (Leitartikel).” (My translation) (Roth and Kesten 1970, 87–8).  
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linguistic expressions of the feuilleton reminiscent of Karl Kraus’s aphoristic attacks on the linguistic 
and cultural hypocrisies of his time. 
Regarding his journalistic writings, Roth’s notorious mythomania hence acquires another 
meaning.214 In those feuilleton pieces, the author not only reworks his own life experiences into 
literary texts of societal and poetic significance. He also carves out the mythic and mythological 
dimensions of a modern reality that is subject to constant change. He “draw[s],” to use his own 
words, “the face of time,” that is the face of his time”—or the “portrait of the age,” as Helen 
Chambers translates the phrase (Chambers 2006, 101). But to the same degree, Roth “draw[s] the 
face of time” as such, where time is understood as an all-encompassing force subjecting everything to 
changes and ruptures, but which also functions as a connecting structure between the past, the 
present, and the future. 
If traditional narratology draws a basic distinction between narrative and description, these 
two modes of literary prose almost always merge into each other in Roth’s journalistic writings. 
These texts are not only descriptions of more or less conspicuous scenes of modern life. They also 
constitute attempts at making sense of a changing world by narrating it, i.e. by integrating the 
symptoms of a changing reality into a temporal horizon. By ‘drawing the face of time’ Roth employs 
and further develops a very productive genre of journalism, i.e. a narrative mode of depiction, 
without lapsing into straightforward storytelling like New Journalism215 would propagate it a few 
decades later. 
                                                   
214 Regarding ‘the myth of progress’ (von Wright) and references to mythological motifs and their critique in Roth’s 
technographic journalism cf. Hughes (Hughes 2006, 113–38). 
215 The label was coined by the US-American author and journalist Tom Wolfe. 
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With that hybrid form of description and narrative, Roth’s feuilleton marks a special 
position in view of an alleged end of storytelling that Walter Benjamin diagnosed in his 1936 essay 
“Der Erzähler” or “The Storyteller,” as a result of the Great War (Huyssen 2007, 27). Benjamin 
viewed the increasing speed of news journalism of his time and the waning of good storytellers as an 
indicator for an all-encompassing process of cultural transformation. In the course of this 
transformation, wrote Benjamin, information is supplanting narrative forms of knowledge 
(Benjamin 2007). He linked the crisis of storytelling with the crisis of experience that has 
traditionally been narrated. Such experience, according to Benjamin, is belied vis-a-vis the radical 
changes brought about by the Great War, and last but not least, by the technology that has made its 
destruction possible: 
A generation that had gone to school on horse-drawn streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape 
where nothing remained unchanged but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in a force field of destructive 
torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body. (Benjamin 2002, 144)216 
Along with these eruptive changes caused mainly by technological developments that had 
culminated in World War I, Benjamin sees a greater epistemological transformation process taking 
hold. “The art of storytelling is nearing its end because the epic side of truth—wisdom—is dying 
out. This, however, is a process that has been going on for a long time.” (Benjamin 2002, 146). 
According to Benjamin, the developments he describes hark back to the early modern period; and 
their first signs can be seen in the “rise of the novel” as a literary genre bound to the medium of the 
                                                   
216 “Eine Generation, die noch mit der Pferdebahn zur Schule gefahren war, stand unter freiem Himmel in einer 
Landschaft, in der nichts unverändert geblieben war als die Wolken und unter ihnen, in einem Kraftfeld zerstörender 
Ströme und Explosionen, der winzige, gebrechliche Menschenkörper.” (Benjamin 2007, 104). 
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book (Benjamin 2002, 146).217 With this argument, however, Benjamin promotes a very narrow 
notion of narration or storytelling (German ‘erzählen’) that is largely limited to the oral tradition of 
the exchange of experience. For him, the cultural-technological transition from narration to 
information starts where the art of storytelling is converted from an oral tradition to the medium of 
writing. 
Joseph Roth, belonging to the same generation as Benjamin, is certainly not in favor of 
substituting information for storytelling. Instead, he suggests and proves by the practice of his 
journalistic writing that there is an intrinsic value of narration as a cognitive device, even if it is 
delivered in a written form. Roth’s journalistic pieces are shining examples of a whole genre of 
feuilleton writing and as such prove that the interwar period saw a thriving of literary journalism in 
the German-speaking world. Walter Benjamin, of course, was part of this journalistic bloom, just as 
well as Roth was. But there is one important difference between their respective contributions to the 
feuilleton. Walter Benjamin, alongside with writers such as Kracauer, Rilke, Benn, or Hofmannsthal, 
attends to a literary form of urban or ‘metropolitan miniature’ as Andreas Huyssen describes it in the 
sense of written Bilder218 (be it Denk-, Schrift-, Körper-, or Raum-Bilder).219 For Benjamin, such a 
‘Bild’ in a “more than visual sense […] condensed the extension of time and space, compressed them 
into an overdetermined synchronous image that was significantly different from ambling 
descriptions, sequential observation, or the merely empirical urban sketch.” (Huyssen 2007, 31). If 
that form of ‘image-writing’ was Benjamin’s way of coping with the above-mentioned onslaught of 
                                                   
217 This is in line with a formulation by Rainer Maria Rilke in his 1910 novel Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids 
Brigge, where the protagonist states: “Daß man erzählte, wirklich erzählte, muß vor meiner Zeit gewesen sein.” (Rilke 
1996, 557). 
218 The German lexem ‘Bild’ covers a wide semantic spectrum only roughly captured by the English words ‘picture,’ 
‘image,’ and ‘tableau.’ 
219 Cf. Huyssen’s 2015 book Minitature Metropolis for an in-depth investigation of this long “neglected literary form 
hidden in plain view.” (Huyssen 2015, 2). 
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information and dwindling of storytelling, Joseph Roth obviously opted for a different strategy in his 
technographic journalism. Even where his texts focus on examples of modern urban spatiality, such 
as skyscrapers, railroad junctions, or traffic regulation, they integrate space into a temporal fabric of 
before and after, of not yet and no longer. Even though they focus on ruptures and discontinuities, 
they bear little resemblance to montage, as Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s miniatures do. Roth’s texts are 
no snapshots, but micro-narratives that oftentimes consist of just the minimal characteristic of one 
single event: a change of state with a ‘before’ and an ‘after.’ 
Roth’s take on journalism transcends the idea of the newspaper as a provider of information, 
by cultivating new forms and applications of literary writing in the shape of description and 
narration alike. It hence promotes forms of knowledge and discourse quite different from science 
and scholarship. 
Unlike the dominant discourse in terms of journalism method and the idea of objectivity rooted in the 
scientific positivism of the 19th century, literary journalism resonates with constructivist epistemology. 
(Berning 2011, 171) 
In this vein, Roth’s journalistic pieces can be viewed as contributions to the narrative and 
narratological construction of ‘Zeitgeschichte’ or ‘contemporary history.’ Unlike the miniatures 
Huyssen describes, Roth’s feuilleton places clear emphasis on questions of time as opposed to space. 
Although Roth describes in many places the changes and ruptures with regard to how they take place 
in the urban environment, he does not limit himself to their aesthetic description and analysis. For 
the most part, the short texts are narrative sketches designed to contextualize the radically new 
within a larger temporal horizon. But as such, they do anything but subscribe to linear notions of 
time or narrative. They explore the instances of modern times not as a teleological movement, but as 
vectors within an isotropic horizon of possibilities. 
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Against this backdrop it does not surprise that technological inventions and the widespread 
diffusion of technology into everyday life take up a considerable part of Roth’s journalistic coverage. 
These ‘technographic’ texts are not formally distinguished from the rest of Roth’s journalistic 
writings by anything other than their thematic focus on technological change. I chose to label them 
‘technographic feuilleton’ in retrospect, hoping to channel some extra attention to the high currency 
and significance they have in technology-obsessed times like ours. One reason why technology plays 
such an important role in Roth’s feuilleton may simply be that what we call ‘tech news’ today, then 
fell, to a large share, under the rubrics ‘below the line’ or ‘unter dem Strich,’ in other words, into the 
feuilleton sections of newspapers. However, Roth’s take on technology goes far beyond a mere 
description of what the engineers and inventors of his time have devised and put into the world. His 
critique of technology, even where it veers toward enthusiasm, is always at the same time a critique 
of the press as a medium as well as of the ideology and propaganda it promotes. And his 
contemplations about the temporality of technological change go hand in hand with his critical view 
of the sheer speed of news journalism. Roth writes in a piece entitled “Der Kurfürstendamm” 
published in 1929 in the newspaper Münchner Neueste Nachrichten: 
Die Nachrichten sind schauderhaft. Die Zeitungen sind schneller als die Zeit, nicht einmal das Tempo, das sie 
selbst erfunden haben, kann ihnen nachkommen. (III 100)220 
The preposterous twist expressed in this passage is characteristic for Roth’s journalism, in particular 
where it focuses on technological change. Roth is well aware of the fact that in view of the ubiquity 
and speed of technological change that constitute modern life it is difficult to tell causes from effects, 
or agents from patients. In this vein, Roth’s critique rarely targets technology per se, but rather a 
                                                   
220 “The news is horrible. The papers are faster than time itself, not even the tempo that they themselves have invented 
can catch up with the speed of the news.” (My translation). 
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crude and uncritical enthusiasm for it—or otherwise rejection of it. In a letter to his friend Pierre 
Berteaux, Roth describes this uncritical but over-sentimental attitude toward technology as a 
characteristic quality of the German public: 
Das Unerträgliche an Deutschland ist nicht die Technik, sondern die Romantik der Technik. […] Und der 
wichtigste Unterschied zwischen dem Amerikaner und dem Deutschen: daß jener die Technik so benutzt, wie 
ein Säugling Milch trinkt und dieser noch Gemüts-Kommentare an jedes Telephongespräch anknüpft (Roth 
and Kesten 1970, 142–3).221 
Roth’s depiction of technological change presents not a comprehensive picture in the form of 
a grand narrative, but a meaningful diversity of short and exemplary miniatures. Constructing a 
narrative arc describing a presumed development in Roth’s view on technological change, 
civilization, and progress would thus mean to contradict the particular quality of his works. If Roth 
scholar and editor Klaus Westermann reads signs of “zunehmendem Kulturpessimismus” or 
“increasing cultural pessimism” in some of Roth’s more polemical feuilleton pieces of the late 1920s 
(Westermann 2013), he falsely suggests a linear shift from a proponent to an adversary of progress 
during the course of Roth’s lifetime. A view of an early technophile and a late technophobe Roth is 
just as inaccurate as the separation of his oeuvre into early works in line with New Objectivity (Neue 
Sachlichkeit) on the one hand and later works (such as Radetzkymarsch) with rather “restorative” 
tendencies on the other (Brittnacher and Amthor 2012, 15). Just as little do the individual feuilleton 
pieces simply reflect the author’s opinion with regard to the technological developments they deal 
with. The semi-fictional quality of these texts implies that their narrators should not be carelessly 
identified with the author. While all of Roth’s technographic feuilleton bespeaks a literary awareness 
                                                   
221 “The unbearable side of Germany is not technology itself, but technological romanticism. […] And the most 
important difference between the American and the German man: that the former makes use of technology just as a baby 
drinks milk, whereas the latter attaches Gemüt commentaries to any given phone conversation.” (My translation). 
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regarding narrative perspective and voice, some texts even evoke a whole spectrum of different 
ideological positions.222  
This said it is certainly true that the view of technology as displayed in Roth’s journalistic 
writings varies between technophile euphoria and pessimistic, at times technophobic, cultural-
criticism. But drawing a clear line of development from one productive phase to another contradicts 
the overall ambiguous223 and multi-faceted views expressed in the single pieces. Roth’s contributions 
about new washing machines, fire arms, skyscrapers, modern traffic, motorcyclists, aeronauts, 
railroad nostalgia, and a club of inventors not only provide a multifarious picture of technological 
progress as such. They also map the ongoing attempts of aligning technological change with human 
or moral progress (von Wright 1997, 7) and to a large extent they contest the prospects of success 
that such attempts allegedly hold out. Instead of subscribing to uncritical technological enthusiasm, 
which the avant-gardes often postulated (think of Futurism, Soviet avant-garde), Roth counters such 
utopianism with a form of technological enlightenment. The present chapter will discuss a selection 
of texts from Roth’s technographic feuilleton to explore the wide spectrum of questions these texts 
raise concerning technological change and its construal in narrative forms. For this purpose, it is only 
a secondary concern to contextualize Roth’s take on technology within the historical setting of 
interwar central Europe. Such contextualization may be occasionally needed for an understanding of 
                                                   
222 Both Jeanne Riou and Michael Bienert observe this narrative quality of Roth’s feuilleton in their respective essays 
about the text “Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck.” Michael Bienert: “Die im Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck vertretenen 
Ansichten können nicht umstandslos mit denen des Autors identifiziert werden. Schon die Überschrift und die ersten 
Sätze signalisieren eine fiktive Redesituation, die des öffentlichen Bekenntnisses. Der Text ist ein Rollenspiel, in dem 
weltanschauliche Positionen weniger vertreten als erprobt werden.” (Bienert 1992, 55)  
Jeanne Riou: “[T]he stylized, highly self-conscious narrator takes on in ‘Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck’” (Riou 2005, 
178). 
223 The stress on the inherent ambiguity in Roth’s views of modern technology should not be understood as a form “der 
heuristischen Behelfsklammer der ‘Ambivalenz’” with the aim “ein einheitliches Roth-Bild zu erhalten” (Düllo 1994, 
138). Instead, it is an attempt at bringing to bear Roth’s technographic feuilleton as a medium of cultural critique 
transcending the confines of individual authors opinion toward a fictional approach to modern technology. 
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the single texts; but the goal is not to reconstruct a historical picture of literary notions of technology 
in Weimar Germany. Instead, the close readings of Roth’s technographic feuilleton will cast light on 
a question that is theoretical and narratological—but not historical: How does modern technological 
change occur and how do we make sense of it through narrative accounts, be it literary, journalistic, 
or historical? 
2. Technological Progress between Destruction and Consumption 
Technological Momentum: The Gunpowder in Chekhov’s Rifle 
One of Roth’s earliest comments on technology makes apparent that critical views of progress in the 
Weimar Era are largely informed by one shared experience: the incisive events of World War I and 
its devastating consequences.224 The short text is entitled “Das Schießpulver”—“Gunpowder” and it 
was published on March 14, 1920 in the Vienna newspaper Der Neue Tag. It draws attention to the 
invention of a „self-loading rifle“ made in the same year by a 19-year-old engineering student in 
Bavaria. In his commentary, Roth underscores the inherent irony of this invention if seen in its 
historical context. The invention, he writes, “was achieved—one make note of the date—in the first 
months of the year 1920 in the German or Bavarian Republic, about fourteen months after the end 
of the World War.” The historical circumstances, however, appear to be oddly absent from the 
consciousness of the inventor, as he himself “has not made any statements concerning the possible 
application of his invention” (I 254). There is a blatant contradiction between the destruction of war 
on the one hand, and the creative and productive activity of engineers on the other. Roth uses this 
                                                   
224 Ten years later, Roth would describe the war as the “wichtigste ‘Stoff’ unserer literarischen Sachlichkeit” (III 161). In 
this context, Roth’s criticism of “Neue Sachlichkeit” can be viewed as an explanation for his avoidance of the Great War 
as a sujet in his own fiction (Düllo 1994, 129). 
 163 
contradiction as a steppingstone for a meditation on technology and its significance for the course of 
history. 
The primary focus lies on the subject of the inventor, and the object of his making: the self-
charging rifle. Roth first describes the rifle as some kind of tool, whose function is clearly defined by 
its maker. The inventor is said to have “eventually perfected his invention in such way that it can fire 
thirty-two shots without the need to reload it.” (I 254, my translation). However, the clear 
relationship between human subject and technological object becomes muddled at the transition from 
the device’s declared functionality to its undeclared purpose: 
Man kann also zweiunddreißigmal hintereinander, ohne zu laden, schießen. Auf Hasen oder Menschen, je 
nachdem man mit der neuen Erfindung auf die Jagd oder in den Krieg geht. Der neunzehnjährige Erfinder hat 
über die Verwendungsmöglichkeiten seines Gewehres nichts verlautbart.225 (I 254) 
Whereas the general use of a firearm is either to hunt animals or to kill humans, the latter seems 
much more likely, in particular under the given historical circumstances—fourteen months after the 
end of World War I and only one day after the Kapp Putsch in Berlin and the beginning of the Ruhr 
uprisings. While thus musing over the possible purposes of the invention, Roth morphs the rifle 
from a tool designed for a clearly defined use into a sign hinting at an undetermined, but somewhat 
daunting future. While the invention is well defined with regard to its functionality by the inventor, 
the purpose it hints at as a mere sign calls for interpreting clarification by the cultural critic. In this 
capacity, Roth rules out hopes that the rifle might have been created for the purpose of hunting. 
Viel berechtigter ist die Vermutung, daß diese fürchterliche Erfindung nur Kriegszwecken dienen soll. Man 
wird also im nächsten Krieg mit dem Geyerschen Gewehr zweiunddreißig Menschen töten können, 
                                                   
225 “You can thus shoot thirty two times, one shot after another, without reloading the rifle. Shoot on rabbits or on 
humans, depending whether you want to go on a hunt or to war with it. The nineteen-year-old inventor has said 
nothing about the possible applications of his rifle.” (My translation). 
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hintereinander, in möglichst rascher Folge. Im nächsten Krieg... 
Denn auf einen nächsten Krieg deutet diese Erfindung hin. (I 254)226 
However prophetic this statement may seem from a current-day perspective, Roth’s estimation 
should not be read as an example of journalistic fortunetelling, but rather as a concise piece of 
cultural criticism. With the statement, the focus of the observation shifts from the purpose of the 
invention to its potential historical consequences. The invention appears no longer as a device that is 
created for an intended purpose, but rather as a sign for tragic consequences that lie in the future and 
that transcend human intentionality and control. 
In what follows, Roth inverts with a sleight of hand the logical order between subject, object, 
and the intended purpose or effect with regard to the invention. He thus opens up a new perspective 
on technology’s place and function. On closer examination, the 19-year-old engineer, who in the 
year of 1920 invents a self-loading rifle, in fact turns out not to form the center of agency in this 
narrative of technological progress. Inventors, Roth observes, are clearly not the actual subjects of 
history. 
Denn schließlich sind Erfinder, ebenso wie Künstler, Produkte ihrer Welt, Konsequenzen der Strömungen, 
Werkzeuge [!] in der Hand des Zeitgeistes. (I 255)227 
The inventor himself turns out to be not a producer, but a product, not a designer, but a tool. It is 
important to note that this reversal of agency does not feed into a crude technological determinism 
where technology would take over the helm, as it happens in many science fiction scenarios.228 
                                                   
226 “It is much more reasonable to assume that this terrible invention shall only serve the purposes of war. You will thus 
be able, during the next war, to kill thirty-two men with Geyer’s rifle, one after another, in the quickest possible 
succession. During the next war... 
Because another war is what this invention is indicating.” (My translation). 
227 “For inventors are, just like artists, products of their world, results of trends—tools in the hands of zeitgeist.” (My 
translation). 
228 Take Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey as just one particularly well-known example. 
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Instead of simply transferring the agency from human to technological subjects, Roth brackets the 
crude notion of intentional action and raises the observation to a more abstract level where 
inventors, as well as artists, depend on trans-human forces such as historical ‘trends’ (Strömungen) 
and ‘zeitgeist.’ 
In this way, Roth inverses the relationship between subject and object with regard to the 
process of history, and in particular with regard to the distribution of agency between inventor and 
technological invention. This form of reasoning is reminiscent of the line of argument that Karl 
Marx pursues in chapter 13 of the first volume of The Capital. Drawing upon Marx’s chapter, Hans 
Blumenberg makes the following observation in his reflections concerning a “Geistesgeschichte der 
Technik” or “Intellectual History of Technics”229: 
[E]ine technische Erfindung ist, zumindest in den letzten Jahrhunderten, ein datierbares Ereignis. Und es 
scheint, daß die zunehmende Technisierung als der Zustand moderner Industriegesellschaften nichts anderes als 
das Resultat der Summierung jener erfinderischen Ereignisse ist. Karl Marx hat als erster im 13. Kapitel des 
ersten Bandes des […] Kapitals mit dem Titel ‘Maschinerie und große Industrie’ diese Betrachtungsweise genau 
umgekehrt. (Blumenberg, Schmitz, and Stiegler 2009, 10)230 
Drawing upon Marx’s reversal, in which “der Erfinder gleichsam nur als der Funktionär und 
Vollzugsgehilfe des objektiven Prozesses der Industrialisierung erscheint”231 (Blumenberg, Schmitz, 
and Stiegler 2009, 14), Blumenberg traces the genesis of technization (German ‘Technisierung’) 
back to the early modern—bourgeois—connection between the concepts of invention and private 
property (Blumenberg, Schmitz, and Stiegler 2009, 14–8). Within this view, invention appears as an 
                                                   
229 Helmut Müller-Sievers suggests this translation in a paper on Blumenberg’s work on technology (Müller-Sievers 
2012, “Kyklophorology: Hans Blumenberg and the Intellectual History of Technics”). 
230 A technological invention is, at least in the last centuries, a datable event. And it seems that technization as the state of 
modern industrial societies is nothing else but the sum of those inventive events. Karl Marx was the first to exactly invert 
that view in the 13th chapter of the first volume of Capital, entitled ‘Machinery and Modern Industry.’” (my translation).  
231 “[…] the inventor appears only as the functionary and representative of the objective process of industrialization” (my 
translation). 
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escape from the ancient “Einwand gegen das Privateigentum, daß die Natur alles allen zur 
Verfügung gestellt habe” (Blumenberg, Schmitz, and Stiegler 2009, 14–5)232. The genesis of modern 
authorship (‘Urheberschaft,’ 15) thus appears, in Blumenberg’s view, at the same time as a history of 
legitimization of private property and as the development of a ‘technological ideology’ (‘technische 
Ideologie,’ 14) which ultimately turns humans from author-subjects into function holders of the 
technization process. 
It is important to note that, unlike Hans Blumenberg and Karl Marx, Roth does not connect 
his observations about the reversal of agency regarding technological inventions with theories of 
private or corporate property. Writing under the impression of the birth pangs of a newly founded 
German “Weimar” Republic, he rather places technological innovation in a context of questions 
concerning the freedom of action, individual or collective choice or election, and political as well as 
semantic representation. The fact that humanity, represented by the young inventor, appears as the 
plaything of technological progress is symptomatic for a general lack of agency on a political level. 
“Dieser Neunzehnjährige ist jedenfalls Repräsentant seiner Generation.” (I 255)233. In contrast to the 
ailing authorities of the new Republic, the young inventor is identified as the true representative of 
his generation that presumably rushes headfirst into another war. It is striking, however, that in this 
relationship of representation no part seems to have real agency. Neither is the generation in the 
position to elect their representative, nor is the inventor able to freely control the course of things. 
The critique of technological progress implicates a profound skepticism about democratic 
participation or representation. 
                                                   
232 “[...] objection against private property that nature had provided everything to everybody” (my translation). 
233 “This nineteen-year-old, in any case, is representative of his generation.” (My translation). 
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What Roth proposes is to read technological artifacts—as well as their ‘creators’—as signs 
within a larger cultural code, and with a certain degree of interpretability. “Sie [the inventors] sind 
der Ausdruck [!] der häufig noch selbst unsichtbar bleibenden Triebe ihrer Umwelt.” (I 255)234 
According to Roth, technological inventions as well as their inventors are not to be understood as 
means to humanity’s ends, but rather as signs that help figure out those ends. Instead of asking 
whether technology is liberating or in fact enslaving, whether it brings benefits or harms, we should 
thus examine a given technology as to what ideas of benefits and harms find their expression in it.235 
Inasmuch as they are symbols in a code, inventions and their inventors have in a certain 
sense hermeneutic qualities. This implies, first, that they are always already items in some sort of 
narrative, whether it be within the framework of a more general history of technology, in the shape 
of individual stories about how a particular invention has come about, or as exemplary narratives 
regarding the application and diffusion of an invention as often used for the purpose of marketing. 
Second, as a result of this narrativity, inventors and their inventions are always potential subjects to 
ideology and propaganda, depending on who, or which instance, is telling and promoting a given 
narrative. 
Roth’s article is a re-telling of history and of technological progress. It is a critical 
engagement with the ‘ideology of technology’ (Blumenberg) of his time. This is to say that it 
reassesses the narrative pre-conception of technological change. Similar to Marx’s ‘critical history of 
                                                   
234 “They [the inventors] are the expression of their environment’s instincts, which are oftentimes still invisible for their 
part.” (My translation) 
235 The word “Ausdruck,” ‘expression’ also places this statement in the context of a debate associated with the discourse 
on ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’ (usually translated as ‘new objectivism,’ ‘new objectivity,’ ‘new sobriety,’ ‘new dispassion’ and the 
like) an aesthetic and ethical tendency that determined a large part of Weimar Republic art and culture during the 
1920s, often in contrast to Expressionism as the ruling stylistic paradigm of the 1910s. (add a brief note on the semantic 
evolution of “Ausdruck” and “Expression” from Ludwig Klages, Karl Bühler, and Helmuth Plessner (Lethen 1994, 102–
19).  
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technology’ (Blumenberg, Schmitz, and Stiegler 2009, 11), the criticism expressed in “Das 
Schießpulver” inverts the crude notion of technization as “the sum of inventive events” 
(Blumenberg). But unlike Marx, Roth does not view technology as a means of production that 
causes a depersonalization of the power structures ‘in the service of capital.’ Instead, Roth’s take on 
the invention of the self-loading rifle suggests an altered view of the narrative structure of history in 
general, and a changed notion of events and agency in particular. Blumenberg’s formula of 
technization as ‘the sum of inventive events’ suggests a linear progression where each of such events 
is datable on a temporal axis and is initiated by an inventor through a creative intentional action. In 
Roth’s “Schießpulver” article, a multi-dimensional structure of cross-references replaces that linear 
notion of technological history. The one event that the article ostensibly concentrates on—the 
invention of the self-charging rifle—is semantically charged by a pars pro toto relation to the one 
major event, which is the previous world war. Instead of a prospective orientation usually associated 
with technological innovation, Roth’s article hence places technology in a retrospective context. 
The invention appears as a petty reverberation of the Great War. Its relation to the future is 
simply that it hints at ‘another war,’ this is to say that it will cause no change for the better, but 
simply a relapse into previous catastrophes. The invention of the automatic rifle is thus a concrete, 
retrospective materialization of the serial killings and ‘mass destruction’ of the Great War. But it is 
also an iteration of that one major invention that gives the title to Roth’s article: gunpowder—
Schießpulver. Gunpowder was commonly listed among the three great inventions during the early 
modern period as a manifestation and proof of the time’s general superiority over previous epochs 
(Pot 1985, 75–6). It is thus a traditional symbol of modern progress linking the superiority over 
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previous times with a gain of physical power over contemporaries. With his article, Roth reassesses 
this traditional symbol by stressing its destructive side.  
Besides changing the status of the inventive event within the notion of technological 
progress, Roth’s article provides an altered view of (human) agency within this process. While the 
common modern understanding of an invention would be the creation of something new, Roth 
immediately shifts the focus from that act of creation to the destructive potential of what has just 
been invented. While the inventor—and his contemporaries—may believe that what he does is 
actually a creative act, Roth debunks this positive view as a misconception. The historical knowledge 
the inventor is lacking clearly reveals the destructive potential of that inventive event. 
Das Schießpulver ist als Kriegstrieb- und -treibmittel nicht zu unterschätzen. Es ist ein tückisches Objekt. Die 
Ereignisse der letzten Monate und der Krieg haben häufig genug bewiesen, daß die Waffe Gewalt über den 
Bewaffneten hat. (I 254)236 
The weapon that gains power over its carrier is not only to be taken literally, but can also be 
understood metonymically for a technological invention as such, which once created, will determine 
the further course of events by its functionality. The invention appears not as a mere increase in 
possibilities for human action that once created can be used. It rather is a determining principle that 
once created will be used to its predestined purpose, beyond any human choice. 
From a narratological perspective, Roth’s gunpowder functions within the narrative course of 
history in a similar way to what playwrights, writers, and theorists of narrative describe as ‘Chekhov’s 
gun.’ As the name suggests, this dramatic principle harkens back to a dictum by Anton Chekhov 
who advised his fellow-writers to  
                                                   
236 “Gunpowder should not be underestimated in its role as a leaven and fuel of war. It is a cussed object The events of 
the recent months and the war have proven often enough that weapons have power over its carrier.” (my translation). 
The German expression ‘tückisches Objekt’ or ‘Tücke des Objekts’ describes the case when an inanimate object 
seemingly acquires a life of its own and turns against its human users. 
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Remove everything that has no relevance to the story. If you say in the first chapter that there is a rifle hanging 
on the wall, in the second or third chapter it absolutely must go off. If it’s not going to be fired, it shouldn’t be 
hanging there.237 
As a principle of storytelling or dramaturgy, ‘Chekhov’s gun’ is the narrative equivalent of Occam’s 
razor in philosophical logic, and the opposite of Hitchcock’s MacGuffin or Barthes’s Effect of Reality. 
It epitomizes the inherent laws of a narrative structure, where every single element has an integral 
narrative function for the whole composition. If we conceive of technological progress as a genuinely 
narrative phenomenon, then Roth’s gunpowder is the explosive agent in ‘Chekhov’s gun’ of history. 
In other words, Roth assigns gunpowder the function of ‘Chekhovs gun’ within the grand narrative 
of progress. For him there is no doubt that a gun that has once been put up on the wall, or a major 
technological invention that has once been made, will ultimately be used for its inherent purpose. 
This view admittedly appears quite deterministic, as there seems to be no room within the 
process of technological change for active intervention. And in fact, the “Schießpulver” article 
depicts inventions not as results of an intentional decision, but as mere expressions of trends and 
zeitgeist. However, Roth’s article still conveys an implicit optimism. By pointing out the great power 
and all-encompassing significance of gunpowder, it also suggests that grasping the full scope of the 
associated danger will somehow point the way to managing and perhaps eventually overcoming it. 
Noch [!] ist es zeitbeherrschend, europabeherrschend, das Schießpulver. Es macht sich selbst politische Ideen 
Untertan, deren Zweck, nebst vielen anderen, auch die Abschaffung des Schießpulvers gewesen. Es bemächtigt 
sich der Seele der Führer und explodiert mit und in den Massen. (I 256)238 
                                                   
237 Qtd. in Valentine T. Bill, Chekhov. The Silent Voice of Freedom (Bill 1987, 79–80). 
238 “Gunpowder still dominates our time, it still dominates Europe. It even gains control over political ideas, whose 
actual purpose it would be to put a ban on gunpowder, among other things. Gunpowder takes possession of the soul of 
our leaders and it explodes with and among the masses.” (My translation). 
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Gunpowder is so ubiquitous and omnipotent that it both rules over the rulers, their subjects, human 
power relations as such, and even over its own existence. Nevertheless, even its own power seems 
limited in time, as expressed in the paradox formulation “[n]och ist es zeitbeherrschend.” 
Consequently, the short feuilleton piece concludes with a warning: 
Die eigentliche Gefahr unserer Zeit ist das Schießpulver, das unsterbliche [!]. Nicht “roter Terror”, nicht 
“Reaktion”. Nur – Schießpulver. Hütet euch vor dem Schießpulver!239 
Gunpowder is acknowledged with the epithet “immortal” and thus put in mythic opposition to the 
mortals, i.e. humans. This implies that technology—as represented by gunpowder—outlasts human 
generations and poses dangers to them that lie above and beyond the political ‘trench warfare’ of the 
time. It threatens both the conservative or reactionary forces and the socialist-progressive 
contemporaries alike.  
And yet, the exhortative thrust of the article suggests that once technology’s dangers are fully 
understood, they can also be averted. If there is such a thing as technological determinism, it lies in 
the fact that technological inventions are falsely seen as mere potentialities, options for a merely 
optional use. The warning implies that such determinism will lose part of its validity once people 
across the different parties stop viewing technology as means to an end, but instead recognize the 
dangers that it poses in and of itself, and to the whole of mankind. 
From War Propaganda to Weimar Commerce 
Apart from the dangerous potential of technology, Roth’s ‘gunpowder’ article draws attention to the 
fact that technological change is always already subject to narrative. To the extent that such a 
narrative can be changed, as well as the functional status of inventors and inventions in it, the 
                                                   
239 “The actual danger of our time is gunpowder, the immortal. Not ‘Red Terror,’ not ‘Reactionism.’ Only—gunpowder. 
Beware of gunpowder!” (my translation). 
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narrative conception of technological progress is always already subject to propaganda, whether it be 
under the signs of technological enthusiasm, determinism, or demonization. Roth’s technographic 
journalism on the whole makes apparent that the newspaper is not just a suitable stage to promote 
such propaganda, but that it provides a forum to subject it to profound criticism. 
One of the highlights of this criticism is another text by Roth entitled “Die neue 
Waschmaschine” or “The New Washing Machine” published in the Bavarian newspaper Münchner 
Neueste Nachrichten on April 13, 1930, about a decade after “Das Schießpulver.” The short 
commentary deals with a lavishly decorated store window on Kurfürstendamm, one of Berlin’s 
leading shopping streets. To be more precise, it is two store windows that attract the author’s 
attention, two windows, “intended,” as Roth writes “to propagate the new washing machine.” [“die 
neue Waschmaschine zu propagieren.”] While the first window vividly demonstrates “the old 
reprehensible method of laundry cleansing” [“die alte verwerfliche Methode der Wäsche-
Säuberung”] by “rubbing laundry on a common corrugated metal sheet” [“an einem gemeinen 
Wellblech die Wäsche zu reiben”], the second window illustrates in dazzling colors the advantages of 
the new method of doing one’s laundry with the aid of the patented machine. The new method, 
however, appears to excel not only by its greater practicality. The technological advances brought 
about by the new machine are directly linked with the general “progress of humanity,” [“Fortschritt 
der Menschheit”] (II 127) at least according to the advertising managers. 
Denn in dem Schaufenster, in dem die alte verwerfliche Methode der Wäsche-Säuberung demonstriert wird, ist 
nicht nur der hölzerne Bottich von einer Fäulnis erzeugenden, gleichsam bemoosten Häßlichkeit: nein! Alles ist 
schlimm in dieser Waschküche! [...] Siehe da! So haben dereinst, vor der Erfindung der neuen Waschmaschine, 
die armen Menschen gehaust, ganze Tage standen sie gebeugt über zerfallenden Bottichen, und vergeblich 
rieben sie ihre schmutzigen Hemden. Wollten sich die geplagten Wäscherinnen hinsetzen, so fanden sie einen 
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schmalen zerbröckelnden Sessel vor, der unter der ohnehin schon reduzierten Last ihrer Körper zu vergehen 
drohte. Und das nannten die törichten Leute Leben! (II 128)240 
The other window grants a view of a quite different reality: 
Heute aber – und seitdem die neue Waschmaschine erfunden ist – sind, wie man aus dem andern Schaufenster 
ersehen kann, die Töpfe aus blankem Aluminium, die Kochgeräte und Sitzgelegenheiten breit, hell und 
bequem, aufrecht stehen die Menschen an einem präzisen Apparat aus nichtrostendem Stahl, drehen an einer 
Kurbel mit graziösen Händen, duschen sich in Badewannen aus schneeigem Porzellan, wechseln dreimal täglich 
die sauberen Hemden und sterben schließlich in hohem Alter an einer normalen Altersschwäche – die auch nur 
noch ein paar Jahrzehnte die Todesursache sein kann, weil sie bald ganz gewiß von der modernen Medizin 
abgeschafft wird. Das irdische Leben in einer modernen Waschküche läßt sich nur noch mit einem 
paradiesischen vergleichen, das ja so zweifelhaft geworden ist und vielleicht nunmehr überflüssig. Bedarf es 
noch anderer Beweise? Der moderne Kommerz versteht sie zu liefern. (II 128-9)241 
The described methods of marketing may seem quite outdated today in times of radical 
changes in media technology and innovative means of consumer targeting. However, by spelling out 
and exaggerating the propagandistic tendency of advertising of his time, Roth points the finger at a 
more general matter. When the Berlin advertising managers present a new machine as a quasi-
messianic tool in the service of human evolution and emancipation, they tacitly merge two grand 
récits into one. The shop window diptych that Roth describes hinges on two narratives of progress. 
On the one hand, there is an incremental succession of technological perfection. On the other hand, 
                                                   
240 “In fact, not only the wooden trough in the store window that features the old reprehensible method of laundry 
cleansing is of a putrefactive, moss-grown ugliness: no! Everything is bad in this laundry room! [...] Lo and behold! 
That’s how the poor people dwelt in those days before the new washing machine was invented. Entire days they spent 
standing, bent over decomposing troughs, vainly rubbing their dirty shirts. When the troubled washerwomen felt the 
need to sit down, they would find a narrow, crumbling chair that threatened to decay under the already diminished 
weight of their bodies. And, yes, this is what those foolish people called life!” (my translation) 
241 “Today, by contrast—since the new washing machine has been invented—the pots are made of bright aluminum, the 
cooking devices and chairs are wide, light and comfortable, and people stand upright at a precise appliance made of 
stainless steel while turning a crank with graceful hands. They shower in bathtubs of snowy porcelain, change their clean 
shirts three times a day and finally die in old age of a natural weakness, which itself can be the general cause of death only 
for a few decades more, because it will soon be abolished by modern medicine. The earthly life in a modern laundry 
room can only be likened to a life in paradise, which has indeed become quite doubtful and perhaps even superfluous 
now.—Any further evidence needed? Modern commerce is here to provide it.” (my translation) 
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we see a linear evolution of humans from hunchbacked half-beasts threatened by illnesses and 
natural enemies on the one side, to upright, clean and emancipated beings on the other. 
A superficial reading could lead to the impression that the two above-discussed texts were 
expressions of a somewhat conservative, techno-critical mindset. “Das Schießpulver” presents 
technological innovation mainly as a “danger” to humanity and “Die neue Waschmaschine” as part 
of a propagandistic promise of salvation insinuated by contemporary advertisement and modern 
commerce. Closer inspection shows, however, that traditional dichotomies such as conservative 
versus progressive or technological optimism versus pessimism do not hold true with regard to 
Roth’s technographic journalism. Both “Das Schießpulver” and “Die neue Waschmaschine” bespeak 
technology not as a thing in itself, but as a complex phenomenon that is always already integrated 
into a context of larger cultural and political narratives. Against this backdrop, Roth’s position 
within the tradition of New Objectivity should be reconsidered. 
Since Helmuth Lethen’s publications of the 1970s and 1980s, scholarship on the literature 
and theory of new objectivity has been informed by a set of conceptual oppositions, such as ‘warm 
versus cold,’ ‘rootedness versus mobility,’ ‘organism versus apparatus,’ or ‘natural cycles versus 
mechanical time.’ 242  Lethen suggested using such oppositions for an understanding of New 
Objectivity that goes beyond ascribing that trend to either conservative or progressive camps, to a 
political left or a political right. Carl Wege, then, proposed in a 1994 essay about classical New 
Objectivity texts by Roth, Bertolt Brecht, Arnolt Bronnen, among others ‘to eventually get away 
from the polarity model’—“vom Polaritätsschema allmählich Abschied zu nehmen” (Wege 1994, 
310–1). However, he still stays true to the basic opposition between a political orientation expressed 
                                                   
242 Lethen spells out these binaries most clearly in his 1983 article “Neue Sachlichkeit” (Lethen 1983). 
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in the texts (between left and right) and a ‘posthumanist standpoint’ (‘von einem 
nachhumanistischen Standpunkt’ (Wege 1994, 332)) or a ‘politically neutral understanding of 
civilization’ (“eines weitgehend ‘politik-neutralen’ Zivilisationsverständnisses” (Wege 1994, 332). 
Based upon this primary opposition, Wege views the common denominator of the different works of 
New Objectivity in the 
stillschweigende Übereinkunft, Politik und technologische Zivilisation zu entkoppeln und auf eine 
Rückbindung der technophilen Attitüde an die politischen Megaerzählungen zu verzichten […]. (Wege 1994, 
332)243 
The two above-discussed texts by Roth of 1920 and 1930 indicate that such a separation of 
technological from political civilization would fall short of the mark to describe Roth’s 
technographic program both before and after the rise of New Objectivity. Instead of helping to 
further uncouple technological civilization from political and ethical concerns, the texts treat 
contemporary views of technology as a central subject for cultural criticism. Roth’s technographic 
journalism is neither a crude critique nor a lavish praise of technological progress. It is a critical 
engagement with an uncritical view of technology. While Roth certainly does not subscribe to what 
Wege calls the “political mega-narratives” (“die politischen Megaerzählungen”), with his feuilleton 
essays he provides numerous micro-narratives underlining that the reconciliation between civilization 
and technology on the one hand, and politics, ethics, and culture on the other hand is a pressing 
concern of his time. 
The shop window diptych links a minor increment of technological progress with an 
imagined continuum of a general ‘progress of humanity.’ Roth’s article describes it as a ‘crystal 
                                                   
243 The “tacit agreement to decouple politics from technological civilization and to do without basing the technophile 
attitude on the political mega-narrative.” (My translation). 
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image’ (Gille Deleuze) representing an all too rash identification of technological or civilizational 
progress with a general betterment of humanity. In a similar way, the ‘gunpowder’ article breaks 
with a common understanding of technological invention as a productive human achievement. 
Roth’s technographic feuilleton is thus a contribution to a long debate about the ‘cultural value’ 
(Kulturwert) of technology that lasted from the middle of the nineteenth and halfway into the 
twentieth century (van Laak 2012, 110). In brief, the two articles are outright refusals of what the 
Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright called the „Great Idea of Progress“ (von Wright 
1997, 7). That idea consists in the assumption that technological and scientific progress plays an 
“instrumental role” in advancing a more general utilitarian and moral progress of humanity. 
Drawing a preliminary conclusion from the reading of the two discussed articles, the misconception 
of that idea starts with falsely viewing technology as an instrument that would compliantly serve 
human interests without adding its own values to the equation. 
3. Technology as Infrastructure: Traffic and Transportation 
Traffic and Mobility as Epitomes of Modern Progress 
One of the key tropes linked with progress is the belief that technological advance, perfection, and 
enhancement altogether help shorten distances and will ultimately make the pursuit of humanity’s 
goals smoother and quicker. As a natural consequence of this belief, ongoing technological progress 
is always already linked with the idea of acceleration (Rosa 2005; Rosa 2010; Lübbe 2003; 
Blumenberg 1981, 121–2) (cf. Rosa 2005, Lübbe 2003). If technological innovation shortens 
humanity’s ways on the pursuit of her goals, it also shortens the very distances that lie between one 
innovational step and another. A narratological investigation of technological progress should hence 
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not simply focus on the stages, i.e. the events where technology is believed to make a step ahead. But 
it should also discuss the routes that connect one station or stop of that trajectory with another in 
the sense of Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of chronotopy. Besides a theory of event, a narratology of 
progress must hence develop a theory of motion, mobility and infrastructure.244 
Against this backdrop it cannot surprise that traffic is a recurring motif in classical 
modernism and in the writings of the literary avant-gardes. In the German-speaking realm, this 
tradition may have gained additional momentum from a linguistic fact. “Verkehr,” the German 
word for traffic, has a particularly rich meaning, implying not just spatial mobility and commotion, 
but also intercourse in both a societal and a biological-sexual understanding of the word. German 
modernist literature often plays on this polysemy, exploring the semantic range of all kinds of 
human motion and exchange. This semantic spectrum, as described by Mark Anderson in his 1992 
book Kafka’s Clothes, reaches from modern technicized ways of transportation and the experience of 
speed down to sexual desire and lust as motor for social reproduction, mobility, emancipation, or 
else: estrangement (Anderson 1992, 19–49). In this context, Anderson also points at another 
difference of German “Verkehr” to English “traffic”: the sound of the word “Verkehr” still reminds 
of the etymological relationship with the adjective “verkehrt”—inverted, perverted, amiss. Even 
though the relationship is not preserved in the meaning of the word, the mere phonetic similarity 
occasionally works to emphasize the fact that traffic not simply functions as an ally of progress, but it 
often enough also poses problems in modern societies, think of traffic jam, gridlock, accidents or 
collisions, and total break-down. These harmful sides of modern traffic can either be viewed as the 
opposites of progress, or as the instances where progress stalls. The very idea of progress, and the 
                                                   
244 Regarding the concept of infrastructure and its key role in the development of social engineering cf. Dirk van Laak’s 
articles on the concept and its history 1999 (van Laak 1999). 
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technological one in particular, directly depends on the permeability of infrastructure. Traffic jams, 
gridlock, and breakdowns of urban or intercity transit appear as ex negativo contestations of that 
idea. 
It is this larger literary chronotopy and tropology of traffic—understood as social exchange 
and mobility—that Roth attends to with a number of articles on the topic, notably “Bekenntnis zum 
Gleisdreieck” (1924),245 “Betrachtung über den Verkehr,” (1924) and “Der Motorradfahrer” (1931). 
These pieces focus on technological progress where it is most conspicuous in its negative or obtrusive 
forms of bogged down street construction, overwhelming railway intersections, and unnecessarily 
noisy engines. These articles emphasize not the smooth side of acceleration, facilitation, and 
emancipation, but the sites and grounds of technology-induced friction and coagulation. Roth thus 
makes note of the fact that continuous technological change will never be continuous in an ideal 
sense. This is because the mere complexity of various intertwined processes of innovation bring along 
various forms of delay, disturbance, destruction of existing structures, and shock. Technological 
change, according to Roth’s depictions of it, is always continuous and discontinuous in equal 
measures. 
Creed to a Railroad Junction 
The first of these articles about modern forms of traffic is “Eiserne Landschaft” or “Iron Landscape,” 
first published in 1923 in the left-liberal daily newspaper Berliner Börsen-Courier (Jäger 2008, 134), 
focusing on the Gleisdreieck, a triangular railway junction located in the heart of modern Berlin, 
south of Potsdamer Platz. At that time, the junction held the status of a landmark as a symbol for 
state-of-the-art technology and modernization industrialized urban landscapes (Bienert 1992, 19). 
                                                   
245 An early version of this article appeared in 1923 under the title “Eiserne Landschaft” or “Iron Landscape.” 
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If comparing the take on the Gleisdreieck with all of Roth’s other texts on technology 
discussed in this section, this piece stands out in at least three ways. Firstly, there are two—albeit 
nearly identical—versions, published under different titles. A slightly altered version of “Eiserne 
Landschaft” appeared about a year later, on July 16, 1924 under the title “Bekenntnis zum 
Gleisdreieck” or “Creed to the Gleisdreieck” in the Frankfurter Zeitung (Hughes 2006, 123–4).246 It 
is in this later version that the text achieved almost canonical status as a prime example of the 
literature of ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’.247 Needless to say, the fact that the article was published twice 
makes apparent that it was clearly not composed as a product of day-to-day journalism, shortly 
before its final publication in 1924—as some scholarship on the text misleadingly suggests (Wege 
1994, 319; Riou 2005, 158). Even though the second version was only slightly altered, it must be 
noted that Roth, and with him the editors of the Frankfurter Zeitung, must have attributed enough 
literary value to the text to publish it again, a year after its first appearance under a new title. 
Secondly, “Gleisdreieck”, unlike most of the other texts discussed in this section, is part of an inter-
textual lineage of literature (and art) referring to the Berlin landmark.248 The ‘Gleisdreieck’ is not just 
a real place in Berlin, but also a commonplace in literature about the city as well as about technology 
and modern urbanity by and large. To put it in Michael Bienert’s words, “Gleisdreieck” stands both 
                                                   
246 John Hughes notes that the most recent—and most comprehensive—edition of Roth’s journalistic writings by Fritz 
Hackert and Klaus Westermann features the text only in its later version and with the final title “Bekenntnis zum 
Gleisdreieck” while leaving the earlier version “Eiserne Landschaft” unmentioned. Hughes does refer to both versions, 
but in turn fails to indicate the exact place of publication of the earlier “Eiserne Landschaft.” 
247 Cf. for example Wege, Carl. “Gleisdreieck, Tank Und Motor. Figuren Und Denkfiguren Aus Der Technosphäre Der 
Neuen Sachlichkeit.” DVJs 68 (1994): 307–32. Print, p. 322. 
248 Victor Shklovsky refers to the “Gleisdreieck” in his 1923 epistolary novel Zoo, or Letters not about Love and Boris 
Pasternak wrote a poem dedicated to the Berlin railroad junction in 1923, which appeared in the following year under 
the German title “Gleisdreieck”248 . A later anthology of poems by Günter Grass entitled “Gleisdreieck” (1960) can as 
well be added to that line of tradition. 
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for a “real topography” and a “literary and rhetorical topos” (my translation) (Bienert 1992, 21).249 
Thirdly, perhaps due to its key role in the later perception of the style of ‘Neue Sachlichkeit,’ and 
because of its inter-textual lineage, “Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck” is one of the few journalistic texts 
by Roth that have received particular attention by literary scholarship. 
Aside from the three mentioned aspects, however, there is yet another fact that distinguishes 
Roth’s “Gleisdreieck” text from the other pieces of technology journalism. As the word “Bekenntnis” 
or “creed” in the title suggests, the text is no doubt Roth’s clearest and most unreserved commitment 
to technology and to the utopian promises associated with it. In his second skyscraper article, Roth 
had joined in the praise of technology quite cautiously, placing his hopes into it only if it were to 
achieve an altered form as a sort of ‘second nature’ entering a higher harmony with the biological 
one. In the “Gleisdreieck” text, in contrast, Roth praises technology in itself, with an 
uncompromising attitude reminiscent of Marinetti’s “Futurist Manifesto.” This unrestrained 
affirmation is coupled with outright opposition against any views that stress technology’s risks and 
dangers, reminiscent of Friedrich Nietzsche in its shear brutality and preference of strength over 
weakness: 
Sie [die Gleisdreiecke, Gleisvielecke] sind stärker als der Schwächling, der sie verachtet und fürchtet, sie werden 
ihn nicht nur überdauern: Sie werden ihn zermalmen. Wen ihr Anblick nicht erschüttert, erhebt und stolz 
macht, verdient den Tod nicht, den ihm die Gottheit der Maschine bereitet. (II 219)250  
Technology overpowers the weaker among humans. The question regarding technology comes down 
to a great tug of war between man and machine, as well as between the stronger and the weaker 
                                                   
249 “Gleisdreieck, ein Ort in Berlin. Das Wort  bezeichnet eine reale Topographie. Aber es meint nicht nur einen Platz in 
der Stadt, es ist auch ein Gemeinplatz im Reden über die Stadt. In den zwanziger Jahren wird der Name als Chiffre für 
Berliner Großstadterfahrungen im umfassenden Sinne gebraucht.” (Bienert 1992, 21) 
250 “They [the “railroad triangles, polygons”] are stronger than the weakling, who despises and fears them, they will not 
just outlast him: they will crush him. He who is not jolted, elevated, and made proud by their sight, is not worth dying 
the death that the machine goddess bestows on him.” (my translation) 
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exemplars of the human species. Yet, this tug of war is not carried out in the evolutionary maxim 
‘survival of the fittest,’ but a struggle for dignity and pride, in which even death is an honorable 
reward. Just like in Nietzsche’s appeals to amor fati251—the love of fate—the frightening, if not 
devastating, nature of technology appears to encourage Roth in his enthusiasm for the spectacle of 
technology, rather than deterring him from it. 252  But however unreserved his technological 
enthusiasm may be in this text Roth’s praise of technology abounds with biological and 
anthropomorphic imagery throughout. The language he uses is fully in the vein of Vitalism (Riou 
2005, 165, 170) when he refers to the railroad junction as the “Anfangs-Brennpunkt eines 
Lebenskreises,” describing it with a pathos-charged prose as “das Herz der Welt” or “das Herz der 
Erde” (II 218), and “Eiserne Landschaft” (II 219)253. But just as present as the biological and natural 
metaphors is imagery that evokes a spiritual or religious context. Resonating with the word 
“Bekenntis” or “creed” of the title, the text dubs the railroad junctions as a “großartiger Tempel der 
Technik” or “great temple of technology”, evoking a “Reich des Neuen Lebens” or “kingdom of the 
new life”, and hosting an “Ewiger Gottesdienst der Maschinen” or “an eternal divine service of the 
machines” (II 219). 
The two semantic fields—religious ritual and biological nature—do not appear in opposition 
to each other, but are in fact bound up with one another, as in the following passage: 
                                                   
251 Nietzsche declares amor fati as his “Formel für die Größe am Menschen” or “formula for the greatness of man” (Ecce 
Homo). Interestingly, Nietzsche does not dedicate his amor fati to the rising reign of technology. Instead, technology 
appears largely as a blind spot within Nietzsches oeuvre (McGinn 1980). 
252 Thomas Düllo describes this embracement of the violent character of technology as a “masochistische Volte” of the 
author (Düllo 1994, 142). Instead of subscribing to this psychologistic view, it should be noted that the unleashed 
technological enthusiasm that Roth voices implies the subordination of human harms and benefits under technology 
understood as an over-arching, trans-human force. 
253 The “origin-focus of a life-cycle,” “the heart of the world,” and “iron landscape.” (My translation). 
 182 
Eiserne Landschaft, großartiger Tempel der Technik unter freiem Himmel, dem die kilometerhohen Schlote 
der Fabriken lebendigen, zeugungsträchtigen, Bewegung fördernden Rauch darbringen. (II 219)254 
While there seems to be no linguistic opposition between the religious or spiritual realm on the one 
hand and the natural or biological realm on the other, the main contrast that the text draws exists 
between human beings and technological entities. Modern technology is huge and overwhelming, 
and “alles Menschliche in diesem metallenen Bereich klein und schwächlich und verloren” 
(II 219)255. 
The contrast in sheer size comes along with a teleological hierarchy. Technology’s immense 
dimensions as represented by the Berlin railroad junction ensues that everything human is 
[…] reduziert auf die ihm angemessene Bedeutung eines bescheidenen Mittels zu stolzem Zweck – genauso wie 
in der abstrakten Welt der Philosophie und der Astronomie, der Welt der klaren und großen Weisheiten; da 
wandelt ein uniformierter Mann mitten zwischen den verwirrenden Systemen der Geleise, winzig ist der 
Mensch, in diesem Zusammenhang nur wichtig als Mechanismus. (II 219)256  
Jeanne Riou takes this fundamental opposition between the human and the technological as an 
opportunity to raise the question of whether Roth’s text is ultimately a praise of ‘technocracy’ (if 
understood in Günter Anders’s sense) or in fact an apology of the human. She asks: “Which side is 
the author on: that of technology or its helpless human victim, or is there still hope of resolution?” 
(Riou 168). Riou is certainly right in answering this question by leaving it open: “The text does not 
present a set of philosophical conclusions or indeed a judgment on modernity: it describes a 
phenomenon.” (Riou 168) In this spirit, Riou suggests to read Roth’s “Gleisdreieck” article as a 
                                                   
254 “Iron landscape, great temple of technology in the open air, to which the miles-high chimneys of the factories sacrifice 
live, fertile, motion-enhancing smoke.” (My translation). 
255 “[E]verything human in this metal region [appears] small and frail and lost.” (My translation). 
256 “[R]educed to the meaning appropriate to it [i.e. to all that is human], a humble means to an eminent purpose—just 
as in the abstract worlds of philosophy and of astronomy, the world of the clear and great truths; a man in uniform is 
wandering amidst the confusing systems of lines and tracks, tiny is the man, in this context he only counts as a mere 
mechanism.” (My translation). 
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“phenomenology of the metropolis” (Riou 2005, 168) as inspired by Georg Simmel (Riou 2005, 
178). What Riou writes about the “Gleisreieck” article could rightly be said about Roth’s 
technographic journalism on the whole: it is “a self-reflexive narration of experience as this is 
changed in the countenance of technology” (Riou 2005, 168). And just as well as a “phenomenology 
of the metropolis,” the “Gleisdreieck” article—and the other technographic pieces—could be 
described as an exemplary phenomenology of modernity as such. 
In the case of “Gleisdreieck”, the phenomenon it describes, the landmark of a railroad 
junction in Berlin, is characterized in two ways, fully in line with Michael Bienert’s general 
observation that the landmark appears as both a real topography and a literary topos. On the one 
hand, it is a semiotic entity, a “Sinnbild”—symbol, emblem, or image—as introduced by the second 
sentence of the text. On the other hand, it is described as a spatial phenomenon, with an 
accumulation of geometrical expressions such as “Gleisdreieck” or “railroad triangle” “Mittelpunkt” or 
“center,” “Gleisvieleck” or “railroad polygone,” “Anfangsbrennpunkt” or “origin-focal-point,” 
“Ursprung” or “origin” (emphases are mine). The latter two expressions are reminders of a general 
metaphorical permeability between spatial and temporal descriptors—a prime example of which is 
the word ‘Fortschritt’ or ‘progress’ itself. At the same time, these words mark the interface between 
the level of description and a level of deeper meaning, where the different aspects of the 
“Gleisdreieck” merge: on the one hand a spatial structure, and as a “Sinnbild” or “symbol” on the 
other. If the signifying structure of the Gleisdreieck is primarily spatial, what it signifies—its 
referent—is a temporal process that has its semantic ‘vanishing point’ in the future. “So ein 
Gleisdreieck von machtvollen Dimensionen wird die zukünftige Welt sein.” (II 221)257 
                                                   
257 “Such a railroad junction of powerful dimensions will be the world of the future.” (My translation). 
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In this sense, the article describes the current Gleisdreieck as a projection space for a 
technicized future. It is at the same time a contemplation of the predictability and decidability of 
that future, of the place and function of humans in it, and a reflection on the present possibilities of 
intervention in the course of that technization process. Just like in the skyscraper articles, 
“Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck” combines two models of temporality: a technological-linear model 
and a natural-biological, cyclical one. 
In the case of “Gleisdreieck,” however, this combination does not take a form of a 
reconciliation of technology and nature on a higher level, but a technological outperforming, or 
potentialization of natural cycles by means of acceleration. 
So sieht das Herz der Erde aus, die tausendmal schneller um ihre Achse kreist, als es Tag- und Nachtwechsel 
uns lehren will; deren unaufhörliche, unsterbliche Rotation Wahnsinn scheint und Ergebnis mathematischer 
Voraussicht; deren rasende Schnelligkeit sentimentalen Rückwärts-Sehern brutale Vernichtung innerlicher 
Kräfte und heilenden Gleichgewichts vortäuscht, aber in Wirklichkeit lebensspendende Wärme zeugt und den 
Segen der Bewegung. (II 218)258 
This passage negates the conventional opposition between the equilibrium of nature on the 
one hand, which always reestablishes itself in cyclical motions, and technological progress on the 
other hand, conceived of as continued, open-ended self-outdoing. Instead, the absolute technization 
of the world appears as an outdoing of an ongoing continuation of natural motions, which is 
characterized as a life-giving blessing, even in its overreaching, technology-induced speed. Alongside 
with negating the opposition between nature and technology, the article also breaks with the 
traditional connotation of Neue Sachlichkeit with coldness (Lethen 1983, Wege 1994). “So ist das 
                                                   
258 “This is what the heart of the earth looks like, which turns a thousand times faster on its axis than the day and night 
cycles teach us; the earth, whose incessant, immortal rotation appears as madness and as the result of mathematical 
prediction; whose racing speed feigns to sentimental backward-lookers the brutal destruction of inner forces and of a 
healing balance; but it’s an earth that in reality begets life-giving warmth and the blessing of movement.” (My 
translation). 
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Reich des neuen Lebens […] nüchtern, aber nicht kalt” (II 219) 259 . As modern technology 
accelerates natural motion, it also begets ‘life-giving warmth.’ 
Despite this vitalistic characterization of technology, however, the world of the future evoked 
by the Gleisdreieck emanates from an absolute and unconditional rationality. It hints at a total 
implementation of a rationale similar to that sort of instrumental reason criticized by Max Weber 
(Zweckrationalität) and that was in the focus of cultural critique of the Frankfurt School 
(instrumentelle Vernunft). Fully in line with this, Roth describes the place and function of humans 
in that future world in similarly unequivocal words. In it, he writes, “alles Menschliche” is “reduziert 
auf die ihm angemessene Bedeutung [!] eines bescheidenen Mittels zum stolzen Zweck […]” 
(II 219)260. In contrast to the critical tradition from Weber onwards, Roth’s article gives a rather 
positive estimation of this absolute function of instrumental reason, and the new subordinate 
positions of humans in this coming world. Instead of talking of estrangement and disenchantment, 
the article describes the new role of humans as an “appropriate significance” and as a “modest means 
to a proud purpose.” The future world represented by the Gleisdreieck is characterized as both 
‘confusing’ by its spatial dimensions and complexity (“mitten zwischen den verwirrenden [!] 
Systemen der Geleise, winzig ist der Mensch,” (219) and predictable in its (temporal) course: “das 
Reich des neuen Lebens, dessen Gesetze kein Zufall stört und keine Laune verändert, dessen Gang 
erbarmungslose Regelmäßigkeit ist.” (II 219)261. 
The amor fati stance of “Gleisdreieck” thus comes along with the clearest expression of 
technological determinism, which is tantamount to the reversal of the traditional teleology. Instead 
                                                   
259 “In this way, the empire of the new life is cool, but not cold.” (My translation). 
260 “[E]verything human [is] reduced to its adequate meaning of a humble means to a proud end” (my translation. 
261 “[…] the kingdom of the new life, whose laws are undisturbed by contingency, unchanged by whims, and whose 
course is merciless regularity” (my translation). 
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of technology being a means for humanity, human beings rather turn into means for technological 
ends. A human individual is “in diesem Zusammenhang nur wichtig als Mechanismus. Seine 
Bedeutung ist nicht größer als die eines Hebels, seine Wirksamkeit nicht weitreichender als die einer 
Weiche.” (II 219)262. The image of the railroad switch can be read as an epitome of technological 
determinism that reduces human decision processes—under conditions of autonomy or freedom—
into mechanical switching operations within pre-determined pathways. 
Taking the image of the railroad switch as a pars pro toto for the whole text, the technological 
determinism of the “Gleisdreieck” appears so unconditional that the only choice that is left for 
humans is either to embrace it in the sense of amor fati, or to be counted among the “sentimentalen 
Rückwärtsseher” (II 218) and as a “Schwächling” or “weakling” who does not even “deserve the 
death brought to him by the divinity of the machine.” (II 219, my translation). 
And yet, even the teleological reversal in the sense of technological determinism comes down 
to a semiotic relationship. Inasmuch as the Gleisdreieck is ‘Sinnbild’ of a technological ‘circle and 
sphere of life’ (“eines Lebenskreises,” II 218), its depiction in “Gleisdreieck” is an attempt at coming 
to grips with the general shift of meaning (‘Sinnverschiebung,’ Edmund Husserl, Erich Hörl) that it 
stands for. Roth seems to acknowledge in the text that the radical changes brought about by 
increasing technization of the world come along with fundamental changes to how this world 
produces meaning. 
                                                   
262 A human individual is “in this context only important as a mechanism. Its meaning is not bigger than a lever, its 
effect not more far-reaching than the one of a switch.” (My translation). 
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In dieser Welt gilt jede menschliche Ausdrucksmöglichkeit [!] weniger als die mechanische Zeichengebung eines 
Instruments. Wichtiger als ein Arm ist hier ein Hebel, mehr als ein Wink ein Signal, hier nützt nicht das Auge, 
sondern die Laterne, kein Schrei, sondern der heulende Pfiff des geöffneten Ventils. (II 220)263 
The rhetorical surface of Roth’s text is informed by an intertwinement of different semantic 
fields, such as nature and religion, and metaphorical relations between humanity and technology. 
But underneath this texture of different semantic fields lies a deeper semiotic problem. The available 
means of signification and expression seem insufficient to grasp the true meaning of the new life:264 
“So gewaltig sind die Ausmaße des neuen Lebens. Daß die neue Kunst, die es formen soll, den 
Ausdruck nicht finden kann, ist selbstverständlich.” (II 220)265 In traditional terms, Roth’s article 
associates the future with the attributes of the sublime. The future reality is too large and therefore 
transcending the realm of human or anthropological meaning, i.e. in recourse to a human teleology. 
The passage goes on: “Diese Realität ist noch zu groß für eine ihr gemäße Wiedergabe.” (II 220)266 
The problem of signification, however, is clearly not one of mere representation. The task of 
art is described as not simply to represent, but to shape, to design, or to form,  ‘formen,’ the new life. 
By assigning this venerable task to art, Roth’s text reveals—at least the hint of—a loophole within its 
seemingly absolute determinism. Even though the current situation allows for intervention only ex 
negativo, as the new reality is ‘still too large’—“noch zu groß“—the quoted passage implies that the 
task of art, to form or shape the new life, could mean the prospect of possible intervention in the 
                                                   
263 “In this world every human possibility of expression is worth less than the mechanical signal of a device or instrument. 
A lever is more important than an arm, a signal matters more than a hint, the eye serves no purpose here, but what 
counts is the headlight, no scream, but the howling wistle of the open valve.” (My translation). 
264 In line with this reading is Harro Segeberg’s suggestion to view Roth as “eine Art technische[n] Zeichensammler” or 
“a technological sign collector of sorts,” venturing from the medium of literature into a realm of “‘unliterarischen’ 
Zeichensysteme” or “‘unliterary’ sign systems,” thereby taking account of a modern reality in which literature is no 
longer the uncontested ‘Leitmedium’ or ‘leading medium.’ (Segeberg 2003, 6). 
265 “The dimensions of the new life are so gigantic—it goes without saying that the new art, which is supposed to shape 
it, is unable to find the right expression.” (My translation). 
266 “This reality is still too big for an appropriate account thereof.” (My translation). 
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characteristics of the “new life” by ‘forming’ it. But at the same time the text leaves no doubt that 
current art and literature falls short of the mark in this task of shaping the new life—especially such a 
naïve form of New Objectivity: “Dazu reicht keine ‘getreue’ Schilderung.” (II 220)267. A truly new 
art, as we could extrapolate it from the passage, would recognize modern technology as a 
revolutionarily new paradigm of signification and invest it with additional meaning. Just as much as 
Roth reads the Berlin railroad junction as a symbol epitomizing a technological future, its function 
within the text can serve as a hermeneutic key to Roth’s tech journalism on the whole. All of these 
texts critically deal with inventions, innovations, changes, etc., and in doing so, they interpret each 
of them, just like “Gleisdreieck,” as a “phantastisches Produkt einer Zukunft verheißenden Gewalt.” 
(II 218)268. 
Reading Roth’s “Gleisdreieck” in such a way also casts new light on the discussion whether 
or not the text should be counted as a classical example of Neue Sachlichkeit. On a surface level, 
Jeanne Riou is certainly right in her observation that “Gleisdreieck” is anything but a homogeneous 
exemplar of one stylistic form. The text clearly shows how its author “enjoys the range and sense of 
stylistic experimentation intrinsic to modernist writing” (Riou 2005, 168). However, if “Neue 
Sachlichkeit” is understood as a philosophical tendency rather than a mere stylistic orientation,269 
“Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck” appears as the first step toward a profound critique of that tendency. 
Roth’s philosophical critique of Neue Sachlichkeit is not limited to undermining the 
opposition between cold and warm—which he will further pursue in his polemical article “Schluß 
                                                   
267 “No ‘faithful’ depiction would suffice here.” (My translation). 
268 A “fantastic product of a future-promising force” (my translation). 
269 Helmut Lethen’s publications on Neue Sachlichkeit confirm such an emphatic reading of the tendency, even though 
the author stresses its implications on a political level rather than focusing on its attitude toward technology. 
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mit der ‘Neuen Sachlichkeit’”. 270  It also takes issue with Neue Sachlichkeit’s obsession with 
technology as an object, a thing that could be described in the way of realism. As Riou points out, 
Roth “anticipates the technological symbol not as one thing, but an ambiguous and complex process 
[!] of coming to terms with life in the city” (Riou 2005, 178). The ‘phenomenology of modern 
technology’ developed in the “Gleisdreieck” article is a hermeneutic type of phenomenology that 
does not describe a contemporary, or trans-temporal phenomenon; but it bespeaks a process of 
change that appears to be utterly determined, and yet at the same time ambiguous and open.271 
Open and ambiguous also imply that the accounted process cannot easily be ascribed to a 
human subject. In this vein, Roth’s text ties in with “the post-humanist aesthetics of Neue 
Sachlichkeit” (Riou 2005, 177) by describing technology as a phenomenon that transcends 
anthropological categories. At least in this regard it is in line with the typical ideology of Neue 
Sachlichkeit. And yet, this post-humanist tendency in Roth’s case does not imply that it would 
bracket the questions of meaning in favor of an objectivist description of surface phenomena. 
Instead, Roth’s “Gleisdreieck” combines a post-humanist view with a hermeneutic and anti-positivist 
approach.272 Roth would later develop his critique of the positivist, documentary dogma of Neue 
Sachlichkeit in a polemical essay entitled “Schluß mit der ‘Neuen Sachlichkeit’” or “Enough of ‘New 
Objectivity’” (III 153—64), published in 1930 in the literary magazine Die literarische Welt. In this 
essay, he debunks his time’s obsession with reportages, testimonies, and documentary style in literary 
                                                   
270 “Félix Bertaux, der mit Roth befreundete französische Germanist, hat die ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’ mit ‘l’ordre froid’ 
übersetzt. Darauf verweist Roths Artikel Schluß mit der Neuen Sachlichkeit mit dem bezeichnenden Zusatz ‘die kalte 
Ordnung – eine sehr schmeichelhafte Übersetzung’ (III, 158).” (Düllo 1994, 139) 
271 We can view these characteristics—according to Gilbert Simondon’s concept of ‘la machine ouverte’—as inherent to 
modern technology as such, “als Signatur von Technologie” (Hörl 2008, 642) (“signature of modern technology,” my 
translation). 
272 As Jeanne Riou argues, by drawing upon Carl Wege (Riou 2005, 177), this combination of post-humanism with anti-
positivism indeed bears some similarity with Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit, published only a few years later, in 1927. 
 190 
and artistic works as the symptoms of a “furchtbare Verwechslung: des Simplen mit dem 
Unmittelbaren” (III 153) or “dreadful confusion: of simplicity with immediacy.” Behind the affected 
sobriety in the style of Neue Sachlichkeit, Roth detects false objectivity, and the blind denial of the 
fact that eventfulness is always mediated, and that it cannot be stripped of “künstlerische 
Gestaltung” (III 153) or “artistic form”: 
Das Ereignis ‘wiederzugeben’, vermag erst der geformte, also künstlerische Ausdruck, in dem das Rohmaterial 
enthalten ist wie Erz im Stahl, wie Quecksilber im Spiegel. 
Die Zeugenaussage, also die Mitteilung, ist eine Auskunft über das Ereignis. Der Bericht gibt das Ereignis selbst 
wieder. Ja, er ist selbst das Ereignis. (III 155)273 
Even the earlier “Gleisdreieck” article makes the reader sense how fateful such a reduction to 
‘Sachlichkeit’ understood as objective documentation would be for art and literature. Just like 
Heidegger did with Sein und Zeit and his later work on technology, Roth acknowledges the fact that 
the progressing ‘technization of the life-world’ poses a challenge to our traditional understanding of 
meaning and signification. As a result, a literary embracement of modern technology, as represented 
by the “Gleisdreieck” text, would amount to a hopeless determinism if it ceased to claim for 
literature the purpose of ‘shaping the new life’ understood as actively investing such life, i.e. the 
future, with meaning. 
Contemplation about Traffic 
The second in the series of texts by Roth revolving around modern traffic is “Betrachtung über den 
Verkehr” published in the Frankfurter Zeitung on November 15, 1924 (II 276-80). The usage of the 
                                                   
273 “ ‘Giving account’ of an event can be done only in the form of artistic expression, in which the raw material is 
contained like ore in steel, like mercury in mirror. 
A testimony, as the message, is a bit of information about the event. A report gives account of the event itself. Or rather, 
it is itself the event.” (My translation). 
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word “Betrachtung” in the title is at least in two ways remarkable. On the one hand, it establishes a 
relationship with a collection of prose pieces by Franz Kafka published under the title 
“Betrachtung.”274 On the other hand, the contemplative, not to say introspective, attitude expressed 
by “Betrachtung” stands in harsh contrast to the actual subject of the article: “Verkehr”—traffic.275 
This semantic tension between the two nouns “Betrachtung” and “Verkehr” is symptomatic for the 
circulation, distraction, noise, etc. of traffic—“Betrachtung” equals “Einkehr” or “contemplation” 
whereas “Verkehr” equals exchange with the outer world.276 The semantic opposition is in line with a 
general epistemological truth regarding progress and its description that Theodor W. Adorno would 
later emphasize in a philosophical essay on “Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Fortschritt” or 
“Philosophy and the Question Concerning Progress” (1964): “Mehr noch als andere zergeht der 
Begriff Fortschritt mit der Bestimmung dessen, was nun eigentlich damit gemeint sei, etwa was 
fortschreitet und was nicht.” (Adorno 1964, 30).277 Progress as such tends to evade description, as it 
is a relational and a temporal concept at once, which, as a ‘basic concept of history’ (Reinhart 
Koselleck), is a constituent trait of the modern understanding of history. 
                                                   
274 The seminal volume published under this title in 1912 (year indicated on the title page 1913)—Kafka’s first book 
publication—was preceded by a collection of eight ‘prose sketches’ (Prosaskizzen) published in the journal or literature 
review Hyperion in 1908. 
275 Andreas Huyssen makes a similar observation with regard to Franz Kafka’s work, reading ‘Verkehr’ and ‘Betrachtung’ 
as markers of an “oscillation between the extremes of fast motion and standstill” (Huyssen 2015, 60) in Kafka’s 
descriptions of perception. Huyssen contextualizes this oscillation within a media reflection about film, photography, 
and literary prose. In the metropolitan miniatures he investigates, Huyssen sees a phenomenon at play that he calls 
remediation in reverse, by virtue of which those minuatures “articulated the aesthetic specificity of literary language in its 
relationship to the new media of photography and film” (Huyssen 2015, 7). 
276 Hans Blumenberg would later make a corresponding observation while referring to the same phenomenon—
Betrachtung—with a different word: Reflexion: “Man erkennt deutlich die stärkere Ausprägung von 
Verzögerungsmomenten im öffentlichen Handeln. Nicht zufällig konnte ein so abgelebtes Wort wie ‘Reflexion’ erneut 
zum Schlagwort werden. Es liegt ein Bedürfnis nach institutionalisiertem Atemholen vor, das auch entscheidungsfähige 
Mehrheiten auf lange rhetorische Umwege schickt.” (Blumenberg 1981, 122). In other words, “Betrachtung” refers to a 
central function, or the raison d’etre of the kind of literature that Roth’s feuilleton pieces belong to. 
277 “More than other concepts, ‘progress’ dissolves in the act of determining what in fact is meant by it, for instance, what 
is progressing and what is not.” (my translation). 
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In his “Betrachtung über den Verkehr,” Roth does not try to determine the concept of 
progress as such, but simply describes the symptoms of a crisis, which ‘progress’ has entered by 
reaching its own limitations. The text deals with how an exponentially growing volume of traffic and 
an increasing diversity of means of transportation have brought the city of Berlin to the brink of 
collapse. In view of this dawning infrastructure breakdown, Roth also describes, in a decidedly 
critical manner, the authority’s attempts at managing the crisis by carrying out road constructions 
and by replacing certain means of transportation by others as well as traffic policemen by their non-
human successor: the traffic light. Roth’s depiction makes apparent that both the causes—in the 
shape of increased traffic volume—and the applied remedies—in the form of road constructions, 
omnibuses, cabs, and traffic lights—are of a technological nature. Technological progress, or change, 
is responsible for both the checks and the balances in this crisis of urban traffic. 
Seit einigen Monaten ist die Frage der Verkehrsregelung in Berlin in dem Maße aktuell, daß sie peinlich wird. 
(II 276)278 
Fast jeden zweiten Tag melden die Zeitungen Straßenbahn-Zusammenstöße. (Mit den Entschädi- 
gungssummen, die in Berlin jährlich an Verunglückte ausgezahlt werden, ließe sich ein wirklich weltstädtischer 
Verkehr einrichten.) (II 277)279 
This latter comment certainly sounds a note of inferiority and provincialism on the part of Berlin in 
comparison with other, more advanced cities/metropolises at the time. In this spirit, a good deal of 
the criticism in Roth’s article aims at Berlin’s incapability of dealing with modernity, i.e. of 
becoming a truly modern metropolis. This is no coincidence, as since the formation of the German 
Empire in 1871, the new German capital had grown with an immense pace (Rotter 2009, 28–9). 
                                                   
278 “For several months now, the question of traffic regulation has been pressing to such a degree that it is getting 
embaressing.” (My translation). 
279 “Almost every day, the papers report about tram crashes. (The sums paid as compensation to the victims would suffice 
to establish a truly cosmopolitan traffic system.)” (My translation). 
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And through the Greater Berlin Act (Groß-Berlin-Gesetz) of 1920, the city’s population was 
doubled, rising to almost 4 million, while its territory multiplied by more than a dozen through the 
incorporation of surrounding towns and villages (Jackisch 2009, 55; Schwenk 2000, 4). 
Instead of stating the city’s rapid growth as a possible reason for Berlin’s incapability in 
dealing with the challenges of modern traffic, Roth lists a number of nuisances accounting for the 
city’s shortcomings. Just like in the first skyscraper article, the detailed description of the single 
nuisances in their pedantry bear a satirical touch. As Roth makes explicit, he assesses and criticizes 
the Berlin traffic situation not in the capacity of an expert, but as a layman (II 277). His pedantic 
obsession with details concerning the various nuisances should be taken as critical mockery of a 
technocratic approach to the problem rather than its advancement. Trams—the first nuisance of 
Berlin traffic—are, as Roth writes, not suitable for a ‘cosmopolitan traffic’ (“weltstädtischen 
Verkehr,” II 277) as they are untimely (unzeitgemäß) “[i]n the age of air traffic” (“[i]m Zeitalter des 
Luftverkehrs,” II 277), too static (as they are usually bound to the rails in the center of the streets), 
and they are too bulky (as they block the view of the other traffic participants), hence the intention 
of the city’s administration to replace them with buses. The second nuisance, according to Roth, lies 
in the fact that Berlin has not enough traffic policemen, and indeed no actual ‘traffic police’ (II 278) 
and no proper street lighting. Third, he bemoans the dead slow and complicated manner in which 
the city carries out street repairs (II 278-9). And last but not least, he points at what he calls 
“metaphysische Gründe” that were, besides the technical ones, responsible for the “nuisance” 
(“Mißstände”). The bad morale of the population of post-war Berlin, Roth argues, could in fact be 
the deeper societal reason for ostensibly technological problems—a socio-technological dependency, 
which he underpins with a linguistic observation: 
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“Es liegt ein Sinn in dem sprachlichen Zufall, daß ‘Verkehr’ in den Straßen der Stadt und ‘Verkehr’ zwischen 
Mensch und Mensch denselben Ausdruck haben...” (II 280)280 
As long as those ‘metaphysical reasons’ are not cleared out, Roth concludes, there is no use in 
sending out experts to other countries for the purpose of acquiring know-how to solve the Berlin 
traffic problems. 
Die Sachverständigenfahrten ins Ausland können nicht viel helfen, solange nicht jeder einzelne eine neue 
Verkehrsordnung für sich selbst ausarbeitet. (II 280)281 
The core of the problem, according to this passage, lies in individual human behavior. A 
technocratic approach will thus ensure, if any, only partial success. This applies in particular to 
another pressing problem that Roth discusses in detail: the strike of the Berlin subway personnel, 
with which the concluding paragraph of the article deals. At first glance, this looks like another 
technical problem and the way in which Roth describes it first underlines this impression: “Die 
Untergrundbahn streikt.” (II 280)—“The subway is on strike.” The metonymical formulation 
suggests that this problem is simply another instance of technical failure. If understood as an 
example of Roth’s subtle irony, however, the phrase is an ingenious poetic realization of the peculiar 
semiotic relationship between technology and society. 
But in the way Roth describes the traffic snarl in his adopted home city, it appears to be 
more than just a temporary, contingent inhibition or delay of progress. In fact, technological change 
seems to have developed an auto-inhibitive dynamic in and of itself. Unregulated progress, 
materializing in the chaos of technicized urban traffic, turns into the inhibition of progress as such. 
Along those lines, Roth’s contemplation about traffic (or better said ‘Vekehr,’ in its above-described 
                                                   
280 “There is a deeper meaning in the coincidicen that ‘Verkehr’ [English ‘traffic’] in the streets of the city and ‘Verkehr’ 
[English ‘exchange’ or ‘intercourse’] among humans have the same expression…” (My translation). 
281 “The expert trips to other countries will not help unless every individual comes up with their own traffic regulation.” 
(My translation). 
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polysemy) in Berlin should be viewed as a general contemplation of progress and its manifestations 
in the form of transformations in the urban space as well as in the ways of human behavior and 
interaction. 
Man ist also darauf bedacht, die Schienen abzuschaffen und Autobusse einzuführen. Aber von der Idee bis zu 
ihrer Verwirklichung ist ein weiter, gleichsam mit der Straßenbahn zurückzulegender Weg. (II 277-8)282 
The older invention of the “Straßenbahn” or tram is to be replaced by the newer invention of the 
bus. However, the process of modernization is inhibited by a force that we could describe—in the 
words of the historian Thomas P. Hughes—as “technological momentum” (Hughes 1994). Once a 
given technology is introduced it develops a self-sustaining persistence. But the quoted passage hints 
at an even deeper truth about modern technology. As technology increasingly penetrates the space, it 
turns from a tool or prosthetic item into an environment and as such into a conditio sine qua non for 
modern human existence. The technology Roth describes in this article is on the verge of becoming 
ubiquitous. As a result of this, the way to (technological) innovation is itself a technological path. 
The ‘progressive’ movement from the tram toward newer technologies must be made by tram. 
If we understand the onslaught of new means of transportation as a continued accumulation 
of technological potential, there will always be a point where that accumulated potential will reach a 
level of overkill. The contemporary response to this overkill, as materialized in the Berlin snarl-up, 
appears to be regulation or control. As one example of such attempts at regulating the chaos, Roth 
mentions the recent erection of an unknown object at Potsdamer Platz: “den Verkehrsturm” 
(II 276). Inspired by American models, this ‘traffic tower’ is documented as one of the first traffic 
lights in Germany, and the first one in the capital of Berlin. The “American-style ‘Verkehrsturm’” 
                                                   
282 “Hence, the city is now considering to get rid of the tram rails and to introduce busses instead. But from the idea to 
its realization leads a long path, which, in a way, has to be made on the tram.” (My translation). 
 196 
(Hughes 2006, 124) would soon gain the status of a landmark, just like the ‘Gleisdreieck,’ “perhaps 
in lieu of “recognizable ‘trademark’ equivalent to Hamburg’s harbor or the Eiffel Tower” (Hughes 
2006, 124). However, the introduction of the innovation takes longer than expected. In the stage 
that Roth describes it, the ‘eyes’ of the ‘traffic automat’ are still shut, and it has to be substituted by 
its human predecessor, an “ansehnliche Schutzmann” (II 276). As the opening sentence of the article 
makes apparent, this is a general problem. The technocratic approach of coping with the traffic snarl 
by means of regulation is not a promising solution but rather a problem and nuisance. The city’s 
obsession with regulation and control has reached a critical state itself, as the above-quoted passage 
showed: 
Seit einigen Monaten ist die Frage der Verkehrsregelung in Berlin in dem Maße aktuell, daß sie peinlich wird. 
(II 276) 
The problem of “Verkehrsregelung”—traffic control—Roth’s article focuses on is just one 
example for an entire emerging strand of “Regelungstechnik” (control technology or engineering),283 
which would around the middle of the century be bundled under the label ‘cybernetics.’ This turn 
toward a cybernetic notion of technology—and to culture in general—is tantamount to the 
emergence of a new type of machine. In the word of Gotthard Günther, one of the main proponents 
and trailblazers of cybernetics, the classical, ‘archimedian’ machine is gradually replaced by a trans-
classical type of machine.284 As follows from Roth’s observation of the traffic snarl and the city’s 
desperate attempts at coping with it, the new type of technology also calls for a new view of 
                                                   
283 At the time of Roth’s article, the various forms of regulation technology have not been converted into a clearly defined 
field of knowledge. This would only happen over a decade later spurred by the works of the German engineer Hermann 
Schmidt (Rieger 2003, 11). 
284 It is certainly no coincidence that Günther, in one of the first texts propagating cybernetics as an emerging sort of 
technology, uses the context of modern transportation and traffic to exemplify the transition from the archimedian-
classical to the trans-classical machine (Günther 1976, 222). 
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technological change, which transcends a merely quantitative notion of progress as accumulation 
(von Wright 1997, 5).285 Control or regulation technology comes with its own specific process 
properties, i.e. its own narrative structure with regard to its history. 
Regulation (as in “Verkehrsregelung” (II 276)) could at first sight seem to be a compromise in 
relation to the idea of uninhibited progression and acceleration. But in fact it is technological 
progress raised to a higher power, as technology is deployed for the purpose of guaranteeing its own 
subsistence. Roth’s “Betrachtung über den Verkehr” unambiguously shows that more mobility, i.e. 
traffic in the streets, is no progress or improvement per se. The sheer increase of potential also has to 
be regulated, that is restricted in its quantity and intensity at a given place and time. These are the 
functionalistic aspects of progress that can be derived from the idea of technology as enhancement of 
utility, efficiency, and precision.286 Technological progress understood as a continued increase of 
utility, efficiency, and precision is thus closely linked with a teleological and utilitarian construction 
of history as approaching the ultimate goal of the improvement of the human condition—the idea of 
technological progress implies a secular promise of salvation. The chaotic scenario Roth describes in 
the form of the Berlin traffic gridlock, however, could hardly be further removed from such a secular 
salvation. Even the shift toward regulation technology with the purpose of coping with the chaos 
and the technocratic solving strategies appear only as a continuation of the problem on a higher 
level. 
The dilemma of traffic regulation that Roth describes should be viewed as a symptom of a 
more profound crisis of a teleological view of both technology as well as of history and culture in 
                                                   
285  Von Wright refers to the notion of progress as knowledge accumulation; but the idea of progress as the 
accumulation/extension/enhancement of technological/technical means could be subsumed under the same category). 
286 This goes hand in hand with transcultural aspects: Technology is accessible to virtually all of humanity (von Wright 
1997, 4) and will eventually rebound to everybody’s advantage—and potentially to every-one’s harm. 
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general.287 Cultural theorist Erich Hörl describes the transition toward cybernetics taking place 
around the middle of the twentieth century as an all-encompassing cultural change which he calls 
‘allgemeine Kybernetisierung’ (Hörl 2008, 632). He then contextualizes this development within a 
larger transformation regarding the ‘meaning of meaning’ that he calls ‘technologische 
Sinnverschiebung,’ following Edmund Husserl’s dictum of a ‘gefährliche Sinnverschiebung’ caused 
by the technization of science (Hörl and Tatari 2014, 44). According to Hörl, the ‘technologische 
Sinnverschiebung’ implies that under the impression of new technology, the question of meaning 
(Sinn) must be re-interpreted ‘beyond any teleology’ or “jenseits von aller Teleologie neu zu denken” 
(Hörl and Tatari 2014, 50). Roth’s texts about urban traffic and transportation, I argue, can be read 
as early forays into such a re-interpretation of meaning. They make apparent that regulation has a 
technical and a societal or human side, and the same goes for progress. Along these lines, Roth sees 
deeper, metaphysical grounds (“metaphysische Gründe,“ II 279) for the problems showing as 
technical ones on the surface in the form of traffic breakdown and permanently unfinished 
construction sites. Once again, technology appears neither primarily as an instrumental means nor as 
a determining—material—condition. It is a symptom allowing for a phenomenological description 
of—undesirable—developments within culture.288 
                                                   
287 Stefan Rieger suggests viewing the movement of cybernetics as an attempt at creating a ‘third culture’ in the sense in 
which Charles P. Snow would later postulate it, bridging what he called the Two Cultures divide between the scientific-
technological fields on the one hand and the fields of humanities and the arts on the other hand (Rieger 2003, 8). Roth’s 
mockery of the obsession with regulation technology and technocracy of his time can be viewed as a critique of such a 
third culture avant la lettre. 
288 In his short text “Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle” (1990), Gilles Deleuze notes that the transition from a 
society of accumulation and discipline (mastery of nature and humanity) toward a society of control, which he states is 
the form of current societies, has spatial implications. As he writes, the disciplinary society as described by Michel 
Foucault and others caused spatial concentration into ‘milieus of inclusion’ (‘milieux clos’), such as prisons, factories, 
hospitals and the like. The society of control, in contrast, according to Deleuze, is “essentially dispersive” (Deleuze 1992, 
6). Even though Deleuze puts the focus not on technology, but on (primarily human) societies, his observations make 
clear that the societal transitions coincide with technological transitions: “Types of machines are easily matched with 
each type of society—not that machines are determining, but because they express [!] those social forms capable of 
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The two latter discussed articles—“Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck” and “Betrachtung über 
den Verkehr”—describe how technology diffuses into the realm of traffic and exchange between 
people. When it permeates the urban space as Roth describes it in these texts, technology has 
obviously become much more than just a tool to humanity’s ends. In the form of railroad junctions 
and automatic traffic regulation, technology is anything but compliant to human control. It is 
simply too large, too widespread, too ubiquitous for it to be subject to an individual or collective 
human will. This kind of technology dwarfs human beings, who move through it or inhabit it, 
rather than allowing humans to dispose of it freely. 
Inasmuch as technology proves to be difficult to control, it is also difficult to describe or to 
conceptualize. There may be metaphysical roots to the noncompliant nature of Berlin traffic just as 
much as there may be a human origin to all technology. But the ‘metaphysical cause’ in the form of 
the spleen of the post-war Berlin population should be taken with a grain of salt. The irony in this 
polemical remark is obvious. Rather than providing a serious explanation for the technical problem, 
it draws attention to the fact that the problems that modern technology poses defy classical notions 
of ethics.289 As Roth’s technographic journalism shows in various instances, this ultimately comes 
down to a problem rooted in the nature of human language, namely in its immanent 
anthropomorphisms and anthropocentrism.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
generating them and using them.” (Deleuze 1992, 6). Note that Deleuze, just like Roth, views technology not within a 
materialist determinism, but within a semiotic context as a readable form of expression. When we combine Deleuze’s 
observations regarding spatiality with this latter statement about the different types of machines, which Deleuze himself 
does not do in this short, draft-like essay, the society of control would by characterized by a dispersed form of 
technology. Roth’s descriptions of traffic and its regulation in the metropolis present precisely such a diffused and all-
permeating form of technology. 
289 Cf. Hans Jonas’s Prinzip Verantwortung as an example of a modern ethics that takes the changed conditions into 
account. 
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With three little texts on technology published in the early 1930s, Roth further explores this 
problem, while shifting the focus of his analysis to a different dimension. In the articles of the 1920s, 
technology appears indescribable and uncontrollable because it appears too big for humans to grasp. 
In the articles of the early 1930s, in contrast, technology appears too close to humans, and the devices 
and their ‘users’ too similar to each other. Technology starts besieging the human body and at the 
same time, humans seem to gradually assimilate with technology. In both cases, the ungraspable 
nature of technology finds reflection in the language and style of the articles. Roth’s struggle of 
trying to grasp the utterly new and disconcerting phenomena brought about by technological change 
is at the same time a challenge of finding the right language and the adequate literary form to engage 
with them. 
4. Dreams of Mankind and the Techno-Metamorphosis of Humanity 
The Event of a Motorcycle 
Roth’s technological journalism of the 1920s reveals the insufficiency of language vis-à-vis the 
overwhelming innovations of modern technology primarily as a problem of scale and of the sublime. 
In other words, technological phenomena (a railroad junction, skyscrapers, traffic) appear too large 
to be described with human language, and too great to be captured in the terms of human 
rationality. In the 1930s, in contrast, the problem is of a different nature. The technographic articles 
of this later period illustrate that it becomes increasingly difficult to see and express the differences 
between technology and the non-technological. At the same time, language appears both still too 
human, and already too technical as means to describe the phenomena of change. As a result, the 
classical thought figure of anthropomorphism—and along with it personification, animism, and 
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biologism—blends together with its modern counterpart290: technomorphism.291 This blend is not just 
proof of rhetorical mastery on the part of the author, but at the same time it displays in another way 
the principal insufficiency of language when confronted with new sorts of technology. In a 
descriptive passage from that period, Roth stakes out this grey area between the human and the 
technological. 
Sein Kopf gleicht einem bebrillten Fußball; sein Oberkörper einem viereckigen Lederkissen; seine Beine sind 
mechanische Hebel in Gamaschen; seine Füße Imitationen menschlicher Füße, vielleicht gar lediglich hohle 
Stiefel. (III 293)292 
The cited passage is the opening sentence to an article entitled “Der Motorradfahrer,” “the 
motorcyclist,” published in the Frankfurter Zeitung on March 3, 1931. In this short piece, Roth 
describes the motorcyclist in unity with his vehicle as a somewhat opaque apparition of modern life. 
The object of description is human: a motorcyclist. Yet, at the same time he appears in full unity 
with his vehicle, so transformed by the technological apparatus that he himself seems to be a 
technological artifact, or a mere imitation of natural and human forms. The cited passage makes 
apparent how this plays out on the level of language and of rhetorical devices. The sentence starts off 
with an explicit simile of a human bodily part with an artifact: “Sein Kopf gleicht einem bebrillten 
                                                   
290 Bruno Latour’s understanding of anthropomorphism already implies this mutual relation between humans and 
technology. “‘Anthropos’ and ‘morphos’ together mean either what has human shape or what gives shape to humans.” 
However, for Latour, this mutual relationship ultimately remains one between ‘actants’ or ‘actors,’ whether it be human 
or technological ones: I “see only actors—some human, some nonhuman, some skilled, some unskilled—that exchange 
their properties.” (Latour 1988, 303). 
291 The phenomenon of technomorphism has been a constant in literature and the arts for a while, notably in science 
fiction, and a known motif in philosophy and cognitive science. However, only rarely has it been the center of theoretical 
investigation (Lum 2011, 2). Heather Christina Lum takes up the topic in her 2011 dissertation, approaching it from 
the standpoint of applied experimental and human factors psychology. She suggests that technomorphism should be 
viewed in a chiastic relationship with anthropomorphism: “Technomorphism and anthropomorphism are intertwined in 
both definition and concept.” (Lum 2011, 5). Scholarship on anthropomorphism has a longstanding tradition in literary 
studies harking back to rhetorical and aesthetical theories of personification and animism. Technomorphism, in contrast, 
has been widely neglected by literary studies and has yet to be discovered as a widespread and multifaceted phenomenon 
in various genres. 
292 “His head is like a spectacled football; his upper body like a square leather pillow; his legs are mechanical levers in 
gaiters; his feet are imitations of human feet, perhaps even just hollow boots.” (My translation). 
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Fußball“, an explicit analogy that is then surpassed by metaphorical formulations: “his legs are 
mechanical levers” (emphasis added) and metaphors, until the analogy is transposed from the level of 
description to the described phenomenon itself: “his feet are imitations of human feet, perhaps even 
just hollow boots” (emphasis added) into de-facto descriptions.293  
The cited passage bears some reminiscence of literary android294 fantasies of the 18th and 19th 
century,295  which were often fueled by the inventive products of entertainer-engineers, such as 
Jacques Vaucanson, Wolfgang von Kempelen, Pierre and Henri-Louis Jaquet-Droz, and others. 
Radicalizing and exaggerating the spirit of such factual inventions by means of literary fiction, their 
authors often suggest that the structure of such inventions reveals reductionist notions of the human 
subject and its ability to act freely. Just like Roth’s motorcyclist, they give expression to the fear that 
the dividing line between man and machine has become blurry: 
Wo Androiden literarisch thematisiert werden, da geht es zumindest implizit stets um die Grenzlinie zwischen 
dem Menschen und seinem ihm äußerlich so ähnlichen Gegenstück. Nicht nur bei Jean Paul droht diese 
Grenze immer wieder durchlässig zu werden. (Schmitz-Emans 1990, 75)296 
Machines that acquire human qualities can ultimately be mistaken for humans. But this observation 
has the flipside that, in return, humans can be mistaken for machines. Along these lines, Roth’s 
motorcyclist could be described as a cyborg. In unity with his cycle, he is—in congruence with 
                                                   
293 The passage also reverses the paradigm of ‘organ projection’ (Ernst Kapp) and applies it back to the human body. 
While in Ernst Kapp’s Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, levers are viewed as projections of human limbs, the 
human leg appears as an imitation, a projection of lever. Whereas Kapp interprets technological progress as a 
continuation of natural evolution, Roth’s comparisons reveal that such an interpretation roots in an inherently 
technomorphic (i.e. functionalist) view of nature. 
294 An android is a machine, a robot, that resembles humans in both looks and behavior. 
295 Think of the machine man in Jean Paul’s “Der Maschinen-Mann nebst seinen Eigenschaften” (a chapter in “Auswahl 
aus des Teufels Papieren”) (1789), Olimpia in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann, or the demon in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, to name just a few. 
296 “Literature that deals with androids always at least implicitly problematizes the boundary between man and his 
counterpart that is so similar to him in appearance. Not only in Jean Paul, this boundary repeatedly threatens to become 
permeable.” (My translation). 
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Donna Haraway’s definition—“a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature 
of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.” (Haraway 1991, 149). In line with Haraway’s 
argument, this hybrid quality amounts to a problem of agency, accountability, and the attribution of 
action (Haraway 1991, 3). Roth’s motorcyclist neither appears as a subject, nor as an object. Instead, 
it appears as an event, which rather provokes than answers a series of questions: Why does it happen? 
Who or what is the initiator? And how could it possibly be controlled or stopped—that is to say: 
how is any intervention possible? 
The unity of motorcyclist and motorcycle is so ungraspable, because it is hardly possible to 
attribute its behavior to a clearly delimited center of agency. In this sense, it is in line with the 
classical examples of androids in literature, as the android problem eventually comes down to a 
problem of human agency. At the same time, however, Roth transcends the classical android 
fantasies by linking the problem of agency to the general problem of technical progress. Even where 
they convert into “radikaler Zweifel an der Freiheit und Selbstbestimmbarkeit des Menschen” 
(Schmitz-Emans 1990, 76) 297 , such literary fantasies implement their critique of the agency 
paradigm in the form of an interaction between human and machine.298  Roth’s technographic 
journalism, in contrast, goes far beyond the basic paradigm of agency consisting of a simple structure 
of actor and sufferer, or subject and objet. In his texts, the problem between the anthropomorphism 
of technology and technomorphism of humans does not manifest itself in an interaction or outright 
                                                   
297 “radical doubts in human freedom and autonomy” (my translation). 
298 Even Jean Paul’s “Maschinen-Mann,” for instance, presents technology as a mere obsession of the century—rather 
than a historical necessity—that could be overcome by ‘enlightenment,’ i.e. by self-empowerment and a more 
sophisticated understanding of human freedom. “In Texten wie den Jean Paulschen Androiden-Satiren steht das 
Maschinenwesen vorranging für eine ‘selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit’, die zu überwinden gleichbedeutend mit 
‘Aufklärung’ ist. Der Mensch reduziert sich insofern selbst zum Maschinchen, zur Puppe, als er sich seiner Fähigkeit zur 
vernünftigen Selbstbestimmung nicht hinreichend bedient. Auch die schuldhafte Verkümmerung des humanen 
Empfindungsvermögens bis zur ‘Seelenlosigkeit’ gilt als ein Prozeß der Mechanisierung—freilich als ein vermeidbarer.” 
(Schmitz-Emans 1990, 75–6). 
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opposition between human and technological agents. While there is still a narrative, the texts do no 
longer focus on any acting subject. What drives the action remains largely undecided and open. This 
indeterminacy is what maintains the peculiar chiasms of anthropomorphisms and technomorphisms in 
Roth’s “Motorcyclist.” The two thought figures form a polar opposition, which manifests the 
indecision as an oscillation within the text. Just like the biker is described as a quasi-mechanical, 
robotic object, the motorcycle is likened to a human subject, that “macht Miene” [composes itself] 
and “will nicht von der Stelle” [is not willing to stir from the spot]. While anthropomorphism 
ascribes genuine human characteristics and agency to non-human entities, technomorphism, in 
contrast, tends to deny human beings such agency by making them appear as mere devices or 
automats. In a modern context, anthropomorphism and technomorphisms should be understood in 
a mutual dependency,299 just as much as, according to Roth, modern man only makes sense in 
conjunction with modern technology and vice versa. 
Die ganze Erscheinung des Motorradfahrers ist, ohne Motorrad, ein Spuk; auf dem Motorrad ein erklärbarer, 
fast selbstverständlicher Spuk. (III 293)300 
Man and machine in conjunction—represented by the unity of motorcyclist and 
motorcycle—appear almost self-evident (“selbstverständlich”), self-explanatory. And yet they remain 
a phantom, a spook (“Spuk”). A “self-evident spook,” as Roth has it, of course is a contradictio in 
adiecto, an oxymoron. But it makes good sense as a general description (of the paradoxical nature) of 
the human relationship with modern technology. On the one hand, it is self-evident or taken for 
granted that technological devices and processes play an ever-greater role in human life. On the other 
hand, the same technology becomes increasingly opaque to the general user. As expressed with the 
                                                   
299 This is in line with Lum’s approach to the topic (cf. note 291). 
300 “The whole phenomenon/apparition of the motorcyclist is, without the motorcycle, a spook; when sitting on the 
motorcycle, he is an explainable, almost self-evident, spook.” (My translation). 
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metaphor of the ‘black box,’ the functionality of modern technology is taken for granted in everyday 
life although, or rather because its mechanisms, which carry out the task, largely elude the 
understanding by a general user. Roth’s formulation of a “self-evident spook” captures this paradox, 
while adding a touch of demonization of technology. What makes technology spooky is that it not 
simply carries out an obvious task in non-obvious ways, but that it starts haunting humanity by 
setting its own purposes, thus developing its own momentum, and yes, even its own agency.301 
The more spooky part in Roth’s text, however, is not the motorcycle, but its rider. The 
actual device, the motorcycle, rather relativizes the spookiness by making it explainable, self-
explanatory. “[W]hen sitting on the motorcycle,” the spook becomes “explainable” and “self-
evident.” Instead of acting against each other in Roth’s text, human and technology complement one 
another, they appear as two sides of the same coin. This said, the cycle does have its own 
momentum, its own will. The various similes and metaphors underlining its resemblance with 
animals make this apparent: 
Es ist sogar zahmer als ein gewöhnliches Fahrrad, das niemals stehen kann und immer Miene macht, von selbst 
davonzugleiten oder sich hinzulegen wie ein müdes Stahlroß. [...] Denn wie oft erlebt man es, daß der Fahrer, 
um es [the motorcycle] aus der elefantenhaften Ruhe zu bringen, zuerst einen grauenhaften Lärm entfacht, 
fünf, zehn, fünfzehn Minuten lang: vergeblich. (III 294)302 
And yet, these passages only make the motorcycle appear more enigmatic. Both motorcycle 
and motorcyclist seem to evade an adequate description. Neither is it clear to which kingdom (of 
                                                   
301 Friedrich Georg Jünger finds the explanation for such demonization in the very nature of modern technology itself: 
“Die technische Ratio selbst, die als ein Zusammenspiel des kausalen und des teleologischen Denkens erkannt werden 
muss, ist das Einfallstor des Dämonischen.” (Friedrich Georg Jünger, Die Perfektion der Technik, qt. after Schenkel, 
Elmar. Geisterzüge. Über Technik, Spuk und Fortschritt. 2008. p. 282). Along these lines, Elmar Schenkel draws a short 
thematic history of the association of spook and technological progress in literature (Schenkel 2008). 
302 “It is even tamer than a usual bicycle, which can never stand and always and always composes itself to glide away of its 
own accord, or to stretch itself out like a tired steel horse. […] For how often do we experience that the rider, in order to 
get it [the motorcycle] out of its elephant-like [!] calm, first raises a horrible noise for five, ten, fifteen minutes: without 
effect.” (My translation). 
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reality) they belong, be it the human, the technological, the animal, or the ghostly; nor is it clear 
which of the two is the agent and which the patient, or whether there is real agency at all. Even in 
conjunction, both the biker and his motorcycle, remain an enigma of modern life. In fact, there 
seems to be only one state of matter in which the unity of biker and motorcycle appear slightly less 
opaque, slightly more transparent and plausible. 
Am wahrscheinlichsten wirkt der Motorradfahrer, wenn er in unmeßbarer Geschwindigkeit dahergerast 
kommt, knatternd, rauchend, dampfend, knallend, in dumpf zischendem Grollen, ein horizontal gleitender 
Donnerkeil aus Leder, Gummi und Stahl, aus unbekannten Fernen abgeschossen gegen ein unvorstellbares 
Ziel. Denn es ist unglaubhaft, daß ein Motorradfahrer jemals innehalten könnte. (III 293)303 
The opaque object hence loses some of its opacity when it is in motion. If the motorcyclist is taken 
as an epitome of modern technology, this statement cannot surprise. The properties of speed and 
acceleration have often been described as the key qualities of modern technology. Hence, 
approaching it in this state of matter ‘while it is racing by in immeasurable speed’ would mean to 
capture the phenomenon in its essence. What Roth states about the motorcyclist equally goes for 
technological progress: ‘it is hard to believe that it could ever stop short’. And yet, describing an 
object in lightning speed in the slow medium of literature necessarily means to slow it down. 
This opposition between object and medium of description brings to mind the counterpoint 
relationship between contemplation and traffic in “Betrachtung über den Verkehr”. That earlier 
piece, however, dealt with the motion of traffic only in its negative form as the congestion and 
deceleration of urban circulation. The contemplative mode of “Betrachtung über den Verkehr” slows 
something down that has already come to a halt in and of itself. 
                                                   
303 “The motorcyclist appears the most probable when he races by in an immense speed, rattling, smoking, steaming, 
banging, with a wooshing roar, a horizontal thunderbolt of leather, rubber, and steel, shot from unknown and faraway 
place and toward an unimaginable target. It is unbelievable, that a motorcyclist would ever halt.” (My translation). 
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In “Der Motorradfahrer,” the problem presents itself in a more radical way. On the one 
hand, the motorcycle and its rider, as epitome of technological progress, make sense only when in 
rapid motion. On the other hand, a literary account always has to slow down or halt a phenomenon 
in order to capture it. This dilemma amounts to a general opposition between modern technology 
and rhetoric.304 While modern technology accelerates, rhetoric slows down processes and helps win 
time (Hans Blumenberg, Rüdiger Campe). Roth’s motorcyclist text presents a simple solution to this 
dilemma. Rather than depicting the motorcycle simply as an object in motion, Roth narrates the 
motorcyclist and its rider as a rudimentary event, as shown by the accumulation of temporal adverbs 
and conjunctions structuring the text: Words such as “wenn” “[s]ooft” (III 293) “[u]nterdessen” 
“wie oft,” “zuerst”, “einmal”, “bereits”, “[n]un, da”, “plötzlich”, “einen Augenblick”, and once again 
“sooft” (III 294) suggest a process, a happening, rather than a static phenomenon. They turn a mere 
description of a motorcyclist into the nucleus of a narrative.  
What makes this narrative so unusual and peculiar, however, is that it largely does without 
ascribing agency to any given subject. Along these lines, the accounted event hardly seems motivated. 
It occurs somewhat unexpected, its origin is almost impossible to explain, and its destination or telos 
is daunting at best. The motorcycle is a calamity or disaster that is itself bound for a future of 
disaster or calamity: 
                                                   
304 According to Hans Blumenberg, acceleration is one of the key qualities of modern technology, or ‘technization,’ 
which was a central topic of Blumenberg’s earlier work (“Das Verhältnis von Natur und Technik als philosophisches 
Problem (1951), “Technik und Wahrheit” (1953), “Lebenswelt und Technisierung”, “Geistesgeschichte der Technik”). 
In this sense, technology stands in opposition to rhetoric (Blumenberg 1981, 121–2), a central subject of Blumenberg’s 
later project of metaphorology (where ‘metaphors are the significant element of rhetoric,’ “Metaphorik [ist] das 
signifikante Element der Rhetorik” (Blumenberg 1981, 131). While modern technology accelerates, rhetoric, according 
to Blumenberg, rather slows down processes and helps winning time (Campe 2000, 291), (Blumenberg Anthropologische 
Annäherung 119-21).304 A central purpose of rhetoric is to make things plausible (it also makes the own workings visible, 
cf. Blumenberg’s Anthrop. Annäherung an die Rhetorik). Drawing on the motorcycle example, we could add to this 
opposition that modern technology tends to be ungraspable by concealing its own workings, overtaking humans by its 
effects. 
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Nun, da man es am allerwenigsten erwartet hätte, fährt das Motorrad plötzlich los, verschwindet vor meinen 
Augen, nach klassisch-göttlichem Muster, in einer Wolke und rast, ein Unheil, mit dem Fahrer dem Unheil 
entgegen. (III 294)305 
Roth’s motorcycle is far from the freedom and self-actualization fantasies of the 1960s and 70s 
associated with the motorcycle, such as the American road movie Easy Rider (1969) and Robert M. 
Pirsig’s book of philosophical fiction Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1974). In Roth’s 
description, the motorcyclist and his vehicle represent the opposite of a salvation promise. Rider and 
bike are acknowledged with the attributes of weapons and warfare; as epitomes of modern 
technology, they appear like the civil continuation of war.306 Just like a projectile, the motorcyclist is 
“aus unbekannten Fernen abgeschossen gegen ein unvorstellbares Ziel” and that “in meiner Nähe 
einschlägt” (III 293)307. What is more, Roth’s motorcyclist does not promise wellbeing or salvation, 
it does not promise Heil (even though it is described as a miracle ‘wie ein Wunder’ (III 293), but the 
outright opposite: Un-heil, calamity. More precisely, the motorcycle itself is described as such an 
“Unheil,” which races, “mit dem Fahrer dem Unheil entgegen.” (III 294). Its essence is characterized 
as calamity. But even its direction, its destination, and its purpose, in brief: its telos, appears to add 
no value for all the noise and nuisance. In other word, the motorcycle is a negative entelechy. What 
it leaves behind is a moribund scenario “wie nach einer Katastrophe,” or “just like after a 
                                                   
305 “Now, that we would have least expected it, the motorcyclist suddenly drives off, disappearing before my eyes, in a 
classic-divine manner, shrouded in a cloud, and he races—a disaster—with the rider in the direction of disaster.” (My 
translation). 
306 Ernst Jünger made similar obversavtions about the bellicose and destructive nature of modern technology in times of 
peace, which find reflection in his introduction to a collection of photographs and reports that was published in the same 
year under the title Der Gefährliche Augenblick or The Dangerous Moment: “Auch die Geschichte der Erfindungen stellt 
uns immer deutlicher die Frage, ob ein Raum der absoluten Bequemlichkeit ode rein Raum der absoluten Gefahr das 
verborgene Endziel der Technik ist. Ganz abgesehen davon, daß es kaum eine Maschine, kaum eine Wissenschaft gab, 
die nicht schon im Weltkriege eine mittelbar oder unmittelbar gefährliche Funktion besaß, haben bereits heute 
Erfindungen, wie die des Automobilmotors, größere Verluste im Gefolge gehabt als jeder noch so blutige Krieg.” (Jünger 
1931, 15). 
307 The verb ‘einschlagen’ can be read in its double meaning as ‘turn left or right; to pull over’ and ‘hit’ as in ‘a bomb or 
bullet hits an object.’ 
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catastrophe.” The small event represented by the motorcyclist thus appears as an echo of a large 
historical event generally perceived as a shock in the collective imagination: World War I. In this 
way, Roth’s motorcyclist subscribes to a radical reassessment of modern progress that the war 
provoked. 
The type of technological advance represented by the motorcyclist is the opposite of the 
‘classical’ notion of progress understood as the secular substitute of religious salvation promises.308 
This negative sort of progress produces incomprehensible entities: increasingly merged units between 
technological artifact and human subject. The incomprehensible quality of the artifact and its user is 
due to the fact that as an event they cannot be integrated into a positive narrative of progress leading 
to any kind of betterment. Even empathy appears to miss the mark, as the language of empathy—
represented by anthropomorphism, personification, and animism—is corrupted by its logical 
counterpart: technomorphism. The human user of the technological device, the motorcyclist 
himself, appears as a mere copy of man. 
After the description of the post-catastrophic scenario caused by the motorcycle, Roth’s text 
ends on a somewhat optimistic note: 
Man hört jedoch, daß die Motorräder von Tag zu Tag besser werden und lautloser und daß es ein Genuß ist, 
auf ihnen zu sitzen. Alle Fahrer, die mir persönlich bekannt sind, sagen es, sooft sie stehenbleiben dürfen. Das 
freut uns alle. (III 294)309 
If one ignores the ironic or even cynical tone of this comment, all that remains in the end is a stale 
hope for general improvement in the sense of enhancement of efficiency, utility and reduction of 
                                                   
308 This notion of progress as secularized salvation may convince as a psychological explanation, if at all. But it certainly 
fails its own epistemological grounds when developed to explain the historical genesis of progress as a modern idea like 
Karl Löwith undertook it (Wallace 1981). 
309 “But they say that motorcycles become better and less noisy every day, and that sitting on them is a joy. All riders who 
I personally know say this, whenever they are allowed to halt; which makes us all happy.” (My translation). 
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disturbances and noise. Not much seems left in this piece of the enthusiasm of progress and 
technology that Roth voiced for instance in “Bekenntnis zum Gleisdreieck.” With the stress on noise 
pollution and the description of the spookiness of technology, Roth’s “Motorradfahrer” appears to 
belong to a long German tradition of techno-critical literature.310 But Roth’s mockery of this noisy 
and unruly piece of technology amounts to more than just a plain critique in the vein of 
technological pessimism. Behind the satire lies a deeper insight into the problem of technological 
progress: the integration of a single event in a larger temporal context of meaning. Roth emphasizes 
the untimeliness, the shock aspect of the motorcycle, its sheer inhumane speed, only to slow it down, 
to extrapolate it by applying his rhetorical skills. By means of the temporal adverbs and 
conjunctions, he underlines that the motorcycle/motorcyclist is in fact a temporal entity, an event, in 
the larger narrative of technological progress.  
As noted above, the concluding paragraph of the text of course has ironic undertones, which 
suggest not the dismissal of the idea of progress, but rather a profound doubt that progress can be 
reduced to a mere enhancement of technological efficiency. Perhaps we can even read the irony as an 
implicit moral statement that an expectant attitude in the form of hope for such improvement is not 
the right way of dealing with the problems posed by technological change. The bottomline of Roth’s 
“Motorradfahrer” article is the same kind of bafflement at the sight of modern technology as Donna 
Haraway would later express in her book A Cyborg Manifesto: “Our machines are disturbingly lively, 
and we ourselves frighteningly inert.” (Haraway 1991, 152)) 
                                                   
310 Think of Jean Paul’s critique of the machine man in ‘Auswahl aus des Teufels Papieren’ (1789), Justinus Kerner’s 
1850 poem ‘Im Eisenbahnhofe,’ and especially the critique of rising industrialization by Karl Immermann, in ‘Die 
Epigonen’ (1836) or Wilhelm Raabe in his novel ‘Pfisters Mühle’ (1884). 
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Aviation: The Evolution of a Dream of Mankind 
Being one of the most persistent dreams of mankind, aviation also represents an age-old topos in 
literature and the arts. Steps toward the realization of that dream have always brought about new 
products of cultural imagination about technology in general, i.e. about humanity’s potential to 
change and enhance her place in the world.311 When the brothers Wright and others invented means 
for heavier-than-air-flight, this sparked a new fire of technological enthusiasm and a whole attraction 
culture around air shows and record flights.312 
It is no coincidence that Roth repeatedly dealt with aviation in his feuilleton, given his 
fascination with technology, which is almost always paired with a critical view of unrestricted, naïve 
enthusiasm. In the 1920s and 30s, Roth dedicated four articles to the still relatively new technology 
as well as to its role in the public imagination, and particularly with regard to its representation in 
the press. The first of those articles, “Flug nach Dortmund” or “Flight to Dortmund” appeared in 
the Berliner Börsen-Courier, 6.10.1921 (I 651-5). It still largely joins in the celebration of aviation as 
a new, revolutionary means of transportation and as a realized dream of humanity. However, the 
article already contains hints at a set of recurring topics and motifs that Roth would elaborate on in 
the later aviation articles, such as the fusion of humans with technology, the trans-prosthetic mode 
of technology, an ambiguity between humbleness and triumph or liberation with regard to aviation, 
the mythological grounds of aviation as a dream of mankind, and aviation as an evolutionary step. 
                                                   
311 When the brothers Montgolfier invented the hot air balloon, for instance, this event of technological history left 
amazing traces in the works and thoughts of German literary classics of the 18th century, such as Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe, Jean Paul, and Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (Plachta 1998). 
312 Robert Walser, Franz Kafka, and Bertolt Brecht are among the most well-known authors who turned their fascination 
with aviation into literary productions. Concerning Walser’s and Kafka’s takes on the topic, cf. Vilas Boas, Gonçalo. 
“Himmlische ‘Spazierfahrten’. Aviatische Texte von Franz Kafka und Robert Walser.” Franz Kafka und Robert Walser im 
Dialog. Berlin: Weidler, 2010. 135–50. Print. And with Scheerbart joining this club, air flight is in fact one point where 
the interests of the three protagonist authors of this dissertation meet in a concrete object. 
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The three other aviation articles all appeared about a decade after “Flug nach Dortmund” 
and they are decidedly more critical, not so much with regard to the invention of aviation as such, 
but to a misappropriation of the dream and its realization by an uncritical, lurid press. “Entwicklung 
des Flugwesens,” the first of those three articles, appeared on September 7, 1929 in the literary 
journal Das Tagebuch (III 79-81). The text distinguishes three stages in the ‘evolution or 
development of aeronautics’ that first mean a certain progress in the form of rationalization, 
understood as the reduction of a dream of humanity to a useful means of transportation with the 
potential to bring the people of this planet together. Toward the end of the third stage, however, this 
process appears in Roth’s view as a decline or regress in the form of the misappropriation of aviation 
by the press. The article thus drafts a ‘dialectics of technological progress’ that is to be found in the 
realization of aviation as a dream of humanity. 
It is worth noting that the article’s title addresses the process of change regarding the notion 
of aviation as an ‘Entwicklung,’ which can be translated either as ‘development,’ or as ‘evolution.’ 
This means that the described process can either be understood as an actively pursued process of 
planning, design, or construction, or rather as a process of emergence, as in Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. ‘Flugwesen,’ the German word for aviation or aeronautics, adds to that polysemy of the 
title, as German ‘Wesen’ can either refer to a natural being, a creature, or essence of a being, or, 
when used in a compound, such as ‘Flugwesen,’ ‘Finanzwesen,’ or ‘Unwesen’ to a general context of 
‘concerns,’ a practice, or ‘doings.’ In this spirit, “Entwicklung des Flugwesens” describes a quite 
sophisticated meta-narrative about how the notion or the dream of aviation has been shaped and 
constructed as a narrative or an imaginary throughout the course of human history. In the form of 
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this meta-narrative, ‘development of aviation’ appears as one concrete example of how the idea of 
technology has changed, evolved, or developed over time. 
The first stage of the development Roth describes is, as he calls it, “das mythologische” (III 79) 
or ‘the mythological stage,’ during which aviation is still fully a dream (wirklich noch ein Traum). In 
this stage, humanity responds to instances of failure, i.e. crashes, by searching not for a 
“Konstruktionsfehler” (constructional flaw, III 79), but for the “Ratschluß der Götter und dem 
eigenen Frevel” (III 79)313. Roth mentions the myth of Daedalus and Icarus, the ‘mythologische 
Flugzeugkatastrophe’ (III 79) or ‘mythological airplane crash’, as he calls it, viewing it as the starting 
point of an ongoing poetic engagement with the idea of aviation. As the second stage within the 
development of aviation, Roth describes an intermediate state when the dream of flying has already 
come true and yet it has not stopped being a dream: “Ein Traum, der anfängt, sich zu verwirklichen, 
aber noch nicht aufhört, ein Traum zu sein.” (III 80)314 
During this stage, writes Roth, humanity splits into two factions: “Man teilte sich sozusagen 
das Fliegen: Die einen forschten nach Möglichkeiten, die andern (die autorisierten, spezialisierten 
Träumer) träumten nur von ihnen.” (III 79)315. This division of dream labor correlates quite neatly 
with Charles P. Snow’s distinction between the two cultures made in his famous Rede Lecture of 
1959 (Snow 1998). Interestingly, Roth counts the first attempts at aerial warfare during the Great 
War among the phenomena of the second stage, as it fostered not only an increase in rationalization 
and ‘scientific perfection’ (“wissenschaftliche Vervollkommnung,” III 80) of aviation, but also a 
‘metaphysical hideousness’ (“metaphysische Grauenhaftigkeit,” III 80), which ‘endowed the war 
                                                   
313 “the plan of the gods and the own sacrilege” (my translation). 
314 “A dream that begins to fulfill itself, but that does not yet cease to be a dream.” (My translation). 
315 “Flying was divided into separate task, so to say: some inquired the possibilities, the others (the authorized, specialized 
dreamers) merely dreamed of them. ” (My translation). 
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pilot with triple miraculousness’ (“verlieh dem Kriegspiloten ein dreifach Wunderbares,” III 80). It is 
the heroic charge of World War I (Herfried Münkler), we could summarize Roth’s argument, which 
prevents the idea of aviation from passing on to its fully rationalized form. 
This does not happen, according to Roth, until the third stage in the evolution of aviation: 
Es beginnt mit der Kommerzialisierung des Traums, mit seiner postalischen Verwendung und seiner 
völkerverbindenen oder nationalen Bedeutung. In dieser Stunde hörte das Fliegen auf, ein Gegenstand der 
Dichter zu sein, also ein Traum der Menschheit. (III 80)316 
Commercialization and the complete utilization of aviation thus also bring about the end of the idea 
of flying as a poetically productive dream of humanity. It may surprise the reader that Roth does not 
at all bemoan this loss of such a rich source of poetic imagination. Quite the opposite, he appears to 
embrace this development, as flying has finally reached the state of unrestrained utility: 
Und also wäre alles gut und wir hätten uns, je nach unserer Veranlagung, über einen realisierten Traum mehr 
oder weniger freuen können. (III 80)317 
Even if this embracement may be marked by a slight irony or otherwise restraint, as expressed by the 
phrasing ‘mehr oder weniger freuen können,’ Roth fiercely rejects the opposite, a misappropriations 
of aviation as an inspiration for pseudo-poetic imaginations by a lurid press. He describes this 
process as a terrifying, albeit predictable occurrence, writing: 
Da aber geschah etwas Furchtbares, das man allerdings hätte voraussehen können: Die Zeitung bemächtige sich 
des Fliegens. (III 80)318 
                                                   
316 “It begins with the commercialization of the dream, with its postal use and its intercultural or national significance. At 
that hour, flying stopped being a subject for poets and writers, and hence a dream of mankind.” (My translation). 
317 “And thus everything would turn out good and we could have been […] more or less happy about a fulfilled dream.” 
(My translation). 
318 “But then something horrible happened, which we could have predicted though: the newspapers took possession of 
flying.” (My translation). 
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This occurrence, as Roth further describes it, foils the entire ‘development of aviation’ as a process of 
rationalization. 
Thus reconstructing the ‘evolution of aviation’ (‘Entwicklung des Flugwesens’) as to the 
described three stages, Roth in fact describes two developments at once. On the one hand, the 
‘evolution of aviation’ is tantamount to a dream of humanity gradually materializing. On the other 
hand, this evolution means a decline of poetic imagination associated with that dream, which 
originates in ancient mythology (e.g. Daedalus and Icarus) and which reaches its low point in 
modern day newspaper and magazine journalism.319 This can be read as a late self-criticism, since 
Roth himself had contributed to that genre of air journalism with his early article “Flug nach 
Dortmund.” 
Even though Roth declares ancient mythology as the common origin of the two processes, in 
the way he describes the subsequent development they appear largely independent from one 
another—at least ostensibly, and after the events.  In this sense, Roth’s text differs clearly from the 
view Karl Kraus formulates in Die Fackel with regard to the news coverage of early Zeppelin flights 
by the journalist and feuilleton writer Paul Zifferer. Karl Kraus, die Fackel 378, Jean Paul Zifferer 
(Juli 16, 1913). Kraus views the decline in quality of literature on aviation from Jean Paul to Paul 
Zifferer as a symptom of the true nature of (technological) progress as regress. Roth’s criticism of the 
development of aviation, in contrast, does not aim at technological progress as such. As anywhere 
else in his technographic feuilleton, Roth is by no means a fierce opponent of modern technology: 
                                                   
319 According to Roth, the development is not only a low point of poetic imagination, but also of newspaper journalism 
itself, as by representing the rationalized form of aviation as i fit where still stuff for myths the press drags behind its time 
where it usually excels by being more than up-to-date: “Die Zeitung, die sonst der Zeit vorauseilt, bleibt diesmal hinter 
ihr zurück. Das Fliegen war schon längst eine nüchterne Angelegenheit. Als aber die Berichterstatter Plätze zu 
ermäßigten Preisen und Aufträge bekamen, begannen sie, den längst aufgespeicherten Schatz an unpassenden, 
romantischen Begriffen gewissermaßen als hinderlichen Ballast in die Spalten auszuwerfen.” (III 80) 
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Die Menschen könnten hurtig sein wie die Schwalben und dennoch kriegerisch. Sie könnten langsam sein wie 
die Schildkröten und dennoch friedlich. Jedenfalls werden ihre Träume verwirklicht, und das ist nicht schlimm. 
(III 81)320 
Hence, Roth does not criticize technological progress understood as the materialization of 
humanity’s dreams, but he attacks a dreamy rapture over such technology, which is largely 
independent of the actual progress. The hope Roth formulates at the beginning of his text and that 
he repeats at the end of it relies exactly on this principal independence of the two. 
Deshalb äußerte ich zu Beginn dieser Ausführungen die Hoffnung, der Aeroplan und das Luftschiff möchten 
endlich die Bedeutung des Fahrrads erlangen. Denn dieses wird längst nicht mehr beschrieben und konnte sich 
also zu einem relative nützlichen Verkehrsmittel entwickeln. (III 81)321 
Does this mean that ultimately we would have to exclude all dreams of humankind once they 
have come true, or, in other words, any technology, as a ‘projection screen’ for poetic imagination? 
Roth’s later aviation articles implicitly show that this question should not be answered in the 
affirmative as long as the perverted practice of myth making in the form of bad technographic 
journalism is still existent producing and reproducing trite clichés about the myth of progress. In 
Roth’s view, as opposed to Karl Kraus’s one, such clichés are unwanted side effects rather than 
necessary symptoms of technological progress. Roth’s later pieces make increasingly clear that it is 
these clichés, rather than technological progress as such, that he attacks with his own technographic 
journalism. By describing and mocking the clichés, however, he also carries forward in describing 
aviation, albeit on a higher, more critical and thus more productive level. Exactly this is what the 
subsequent two aviation articles do. They take a fierce swipe at that latest trend in the ‘development 
                                                   
320 “Humans can be quick like swallows, and still militant. They can be slow as turtles, and still peaceful. In any case, 
their dreams a fulfilled, and this is not bad.” (My translation). 
321 “Therefore I expressed the hope at the outset that airplanes and the airship may finally achieve the importance of the 
bicycle. The latter has not been described for a while, and therefore it could turn into a relatively useful means of 
transportation.” (My translation). 
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of aviation’ and by doing so they transform the lurid pseudo-poetry of day-to-day journalism back to 
productive poetic imagination. 
Both of those later texts appeared in the early 1930s: “Die Weltfliegerin,” was published in 
the Frankfurter Zeitung on October 5, 1931 (DJW 3, 398-9) and “Betrachtung über Fliegerinnen,” 
in Das Blaue Heft on August 15, 1932 (DJW III, 450-1). Interestingly, the two articles share another 
common feature that might at first glance seem arbitrary. As their titles suggest, both “Die 
Weltfliegerin” and “Betrachtung über Fliegerinnen” focus on a contemporary hype about women 
aviators.322 As the articles directly take issue with contemporary press coverage, Roth might just be 
poking fun at this prevalent hype. Apart from this ostensible reason, however, the articles suggest a 
deeper meaning to Roth’s peculiar predilection for women aviators. In his time’s obsession with 
female aeronauts, Roth unearths another one of those emblems—just like the skyscraper, the Berlin 
Gleisdreieck, or the self-loading rifle—that help him draw the face of his time. As a quasi-literary 
type, the figure of the woman aviator forms an incarnate crossing of two strains of ideas. On the one 
hand, the figure embodies like few others the idea of progress as a promise of emancipation, both in 
the way of gender roles and understood as a general liberation from earthly constraints, symbolized 
in the dream of flying. On the other hand, the character of a woman aviator links in an 
unprecedented way modern technology with evolution and biological (bi-sexual) reproduction by 
virtue of the new forms, ethos, and patterns of behavior that aviation as a technology and practice 
imposes on those women. 
                                                   
322 Both articles make explicit reference to the German aviator Elly Beinhorn (1907) who would in 1932 publish an 
autobiographical air travel report under the title Ein Mädchen fliegt durch die Welt. Regarding Beinhorn and her 
historical role within a fight for gender equality in aviation cf. Dimitrova-Moeck, Svoboda. Women Travel Abroad 1925-
1932. Maria Leitner, Erika Mann, Marieluise Fleisser, and Elly Beinhorn. Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag, 2009. Print. 
 218 
As noted above, the two articles on women aviators attack the language, style, stereotypes, 
and double standards of the contemporary press more decidedly than the earlier texts. While such 
style criticism partly eclipses a more general engagement with technological progress, it remains 
apparent throughout that stereotypical coverage about female aeronauts and a short and all too 
enthusiastic view of modern technology are two sides of the same coin. Roth spoofs by exaggeration 
the stereotypical ideas of technological progress while extrapolating the utopian prospects they 
imply. He debunks the double standards of a press that propagates equal treatment of sexes on the 
one hand while on the other hand baits its readership with descriptions of the female attributes of 
women aeronauts. 
Whereas “Betrachtung über Fliegerinnen” mainly focuses on the topic of gender equality,323 
the earlier article “Die Weltfliegerin” is certainly more interesting in terms of progress narratives, as 
it extends the mockery of language and style in the press to a deeper critical engagement with the 
temporal and narrative patterns they evoke. It will therefore suffice here to discuss the earlier article 
in detail while leaving aside the later text “Betrachtung über Fliegerinnen.” 
Unlike most of Roth’s other technographic articles, “Die Weltfliegerin” incorporates the 
vocabulary of the press it criticizes. A number of single words even appear in quotation marks such 
“startet,” “süß,” “verschollen‚” “erfaßt,” “sichten,” “landen,” “Drahtbericht,” “Weib.” They seem to 
come straight out of the tabloids and the illustrated magazines of the time that feature sensation 
reports and news about women aviators. Roth reproduces the language of such reports and their 
patterns of sensational description, but at the same time he turns them into their opposite. He 
exaggerates their practice of uncritically conflating different linguistic and cultural registers with each 
                                                   
323 Cf. Birgit Wagner’s book Technik und Literatur im Zeitalter der Avantgarden regarding the general topic of gender and 
technology within the avant-gardes (Wagner 1996, 25–8). 
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other, such as a modern technological and scientific language with concepts derived from ancient 
mythological or classical ethics and aesthetics: 
Eine klassische Amazone ist, im Vergleich mit ihr [die Weltfliegerin], gewissermaßen ein Waisenknabe, um 
nicht zu sagen: ein Waisen-Hermaphrodit. (III 398)324 
The analogy between amazon and aviator is a satirical reprise of the quarrel of the Ancients and the 
Moderns. With a surge of irony, it takes sides with the Moderns, whose technological feats and 
means of medial representation are said to overshadow and dwarf their ancient predecessors. Yet, the 
meta-narrative Roth constructs goes beyond this simple, linear opposition between an earlier and a 
later epoch. Roth hints at how the press appropriates narrative devices of storytelling (and film) such 
as suspense for its own purposes. 325  In order to boost newspaper sales—Roth mentions the 
“Abonnenten-Werbestelle” (‘the subscriber acquisition department,’ III 398)—the press makes the 
fate of the woman aviator part of a story. She, whom the press apparently describes as ‘süß’, ‘cute’, 
gets lost—“verschollen” (in quotation marks, III 398)—and media and technology seem to be 
incapable of tracking her “ohne jedweden ‘Drahtbericht’” (III 398). In the way Roth describes this 
fate of the aviator, it is obviously staged as part of a larger media spectacle and star cult: “‘Süß’ wäre 
es, eine Zeitlang [!] ‘verschollen’ zu bleiben.” (III 398). This invests the press coverage with a 
“Verkaufsfördernder Sog” or “promotional clout”, a momentum of attention and curiosity that 
appears to mirror the technology-induced centripetal force of aviation. The aviator is described as 
being 
                                                   
324  “An ancient amazon is, in comparison with the aeronaut, an orphan boy of sorts, not to say: an orphan 
hermaphrodite.” (My translation). 
325 Cf. Sven Lütticken, History in Motion. Time in the Age of the Moving Image For an investigation into this common 
practice of modern mass media and history making. Lütticken explores how phenomena that originate from the 
vocabulary of new media—such as shock and suspense—retroactively inform how our common historical reality is 
construed (Lütticken 2013, 77–117). 
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in dem sicheren Bewußtsein, daß die Neugier der Erde um sie ebenso kreist, wie sie selbst dereinst um die Erde 
gekreist hat. (III 398)326 
However, as the aviators orbiting movement is just for show, Roth predicts that its effects in the 
form of “Ruhm” (‘fame,’ 399) will not be sustainable: 
Und so groß die Welt auch sein mag und so winzig, mit ihr verglichen, ein Beinhorn, das fliegt, und ein 
Staubkorn, das verweht wird: Der Lärm, der um eine Weltfliegerin entsteht, ist noch größer, und noch winziger 
ist ein Ruhm, der wirklich einmal verblaßt!” (III 398-9)327 
The size ratio that had let appear ‘a classical amazon’ as an orphan boy in comparison to the 
aviator turns out to be part of the media-induced illusion (‘Trug’) that collapses with its high degree 
of transitoriness. While the myth-made amazons have a cultural impact to this day, the press-
produced woman aviator will be forgotten as quickly as it appears. The woman aviator is an emblem 
of the transitoriness associated with modern media and technology and at the same time is just its 
ephemeral casualty. This is the point where Roth’s criticism transcends most clearly a mere media or 
press criticism. Toward the end his article expresses a fear—or more positively turned: a vision—of a 
radical transitoriness of modern phenomena that breaks with the natural and cultural cycles of 
reproduction. At the time, Roth was in good company with such fears, or visions about the 
incorporation of one of the last human and biological domains: reproduction, into the realm of 
technology. Think, for instance, of the machine phantasies in Fritz Lang’s 1927 film Metropolis and 
the techological procedures of human reproduction in Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World, 
which appeared in 1932, the year after Roth’s article was published. In Roth’s description, the 
                                                   
326 “in certain awareness that the curiosity of the whole globe revolves around them just like she has once circled around 
the earth.” (My translation). 
327 “However wide the world may be and how tiny, in comparison with it, a Beinhorn that flies, and a grain of dust that 
is blown away: the noise and fuss that is made about the aeronaut is even bigger, and even tinier is the fame that will 
once fade away.” (My translation). 
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woman aviator appears to have forfeited any attributes of femininity traditionally associated with 
natural reproduction, in favor of a symbiotic relationship with modern technology: 
Wenn ihr Schoß, gewohnt an Pilotensitze und entartet zu einer Empfangsstation, wirklich einmal wirkliche 
Töchter zu der Welt bringen sollte, welche die Mutter umflogen hat, so werden diese den Aeroplan so 
selbstverständlich lenken, wie wir die Kurbel der Grammophone aufziehen, und alle Pioniertaten der 
Zivilisation von heute werden vergessen sein vor den Pioniertaten von morgen. Denn auferstehen wird nach 
dem Geschlecht des Herrn Edison ein ganz fürchterliches Geschlecht von Edi-Söhnen (die Töchter 
einbegriffen), und mit Propeller-Eile werden die Erfindungen und die Kühnheiten einander jagen, und die 
Amazonen Homers, die sich aus demonstrativen Gründen die linke Brust abgeschnitten haben, werden ein 
Muster weiblicher Natürlichkeit sein im Vergleich mit den Frauen einer Zukunft, der die weibliche Brust 
Gegenstand einer Legende ist. (III 399)328 
This passage is noteworthy concerning the way in which it intertwines a narrative of natural 
reproduction with one of technological innovation. It features a future scenario in which the 
exponential development of technological progress causes a quasi-natural adaptation of humans and 
their culture. The (cyclical) pattern of biological reproduction appears to wane in favor of 
technological progress, which is both linear and exponential. And yet, the narrative substitution 
appears not without a preposterous twist. The cyclical structure of reproduction inscribes itself into 
the linear structure of technological outdoing. Under these technological conditions, the 
reproduction of the species appears doubtable, as the word “wenn” initiating the passage is not 
temporal, but conditional, as the form of the verb “sollte” indicates and as the repetition “wirklich 
einmal wirkliche” or “really ever real” underlines. The technological future overshadows the present 
events, such as the “Pioniertaten” or “pioneering acts,” as well as the driving principles of past 
                                                   
328 “If their wombs, used to pilot seats and degenerated to a receiver station, will ever deviler real daughters to this world 
that the mother has circuited with her plane, then these daughters will steer the aeroplane as naturally as we crank up a 
gramophone; and all pioneering acts of today’s civilization will be forgotten before the pioneering acts of tomorrow. For 
after the lineage of Mr. Edison, a new generation of Edi-sons (the daughters are implied) will rise; and with propeller-
haste the inventions and audacities will chase one after another, and Homer’s amazons who cut off their breasts for 
demonstrative reasons, will be examples of natural female authenticity when compared to the women of a future that 
deems the female breast the subject of legends.” (My translation). 
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history, such as natural reproduction, and thus makes them insignificant, yes, almost cancels them 
out. 329  The concluding sentence then reveals the aviator as an ‘infertile’ harbinger of that 
overshadowing future: 
Sie [die Weltfliegerin] ist die unfruchtbare Ahnfrau, die Ahn-Läuferin, Ahn-Fliegerin, könnte man sagen, einer 
geschlechtslosen Welt, in der, was noch »Weib« genannt werden kann, Wesen im Fluge gebärt; Wesen, deren 
erster Laut kein Schrei mehr sein wird, sondern ein Surren; ein Gesurr!... (399)330 
The ‘Geschlechter’ or ‘generations’ of the future will thus live in ‘einer geschlechtslosen Welt’—‘in a 
genderless world,’ which will be populated not by beings driven by needs and emotions, but 
machine-like entities that make an impersonal noise: ‘Gesurr.’ 
The scenario Roth drafts here has no doubt a dystopian quality—note the formulation 
‘fürchterliches [!] Geschlecht von Edi-Söhnen.’ Moreover, it bears a good deal of determinism that 
consists in the peculiar fusion or entanglement of technological change with biological evolution. 
The article leaves unresolved how any meaningful and productive intervention could be possible 
within this entanglement of technology and evolution. The various ways in which National 
Socialism would entangle human life and death with technological means shortly thereafter can only 
be viewed as a very destructive intervention. In fact, this question remains widely unresolved to this 
day, when innovations in genetic engineering have largely extended the realm of the technologically 
feasible. 
                                                   
329 This can be read as a variation of that modern phenomenon the German philosopher Hermann Lübbe called 
“Gegenwartsschrumpfung” (reduction or contraction of the present). While in Lübbe’s terms,  (not the one in terms of 
time, but in terms of significance). 
330 “She is the unfertile foremother, fore-runner, fore-flyer, one could say, of a genderless world, in which, what can still 
be called ‘woman’ gives birth to creatures on the flight; creatures, whose first cry of life is no longer a cry, but a whirring 
hum!...” (My translation). 
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5. “Glauben und Fortschritt”: Critique of Progress as Political Intervention 
With Roth’s emigration in 1933331 the focus of his critical engagement with progress shifts from 
technology to a more general cultural critique with National Socialism as its declared nemesis.332 
This new orientation toward the political developments of his time did not mean that Roth’s critical 
engagement with the question of progress tailed off. Instead, he took the deep political and 
humanitarian crisis as an opportunity to integrate his critique of progress into a more comprehensive 
cultural critique. A prime example of this cultural critique of progress is a talk entitled “Glauben und 
Fortschritt,” which Roth gave on June 12, 1936 during his exile on a lecture tour in the 
Netherlands. As the title suggests, the talk incorporates a critique of progress into the context of a 
Christian worldview, reflecting the author’s rising interest in Catholicism around that time.333 In line 
with this, the lecture was subsequently published in the Dutch Catholic journal De gemeenschap in 
the same year.  
In the talk, Roth obtains the grounds for his skepticism against modern progress from a 
religious worldview. However, he pursues his line of argument in the hope that “those who are 
irreligious or unbelieving will mobilize at least a fraction of that skepticism against their own 
judgment and against progress that they mobilize against faith and religion” (III 705). Right at the 
outset he makes unmistakably clear that the relationship between faith and progress is a negative one. 
Accordingly, he states, that a more suitable title for the lecture would have been “the superstition of 
progress”—“Der Aberglaube an den Fortschritt” (III 691). An unrestrained faith in progress is 
                                                   
331 Roth left Germany for Paris on January 30, the very day when Adolf Hitler was appointed as Reich Chancellor. 
332 As striking examples for that shift cf. the articles “Der Tod der deutschen Literatur” (Le Mois, Paris, August 1933, 
published in French) and “Das Dritte Reich, Die Filiale der Hölle auf Erden,” Pariser Tageblatt, 6.7.1934), among 
others. 
333 While Roth described himself as a Catholic and increasingly integrated Christian doctrines into his written and oral 
statements, statements about his father’s alleged conversion to Catholicism appears to be yet another product of the 
author’s mythomania (Bronsen 1974, 35). 
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tantamount to idolatry—“weil er eben Götzen schafft”—as Roth states later on in the lecture 
(III 700). 
The superstition of progress—according to Roth—is identical to a general belief in the 
“victory of reason over barbarism”—a “‘Sieg der Vernunft über die Barbarei’” (III 693). In this belief 
he views “not just the cause of the historical disappointments” of his time, but also “the cause of the 
confusion” (III 693) that has overtaken the world, i.e. those developments that generate the 
disappointment in the first place. In other words, Roth views the belief in progress as both a negative 
indicator and a destructive factor of contemporary history.334 In a similar way as Roth doubts the 
value of progress as an advancing ‘victory over barbarism’ he dismisses a widerspread opinion 
according to which the “atrocities”—“Greuel” of his time are a “relapse into the Middle Ages” 
(III 694). In contrast to this, he views the drastic developments as a genuinely modern phenomenon, 
since, unlike the atrocities of the Middle Ages, they do not occur in the name of god or religion, but 
in the name of “the common practice principle of a human force”—“des gang und gäbe 
Gesetzlichen einer menschlichen Gewalt” (III 694). 
As the two main materializations of this principle Roth identifies modern technology and 
competitive sports. The two phenomena, according to him, have in common that they lure with a 
promise that they actually do not fulfill: 
                                                   
334 Reinhart Koselleck would later insistently point at this double-sided reality of ‘progress’—by virtue of being a basic 
concepts of history—as indicator and factor (Koselleck 1975, 412). Taking Roth’s polemical take on his time’s blind faith 
in progress seriously, this observation can be extended to the reality of progress as a mere idealogy. 
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Leider verbinden die Flugzeuge und die Radioapparate—die neuesten Errungenschaften der Technik—die 
Völker ebensowenig wie der Sport. Sie stellen höchstens geschäftliche Beziehungen her zwischen den 
Fluggesellschaften und den Fabrikanten der Radioapparate. (III 698)335 
But apart from this empty promise of uniting the people of this world, Roth sees another connection 
between the two phenomena in that progress in general, and modern technology in particular, 
increasingly assimilate themselves to the practice of competitive sports. In a first step, Roth states 
that thought and reflection have lost their status as a driving force of progress to invention: 
Das Erfinden hat geradezu den Platz des Denkens eingenommen. Und die Ehren, die vorher dem Denken 
vorbehalten waren, haben wir dem Erfinden eingeräumt; und nicht nur dem Erfinden, sondern dem 
Erfundnenen; und nicht nur dem Erfundenen, sondern dem Nutznießer des Erfundenen. (III 699)336 
Although it is not made explicit in the lecture, this step means in other words that progress in 
general is reduced primarily to technological progress, which advances not through an ever more 
profound knowledge of the human and non-human world, but through the ongoing creation of new 
objects, procedures, and ideas. In a second step, as described in Roth’s lecture, the logic of invention 
is reduced to a logic of mere outdoing and surpassing, into a logic of setting and breaking records of 
others. This logic operates on principles in the form of profane commandments such as: “‘Fly 
higher, or faster, than thy neighbor!’—‘Outperform thy neighbor!’—‘Defeat thy neighbor—yes, 
even on the murderous principle: ‘Annihilate thy neighbor!’” (III 701)337 In this fashion, the way of 
dealing with technology increasingly conforms to the practice of competitive sport, i.e. to a principle 
                                                   
335 “Unfortunately, airplanes and radio receivers—the newest achievements of technology—connect people just as little 
as sports does. They establish business relations, if at all, between the airlines and the factory owners, and the owners of 
the radio receiver factories.” (My translation). 
336 “Invention has taken the place of thinking. We have granted the same honors to invention that were previously 
reserved to thinking; and not only to invention, but to what has been invented; and not only to what has been invented, 
but to the beneficiaries of it.” (My translation). 
337 “‘Fliege höher, oder schneller, als dein Nächster!’—‘Übertriff deinen Nächsten!’—‘Besiege deinen Nächsten!’—Ja, 
sogar, nach dem mörderischen Grundsatz: ‚Vernichte deinen Nächsten!’” (III 701). 
 226 
of competition rather than of cooperation.338 Although this is not made explicit in the lecture, the 
climactic succession of the quoted commandments suggests that a pure logic of competition will 
ultimately result in destruction and mutual annihilation, as expressed in the commandment 
“Annihilate thy neighbor” (III 701). 
However harsh Roth’s critique of the faith in progress may seem, he nevertheless underlines 
that he is not a fierce opponent of modern civilization. 
Halten Sie mich bitte weder für einen törichten Feind der Technik noch einen des Sports, noch einen stupiden 
Gegner der sogenannten Zivilisation! Es handelt sich mir nur um den Versuch, die gebotenen und natürlichen 
Maße wiederherzustellen und die natürliche Hierarchie der Werte. (III 698-9)339 
Instead of proposing to do away with progress, sports, and modern technology altogether, Roth 
prescribes the following therapy to his audience, in order to “restore […] the natural hierarchy of 
values” and to push back progress to its legitimate confines: First, he advises not to take the “so-
called visible insignia” of human reason—i.e. progress and technological inventions—as proofs 
thereof. Second, he admonishes his audience not to view the “so-called technological achievements” 
(III 702) as a “triumph of human reason,” but at best as mere means to gain time for us to make use 
of reason. And third, Roth exhorts the public to remain aware that “the so-called progress,” if 
reduced to a mere logic of outdoing is “no evidence for the growth of human reason […], but can 
rather occasionally mean a regress of human reason” (III 702). Concluding his argument, Roth 
proposes to acknowledge that reason is not an end in itself, but a mere means to promote the 
                                                   
338 Although Roth does not use the two concepts explicitly, his statements can be read against the backdrop of a larger 
theoretical debate around the evolutionary opposition of cooperation vs. competition, harking back to Peter Kropotkin’s 
1902 book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. While Darwinism decidedly put the emphasis on competition, Kropotkin 
was one of the first to stress the significance of cooperation for the evolutionary process. 
339 “Please don’t take me for a foolish technophobe or an enemy of sports, nor a stupid opponent of so-called civilization! 
My concern is simply to try and reestablish the requisite and natural dimensions, as well as the natural hierarchy of 
values.” (My translation). 
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(religious) principle of love instead of viewing progress as evidence for—the growth of—human 
reason: “stellen wir vor allem die Vernunft in den Dienst dessen, wozu sie uns gegeben ist: nämlich 
in den Dienst der Liebe” (III 704). By restoring this Christian teleology, 340  Roth states that 
technological inventions should be viewed rather as “waste products” of reason than as its 
“triumphs”. In this spirit, he concludes his talk by calling upon his audience “not to succumb to the 
tyranny of the most merciless dictator” (III 704)—whom he identifies not with the Führer, but with 
modern progress itself. 
Even though the lecture is featured within the volumes “Das journalistische Werk” in the 
Kiepenheuer & Witsch edition, it cannot be ascribed to the same genre as the other texts that this 
chapter deals with. “Glauben und Fortschritt” is clearly not a feuilleton commentary, but a public 
talk held in the context of a clear political agenda. Even in the version published in the same year in 
the journal De gemeenschap, the text exhibits the typical markers of a direct political intervention 
with an immediate address to an audience, rather than the reflexive observations featured in the 
feuilleton pieces. Accordingly, Roth appears in a different role, not as the well-known feuilleton 
journalist, but as an author of novels and novellas who now seeks direct contact with the public. As a 
result, the text is more argumentative and less speculative or fictional, as is reflected in the opening 
remarks of the talk. The first paragraph describes the speech situation such that an author of fiction 
abandons this role for a moment, under the impression of disturbing historical circumstances, in 
order to address his audience in a more direct way. To the extent that this change of roles is an 
exceptional situation, it also appears problematic and difficult to carry out: 
                                                   
340 Roth makes explicit reference to a passage in Thomas Aquinas: “‘Aller menschlichen Werke Quelle ist die Vernunft. 
Besonders aber für die Werke der Liebe.’” (III 703) 
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[…] es ist, sage ich, schwer für einen Schriftsteller, dessen natürlicher Ausdruck das in der Einsamkeit 
geschriebene Wort ist, zum gesprochenen zu greifen. Damit solches zustande komme, muß das Unheil, das in 
der Welt grassiert, so groß sein, daß die Stummen zum Reden gezwungen werden. (III 691)341 
This exceptional status does not apply to Roth’s practice as a journalist, even though Roth’s 
feuilleton pieces deal for a good part with the same topics as the talk “Glauben und Fortschritt,” e.g. 
progress, modern technology, competition, and the like. At the same time, he contrasts the particular 
speech situation of the lecture not with his persona as a journalist, but with his role as a writer of 
fiction: ‘belletristischer Autor’ ‘Romancier,’ ‘Novellist’ (III 691). What is more, in the lecture there is 
not even an explicit mention of Roth’s prolific journalistic work. While Roth’s feuilleton thus marks 
a blind spot in his lecture in spite of the significant thematic overlaps, it is all the more important to 
ask how these two different forms of engagement with the phenomenon of progress relate to one 
another. 
There is no doubt that “Glauben und Fortschritt” is the document of a radical change in the 
author’s mindset. The lecture reflects Roth’s alleged conversion to Catholicism, or at least his serious 
commitment to a Christian worldview. Moreover, it expresses his willingness to make a clear 
statement with socio-political relevance or impact, embedded in a more comprehensive, ideological 
framework. This is to say that he abandons for a moment not only his role as ‘novellist’ or ‘belletrist,’ 
but also his role as journalist, which is characterized by a rather descriptive and speculative attitude, 
as illustrated by the phrase “I draw the face of time”—“Ich zeichne das Gesicht der Zeit.” However, 
“Glauben und Fortschritt” should not be read as an overcoming of the merits manifested by Roth’s 
technographic journalism. In other words, the lecture does not integrate in a continuum leading 
                                                   
341 “[…] I say it is difficult for a writer to rise to speak whose natural form of expression is the word written in solitude. 
Before this happens, the calamity in the world must have grown so much that the dumb are forced to talk.” (My 
translation). 
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from Roth’s earlier views of technological progress to a culmination of those views in this talk. The 
straightforward argument developed in the lecture can be taken as a foil of comparison that makes 
the program manifested in Roth’s technographic feuilleton even clearer. 
The lecture describes the socio-political calamities, the “Unheil, das in der Welt grassiert,” 
not as the reason for a crisis for Roth, the journalist, but for Roth, the author of fiction. This crisis 
for the “belletristic author” consists in the fact that in the moral twilight or “non-light,” where it is 
impossible to tell good from evil, it is equally impossible for the novelist “to see, let alone to shape 
(gestalten), a human being” (III 692): 
“Wir, die sogenannten ‘Belletristen’, wir könnten sagen, daß wir uns nach jenen Zeiten zurücksehnen, in denen 
ein Bösewicht noch ein Bösewicht war, ein guter Mensch ein guter Mensch, dem Lügner nicht getraut werden 
konnte, dem Wahrheitsliebenden Kredit gegeben werden mußte.” (III 692)342 
The technographic pieces that have been discussed here clearly do not depict and shape such human 
characters or agents who would be the “carriers and executors of moral laws”—“Träger und 
Vollstrecker der sittlichen Gesetze” (III 692). Just as little do they describe a universe of “moral 
action” (“sittliches Handeln” III 697). 
The fact that Roth’s role as a journalist appears as a blind spot in the lecture indicates that 
the position he takes in the technographic feuilleton is not overcome, but rather buried in view of 
the “calamity” of the historical circumstances. “Glauben und Fortschritt” is not a continuation of the 
author’s sophisticated engagement with the ambivalence of progress, but rather a withdrawal from it. 
As such, it is particularly valuable as a negative foil of comparison to better understand the particular 
value of the technoraphic pieces. 
                                                   
342 “We, the so-called ‘writers of the belles lettres,’ we can say that we wish ourselves back to the times when a villain was 
still a villain, when a good man was still a good man, when a liar could not be trusted, and when a truth-loving person 
had to be believed.” (My translation). 
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A conventional model of action or Handlung—understood as human agency clearly 
embedded in a teleological framework—is not what is at play in Roth’s technographic feuilleton. 
The particular value of the technographic pieces is rather that they explore transhuman structures of 
agency, in which humans are still present, but generally not in the position to decide over the course 
of events, nor on its overall purpose. The prevalence of such structures in Roth’s technographic 
feuilleton indicates a deeper insight into the fact that describing and understanding them is essential 
to a meaningful existence in a present and future world. Proponents of cybernetics would later foster 
thoughts similar to what Roth observes with regard to the technology of his times. Cybernetics, 
however, is generally affirmative of the new trans-human dimensions of emerging technologies. It 
lacks the politically critical stance Roth takes in his technographic feuilleton. 
When Roth, in “Glauben und Fortschritt,” turns to a rather classical model of agency—
where humans are viewed as “carriers and executors of moral laws” (III 692), this does not mean that 
his previous insights are now declared obsolete. The lecture rather suggests an intuition that under 
the pressing circumstances, political and moral action is a more adequate behavior than speculative 
description of the structures of change.343 Perhaps this intervention could be called a reflected form 
of actionism in view of an alarming historical situation. 
                                                   
343 Such an interpretation is fully in line with the concluding sentence of Jeffrey Herf’s book Reactionary Modernism: 
“The challenges created by the second industrial revolution were not to be mastered by philosophical speculation on 
technology and the soul.” (Herf 1984, 235). 
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Universal history must be construed and denied. […] No 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but 
there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. 





1. Theoretical Framework and Epistemological Challenges 
The reflections resulting in this dissertation started with a basic intuition concerning the relation 
between individual literary narratives and history at large. If the understanding of history at a given 
time rests on certain unspoken assumptions about the nature of time, eventfulness, and agency, then 
literary narratives in their capacity of being fictional can both reveal and challenge these 
assumptions. Within this theoretical framework, I intended to demonstrate how the idea of 
technological progress is attested and contested by literary narratives that deal with technological 
change in the early twentieth century. My hope was that the individual texts would help deepen our 
understanding of technological change and thereby also enable us to engage more productively with 
emerging technologies in our own day. Admittedly, this research goal is rather ambitious and 
anything but usual within the epistemic scope of literary or cultural studies. But a bold approach 
seemed fitting in times like ours, when emerging technologies jeopardize both the medial status of 
literature and the place of the humanities in society. 
The idea of social and moral progress has come under repeated scrutiny as a guiding 
paradigm of universal history since the late nineteenth century, and in academic discourse it has 
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widely been rebuked for its normative implications.344 But technological progress, too, relies more 
critically on construal than Adorno makes us believe with the above-cited dictum. In order to 
increase our awareness of this construal and its narratological preconditions, we are well advised to 
turn to fiction so as to complement factual historiography of technology by observations about 
alternative ways of narration. This epistemological setting comes with a high risk of arbitrariness, as 
the link between the literary narratives and history at large is not one concerning the told facts, but 
rather the forms and techniques of narration. Told facts lend themselves to procedures of 
verification, falsification, and comparison. The ways in which things are told, in contrast, often defy 
such techniques of objectifiability. 
Within the field of literary studies, this has found reflection in a “Pluralisierungsschub” or 
“push toward pluralization,” as well as in the widely accepted assessment that “[w]eder im Hinblick 
auf den Gegenstandsbereich noch im Hinblick auf Theorie- und Methodenoptionen sei Konsens zu 
erzielen.” (Müller 2016, “Genealogie als Herausforderung,” 35)345. In view of this pluralism of 
contents and methods, Harro Müller proposes that literary studies rely on a well-founded theory of 
modernity, understood as a social theory, so as to maintain an active relation with its own historical 
present (Müller 2016, “Genealogie als Herausforderung,” 35). Müller’s recommendation is 
appropriate and vital in times like these, when literary studies is increasingly coming under pressure 
from various angles. However, I would like to complement his proposal with two demands towards 
such a theory of modernity. Firstly, it has to be open and permeable enough to be adjusted, 
corrected, and refined by literary studies’ own methods and findings (narrative theory, philological 
                                                   
344 Cf. Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory for a summary of the 
main objections to progress as an uncontested principle of historical thought from a post-structuralist and post-
colonialist perspective. 
345 “Consensus can be achieved neither regarding the exact subject area of the field, nor concerning preferable options of 
theories and methods.” (My translation). 
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method, theory of language and style, etc.); secondly, a theory of modernity cannot do without a 
profound and continued engagement with modern technology—which cannot be limited to media 
theory, but which will also have to include in-depth reflections of the process properties of 
technological change or technization. 
Aside from these rather general methodological concerns, the textual basis I chose posed its 
own challenges regarding the literary analysis, as well as the theoretical knowledge it can yield. The 
first of these challenges lies in the generic disparities between the single texts: Walser’s Der Gehülfe is 
a relatively conventional novel—albeit characterized by a minimum of eventfulness and a maximum 
of irony; Scheerbart’s Das Perpetuum Mobile should be viewed as an experimental intervention on 
the borders of literary fiction; and Roth’s technographic feuilleton is constituted by a series of 
attempts at linking the up-to-dateness (German ‘Aktualität’) of modern news reporting with a 
profound interpretation of the technological condition of modern temporality. 
These disparities made it difficult to compare the texts with one another in general terms, 
and their low degree of familiarity posed obstacles to an in-depth analysis of the individual texts. 
None of the discussed texts is by any means canonical, especially not in the English-speaking realm. 
Hence, their literary content and historical context had to be introduced quite comprehensively 
before I could zero in on their specific yield concerning the research question. Moreover, the basis of 
literary material discussed in this dissertation is rather narrow, and the textual analysis cannot claim 
to provide a comprehensive empirical foundation to a greater argument concerning the notions of 
technological progress in the sense of its history of ideas. Hence, the three chapters are meant to be 
exploratory case studies investigating how each of the three authors tackles the challenge of narrating 
technological change beyond the notion of linear progress. Each of the three case studies opens up a 
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different perspective on how technology change could be construed if the common assumptions 
associated with progress are set aside. Their juxtaposition, so I hope, could supply the impetus to 
future narratologies of technological change. In addition, the hypothesis about a crisis of ‘progress’ as 
a basic concept of history around 1900 and through the first decades of the twentieth century served 
as an epistemic lens sharpening the view on the individual texts and deepening our understanding of 
their literary value. In the following, I will summarize the results of the three case studies before 
concluding with a reflection on the significance these texts have in the context of historical and 
current discourses concerning progress and technological change. 
2. Summary of the Chapters 
In order to understand the particular form of Der Gehülfe and the narratological innovation it 
implies, I have contextualized Walser’s novel within a tradition of employee’s literature. The 
employee figure features as an emerging character type and perhaps as a prime representative of the 
Second Industrial Revolution.346 Employees appear in literature in a peculiar form of concealment and 
denial (German ‘Verschwiegenheit’), coupled with a topical novelty claim wherever they occupy 
prominent positions (in Melville’s Bartleby, in Walser’s short prose, and later in Kracauer’s Salaried 
Masses). These literary characters appear as alter egos of writers, as their masked personas and 
informants within an increasingly technicized, professionalized, and differentiated (German 
‘ausdifferenzierenden’) modern world.347 The associated literary genre, employee’s literature, comes 
                                                   
346 In this role, the employee has his alter ego in the inventor-engineer. The two form a pair in much the same way as 
(blue collar) workers and capitalists are the prime representatives of the First Industrial Revolution. 
347 Think of Franz Kafka in his ‘day job’ as a clerk for the Arbeiter-Unfallversicherungs-Anstalt or Workers Casualty 
Insurance Company, to name just one prominent example. 
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with the narratological challenge of giving center stage to a subordinate character, i.e. a character 
who by definition can neither act nor speak freely. 
The narratological setting of Der Gehülfe intensifies this challenge by narrating the story 
from the employee’s perspective, which is to say that the narrative focalization lies primarily on the 
employee Joseph Marti. Walser meets this challenge by employing a narratological innovation that I 
labeled ‘kaleidoscopic narration’. The focus of narration oscillates in a space between the 
characters—primarily the assistant and his employer—rather than zeroing in on one single 
individual. In this way, Walser’s novel constitutes a complex web of speech acts that does not 
perpetuate the master-servant power relationship,348 but rather subverts it by way of a sophisticated 
texture of irony and free indirect speech. 
This narrative constellation as it is portrayed in Walser’s novel can be read as a miniature 
model of history, except that this model does not appear to actually work. The novel portrays 
Tobler’s ‘technisches Büro’ as a dysfunctional germ cell of progress. Neither are the two main 
characters able to act out agency (as true ‘prot-agonists’) by effectively changing the course of things 
or even by simply carrying the action forward. Nor do the events seem to have an educational effect 
on the characters, e.g. in the sense of the generic plot of a Bildungsroman. In Walser’s miniature 
model, progress fails as a paradigm of history if understood both as a collective learning process and 
as a process of increasing technological mastery. Moreover, the social structure portrayed in the novel 
defies common notions of historical agency as well as the usual conceptions of the subject of history: 
The relationship between the inventor-entrepreneur Carl Tobler and his employee Joseph Marti 
defies a description along the lines of the Hegelian dialectic between master and servant (although 
                                                   
348 In this point, my reading of Der Gehülfe differs from a line of scholarship that has interpreted the novel primarily 
through the lens of the master-servant relationship (Rüsch 1983; Wagner 1980; Borchmeyer 1980). 
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the novel cites it explicitly), between great ‘world-historical individuals’ and ‘maintaining 
individuals’ (German ‘welthistorische’ und ‘erhaltende Individuen’), or the Marxian understanding 
of history as class struggle; the novel names socialism as a historically effective—albeit 
questionable—trend. Through the periscope of the employment situation, Walser’s narration breaks 
with such binary oppositions that have long served as the epistemic lens for an understanding of 
progressive change in history. Instead, the novel sheds a critical light on the complicit dependency 
between instrumental understandings of technology on the one hand, and the way change in 
history—i.e. technological progress—is construed on the other hand. 
In my reading of Walser’s novel I have consciously conflated three levels of literary analysis 
that are usually neatly kept apart. The first one is the level of the interaction between the single 
characters represented by the narrative; the second level concerns the act of narration represented 
within a work of fiction; and the third level is constituted by the theoretical implications of the text 
concerning an altered understanding of historical reality. The reason why I conflate these three levels 
in my analysis is that I view Walser’s novel as a critical engagement with the very principles of 
narration concerning both the constitution of literary fiction and the understanding of history. 
When the two main characters in Walser’s novel first meet, their conversation sets the stage 
for a critical engagement with the ‘technological condition’ of agency. Tobler says he needs no 
machine, but a head, i.e. an intelligent entity as an employee, because ‘a machine cannot serve him.’ 
The entrepreneur’s admonition not only indicates that the distinguishing line between humans and 
technology has become blurry—machines can replace humans and some humans act like machines. 
But it also suggests that the existence of machines in the workplace has become a threat to the 
human ability to act autonomously, and to serve others. This and the animistic descriptions of the 
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inventions give rise to the impression that the instrumental paradigm (in the sense of instrumental 
reason) has entered a crisis in the world depicted in this novel. 
The critical point in my argument is that this crisis of the instrumental paradigm affects not 
only the power relationship between the two main characters within the world of the novel, but also 
the way in which this world is represented through the act of narration. The story is told from a 
position within, oscillating between internal and external focalization, while focalizing primarily on 
the subordinate position of the employee Joseph. However, the described strategy of ‘kaleidoscopic 
focalization’ disrupts the binary and asymmetric hierarchy of master and servant, or to be more 
specific, between employer and employee. The narration is neither in favor of the employer and his 
inventive enterprise, nor does it clearly take sides with the employee. Not only do the machines, i.e. 
the inventions, fail to serve; but the employee fails to serve, too, in that he subverts the faith in the 
purpose of the ‘enterprise’ at large, hence ultimately the faith in the sense of progress. A critical part 
of this service would be for the employee to wholeheartedly propagate the optimistic spirit driving 
the enterprise of technological progress. And Joseph fails, or refuses, to do so for various reasons. But 
just as little can he sing the song of technological pessimism, since he is complicit with the ‘technical 
office’ in his role as Tobler’s employee. In brief, Walser’s employee’s novel reveals the instrumental 
condition of modern history if understood as an enterprise to make progress credible as the telos of 
human activity.349 
                                                   
349 A striking resemblance connects this superimposition of historical narration and the instrumental power relationship 
adumbrated by Walser’s novel on the one hand with Walter Benjamin’s project of brushing history against the grain as 
sketched out in his theses on The Concept of History on the other hand. Benjamin proclaims: “The danger [confronting 
the historical subject] threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it. For both, it is one and the 
same thing: the danger of becoming a tool [!] of the ruling classes. Every age must strive anew to wrest tradition away 
from the conformism that is working to overpower it.” (Benjamin 2006, 391).  
Like Benjamin’s take on historical materialism, Walser’s novel reveals how the instrumental power relation is at work in 
the narrative construal of history itself. However, there is one important difference between Benjamin’s concept of 
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The premise of Der Gehülfe can be formulated in the form of a question: What if technology 
serves no purpose other than maintaining the power and legitimacy of the employers? Within the 
logic of the novel, the inventions’ shortcomings and failure shake the faith in the greater purpose of 
the enterprise. But reading the narrative composition against the grain, this logic can actually be 
reversed. Progress would then appear as a great advertising campaign in place to convince humanity 
of the overall purpose of technological innovation. 
However, the novel is not a conspiracy theory against the world leadership of the engineering 
mind. Its narratological setup rather highlights the instrumental rationale inherent to the notion of 
progress if understood as a way of construing a story, and not least of construing history at large. In 
revealing and challenging this instrumental rationale, Walser’s novel points in a similar direction as 
Walter Benjamin’s theses on The Concept of History. In this late fragment, Benjamin proclaims: 
The danger [confronting the historical subject] threatens both the content of the tradition and those who 
inherit it. For both, it is one and the same thing: the danger of becoming a tool [!] of the ruling classes. Every 
age must strive anew to wrest tradition away from the conformism that is working to overpower it. (Benjamin 
2006, 391) 
Like Benjamin’s take on historical materialism, Walser’s novel reveals how the instrumental power 
relation is at work in the narrative construal of history itself. However, there is one important 
difference between Benjamin’s concept of history and the picture painted by Walser’s novel. In 
Benjamin’s media-conscious version of historical materialism, the instrumental condition of history 
generally stays intact; it has to be overwritten, always anew, by the class-conscious historical 
                                                                                                                                                                    
history and the picture painted by Walser’s novel. In Benjamin’s media-conscious version of historical materialism, the 
instrumental condition of history generally stays intact; it has to be overwritten, always anew, by the class-conscious 
historical materialists of a given age. The picture painted by Walser’s novel, in contrast, debunks the instrumental power 
relation between ruling and ruled classes as being undermined from the start; under the given technological conditions, 
the practice of ruling and serving appears to the same degree obsolete as modern technology defies any notions of 
instrumentality. 
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materialists of a given age. The picture painted by Walser’s novel, in contrast, debunks the 
instrumental power relation between ruling and ruled classes as being undermined from the start; 
under the given technological conditions, the practice of ruling and serving appears to the same 
degree obsolete as modern technology defies any notions of instrumentality. 
Walser’s depiction of Tobler’s inventions plays a crucial role in this critique of the idea of 
progress. The inventions serve, if any, only questionable or absurd purposes. In their overall failure 
as meaningful and functional devices, they cast doubt at the general notion of technology as a tool in 
the service of human emancipation, or on the idea of man’s domination over nature. Tobler’s 
inventions could not be more of a flop as commodities in the marketplace. The fact that they 
nevertheless play a central role in the novel can be read as a critique of modernity’s inherent 
tendency toward reification.  
If successful, a modern invention can be described as an operation of transformation from 
singularity into seriality. At the moment of its first occurrence, the new device or process is unique, 
but the inventive process is not complete until this initial uniqueness is transformed into the seriality 
of industrial production and commodification.  
According to Reinhart Koselleck, the modern notion of progress has brought along a 
decoupling of historical time from natural cycles. This ‘denaturalization of the experience of time’ 
has its main condition in ‘technical factors of acceleration’ (Koselleck 2000, 153–68). In other 
words, modern technology plays a central role in modernity’s emancipation from natural time, in 
that it helps replacing cycles of recurrence increasingly by linear developments of acceleration and 
greater efficiency. If Der Gehülfe gives a picture of this genuinely modern temporality as Koselleck 
describes it, then this picture is much like a photographic negative. The technology presented in the 
 240 
novel does not represent acceleration, but rather stagnation. Tobler’s inventions do not bring about 
progressive change or carry forward a linear development, but instead they feature as elements in a 
farce of absurd repetitions. The course of natural cycles, on the contrary, is experienced as a 
bothersome disruption. They mark temporal progression while the technological enterprise remains 
in a deadlock. The situation is similar where the novel depicts technology as a form of direct 
intervention in the environment. Tobler’s landscaping project and his undertakings to electrify his 
estate and the lot around it do not amount to a technological emancipation from nature. Instead of 
establishing a consistent chronotope easier to control for humans, Tobler’s landscaping and 
electrification campaign appears in the form of irrational, unpredictable whims that bears more 
resemblance with the force of nature than with a human plan. 
As amply demonstrated above, Der Gehülfe does not draw a very positive picture of modern 
technology. Carl Tobler’s inventions are petty and useless, to say the least. The entrepreneur’s 
ostensive use of the railroad and the telegraph seem pretentious, frivolous, and futile, and so does the 
entrepreneur’s obsession with landscaping and electrifying his property. However, reading the novel 
as a trite example of neo-Luddism, i.e. a crude rejection of modern technology, would mean to 
disregard its complex narratological construction. Der Gehülfe places the mediatedness of 
technological change center stage by hinting at the technological condition of a modern employment 
situation (Herr-Knecht, Kopf-Maschine) and by spelling out how the belief in the utility of 
technological inventions is subject to public relations and marketing. Hence, Walser cannot be 
counted among the ‘adversaries of progress’ or ‘Fortschrittsfeinde’ with whom Rolf Peter Sieferle 
dealt in his influential book of the same title. Der Gehülfe does not perpetuate an ‘opposition to 
technology and industry’ (as the subtitle of Sieferle’s book has it), but instead it draws attention to 
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the erosion of progress as a narrative paradigm to make sense of technological and societal change. 
Not only is there no progression within the novel regarding the development and activities of the 
characters. But even the typical representatives of technological progress: the inventor and his 
inventions, appear as empty promises. 
To conclude, rather than debunking the use and benefit of modern technology, Walser’s 
novel represents a profound critique of progress understood as a way of understanding technological 
and societal change. I read the ludicrous manifestations of modern technology in the novel as well as 
the characters’ manic and obsessive engagement with them as symptoms of a crisis of progress. The 
novel gives the impression that technological progress has eroded from a grand récit promising to 
humanity ever greater mastery and emancipation into a mere farce and an ideology harmful to 
society and to humanity’s relationship with nature. 
Walser’s novel exposes the absurdity and failure of progress by zooming in on its 
microcosmic workings. The techno-obsessions of a failing engineer and the pettiness of his useless 
inventions appear as a small-scale caricature of progress, as the concept has deteriorated from a grand 
historical idea into a mere ideology. Der Gehülfe gives not even a mere hint at how this failure of 
progress could be resolved. Neither within the microcosm of the technological enterprise it depicts, 
nor in the bigger meta-historical picture it adumbrates. 
In direct contrast to Walser’s ‘poetics of the small,’ Paul Scheerbart with his Perpetual Motion 
finds the absurdity of technological progress in the superlative dimension. The narrator’s ambition of 
inventing the perpetual motion machine is a project of superhuman and trans-historical proportions, 
and if its success would result in a super-invention that would not only entail innumerable further 
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innovations, but, as Scheerbart’s peculiar narrative setup suggests, it would also overthrow the entire 
logic of history. 
In accordance with the megalomania of its content, the book defies any classification along 
the lines of common distinctions between fiction and non-fiction, or among literary genres. I 
therefore decided to read Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion as a literary intervention that transcends the 
boundaries of conventional literature so as to provoke reflections on the literary conditions of the 
distinction and mutual dependencies between fiction and historical truth. Such a reading gains 
plausibility if viewed against the backdrop of Scheerbart’s role as an author and visionary whose 
activities and impact on others bridged the gap between otherworldly fantasy and technological 
feasibility. 
In Das Perpetuum Mobile, this hybridity between fact and fiction manifests in an exceptional 
form of a literary truth claim. Generally speaking, truth claims in literature can be roughly 
distinguished into two subclasses. When a text claims for itself to be ‘based on a true story,’ such a 
self-referential statement serves either as a legitimation gesture of fictional discourse, or as a subtle 
suggestion establishing poetological reflections. While Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion certainly falls 
under the latter category, it also transcends and subverts it, by virtue of turning the relation between 
fiction and truth upside down. The literary depiction of the inventive project in the book is actually 
embedded within the author’s own biography. Correspondences and eyewitness testimonies show 
evidence that Scheerbart himself in fact worked on such an invention. The claim that the invention 
is successful can of course only be classified as fiction, since the very possibility of a perpetual motion 
machine contradicts the common understanding of reality as governed by the laws of nature—in this 
case the first law of thermodynamics. In this sense, Scheerbart’s book constitutes the opposite of 
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what we call ‘hard science fiction’ today.350 However, by claiming the possibility of the perpetual 
motion machine in spite of an established law of nature, Scheerbart does not perpetuate a pre-
modern, or else fantastic, belief in miracles. Instead, he points at the historicity, and thus at the 
temporary-provisional nature of modern science. Scheerbart’s narrator singlehandedly transforms the 
history of science from a linear progression toward greater knowledge (about the true workings of 
nature) into a sequence of contingent, potentially reversible events; this literary transformation 
culminates in the reference to Julius Robert Mayer’s failed attempt at inventing the perpetual motion 
machine. In Scheerbart’s version of the history of science, Mayer’s failure at inventing the perpetual 
motion machine has motivated the scientist to formulate the law of conservation of energy. The 
story (Geschichte) of the (successful) invention hence not only means to falsify the first law of 
thermodynamics, but also the idea of modern history, as we know it.351 
Scheerbart’s text makes explicit and repeated mention of energy conservation, and of Julius 
Robert Mayer. The first law of thermodynamics, although not labeled as such, thus plays a crucial 
role in the book. In contrast to this, the idea of increasing entropy as formulated in the second law of 
thermodynamics lingers only in the background of this text. However, considering its ubiquity in 
intellectual debates at the time (Neswald 2006), it may serve as a key to a deeper understanding of 
Scheerbart’s text.  
                                                   
350 While definitions vary, hard science fiction is generally viewed as a projection of what we deem possible under the 
laws of nature today, into a different, (usually) future reality (Cramer 2003). 
351 Reversing the logical dependency between technological invention and law of nature also implies an emancipation of 
technology as a system of knowledge practice partly independent of modern science and hence able to have an impact on 
the latter. Scheerbart’s (or his narrator’s) rebellious disregard of the law of nature thus suggests a paradigm shift 
concerning the relation between science and technology. Since the sixteenth century, technology had in so far been 
subordinate to science as the same laws that science formulated in their universal validity for nature also governed 
modern technology (Hermann 2010, 54). Since then, modern technology had no longer been a cunning trick to 
outsmart nature, but a productive use of its lawful conditions for human purposes. When Scheerbart’s narrator claims 
the perpetual motion machine possible against the law of energy conservation, this indicates a leap into a new age where 
modern science is gradually turning into a practice of enhancing technological feasibility. 
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Entropy as it features in classical thermodynamics can be described as the flipside of the 
modern notion of progress. Both the idea of progress and the law of entropy fill the indeterminate 
notion of modern time, i.e. irreversibility, with a more concrete meaning, a prospect. Progress 
promises that the irreversible advancement of time correlates with a gradual improvement of the 
human condition—be it in the form of emancipation or greater mastery and domination. The law of 
entropy, on the contrary, states that this very irreversibility correlates with an ever-greater measure of 
chaos until it reaches its natural end in the form of the ‘heat death of the universe.’ If this continuous 
increase of entropy holds true for the universe, then progress seems like humanity’s desperate and 
quixotic attempt at fighting windmills.352 Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion, in contrast to this, seems to 
suggest an even bolder resolution. In the book, the narrator concretely explores the following 
question: Why not come up with a super-invention that does not simply equip humanity with a 
surplus of energy to counter the progressing decay, but that topples, by its mere possibility the very 
irreversibility regime of modern temporality. The potential of “moving mountains” (“Berge 
versetzen,” PM 381) with the perpetual motion machine appears like nothing more than a spatial 
surface phenomenon of a more profound transformation concerning the temporality of nature and 
of history. The narrator’s repeated reference to the invention as “die Geschichte” is more than just a 
quirk of the author’s diction. It is rather a cunning poetic trick with which Scheerbart signals that 
the preoccupation with this peculiar, technological device is in fact a meditation on the very notions 
of history, story, and invention. 
If Scheerbart’s ‘self-driving’ machine were to work, this would topple the temporal 
foundations of modern physics and of modern history in one fell swoop. At the time, the laws of 
                                                   
352  Post-classical thermodynamics—since Ilya Prigogine’s revolutionary insights in the 1960s—overcomes this 
conundrum by no longer viewing the universe as a closed system (De Landa 2000, 14). 
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thermodynamics were not just some scientific tenets among others, but they lay at the foundations 
of the period’s understanding of the universe and of natural time as irreversibility. The possibility of 
the perpetual motion machine directly contradicts at least the energy conservation law, and with it 
the entire paradigm of thermodynamics. Considering the foundational status that thermodynamics 
had and still has, challenging its laws would also mean to shake the widespread notion of science as 
an advancing accumulation of knowledge. The single event of Scheerbart’s invention would hence 
undermine not just the prevailing understanding of nature; but it would also challenge the very 
historical chronology that is the condition of possibility to all past, present, and future events. 
In the way it appears in Scheerbart’s book, the perpetual motion machine would be a true 
super-invention. This is to say that its coming into existence would spawn a chain reaction of 
innumerous other inventions and ideas. Much like the fifth essence in alchemy, perpetual motion 
bears in itself the spirit of inventiveness as such, and its unprecedented powers would render physical 
work and human labor useless. With these qualities, the perpetual motion machine would 
undermine any instrumental understanding of technology. Scheerbart’s invention of the perpetual 
motion machine is where both an instrumental idea of technology and a progressive, accumulative 
notion of history explode—much like the nuclear bomb would mid-century in a realm beyond 
fiction.353  In this way, Scheerbart’s book unfolds the fixed idea of an absolute invention—the 
perpetual motion machine—to challenge the instrumental presupposition within the modern 
concept of history. 
                                                   
353 Concerning the philosophical consequences of this technological invention cf. Günther Anders’s magnum opus Die 
Antiquiertheit des Menschen, particularly the chapter “Über die Bombe und die Wurzeln unserer Apokalypse-Blindheit” 
(Anders 1994, 233–324). Regarding the changed conditions of agency resulting from the ‘postnuclear’ condition also cf. 
Diego Compagna’s book Postnukleare Handlungstheorie (Compagna 2015). 
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Scheerbart’s Perpetual Motion explores the deeper link between the concepts of ‘Geschichte’ 
and ‘Erfindung’ as they appear in the book’s subtitle. The author thus recognizes radical 
technological change—as represented by the super-invention of the perpetual motion machine—as a 
challenge to historical and literary narration. A few years after Scheerbart, Joseph Roth makes his 
own literary attempts at rendering technological change tellable. The two authors start with a similar 
baseline, but they carry out their technological meditations in quite different mediums and present 
their results in different literary formats. Scheerbart chooses, or happens to use, the book—in 
addition to his concrete, material experiments—as a medium for his meditation on technological 
change, whereas Roth finds a forum for his technographic reflections in the newspaper feuilletons. 
Scheerbart, on the one hand, publishes the written results of that meditation in one unity, in the 
form of a more or less coherent and consecutive collection of diary notes. Roth, on the other hand, 
over the years issues a whole series of small vignettes, each dealing with a different instance of 
technological change. And yet, I argue that despite these medial and formal-generic differences, the 
two authors try to tackle one and the same problem: that radical technological change can no longer 
be narrated in the linear, teleological, and deontological form of progress. 
In this sense, I read Roth’s technographic feuilleton as both a portrayal of his time and as a 
literary reflection on the changing experience of modern temporality itself. Such a reading finds 
confirmation in the author’s own words when he tried elucidating the deeper purpose of his 
journalistic activity to his editor Benno Reifenberg with the slogan: “I draw the face of time.” 
In view of radical technological and societal changes in his day, Roth appropriates the 
feuilleton as a medial platform allowing for reflection of temporal phenomena. With his 
technographic (and other) vignettes, he develops the bottom section of the newspaper page ‘below 
 247 
the line’ to its full potential as a counterpoint to day-to-day news reporting.354 On an epistemological 
level, these small texts also fill a niche left by literary fiction on the one hand and scientific 
knowledge on the other hand. Within this medial framework, Roth published micro-narratives that 
depict change in nuce as to a ‘before’ and an ‘after.’ He thus set his own narrative form of journalistic 
writing against the threat conventional storytelling faces in the dawning information age as Walter 
Benjamin described it around the same time. Roth’s feuilleton not only bears witness of the waning 
binding powers of progress as the grand narrative to integrate the onslaught of overturning 
inventions, innovations, and news. But each of the little technographic texts also constitutes another 
attempt at finding new forms of narrating such change—beyond the linear, normative, and 
voluntaristic premises of progress. By narrating how new technologies and technology-induced 
transformations emerge Roth depicts not only the radical changes determining his time. But he also 
captures how the experience of time and temporality itself change along with these transformations. 
In this sense, I read his technographic feuilleton as a continuation of the Enlightenment becoming 
aware that its own temporal foundations—progress and its assumptions concerning teleology, 
normativity, and anthropocentrism—are in a process of erosion. Roth’s micro-narratives explore 
how modern technology can be grasped and accounted as a partly trans-human, non-voluntary, and 
non-linear process of change, and without assessing it in moral categories of good or evil. 
This reading lead me to divide Roth’s technographic feuilleton into three strands, which do 
not correspond to a linear development of the author’s view from progressive technological 
optimism to reactionary Luddism. Those strands rather stand for key aspects covered by Roth’s tech 
journalism, showing how it tackles phenomena of change from different angles. Each strand, and 
                                                   
354 They also fill an epistemological niche left by literary fiction on the one hand and scientific knowledge on the other 
hand. 
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each of the texts in its own way, takes different manifestations of technological change as a 
provocation to invent new forms of narration. 
Roth’s 1936 lecture “Glauben und Fortschritt,” then, differs clearly from the author’s work 
for the feuilleton even though it includes a continuation of their critical take on technological 
progress, and progress at large. In the lecture, Roth takes on the role of a politically committed 
novelist, while leaving his long-term journalistic work unmentioned. In light of the devastating turn 
of events at his time—the rise of fascism and National Socialism in Europe—the lecture reverts to a 
more humanistic and moralistic critique of progress. Under the impression of heightened 
humanitarian urgency, Roth abandons the project of understanding technological change as a 
transformation with trans-human agency, although he does not refute its validity.355 
3. Theoretical Yield of the Case Studies 
The three case studies constituting this dissertation have shown that Robert Walser, Paul 
Scheerbart, and Joseph Roth share one central insight as is manifested in their literary depictions of 
technology. All three authors recognize technological change as a problem concerning the 
narratological condition of their time. Their texts about technology bespeak a profound awareness 
that the momentum which technology change has acquired directly affects the task they prescribe to 
their writing, as well as to literature as such. With their project of linking a critical engagement with 
reality with an innovative approach to fiction they can take their cues from the tradition of realism 
and naturalism, primarily in the form given to it by Balzac and Zola.356 This tradition deploys fiction 
                                                   
355 A similar project would later be taken up by cybernetics, albeit with a slightly less critical take on the idea, or ideology, 
of progress (Hörl 2008). 
356 Zola’s Roman expérimental, for instance, is the attempt at re-inventing literary fiction by orienting it at empirical 
science as exemplified by Claude Bernard’s experimental physiology.  
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as an experimental setup for investigating the principles of human society understood as a structure 
and process of human interaction. 
Walser, Scheerbart, and Roth, however, go a decisive step further. Their technographic 
literature bespeaks not only the awareness that progress is an idea central to the modern notion of 
history. But it also suggests that progress has come under suspicion of being an ideology that has 
inscribed itself into the very form of narrative literature. In other words, these texts are indicators of 
a rising skepticism concerning progress both as a basic concept of history and as a narrative form of 
coherence to understand the relation of humans and technology.357 
Walser, Scheerbart, and Roth perpetuated a surge of progress criticism around 1900, which 
can be contextualized within a shift of modern societies described by some sociologists as a shift 
toward functional differentiation.358 The sociological notion of functional differentiation defies any 
paradigm of progress made and experienced by humanity as a whole. What is progressing is rather 
the ever-increasing differentiation of the single subsystems of society among each other, and of each 
subsystem in its own right.359. Niklas Luhmann draws the consistent conclusion from this doctrine 
of differentiation by erasing any notion of social actors or action from the basic design of his theory. 
                                                   
357 With this skepticism in mind, the discussed texts deserve a place within a greater line of techno-historical thought in 
the vein of Walter Benjamin, Gilbert Simondon and more recently Bruno Latour or Bernard Stiegler. These theorists are 
united in the endeavor of making modern technology graspable as a process of change beyond the teleological, 
normative, and anthropocentric premises of progress. If we extend the scope toward critical reflections on the idea of 
progress at large, the names of Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Kraus, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber could be added to this 
list. In other words, the conceptual work of these authors approaches from a theoretical angle similar problems as Walser, 
Scheerbart, and Roth tackle in rather concrete ways in the form of literary fiction and non-fiction. 
358 The theory of social differentiation was first formulated by Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel (Hess 2001, 36–49) 
on the eve of the twentieth century, and it was further developed later on in the twentieth century by Talcott Parsons 
and Niklas Luhmann, among others. 
359  Luhmann already views the classical sociological theories (Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, among others) as a 
consequence of a waining faith in progress: “Man hat das Ende des Fortschrittsvertrauens zu akzeptieren und ersetzt die 
Annahme einer bei allen Kosten positiven Entwicklung durch strukturelle Analysen, vor allem durch Analysen der 
sozialen Differenzierung, der Organisationsabhängigkeiten, der Rollenstrukturen.” (Luhmann 1998, 19). Within this 
general theoretical framework, action and agency (German ‘Handeln’ or ‘Handlung’) are explained as attribution 
(German ‘Zurechnung’) of certain communicative operations to persons by an observer (Heidenescher 1992). 
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Instead of viewing society as a process consisting of actions (social theory as a theory of social action), 
he suggests that it henceforth be understood as a process consisting of communicative operations or 
events (Luhmann 1998, 608).360 By abstracting social processes—i.e. society—from the traditional 
contexts of (human) practice, Luhmann’s theory complicates the view on questions of agency, and 
hence blocks off the path towards productive interventions in the course of history. Partly resulting 
from this, the systems theory of social differentiation largely fails to problematize the relation 
between humans and technology. Any practical or political behavior based on such a theory will have 
to simply accept advancing technization as a necessary and irreversible development, i.e. its decisions 
will always be of a more or less technocratic nature. 
The pragmatic deadlock consisting in this technocratic mindset bespeaks that the problem of 
modern technology is always at the same time a problem of agency—a problem that takes center 
stage in a narratological framework. A narratology of technological change deepens our 
understanding of agency and its constructedness, with an aim to understand the challenges modern 
technology poses, and to fully seize the potentials it provides. This intuition has informed the 
present dissertation regarding its theoretical footing as well as the analyses of the discussed texts. The 
three above chapters helped explore its heuristic horizon. To conclude, I will briefly contextualize the 
                                                   
360 This consequential choice regarding the design of Luhmann’s social theory comes with a great gain in terms of its 
descriptive acuteness and complexity. However, it also comes with two major drawbacks. The first consists in systems 
theory’s own technomorphisms manifested on the one hand in its technical terminology and on the other hand in the 
unquestioned assumption that modern temporality is constituted by irreversible functional differentiation. While the 
proponents of systems theory try to sell these technomorphisms as a productive reduction of complexity and an 
achievement in abstraction (German ‘Abstraktionsleistung’), this ‘Systemglaube’ cannot conceal that technical language 
and systemic functionalism always means to barter a gain of inclusion for an equal increase of exclusion. This is to say 
that such epistemological operations do facilitate communication among experts, but they also alienate this discourse 
from the non-expert parts of society. The second drawback of systems theory since Luhmann lies in the consequences it 
draws from the diagnosis of a “falsch gewählter Anthropozentrismus” or “wrongly chosen anthropocentrism” (Luhmann 
1991, 141) inherent to classic social theories. Luhmann shares this assessment of a false anthropocentrism in traditional 
theories with Michel Foucault, who concludes his archeology of the human sciences The Order of Things with the 
prognosis “that man would [eventually] be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.” (Foucault 2004, 422). 
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observations made in the close readings of the literary narratives within current debates about the 
notion progress on the one hand, and about the practical dealing with technological innovation on 
the other. 
Questions regarding the agentic implications of technology become increasingly pressing 
today as technological systems and structures diffuse ever deeper into the fabric of our individual and 
collective decision making, as well as into the complex processes of subject formation and self-
determination. Emerging technologies are integrating us in practices of user profiling, addressing us 
through screened consumer identities, monitoring us by means of market demand anticipation, 
making us providers and clients in sharing economies, and they seem to be enclosing us in filter 
bubbles. All these relatively recent phenomena suggest that we are witnessing a deep transformation 
of the relationship between individual and society. The transformation would not just be 
unthinkable without innovative technologies and a growing trend of integrating them into the 
practices of business, politics, and communication in general. It also shows that questions of 
technology and agency remain largely unanswered, and as open questions they cast widespread social 
anxieties and general uncertainties regarding the future. 
It is obvious, but not stressed often enough, that the field of literary studies would have a lot 
to say about the described developments. Fiction, for instance, plays a central role in those practices, 
which shows not only in the surge of fantasy and science fiction, of conspiracy theories and of fake 
news. But it also manifests itself in a plethora of user names, profiles, virtual addresses, characters, 
and chat bots that we use to participate in the global exchange of information and commodities. 
Classic sociology has bracketed the conundrum of technology and agency by understanding 
social actors principally as emergent: Instead of integrating them within causal or teleological lines 
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where they would appear as either agents (subjects) or ‘sufferers’ (objects) of a historical process, 
sociology from Durkheim to Luhmann describes social actors as emerging from a whole of 
concomitant factors. This theoretical choice has ensured that (human) actors and technological 
entities have appeared more comparable than an ontology of tools and users would allow.361 But at 
the same time, it has prevented sociologists from problematizing their mutual dependencies. And 
there have been only a few exceptions in social theory that have developed a deeper understanding of 
the relation between technology and agency.362 The epistemic framework of this dissertation differs 
clearly from classic sociology in that it highlights the mutual dependency between the problems of 
technology and of agency by virtue of viewing it through the lens of narratology. Through this lens, 
modern technology appears always already as a process of change that becomes addressable in the 
first place by its construal in historical or literary narratives. This framework allowed for an analysis 
of the single texts as literary confrontations with the same narratological and poetological problem. 
We can assume that technological change appeared to the authors as an open-ended, discontinuous, 
and yet seemingly deterministic historical process. If so, their texts are literary attempts at reconciling 
this historical situation with ideas of agency and possible human intervention. Considering the 
narrow and selective scope of the three case studies, this dissertation cannot claim to provide a 
comprehensive discussion of the posed questions concerning technology and agency, nor does it 
intend to. However, the case studies highlight—as forays into an envisioned narratology of 
technological change—and employ what differentiates literary studies. They are intended to 
exemplify how this academic field could make significant contributions to trans-disciplinary debates 
                                                   
361 “Die Rekonstruktion einiger Wegbereiter und Klassiker der Soziologie (Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Mead) hinsichtlich 
der Konzeption von Technik und Akteur soll zeigen, dass es insbesondere dem Verständnis von sozialen Akteuren als 
soziale Emergenz und deren Verhältnis zum Subjektbegriff geschuldet ist, dass diese der Technik eine den Akteuren 
ebenbürtigen Platz zuweisen konnten.” (Compagna 2015, 28). 
362 One quite successful example of overcoming this neglect is Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. 
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about technological change. Positioned in such a way, literary studies could benefit from the fact 
that its subject matters are more often idiosyncratic exceptions than familiar canon.  
Broadly speaking, modernity has popularized two main strands in conceiving of the relation 
between technological change and agency; the literary texts discussed in this dissertation stand out 
for not belonging to either of them. The first of those two strands centers its narratives on human 
agency. This generally amounts to narrative constructions affirmative of progress, viewing history as 
a set of accumulative endeavors that lead to an increasing emancipation of humans, or else an ever-
greater mastery of humanity over nature.363 The second strand, in contrast, centers its historical 
construction on technological agency, or else on a perceived lack of human freedom. It favors 
narratives within which machines, or the technological apparatus, take over the helm in the story, or 
of history at large, often resulting in scenarios of ‘autonomous technology’ (Winner 1977; Winner 
2002). Examples of this strand are legion in romanticist and science fiction literature. But at least 
since the early twentieth century, some theories of history show this tendency as well; think for 
instance of Ludwig Klages’ Mensch und Erde, Friedrich Georg Jünger’s Perfektion der Technik,364 or 
of the technology criticism in the vein of dialectical materialism carried out by the early Frankfurt 
School, such as Herbert Marcuse’s 1941 essay Some Social Implications of Modern Technology 
(Marcuse 1982). 
                                                   
363 Well-known examples may be found in Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum Scientiarum, in Whig history à la Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, or in modern popular histories and theories of technology, such as Dyson’s Turing’s Cathedral 
(2012), or Ray Kurzweil’s The Singularity is Near (2005), the latter of which already hints at the following category. 
Ernst Kapp’s Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877) certainly constitutes a special form of this first strand, as it 
leaves man in the protagonist position in a historical construction whose subject is technology understood as an 
objectifying projection of man himself. 
364 Jünger even makes explicit that such a view of modern technology ultimately ascribes to it demonic qualities: “Die 
technische Ratio selbst, die als ein Zusammenspiel des kausalen und des teleologischen Denkens erkannt werden muss, 
ist das Einfallstor des Dämonischen.” (Friedrich Georg Jünger, Die Perfektion der Technik, quoted in Elmar Schenkel, 
Geisterzüge. Über Technik, Spuk und Fortschritt) (Schenkel 2008, 282). 
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These two main strands inform the historical and narratological construal of technological 
change. They are roughly in line with another basic dichotomy determining modern historical 
thought, namely the mutual dependency between social and technological progress. Theories and 
narratives belonging to the first strand view technological progress in an instrumental relation to 
social progress. Examples of the second strand, in contrast, either ascertain a reversal of this relation, 
view it as obstructive rather than instrumental, or deny any significant relation between social and 
technological progress altogether.365 
Rather than weaving themselves into either of these strands, Walser, Scheerbart, and Roth’s 
texts bear witness to the insight that the basic dichotomies of agent versus sufferer, or agent versus 
tool, do not do justice to the technological condition of modern existence.366 If the grand récit of 
progress appeared as a total social fact (Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss) or as a ‘narrative resistant to 
falsification,’367 the discussed texts provide concrete approaches to contesting and potentially to 
overcoming it. At the turn of the twentieth century, the idea of progress was increasingly challenged 
                                                   
365 Under slightly changed theoretical premises, we could interpret the dichotomy of agency and determinism in view of 
technological change as an instance of the modern paradox of contingency and necessity (Müller 2016, “‘Danton’s Tod’. 
Eine Relektüre,” 178). The discussed technographic texts would then be examples of literary “Kontingenzbewältigung” 
(Koschorke 2012, 11). This theoretical framework, however, generally emphasizes aspects of ‘Gewalt’ or ‘force’ of 
history: Büchner’s ‘gräßlicher Fatalismus’ (Müller 2016, “‘Danton’s Tod’. Eine Relektüre,” 178), while questions of 
agency and possible intervention recede into the background. 
366 The narration in Der Gehülfe focalizes on the space between the two main characters while the ostensible opposition 
between human intelligence and instrumental technology results in an aporia rather than being resolved; Scheerbart’s 
Perpetuum mobile casts doubts not only at the voluntaristic nature of invention, but also at the teleological, linear, 
cumulative, and anthropocentric nature of modern history; and Roth’s technographic feuilleton presents modern 
technology as a multifarious, emergent, and ubiquitous process, which increasingly permeates human existence, and 
which often transcends human intentions. 
367 Albrecht Koschorke describes such narratives as “falsifikationsresistent” or “resistant to falsification” whose validity 
cannot be openly refuted even by facts. Such narratives, according to Koschorke, model “das Wissen und das Nicht-
Wissen einer Gesellschaft gleichermaßen” or “a society’s knowledge and non-knowledge alike” (Koschorke 2010, 100). 
Historical progress—and technological progress in particular—largely fulfills the criteria of such a resistant narrative. 
Even if its validity has repeatedly been questioned, it could never be refuted by factual observations. 
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in its validity by the likes of Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Kraus.368 But to the extent that as a grand 
narrative it was resistant to falsification, its normative claims also defied moral evaluation.369 As a 
result, it is virtually impossible to contest social movements as well as civilizational agendas so long as 
they can lay credible claim on their own progressive character. This ‘aporia of progress’ still serves as 
a knockout argument to help propagate unpopular changes in the world of business or politics, even 
though progress has been largely banished from theoretical discourse as a universal idea informing 
the shared understanding of history. The technographic texts by Walser, Scheerbart, and Roth point 
beyond this aporia of progress in that they do not make statements of an evaluative nature 
altogether. Neither do they state clearly whether or not technological change should actually be 
described as progress. Nor do they assess that change decidedly as either beneficial or harmful to 
humanity. 
The observations made with regard to the discussed texts do not aim solely at advancing the 
knowledge and methodology specific to the field of literary studies. With the analysis of 
ideosyncratic literary texts, I have adumbrated a narratology of technological change to be elaborated 
in the future. Such a narratological engagement with technological change could make significant 
                                                   
368 Nietzsche denied the notion of progress any validity by dismissing it as a modern, and hence false, idea: “Die 
Menschheit stellt nicht eine Entwicklung zum Besseren oder Stärkeren oder Höheren dar, in der Weise, wie dies heute 
gegalubt wird. Der “Fortschritt” ist bloss eine moderne Idee, das heisst eine falsche Idee.” (Nietzsche 1999, 171). Kraus 
derides it as a pure invention, whose impact and value consist solely in the fact that humanity believes in it: “Der 
Fortschritt aber ist schon deshalb eine der sinnreichsten Erfindungen, die ihr [humanity] je gelungen sind, weil zu 
seinem Betrieb nur der Glaube notwendig ist, und so haben jene Vertreter des Fortschritts gewonnenes Spiel, die einen 
unbeschränkten Kredit in Anspruch nehmen.” (Kraus 1918, 307). 
369 Friedrich Nietzsche tried circumventing this aporia by virtue of his philosophy of the future ‘beyond good and evil.’ 
Harro Müller describes this philosophy as a post-metaphysical confrontation with the following dilemma or paradox: 
“Wie gehe ich damit um, dass ich ein singuläres, individuelles, einzigartiges Lebewesen und zugleich universales, 
allgemeines, gemeines Herdentier bin? Da gibt es logisch keine Lösung, sondern immer wieder anders ausfallende 
prekäre Entparadoxierungen, welche die Praktik Schreiben erzeugen muss.” (Müller 2016, “Taubenfüße und 
Adlerkrallen. Friedrich Nietzsches Sprach- und Stilkonzeption,” 28). If the Enlightenment notion of progress had been 
the common approach of resolving this paradox between individual and species, we could understand the technographic 
writing practice of Scheerbart, Walser, and Roth as attempts at tackling the paradox after Nietzsche. 
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contributions to debates about technology, the notion of progress, the Singularity, and about the 
Anthropocene, which each transcends the confines of single academic disciplines. 
Recent years have seen attempts at rehabilitating ‘progress’ as a fundamental concept of 
philosophy and historical thought after the word had seemed to have widely disappeared from the 
academic scenery in the wake of postmodernism370 and post-colonialist theory,371 at least as an 
affirmative concept. In the growing variety of returns to progress we can distinguish two principal 
approaches. The first one asserts a need for reintroducing the idea of social and moral progress.372 The 
second approach views notions of technical and scientific progress as indispensible for a critical and 
productive engagement with a changing reality.373 Each of these two approaches comes with its own 
                                                   
370 Think notably of Jean-François Lyotard’s theorem of the end of ‘grand narratives’ as the hallmark of what he labeled 
the ‘postmodern condition’ (La condition postmoderne, 1979). 
371 Postcolonialist theorists such as Gurminder Bhambra, Anibal Quijano, and Susan Buck-Morrs have rightly argued 
that the Enlightenment notion of progress comes with the distortions of Eurocentrism: “The progressive reading of 
history that views European modernity as developmentally more advanced than premodern cultures or societies also 
relies on a highly selective reading of Europe’s own history, a reading that ignores the extent to which the distinctively 
European form of modernity that Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers valued so highly was a product not of Europe 
alone but of Europe’s interaction with the non-West.” (Allen 2016, 17). 
372 Some leading representatives of Frankfurt School critical theory, Rahel Jaeggi and Axel Honneth, have put forward 
‘transcendental’ reasons to rehabilitate notions of ‘moral progress.’ They ascertain that such a rehabilitation is necessary 
for a meaningful engagement with history—by understanding it as a learning process—, to avoid relativism, and 
ultimately as a condition of possibility of meaningful political action. With this premise, Jaeggi and Honneth identify the 
main problem of the conventional notion of progress in its normative claims that always have a tendency toward Whig 
history (German ‘Siegergeschichte’) while hampering a truly critical engagement with the status quo. They attempt to 
overcome this conundrum by replacing the normative way of thinking with a ‘normativistic’ approach of ‘immanent 
critique,’ which in their mind allows for a truly critical engagement with history and the societal status quo. (Honneth 
2007; Honneth 2015; Allen, Jaeggi, and Redecker 2016). 
The mentioned representatives of Frankfurt School critical theory try rehabilitating progress as a paradigm of social 
change and ultimately with political goals in mind. These aproaches assert progress in an emphatic sense with strong 
anthropocentic and ethical presuppositions. 
373 On the one hand, such attempts factor in the perceived—and virtually undeniable—achievements of modern science 
and technology. On the other hand they take into account the problems such ‘signs of progress’ bring about both in a 
theoretical sense (i.e. epistemological and ethical), and in the practical dimension, i.e. the limits of growth and the—
unintended or harmful—ecological and societal consequences. Such approaches favor a less emphatic notion of progress 
that diminishes claims of simple linearity and normativity usually implied by the idea (Zimmerli 1990). 
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epistemological and pragmatic problems; and neither of the two sufficiently tackles questions about 
modern technological change and agency.374 
The recent return of ‘progress’ into academic debates recalls that—despite all criticism—the 
notion has perhaps been the most powerful idea construing the entirety of human life into the 
narratological unit of universal history. And even though it has been harshly contested, ‘progress’ has 
largely been without competition of alternative concepts for a while as the guiding paradigm to 
conceive of global change in the sense of universal history. In recent years, however, the demand for 
a unifying view of humanity’s actions and fate has been on the rise, as climate change, globalization, 
and emerging technologies have increasingly been considered threats to the very existence of the 
human species, as we know it. And ‘progress’ appears as a less than unsatisfactory choice to construe 
these unsettling developments. 
In view of this crisis concerning humanity’s place in the world, there is one notion that 
certainly fulfills the criteria of a true competitor to the idea of progress: the notion that we are 
entering a fundamentally anthropogenic epoch, dubbed the ‘Anthropocene.’375 Theories that have 
appeared under this label allow for a critical engagement with current reality by taking into account 
                                                   
374 Aside from the two above-mentioned approaches toward a rehabilitation of the idea of progress, there has been yet 
another attempt at reintroducing the concept into philosophical debates, proposed by the Finnish philosopher Georg 
Henrik von Wright and later revived by the French philosopher Jacques Bouveresse: “Von Wright emphasizes that ‘To 
abandon belief in progress as a historical necessity is not to abandon work for progress as a task’ (TK, 227); but this task 
is today essentially critical. The belief in progress, when it takes on the aspect of a myth, is precisely what dispenses us 
most of the time from demanding and actualizing real progress.” (Bouveresse 2011). This approach can take its cue from 
Adorno, who suggested that ‘progress may in fact occur where it ends’ (Adorno 1964, 37). But it will always have to 
confront itself with the question of whether, from that critical standpoint, what is asserted to be progress should really 
still be called progress, and not simply change. 
375 Since it was first introduced to the scientific community by the atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, the idea of the 
‘Anthropocene’ has undergone a spectacular career. Within just a few years, it has turned from a suggested 
geochronological term into a transdisciplinary category, linking geological observations with questions of political theory 
and universal history. Decisively broadening the semantic scope of Crutzen’s original coinage, the historian and 
postcolonial theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests a “new universal history of humans” (Chakrabarty 2009, 221) in view 
of the “planetary crisis of climate change or global warming” (Chakrabarty 2009, 197). Chakrabarty sets the tone for a 
“dual approach” to the radical changes observed at the present age, by “linking a critique of capitalist globalization to a 
longer history of humans as a species” (Davies 2016, 50). 
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processes that transcend the scope of human will. And yet the notion of the Anthropocene may open 
up new horizons of human agency in an attempt at tackling the problems posed. Like progress, the 
anthropocene points toward a universal history of humans; But unlike progress, the anthropocene 
addresses history not as the intended pursuit of human emancipation and empowerment, but as the 
“unintended consequence of human choices” (Chakrabarty 2009, 210). Aside from some unresolved 
epistemological problems,376 theories of the anthropocene come with two rather practical drawbacks: 
firstly, they generally reduce the current crisis to the ecological shift (climate change) while paying 
less attention to radical changes in media and bio-technologies; secondly, proponents of the 
anthropocene see themselves confronted with a dire baseline for political action. The rather 
disenchanting assessment of the historical and environmental situation makes it difficult to conceive 
a positive political agenda or vision. Where the theoretical insights around the anthropocene make 
their way into policymaking, the options often range between crisis management and damage 
control on the one hand, or maximization of ecological efficiency—a push toward greater 
sustainability—on the other. 
The other end of the spectrum is marked by theories and agendas propagating a so-called 
‘proactionary principle.’ In attempt at overcoming the old political left-right opposition, proponents 
of that principle suggest distinguishing between “precautionary versus proactionary attitudes towards 
risk as principles of policymaking” (Fuller and Lipinska 2014, 25). The precautionary approach 
                                                   
376 The most vexed of these problems is that the Anthropocene paradigm comes with its own observer’s paradox. 
Theories of a human geological epoch generally imply a tricky epistemological setting which could be called the 
conundrum of posthumanism: “The positing of an anthropocene era (or the idea that the human species will have 
marked the planet to such a degree that we will be discernible as a geological strata) deploys the idea of human 
imaging—the way we have already read an inhuman past in the earth’s layers—but does this by imagining a world in 
which humans will be extinct. The anthropocene thought experiment also alters the modality of geological reading, not 
just to refer to the past as it is for us, but also to our present as it will be without us.” (Colebrook 2014, 28) 
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prescribes preventive and protective action where possible risks have been identified.377 Advocates of 
the proactionary principle view the precautionary approach as an established political practice 
obstructing progress and innovation (More 2004). What the proactionaries propagate instead is a 
risk-taking approach to technological change, placing the onus of proof on the side who is pleading 
that a given innovation involves non-justifiable risks. Their ‘principle’ may appear as simply a more 
risk-friendly approach to political action. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out to be the 
cornerstone of an uncritical ideology, combining a blind faith in progress with an overreaching 
anthropocentrism. In their own words 
[t]o be proactionary is, in the first instance, to identify with this progressive historical narrative, which in the 
secular West has been known mainly as ‘Enlightenment’ but in our own day is expressed as the drive to ‘human 
enhancement’. (Fuller and Lipinska 2014, 129) 
The proactionaries’ disregard of the lessons of history and their unconditional enthusiasm for the 
‘transhuman’ disqualify their doctrines from being a valid theoretical foundation for a critical 
engagement with technological change. In view of their increasing rise to power at least in the 
corporate sphere we could ask ourselves which prospect is actually the more scary one: the 
unintended consequences of human behavior described by theories of the anthropocene, or the 
intended transhumanist scenarios of enhancement in the sense of ‘humanity 2.0’ propagated by 
proactionary theorists and deciders.378 
Motivated by the outlined debates, this dissertation is an attempt at approaching the 
problem of technological change from the standpoint of narrative theory. The literary texts discussed 
                                                   
377 “The precautionary principle—broadly stated, the idea that where possible risks to the environment and public health 
have been identified, action should be taken instead of waiting for conclusive evidence of a causal relationship—emerged 
from a recognition that clear evidence of threats cannot always be obtained before damage occurs.” (Holdway 2008, 38). 
378 The fact that the proactionaries cite “Nietzsche’s Zarathustrian maxim: ‘What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger’” 
(Fuller and Lipinska 2014, 25) as a positive confirmation of their own principles certainly does not make their agenda 
seem any more trustworthy. 
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imaginatively deal with the question of how and where technological change is brought about, and 
by whom or by what kind of agent. From within their historical context, the discussed authors raise 
the question of how agency is possible or conceivable in view of historical change, which presents 
itself as inexorable and at the same time as increasingly discontinuous. Through innovative narrative 
forms, Walser, Scheerbart, and Roth explore how radical changes of reality associated with 
technology can be captured as new ways of making sense of the temporality of that changing reality. 
With their disruptive narrative approaches, they also debunk conventional narratives of technological 
progress as ideology formations within our understanding of history. 
If the period around 1900 has been hypothetically described as a ‘zweite Sattelzeit’ or ‘second 
saddle time,’ the discussed texts could serve as examples proving this historical hypothesis.379 They 
contest ‘progress’ as a persuasive narrative to make sense of technological change by exploring 
alternative forms of narration. The first ‘Sattelzeit’ or ‘saddle time,’ as Reinhart Koselleck 
suggested380, had established ‘progress,’ among other notions, as a basic concept in the semantic 
inventory of historical thought. At the entrance to the twentieth century, this semantic inventory 
                                                   
379 Drawing upon Koselleck’s original coinage of “Sattelzeit” around 1800, some historians and cultural theorists in the 
German-speaking realm have introduced the notion of a “zweite Sattelzeit” into debates about radical transformations 
around 1900: “Insgesamt kann mit Blick auf die Entstehung neuer politisch-sozialer Beschreibungsbegriffe und 
Bewegungen […] für die Jahre zwischen der Gründung des Deutschen Reichs und dem Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs von 
einer ‘Zweiten Sattelzeit’ sprechen: Hatte die erste Sattelzeit von etwa 1750 bis 1850 eine Umwälzung der gesamten 
sozialen Sprache und des damit verbundenen Denkens gebracht, in deren Verlauf und als deren Folge sich die moderne 
Geschichtswissenschaft formiert hatte, so wurde das moderne Denken in der zweiten Sattelzeit zwischen etwa 1870 und 
1920 noch einmal grundlegend verändert, vor allem indem seine Basis nicht mehr auf idealistischen Begriffen beruhte, 
sondern auf materialistischen.” (Jordan 2013, 67–8). 
380 Koselleck introduces the concept of “Sattelzeit” as part of a heuristic reflection in the introduction to his historical 
dictionary Historische Grundbegriffe: “Der heuristische Vorgriff der Lexikonarbeit besteht in der Vermutung, daß sich seit 
der Mitte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts ein tiefgreifender Bedeutungswandel klassischer topoi vollzogen, daß alte Worte 
neue Sinngehalte gewonnen haben, die mit Annäherung an unsere Gegenwart keiner Übersetzung mehr bedürftig sind. 
Der heuristische Vorgriff führt sozusagen eine ‘Sattelzeit’ ein, in der sich die Herkunft zu unserer Präsenz wandelt. 
Entsprechende Begriffe tragen ein Janusgesicht: rückwärtsgewandt meinen sie soziale und politische Sachverhalte, die uns 
ohne kritischen Kommentar nicht mehr verständlich sind, vorwärts und uns zugewandt habe sie Bedeutungen 
gewonnen, die zwar erläutert werden können, die aber auch unmittelbar verständlich zu sein scheinen. Begrifflichkeit 
und Begreifbarkeit fallen seitdem für uns zusammen.” (Koselleck 1972, XV). 
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appears to have lost some of its persuasive power. If the Enlightenment notion of progress no longer 
holds as a basic concept of history, the question remains what could take its place. The literary texts 
discussed in this dissertation may not provide a full-grown answer, but they certainly stake out the 
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